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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis is a study of the politics of identity of Indonesian university students 
(mahasiswa) under Suharto’s New Order.  It focuses on the period between 1973 and 
1988 and on the period between 1989, when Indonesia entered a limited period of 
openness (keterbukaan), and the fall of Suharto in 1998.   
 
The study is grounded in theories about the relationship between language and power 
and in a method of textual analysis based on critical discourse analysis.  Through the 
application of critical discourse analysis to a number of key state and student texts, the 
study provides an insight into the linguistic techniques the New Order employed in 
producing particular ways of thinking and speaking (discourses) about students’ roles 
and identities.  These discourses aimed to regulate how students were able to act in their 
capacity as students.  It is also concerned with the ways in which students challenged 
the discourses of the New Order state by producing their own, alternative ways of 
thinking and speaking about their roles and identities.   
 
Two state texts form the basis for the analysis in chapters three and five.  These are the 
New Order’s ‘official’ national history, the Sejarah Nasional Indonesia, and a magazine 
published by the Department of Education and Culture from the late 1970s to the 1980s.  
The student texts analysed in chapters four and six comprise influential student 
newspapers and magazines published on campuses in Yogyakarta, Jakarta and Bandung 
during the mid to late 1970s and the 1990s.   
 
As this study shows, the state employed strategies and techniques which aimed to 
incorporate students into the state itself by modifying their behaviour in ways which 
were consistent with its needs and interests.  And while students’ resistance was to 
some extent constrained by the limits set by the state, they also retained a significant 
capacity to exercise power on their own account.  Indeed, students were only able to 
resist the state and its practices because they did so from within the parameters the state 
had defined for dissent.   
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bapak father. 
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methodological approach to the analysis of language and 
its relationship to social and political power; combines 
linguistic methods of analysis with social and political 
theory. 
CGMI Consentrasi Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia, 
Concentration of Indonesian Student Movements, the 
communist party affiliated student organisation of the 
1960s. 
cukong Chinese conglomerates. 
demokratisasi democratisation. 
dewan mahasiswa student council, the main student representative body 
prior to introduction of BKK policy. 
discourse  an abstract system of ‘rules’ which determine what can be 
said about a particular topic and how, when, by whom and 
to whom it can be said; a way of speaking and thinking 
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mahasiswa university student.  
Malari Malapetaka Limabelas Januari, the Fifteenth of January 
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pembangunan development. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
 
In early 1998, a series of significant events took place in Indonesia.  Prompted by price 
rises and worsening economic conditions, Indonesian university students began taking 
to the streets.  As tensions grew, students clashed with the security forces, who fired 
rubber bullets and used tear gas against demonstrators.  Then on 12 May at Jakarta’s 
prestigious Trisakti University four students were shot.  The shooting triggered several 
days of rioting in which buildings, vehicles and homes were burned and up to 1000 
people were killed.  On 18 May, students occupied the parliament building.  Three days 
later, on 21 May, Suharto resigned.  The images on the news showed jubilant and 
tearful Indonesian students celebrating Suharto’s resignation. 
 
As I followed these events, I was struck by the power of Indonesia’s students as a 
political force.  The student demonstrations of 1966 and 1998 were a significant (and 
very visible) factor in two leadership transitions. In fact, Indonesian students enjoy an 
almost legendary status, which dates back to the very beginnings of Indonesia’s modern 
history as a nation-state.  This status is celebrated in the prolific literature on pemuda 
(youth) and mahasiswa (university students) which documents their historical and 
contemporary role in Indonesian politics and society.  Yet ironically, under Suharto’s 
New Order regime (1966-1998) students were subject to various forms of physical 
repression, from intimidation to imprisonment and kidnappings.   
 
I wanted to be able to explain this apparent contradiction.  Why were Indonesian 
students both celebrated and maligned by the New Order?  What had motivated them to 
take to the streets in 1998 as well as at various other times?  As I delved into this topic, 
I began to think about questions of identity, and the ways in which the historical 
tradition of student activism, together with the relations of power which existed during 
the New Order, had shaped both the state’s approach to students and the character of 
student dissent.  Official histories celebrating the role of pemuda presented a stylised 
version of passionate nationalist youth struggling to improve the lot of the Indonesian 
people and rid the nation of its colonial oppressors and, later, of the communist scourge.  
At the same time, the government’s policy and the approach of the security apparatus to 
student activism was designed to prevent contemporary pemuda and mahasiswa from 
 1
 acting out these roles.  Student activism was seen as a threat to the stability and order so 
prized by the regime.  Yet it was students’ understandings of their historical roles, and 
their reactions to the New Order’s policy approach, which led them to demonstrate in 
protest against it. 
 
This thesis is a study of the politics of identity of Indonesian university students 
(mahasiswa) under Suharto’s New Order.  It focuses on the period between 1973 and 
1988 - the height of the New Order - and on the period between 1989, when Indonesia 
entered a limited period of openness (keterbukaan), and the fall of Suharto in 1998 (see 
Aspinall 2000; Bertrand 1996; Lane 1991).  The central question which this thesis asks 
is: how did the relations of power between students and the state and, more generally, 
between the state and wider society under the New Order, shape the ways both students 
and the New Order state represented students’ roles and identities?  It also addresses the 
secondary question of what effect these representations had on the terms in which 
students were able to think and speak about their roles and identities and hence on how 
they were able to act in their capacity as students.  
 
The study is grounded in theories about the relationship between language and power 
and in a method of textual analysis based on critical discourse analysis.  Through the 
application of linguistic methods of analysis to a number of key texts, the study 
provides an insight into the linguistic strategies used by the state to attempt to regulate 
how students were able to act.  By producing particular ways of thinking and speaking - 
or discourses - about students’ roles and identities, the New Order’s aim was to 
construct a version of reality which would enable it to maintain the status quo, in 
particular, the asymmetrical relations of power between the state and wider society.  For 
students, this meant acceptance of a depoliticised and development-oriented mahasiswa 
identity, one in which they were expected to fulfil the roles assigned to them in the 
‘organic state’. 
 
The view of power on which this thesis is based draws on Foucault’s work on the nature 
of power and the techniques of government.  In Foucault’s view, power is not an object 
or an entity but a complex set of strategic relations which aims to regulate the behaviour 
of others by determining the parameters within which they are able to act (Barker 1998, 
27 and 38; see also chapter one).  This view of power is captured in the notion of 
governmentality which describes the ‘strategies, programmes, calculations, techniques, 
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 apparatuses, documents and procedures through which authorities seek to embody and 
give effect to governmental ambitions’ (Philpott 2000, 149).  Governmentality is also 
concerned with how individuals govern themselves.  As Philip Barker expresses it in his 
examination of Foucault’s work: ‘[i]t is the basis of those self-subjecting technologies 
through which we are policed and police others’ (Barker 1998, 64).  The most effective 
forms of government are those which provide the conditions within which the governed 
are able to regulate their own behaviour.  This necessitates allowing subjects the 
freedom to ‘make the right choices’.  Yet this freedom also carries a risk: free 
individuals will not always make choices that are consistent with the interests and aims 
of those in authority.   
 
Foucault’s view of power as a set of relations rather than a substance thus allows the 
possibility for resistance.  This resistance may take a variety of forms, from private acts 
of non-conformity to public opposition to the authorities.  As Hodge and Kress suggest, 
‘structuring the versions of reality on which social action is based’ enables powerful 
groups to limit the ways in which individuals and groups within society are able to think 
and hence to act.  Yet this will only be effective insofar as these versions of reality 
‘have been effectively imposed and have not been effectively resisted’ (Hodge and 
Kress 1988, 3 and 7).  This thesis is also concerned with the ways in which students 
challenged the discourses of the New Order state by producing their own, alternative 
ways of thinking and speaking about their roles and identities.  The effect of these 
discourses was to contest the ways in which the state represented students’ roles and 
identities and so redefine the parameters within which they were able to act.  This had 
the dual purpose of justifying students’ ongoing role in social and political life and of 
modifying (some aspects of) the status quo, in particular the relationship between 
students and the state and, to a lesser extent, between the state and wider society.   
 
The relationship between students and the New Order state was both complex and at 
times contradictory.  Ariel Heryanto has suggested that: 
 
Student activism is to a significant degree a construct of dominant discourse.  … 
It is fair to say, appropriating Foucault’s famous aphorism, that the history of 
Indonesian student activism is the history of the dominant discourse on students 
(Heryanto 1993, 44).   
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 Such a formulation appears to bow to an overly constructivist view of discourse and one 
which limits the possibilities for the discursive creativity of social actors.  Power 
relations between students and the state in New Order Indonesia cannot be adequately 
explained by the unqualified use of dichotomous categories such as ‘dominant’ and 
‘dominated’.  In analysing the relationship between students and the state, I want to 
avoid a view which sees the state as dominant and students as merely subordinate.  
Rather, as this study will argue, the development of particular ways of thinking and 
speaking about the roles and identities of students was a product of the conflict between 
students and the state over students’ roles and identities.  This conflict mirrored the 
broader patterns of contestation between the state and wider society.  An analysis of the 
politics of student identity can thus provide an insight into the broader dynamics of 
power in Indonesia.   As this study argues, the state’s attempts to limit the ways in 
which students were able to think and speak about their roles and identities, and, 
consequently, how they were able to act, were not entirely successful.  While the state 
discourse was able, to some extent, to set parameters for students’ actions, the strong 
tradition of student activism in Indonesia, together with other factors, gave them a 
significant voice within Indonesian society and politics and rendered them far from 
powerless in their relationship with the state.   
 
The link between discourse, power and the politics of identity is an important one in 
Foucault’s work.  In his view, social and political identities are not ‘given’ but, rather, 
are articulated and rearticulated through discourse on the basis of power relations.  As 
Barker notes, social subjects are ‘the object[s] of interrelations of power that inscribe 
themselves on the body and induce subjects to recognise themselves in certain ways’ 
(1998, 29).  
 
Texts are the material manifestation of discourse.  The various properties that a text 
displays thus reflect particular ways of thinking and speaking.  The linguistic choices 
made in the state and student texts examined in this study articulate students’ roles and 
identities as they are conceived in the discourses of the state and of students.  Yet texts 
are also part of a continuous act of meaning-making between speakers or writers and 
listeners or readers.  In producing their texts, speakers and writers choose from a range 
of linguistic features.  Readers and listeners then engage in an active process of 
interpreting these texts (Halliday and Hasan 1985, 10-11; see also chapter one).  All 
readers approach texts with a variety of different textual experiences and interpretive 
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 resources.  These resources help to determine whether they will produce (fully or 
partially) compliant readings or whether they will resist the speaker’s or writer’s 
attempt to shape their reading of the text.  As a result, the extent to which the identities 
produced in the state and student texts were ‘taken up’ by students depended in part on 
how students interpreted the texts they read.   
 
Consequently, one of the limitations of this kind of text analysis is that we cannot know, 
without conducting detailed analysis of the responses of student readers to these texts, 
how they interpreted them.  We also cannot know to what extent they accepted or 
rejected the roles and identities produced in these texts.  As a result, this thesis does not 
claim to provide a comprehensive analysis of the meaning and, perhaps more 
importantly, the effect of the state and student texts.1  Rather, it is concerned with 
identifying the textual and discursive strategies that were developed in the process of 
text production, as both state and student texts attempted to shape the ways in which 
student readers could think and speak about themselves, and consequently the ways 
they could act.  Moreover, since the analyst is also a reader, who interprets the texts 
according to his or, in this case, her own textual experiences and interpretive resources, 
the analysis of the texts represents only one among a variety of possible interpretations, 
albeit one which is grounded in the current body of literature on power relations and the 
politics of language in New Order Indonesia (see Widdowson 1995a; Widdowson 1996; 
Fairclough 1996; see also chapter one). 
 
The study focuses on a close examination of a number of key state and student texts.2  
Two state texts form the basis for the analysis in chapters three and five.  These are the 
New Order’s ‘official’ national history, the Sejarah Nasional Indonesia, and a magazine 
published by the Department of Education and Culture from the late 1970s to the 1980s, 
entitled Majalah Mahasiswa (Student Magazine).  These two texts were an important 
vehicle through which the state articulated its view on students’ roles and identities.  
They were also explicitly aimed at students: the Sejarah Nasional Indonesia was the 
standard text on which all New Order history textbooks were based, and Majalah 
Mahasiswa described itself as a forum for ‘the thinking as well as the concrete 
aspirations of students in supporting development’.  For this reason, these two texts also 
                                                          
1 Chapter five does explore the degree to which students accepted or rejected the state’s definition of their 
roles and identities in their contributions to the state-run magazine Majalah Mahasiswa (Student 
Magazine). 
2 These texts, and their audiences, are discussed in more detail in the individual chapters.   
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 provide an insight into the ways in which the state attempted to socialise student readers 
into what it saw as their appropriate roles and identities.   
 
The student texts comprise influential student newspapers and magazines published on 
campuses in Yogyakarta, Jakarta and Bandung during the mid to late 1970s and the 
1990s.  The student press provided those who contributed to it as well as their audiences 
with a forum in which to reflect on their roles and identities.  It brought together 
students from a variety of disciplines with a range of backgrounds and political views.  
These students directed their publications at a ‘critical middle ground’, attempting to 
appeal to an average student audience and at the same time encourage these readers to 
think in a critical way about a range of national and campus issues.  The student press 
also had an important link to student activism: the growth of a critical student press 
often accompanied the development of student activism and, in the 1990s at least, 
students associated with campus-based publications often referred to themselves as 
aktivis pers (press activists).  Former general manager (pemimpin umum) of Universitas 
Gadjah Mada’s student magazine Balairung, Hasan Bachtiar, for example, describes the 
student press as straddling the non-student press and student activism, academic 
pursuits and the desires of youth (kehendak masa muda) (Bachtiar 2000).  The links 
between the student press and student activism gave the student publications a unique 
character as ‘the pioneers of change and a force to break through stasis’ (pelopor 
perubahan dan pemecah kebekuan) (Arifin 2000, cited in Bachtiar 2000).  For these 
reasons, the student press provides a rich source of information on the ways in which 
those who wrote for the student press during the mid to late 1970s and the 1990s 
represented their roles and identities.  It also provides an insight into the kinds of 
strategies that these students used to attempt to socialise their fellow students into the 
roles and identities constructed for them in the student press.  
 
The analysis of the texts centres on a number of key areas of meaning, identified for 
their significance in the construction of students’ roles and identities.  These key areas 
of meaning include the categories of mahasiswa (university student) and pemuda 
(youth) and the characteristics that are assigned to these categories.  There is also a 
focus on students’ relationship to wider society, and to the state, and their status and 
role as intellectuals, as well as their role in politics.  Each of these areas of meaning is 
described by a keyword, and is located within a broader set of terms.  As the analysis 
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 shows, much of the contestation between students and the state is manifested in the 
competing meanings which are given to particular keywords.  
 
Attention is also paid to some of the linguistic features of the texts.  Of particular 
concern is the analysis of what the linguist Michael Halliday terms the ‘experiential’ 
and ‘interpersonal’ dimensions of language.  The analysis of experiential and 
interpersonal meaning is concerned with specifying what kinds of actions students are 
represented as involved in, whether they are active or passive participants, and what the 
objects of their actions are.  These linguistic choices are explored for their significance 
for the representation of students’ roles and identities.  The analysis is also concerned 
with an examination of the patterns of modality in the text, with how discourse 
positions people as subjects and with who has the authority to speak a particular 
discourse.  These linguistic features play an important role in the attempts to socialise 
students into the roles and identities constructed for them in the texts.  The analysis of 
style, intertextuality and, in the student texts, irony and satire, also provide an insight 
into the ways in which students roles and identities are constructed in the texts and the 
ways in which the writers attempt to socialise students into these identities. 
 
My aim has been to make the thesis accessible and interesting for those without a 
background in linguistics or discourse analysis.  As a result, this thesis does not present 
a comprehensive linguistic analysis of the texts themselves.  Rather, it uses the texts as 
evidence of the structures of discourse and the dynamics of power relations in New 
Order Indonesia as they relate to the politics of student identity.   
 
This study aims to add to the understanding of the politics of student identity in 
Indonesia during the New Order.  The organisations, themes and character of 
Indonesian youth and student activism, particularly in the New Order period, have been 
well-documented (see chapter two).  However, very few of these studies have 
approached the student movement from the perspective of discourse analysis (Heryanto 
1993, 1996 are exceptions).  Nor have there been any systematic attempts to examine 
the ways in which students actively constructed their role and identity as students as a 
means of justifying their continuing role in social and political life during the New 
Order period and of challenging the state.   
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 Much scholarly work on New Order Indonesia has focused on the dominance of the 
state over social and political life, and on the reasons for the collapse of this dominance 
in the late New Order period (see for example Anderson 1990a; Jackson 1978; Mackie 
and MacIntyre 1994; James 1990; Crouch 1998).  The literature on opposition to the 
state has tended to focus on the themes of opposition or the activities of political 
organisations (see for example Aspinall 2000; Uhlin 1997).  Opposition to the New 
Order has also been approached from the perspective of literature and the performing 
arts (see for example Hatley 1990; Foulcher 1990; Clark 2001; Errington 2001; Hill 
1979; see also Matheson Hooker 1999).  In contrast, this study focuses on the micro-
level aspects of resistance and opposition.  It foregrounds analysis of one form of 
resistance to the New Order by examining one of the key groups which consistently 
challenged the New Order.  A significant strength of this approach is that it focuses in 
detail on the role of language in the articulation of power and resistance to power.  Its 
focus is also on the analysis of non-literary texts.   
 
The study also contributes to the broader theoretical literature by providing a practical 
case study of the application of critical discourse analysis to the analysis of resistance in 
language.  Critical discourse analyses have tended to focus on the language of the 
powerful with the result that analysis of resistance to the exercise of power and to the 
discourses of those in authority has been somewhat neglected.  This is in part an effect 
of the application of Weberian theories of power and Marxist conceptions of ideology, 
with their emphasis on dominance and ‘false consciousness’.  The application of 
Foucault’s concept of power provides the theoretical tools which enable this to be 
redressed.   
 
Critical discourse analysis offers an effective model for examining power relations in 
Indonesia.  Yet the limitations of the critical discourse analysis method also apply to 
this study.  In particular, unless coupled with a quantitative analysis of readers’ 
responses to the texts, critical discourse analysis can only provide an insight into the 
strategies of text production and not those of text interpretation.  An understanding of 
the latter is critical if we are to fully understand the effect of texts and reading on how 
New Order students themselves saw their roles and identities. 
 
The primary focus of the thesis is the period from 1973 to 1998.  It does not deal with 
the early years of the New Order (1965-1973) or with the post-Suharto era.  The period 
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 between 1973 and 1988 was characterised by the increasing consolidation of power at 
the centre and by a simultaneous restriction on political freedoms.  It was also during 
this time that many of the New Order’s ideological indoctrination programs were put in 
place, including the introduction of the Pancasila indoctrination courses (Pedoman 
Penhayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila, Guidelines for the Understanding and 
Application of the Pancasila), and school subjects such as Pancasila Moral Education 
(Pendidikan Moral Pancasila, PMP), as well as courses in the History of the National 
Struggle (Pendidikan Sejarah Perjuangan Bangsa, PSPB) and civics (see Thomas 
1981; Siegel 1986, 145; Leigh 1991; Parker 1992; Bourchier 1994; Antlov 1996; 
Mulder 2000).  These programs aimed to socialise Indonesian citizens into New Order’s 
interpretation of Pancasila (and its application in the form of Pancasila democracy) and 
its version of Indonesia’s national history.  More practically, these programs aimed to 
mobilise the support of wider society for development.3   
 
The economic growth of the 1970s and 1980s resulted in significant changes to 
Indonesia’s social structure.  This growth had important political and social impacts on 
Indonesia’s class structure.  In particular, it resulted in the creation of a new, more 
politically aware middle class.  As a result of these and other changes, societal and elite 
level pressures for reform began to mount, and the New Order was forced to allow for a 
limited ‘opening’ of the political system.  The period of keterbukaan, which began in 
1989 and lasted until 1994, was marked by an increase in political activity by civil 
society groups, including elite level groups such as the Petition of Fifty (Petisi 
Limapuluh) and the Democracy Forum (Forum Demokrasi, Fodem) as well as NGOs, 
students, urban workers, and the Indonesian Democracy Party (Partai Demokrasi 
Indonesia, PDI) (see Aspinall 2000).  This study thus compares the politics of student 
identity during two key periods in the New Order – its height, and then slow decline.4
 
The aim of this study is not to provide a comprehensive account of student identities 
across Indonesia.  The depth of analysis has necessitated a limit to the number of texts 
analysed.  The publications selected are from universities based on Java, and in the 
large urban centres of Jakarta, Bandung and Yogyakarta.  This choice reflects the 
                                                          
3 The Pancasila courses were not a New Order initiative.  During the Guided Democracy period similar 
courses had been run in schools and universities (Fischer 1965, 113). 
4 This thesis does not examine student identities during the early New Order period (1966 to 1974) 
although aspects of the student discourse of that period had an important impact on the development of 
students’ representations of their roles and identities during the mid to late 1970s.  Where this is the case, 
it has been noted.  
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 importance of these centres in the development of student activism.  In the 1960s and 
1970s at least, the campuses of three of the oldest and most prestigious universities in 
the country - Universitas Indonesia in Jakarta, Institut Teknologi Bandung and 
Yogyakarta’s Universitas Gadjah Mada - were also among the main sites of student 
activism and of student press activism more specifically.  By the 1990s, the 
geographical distribution of student activism, and with it the development of a critical 
student press, had shifted to other geographical centres as well as to smaller state and 
private universities.  Although the publications chosen for analysis in chapter six to 
some degree reflect this, it has not been possible to include publications from outside 
Java.   
 
The study focuses on publications from the larger secular state universities.  The choice 
of publications reflects the relative importance of student activism on these larger state 
campuses, although I have included publications from a number of private universities 
and state Islamic universities in the analysis in chapter six in recognition of the growing 
importance of these campuses.   A study of the development of student identities in the 
student press on the campuses of smaller private universities and of state and private 
Islamic universities would no doubt yield additional dimensions to the discourse that 
have not been covered here. 
 
The study is structured to reflect the chronological development of students’ roles and 
identities during the two periods under examination.  The early chapters provide the 
theoretical and contextual framework for the study.  The remaining chapters comprise 
detailed analysis of the texts themselves. 
 
Chapters one and two locate the thesis both theoretically and in the context of New 
Order Indonesia.  Chapter one surveys the literature on critical discourse analysis and 
outlines the particular method which this study employs in the analysis of the texts.  The 
second part of the chapter examines the literature specific to Indonesia.  It surveys the 
literature on state-society relations and the nature of opposition and resistance in New 
Order Indonesia.  It then explores existing work on political discourse and political 
aspects of language in Indonesia and identifies the need for a greater understanding of 
the micro-level aspects of opposition and resistance in New Order Indonesia. 
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 Chapter two examines the history of youth and student activism in Indonesia and 
introduces the youth and student population of the New Order.  This provides the 
background for the analysis in the remaining chapters.  The first part of the chapter 
examines the history of youth and student activism in Indonesia, focusing on some of 
the ways in which these early student activists saw their roles, as well as how the terms 
pemuda and mahasiswa emerged in the colonial and immediate post-colonial era.  The 
second part of the chapter examines some of the key national policies on the young 
generation (generasi muda) and students (mahasiswa) under the New Order.  The 
chapter suggests that the strong tradition of youth and student activism in Indonesia, 
coupled with Indonesia’s predominantly young population, necessitated a policy 
approach which sought to integrate the young generation ideologically, and at the same 
time utilise them in a practical way for development (pembangunan).  The final part of 
the chapter provides a brief survey of student activism in Indonesia during the New 
Order and examines the existing literature on the student movement in Indonesia, as it 
relates to the present study.   
 
Chapters three, four, five and six constitute the substantive component of the thesis.  
Chapter three is a close reading of the Sejarah Nasional Indonesia (National History of 
Indonesia).  Through a detailed examination of the Sejarah’s account of the key 
moments in Indonesia’s modern history in which the role of youth is celebrated, the 
chapter explores the ways in which official New Order historiography constructed the 
historical roles and identities of Indonesia’s youth.  The chapter suggests that the 
Sejarah provides a series of ‘lessons’ for the young generation of the 1970s, 1980s and 
1990s about the roles they were expected to play within the New Order state.  These 
lessons were constructed within an organicist framework of harmony, consensus, self-
sacrifice and collective over individual interests.  It argues that in the process of 
redefining the historical roles and identities of Indonesia’s youth and students, the 
Sejarah’s account both manifests and attempts to resolve the essential tension between 
recognising the pioneering role of Indonesia’s youth in history and the need to ensure 
that the youth and students of the New Order saw their role not as revolutionaries but as 
heroes of development.   
 
Chapter four analyses the ways in which students writing in the student press between 
1976 and 1980 responded to the state’s attempts to limit their practical role in politics 
through the measures put in place following the Malari riot of 1974 and the 
 11
 demonstrations of 1977/1978.  Through an examination of two student publications, the 
chapter traces the development of students’ ‘discourse of dissent’ regarding their roles 
and identities.  In this discourse, students defined their role as a force for ‘social 
control’ and ‘correction’ of the New Order state and its practices, as a moral rather than 
a purely political force, as leaders of the common people (rakyat) and as intellectuals.  
They did so from a position of loyalty to the ideals, if not the practice, of the regime.  
As a result, the student press of the 1970s did not present a fundamental challenge to the 
state or its discourse.  This strategy was a response to the very real threat of repression 
that students faced.  The chapter also explores some of the linguistic techniques 
employed in the student press.  It focuses on the use of irony and satire, rhetorical 
questions and a colloquial variety of Indonesian, suggesting that students who wrote in 
the student press used these techniques to attempt to socialise their fellow students into 
the roles and identities constructed for them in the student press.   
 
Chapter five is a close analysis of a magazine aimed at students and published by the 
Department of Education and Culture during the 1980s.   The chapter traces the ways in 
which, through this magazine, the New Order state sought to redefine students’ roles 
and identities in developmentalist terms.  In this view, students were ‘people of 
analysis’ and future technocrats rather than politically engaged intellectuals.  They also 
had a duty to serve wider society and the nation.  At the same time, students were the 
objects of state efforts to ‘improve’ them.  This depoliticised and development-oriented 
identity had as its aim the regulation of students’ political behaviour.  Yet this magazine 
was more than just a vehicle for the dissemination of the state’s ideas on the roles and 
identities of youth and students.  It also represented a site where students actively 
collaborated in the process of defining those identities, even as it limited the discursive 
and practical possibilities open to them.  This was an integral part of the state’s 
disciplinary strategy.  And while the state was to some extent successful in governing 
the terms in which students were able to define their roles and identities, students also 
challenged the state’s definitions of their role as compliant subjects in development.   
 
Chapter six examines the shifts in students’ representations of their roles and identities 
in the context of the period of political openness (keterbukaan) and the period leading 
up to the fall of Suharto.  The chapter demonstrates that through the meanings they gave 
to six interlinked keywords, students who wrote in the student press of the 1990s 
defined their role as actors in a broad pro-democracy movement which aimed at a 
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 thoroughgoing transformation of Indonesia’s social, political and economic structures.  
Within this movement, students’ relationship to the state was conceived in terms of 
opposition and resistance and their relationship to the rakyat as one of strategic 
collaboration.  The chapter suggests that within the student press, students developed a 
genuinely oppositional discourse in which their roles, and their relationship to the state, 
were defined in terms of conflict, struggle and resistance.  Yet although this role 
presented a significant challenge to the New Order’s organicist values of harmony, 
consensus and the unity of state and society, students retained a significant amount of 
freedom for political expression.  This freedom was possible in part because a 
significant proportion of students used their political freedom ‘responsibly’, by 
representing their roles and identities in ways which did not directly threaten the 
ideological basis of the regime.  It was also a product of the state’s capacity to repress 
dissent when necessary and the relatively weak nature of organised civil society 
opposition.   
  
The study highlights the complex nature of power and power relations in New Order 
Indonesia.  It demonstrates that in ‘governing’ Indonesian students, the state employed 
strategies and techniques which aimed not at the simple domination of these students 
but at their incorporation into the state itself.  The exercise of this productive form of 
power aimed to modify students’ behaviour in ways which were consistent with the 
needs and interests of the state.  In addition, rather than emphasising the negative effects 
of the exercise of state power on students, this study focuses on students’ utilisation of 
the freedom allowed them as part of the process of government.  The study suggests that 
while students’ resistance to the state was to some extent constrained by the limits set 
by the state, students also retained a significant capacity to exercise power on their own 
account.  Indeed, it was only because students were able to work within the parameters 
set by the state, that they were able to continue to play a role a significant role in social 
and political life. 
 
 
 13
 CHAPTER ONE 
 
Discourse, opposition and the politics of 
student identity 
 
The aim of this chapter is to locate the key questions addressed in this study within both 
an empirical context and a theoretical framework, and to explain the approach this study 
will take in answering these questions.  The chapter is divided into two parts.  The first 
part locates the study within the literature on critical discourse analysis (CDA).  It 
outlines some of the key issues in critical discourse analysis which underpin the thesis 
and defines the key terms used in the study (see also glossary).  These include 
definitions of text and discourse and the relationship between text, discourse and social 
structure, the construction of identity in discourse and text and the nature of power.  The 
section concludes by setting out the methodological framework used in the analysis of 
the texts, which is based on the linguist Michael Halliday’s work on social semiotics 
(see Halliday 1978; see also Halliday and Hasan 1985; Halliday 1994; Eggins 1994).  
Since an important element of this thesis is to test the effectiveness of this method for 
understanding discourse and power in Indonesia, some of the methodological and 
theoretical limitations which have influenced the analysis and the findings of the study 
are also discussed. 
 
The second part of the chapter examines the literature specific to Indonesia.  It begins 
by locating the central arguments of the thesis within the scholarly writing on the nature 
of the New Order state and the nature of opposition and resistance in New Order 
Indonesia.  It then explores existing work on political discourse and political aspects of 
language in Indonesia.  The discussion centres on the contributions previous studies 
have made to the understanding of political discourse in Indonesia and, by identifying 
both the strengths and the limitations of their approaches, indicates where the gaps in 
the literature lie.  The discussion also shows how the key research questions both arise 
in response to the limitations of earlier investigations and are built on their findings.   
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 Conceptualising discourse and power 
 
Critical discourse analysis refers to a range of theoretical and methodological 
approaches to the analysis of language and its relationship to social and political power 
(see Fairclough and Wodak 1997, 262-8).  Its genesis lies in attempts beginning in the 
late 1970s to explore the social and ideological dimensions of language.  A number of 
streams within CDA, including critical linguistics, social semiotics and Norman 
Fairclough’s three-dimensional model of discourse and discourse analysis, take their 
inspiration from the work of Michael Halliday, and in particular his view of language as 
a ‘social semiotic’ (see Fowler, Hodge Kress and Trew 1979; Hodge and Kress 1979; 
Hodge and Kress 1988; Fairclough 1992; see also Halliday 1978; Halliday and Hasan 
1985).1  This model is combined with aspects of social and political theory, and in 
particular neo-Marxist theories about ideology developed in the work of Antonio 
Gramsci, Jurgen Habermas and other philosophers associated with the Frankfurt School, 
as well as Louis Althusser (Fairclough and Wodak 1997, 260-1).   
 
The term ‘critical discourse analysis’ was first used by Norman Fairclough in 1985 
(Fairclough 1995, 23; Fairclough 1985, reproduced in Fairclough 1995).  Fairclough’s 
work drew on Halliday’s model as well as social and political theory, in particular the 
work of Gramsci and Althusser.  It also incorporated elements of French philosopher 
Michel Foucault’s work on discourse and discourse analysis (see Fairclough 1992, 
chapter 2).  Since then, the term has gained currency and is now used as an umbrella 
term for the Hallidayan-based approaches, including critical linguistics, social semiotics 
and Fairclough’s approach, the socio-cognitive approach of Teun van Dijk, the 
‘discourse-historical method’ of Ruth Wodak, and a variety of other critical approaches 
to discourse analysis (Fairclough and Wodak 1997, 262-8).2   
 
The aim of critical discourse analysis is to examine aspects of power and power 
relations and their ‘enactment, concealment, legitimation and reproduction’ in language 
(van Dijk 1993a, 132; see also van Dijk 1993b, 249-52; van Dijk 2001, 352-3; 
Fairclough and Wodak 1997, 258-9; Fowler 1987, 482-3; Pennycook 1994, 121).  Most 
                                                          
1 Halliday’s model draws on the semiotics of the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure. 
2 This broad use of the term is not unproblematic.  Toolan (1997, 99-100), for example, suggests that the 
methodological diversity of CDA has been a key criticism of the method.  Fowler (1987, 492), identifying 
the disintegration of the Hallidayan framework of critical linguistics and social semiotics, calls for ‘a 
standardisation of the method and its metalanguage’.   
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 work in CDA has to date focused on the ways in which powerful groups use language to 
sustain unequal relations of power, although CDA is also concerned with the ways in 
which resistance and opposition are encoded in text (van Dijk 1993a, 132; van Dijk 
1993b, 250; van Dijk 2001, fn 2).   
 
CDA also has an explicitly reformative aim, namely to expose inequalities in power 
relationships as they are represented in language and so to raise awareness amongst 
disadvantaged groups of the ways in which the powerful position them.  In doing so, it 
hopes to effect social and political change (van Dijk 1993b, 252-4; van Dijk 2001, 352-
3; Fairclough and Wodak 1997, 258-9; Fowler 1987, 482-3; Pennycook 1994, 121).   
 
This explicit socio-political stance has received some criticism, in particular from the 
applied linguist Henry Widdowson (see Widdowson 1995a; Widdowson 1996; see also 
Toolan 1997, 87-88; Dillon, Doyle, Eastman, Silberstein and Toolan 1993).  
Widdowson suggests that political commitment in critical discourse analysis detracts 
from its validity as analysis and renders it closer to interpretation. Analysis, he argues, 
‘recognises its own partiality, [whereas] interpretation, of its nature, must suspend that 
recognition’ (Widdowson 1995a, 159). As a result, he claims, ‘[w]hat is actually 
revealed [in critical discourse analysis] is the particular discourse perspective of the 
interpreter’ (Widdowson 1995a, 169; see also Widdowson 1995b; Widdowson 1996; 
see also Fairclough 1996).  Yet an explicit ideological position, and in particular the 
position of the dominant, need not be a requirement of critical discourse analysis.  All 
analysts approach the process of analysis with particular socio-political stances and 
interpret data to some extent according to these biases.  The position of the analyst in 
critical discourse analysis is thus no more partial than that of the historian or the 
political scientist (see also Toolan 1997, 100).  Nevertheless, recognition of this 
partiality is of value in pointing out the limitations of any analysis which claims to 
represent ‘truth’.3
 
Text, discourse and social structure 
 
Two fundamental concepts that CDA employs in the analysis of language and power 
are text and discourse.  Text is a familiar term in linguistics.  In its broadest sense, text 
                                                          
3 Foucault’s view of discourse, outlined below, is also useful in this regard (see Widdowson 1995b, 516). 
 16
 can be conceived as a social or cultural product.  In this view, text is not merely a 
linguistic product, made up of words or sentences, but, as Halliday expresses it, a ‘unit 
of meaning’ which serves a social function and which has social significance for those 
who produce it as well as those who hear, read, see or otherwise experience and 
interpret it (Halliday 1978, 108-9; Halliday and Hasan 1985, 10).  The present study is 
mostly concerned with the linguistic form of text, and in particular with written texts 
(see Widdowson 1995a, 160-4 for this view of text).  However, it also considers texts 
which incorporate both a written and a visual element, such as the student cartoons 
examined in chapters four and six.  For the most part, the study is concerned with the 
analysis of texts of sentence length and above, although it also deals with smaller texts 
(individual words) and with larger texts (paragraphs, newspaper articles, chapters and 
sub-sections).  These texts are considered in their wider contexts, both their wider 
textual context as well as their broader social, cultural and political context. 
 
Following Halliday, this study defines text as a process in the sense that it is a 
continuous process of meaning-making, defined by the choices that text producers 
(speakers and writers) make from the overall linguistic system (Halliday 1978, 139-40; 
Halliday and Hasan 1985, 10-11) and the ways in which readers or listeners interpret 
these choices (see below).  This insight draws on Saussure’s distinction between langue 
(the language system) and parole (the use of language).  Saussure held that meaning 
came from the system of language (langue), which was responsible for structuring 
speakers’ experience of the world (Macdonell 1986, 8-9).4  In producing instances of 
language use (parole), manifested in texts (in their linguistic form), speakers make 
choices from this linguistic system.  This is often referred to in terms of ‘representation’ 
(see Fowler 1987, 482-3; Wilson 2001, 401).5  Not all choices are the same: speakers 
and writers may represent similar phenomena in different ways.  A basic assumption of 
both the Hallidayan model and of CDA, as well as sociolinguistics more generally, is 
that the linguistic choices that speakers and writers make when they use language are 
socially, culturally and politically determined (see Widdowson 1995b, 514; Fowler 
                                                          
4 See also Widdowson 1995b, 514 and Kress 1985a, 30 for a discussion of Saussure in the context of 
CDA. 
5 Wilson defines representation as ‘how language is employed in different ways to represent what we can 
… believe and perhaps think’.  The universalist perspective on representation holds that the way we think 
determines what we are able to say (or write) and the ways in which we are able to say (or write) it.   The 
relativist position, on the other hand, maintains that our experience of the world, and the ways in which 
we are able to think about it, is mediated by language.  The corollary of the relativist position is that 
controlling what people are able to say and the ways in which they are able to say it, enables control over 
thought (Wilson 2000, 401).   
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 1987, 482-3).  One of the stated aims of CDA is to reveal the underlying reasons for the 
particular representations or choices that speakers and writers make from this language 
system (Fowler 1987, 482-3; see also below).6    
 
Discourse is also a term familiar to linguistics.  The term discourse, however, is also 
used in other social sciences.  This has led to some confusion about its meaning, 
particularly in CDA, which seeks to combine a linguistic view of discourse with more 
socially and politically oriented perspectives.7  In many branches of linguistics, 
discourse is defined as a unit of text larger than a sentence (see Pennycook 1994, 116 
and 117-120; Widdowson 1995, 160-4).  Such a definition is of limited use in a theory 
of language which seeks to explore its social and political aspects.  A more useful 
conception of discourse is that offered by Foucault, who suggests that discourse is an 
abstract system of ‘rules’ which determine what can be said about a particular topic and 
how, when, by whom and to whom it can be said (Foucault 1972).  In this view, 
discourse describes a way of speaking and thinking about a particular domain of social 
experience.  Discourse is derived from the social structure (with its particular 
configurations of power relations) and is often, though not exclusively, realised in text 
(Pennycook 1994, 128 and 130-1; see also Kress 1985b, 27).  Kress sums up Foucault’s 
view of discourse in the following way:  
 
Discourses are systematically-organised sets of statements which give 
expression to the meanings and values of an institution.  Beyond that, they 
define, describe and delimit what it is possible to say (and by extension – what it 
is possible to do or not to do) with respect to the area of concern of that 
institution… A discourse provides a set of possible statements about a given 
area and organises and gives structure to the manner in which a particular topic, 
object, process is to be talked about.  In that it provides descriptions, rules, 
permissions and prohibitions of social and individual actions (Kress 1985a, 6-
7).8
                                                          
6 Fowler notes that ‘Critical linguistics insists that all representation is mediated, moulded by the value-
systems that are ingrained in the medium (language in this case) used for representation; it challenges 
common sense by pointing out that something could have been represented some other way, with a very 
different significance.  This is not, in fact, simply a question of ‘distortion’ or ‘bias’: there is not 
necessarily any true reality that can be unveiled by critical practice, there are simply relatively varying 
representations’ (Fowler 1987, 483). 
7 The combination of linguistic definitions of discourse with more socially and politically oriented 
perspectives in CDA is both a strength and a weakness.  As Widdowson points out, Fairclough’s model 
(set out in Fairclough 1992) raises questions about ‘…how far it is possible to combine theories without 
compromising them.  It raises too the question of compatibility between …abstract theoretical models and 
descriptive practice’ (Widdowson 1995b, 516).   
8 Some practitioners of CDA, most notably Norman Fairclough, have drawn on the work of Foucault in 
formulating a critical view of discourse and discourse analysis (Fairclough 1992; Fairclough 1995; see 
also Kress 1985a; Kress 1985b). Yet there are some important differences between the way in which 
Fairclough uses the term discourse and the way in which Foucault saw discourse.  Fairclough defines 
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Foucault’s position thus provides us with a number of important insights about the 
nature of discourse and its effects on individuals.  Foucault’s view of discourse is a 
relativist one, in which language is seen as mediating our experience of the world, and 
as determining the ways in which we are able to think about it (see fn 5).  Thus, for 
Foucault, by producing ways of speaking about the world, discourse also provides a 
way of thinking about the world.  Moreover, since the ways in which we speak and 
think about the world also influence what we do, discourse provides a set of parameters 
for the ways in which individuals and groups are able to act in their capacity as social 
subjects (see also van Dijk 2001, 357-8; Hodge and Kress 1988, 3).9   
 
Shifting the focus from the nature of discourse and its effects on individuals to the place 
of discourse in the social structure, we gain further insights from Foucault’s work.10  
Foucault’s method of discourse analysis is an historical one, based on his view that 
discourses are socially and historically constructed.  In this view, discourses are 
constructed from combinations of both prior and contemporary discourses which are in 
turn derived from the conditions of past and present social structures.  As a result, any 
one discourse is defined by its relation to both past discourses and to the discourses 
which are its contemporaries (Fairclough 1992, 39-40).11  The total set of discourses in 
a particular society or institution is called an ‘order of discourse’ (Fairclough 1992, 43).  
An order of discourse describes the relationships between discourses, including 
specifying which discourses are privileged in which particular fields and how these 
discourses relate to less privileged alternatives.  As Kress expresses it: 
                                                                                                                                                                          
discourse (as an abstract noun) as ‘spoken or written language use’ (although it can also refer to non-
verbal types of communication, etc) and ‘language use conceived as social practice’ (Fairclough 1995, 
131 and 135; see also Pennycook 1994, 121).  Yet he also distinguishes discourse as a count noun 
(discourses), which he defines as ‘ways of signifying areas of experience from a particular perspective’ 
(Fairclough 1995, 132 and 135).  While the latter definition approximates Foucault’s view of discourse, 
the former, as Pennycook rightly points out, defines discourse as an essentially ‘linguistic phenomenon, 
albeit socially embedded’ (Pennycook 1994, 127; see also Kress 1985b, 27-9 for a discussion of the 
distinction between text and discourse).  For Foucault, however, discourse was not itself a linguistic 
phenomenon but, as suggested above, an abstract system (Fairclough’s second definition of discourse) 
which is realised in texts (as instances of language use).  A similar use of the term discourse in both a 
linguistic sense and in a Foucauldian sense (‘racist discourse’) is also evident in van Dijk’s socio-
cognitive approach (see for example van Dijk 1993b).  To the extent that the term ‘discourse’ refers in 
Fairclough and van Dijk’s work to ‘socially embedded language use’, then it seems to represent 
somewhat of a conceptual ‘doubling-up’ of the definition of text as ‘product’ and ‘process’ offered by 
Halliday (see above).   
9 Hodge and Kress suggest that ‘[i]deological complexes are constructed in order to constrain behaviour 
by structuring the versions of reality on which social action is based, in particular ways’ (1988, 3). 
10 But see Fairclough (1992) on the shifts in Foucault’s view of discourse throughout his work. 
11 This view is similar to ideas about intertextuality developed by Julia Kristeva and Mikhail Bakhtin (see 
below). 
 19
  
Discourses do not exist in isolation but within a larger system of sometimes 
opposing, contradictory, contending, or merely different discourses … [The] 
dynamic relations between these [discourses] … ensure continuous shifts and 
movement, progression or withdrawal in certain areas (Kress 1985a, 7).   
 
This idea of discourses as competing is a central one for the concerns of this thesis.  
Kress suggests that:  
 
Within any social group there are a number of discourses, because a number of 
significant institutions operate within any one social group.  Hence any group 
will be using a number of discourses offering alternative or contradictory 
accounts of reality. That is, even though any one discourse accounts for the area 
of its relevance, there are overlapping areas of interest where differing accounts 
are offered, which are contested by several discourses (1985a 11). 
 
In later work on power, Foucault saw discourse itself as both a site of and a stake in 
struggles of power (see also below):   
 
Discourse is not simply that which translates struggles or systems of domination 
but is the thing for which and by which there is struggle, discourse is the power 
which is to be seized (1984, 109). 
 
It is this notion of discourses as ‘competing’ for discursive supremacy which underpins 
the characterisation of state and student discourses in this thesis as ‘warring words’.12   
 
Foucault’s view of discourse is useful for pointing out the ways in which discourse sets 
certain parameters for what we are able to say and write about the world and how we 
are able to do so.  However, as Fairclough points out, this view is an overly constitutive 
one (Fairclough 1992, 60-1).  Foucault’s concept of ‘orders of discourse’ does allow for 
opposition, contestation and difference between discourses and suggests that discourse 
is in fact a key stake in power.  This contestation is manifested in the contradictory 
ways in which texts are produced.  Yet Foucault’s perspective, like that of the early 
critical linguists, does not allow sufficient scope for the creative processes of text 
interpretation, in which readers and listeners may interpret texts in a variety of 
compliant or resistant ways.   
 
                                                          
12 Seidel suggests similarly that: ‘…discourse of any kind … is a site of struggle.  It is a terrain, a 
dynamic linguistic, and, above all, semantic space in which social meanings are produced or challenged 
(Seidel 1985, 44).   
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 What, then, is the relationship between text and discourse?  It was suggested above that 
for Foucault, discourse is often, though not exclusively, realised through text, or, to use 
his term, statements.  Kress argues that this fact means that ‘certain syntactic forms will 
necessarily correlate with certain discourses’ (1985b, 28):   
 
The systematic organisation of content in discourse, drawing on and deriving 
from the prior classification of this material in an ideological system, leads to 
the systematic selection of linguistic categories and features in a text (Kress 
1985b, 30).   
 
The relationship between text and discourse, however, is a complex one since different 
and even conflicting discourses may be realised in a particular text (Kress 1985b, 27 
and 29; see also Fairclough and Wodak 1997, 227).   
 
Given this relationship, what is the place of text-based analysis in discourse analysis?  
In The archaeology of knowledge (1972), Foucault acknowledged that linguistic 
analysis was one method for the analysis of discourse, although discourse analysis 
could not be reduced to linguistic analysis (Fairclough 1992, 40; Foucault 1972, 108).13  
In his own work on discourse, however, Foucault was more concerned with specifying 
the social and historical processes by which particular discourses came into being 
(Fairclough 1992, 40).  Fairclough has suggested that this emphasis on macro-level 
social and historical processes is one of the main weaknesses of Foucault’s approach 
and one of the ways in which the focus on text analysis in critical discourse analysis 
approaches can strengthen Foucault’s method of discourse analysis (Fairclough 1992, 
57-8).  Since discourse is realised in text, a close analysis of the features of a text can 
provide an insight into the structures of the discourse which inform it as well as the 
larger social system, including the power relations, from which the discourse is derived.   
 
Yet in analysing the linguistic features of a text, we must be careful to avoid a view of 
the text as encoding social meanings, which can then be ‘read-off’ by the analyst.  This 
view, which was an underlying assumption of early critical linguistics (Fowler et al 
1979; Hodge and Kress 1979), has received some strong criticism.  This criticism has 
focused on the role of readers and listeners in actively interpreting the texts they read 
                                                          
13 A text-based analysis of discourse is thus not incompatible with Foucault’s view.  Foucault argues that 
discourse determines what statements are possible about a particular area as well as how, when, by whom 
and to whom such statements can be made.  While Foucault’s concern was with macro-level social and 
historical processes, there is no reason why discourse analysis cannot also be concerned with specifying 
the properties of the statement (text) which is ‘the elementary unit of discourse’ (Foucault 1972, 80).   
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 and hear and, in doing so, constructing their own, often divergent, social meanings (see 
for example Fowler 1987, 488; Fairclough 1992, 60-1).  As a result of these criticisms, 
subsequent formulations have emphasised the fact that texts as products represent only 
part of the process of social meaning making; as processes, texts (in their linguistic 
form) are subject to active processes of interpretation on the part of listeners and 
readers.  Widdowson, for example, suggests that texts record the meanings of the text 
producer, which are directed at an idealised anticipated audience.  During the process of 
text interpretation, ‘real’ readers engage in an active process of meaning-making 
(Widdowson 1995a, 164).  In recognition of this, there has been an increased emphasis 
in critical discourse analysis on the role of listeners and readers in interpreting texts.  
Fowler, for example, suggests that: 
 
Texts construct ‘reading positions’ for readers, that is, they suggest what 
ideological formations it is appropriate for readers to bring to texts.  But the 
reader, in this theory, is not the passive recipient of fixed meanings: the reader, 
remember, is discursively equipped prior to the encounter with the text, and 
reconstructs the text as a system of meanings which may be more or less 
congruent with the ideology which informs the text (Fowler 1987, 486). 
 
The idea that readers may not interpret texts in the way that writers intend is captured in 
the notion of ‘resistant readings’ (see Fairclough 1992, 135-6; see also Hacker, Coste, 
Kamm and Bybee 1991).14  Since all readers approach texts with a variety of different 
textual experiences and interpretive resources, they may produce a wide range of (fully 
or partially) compliant or resistant readings (Fairclough 1992, 135-6).   
 
To sum up: discourses produce ways of speaking and thinking about the world.  In 
doing so, they also set parameters for the ways in which individuals and groups are able 
to act in the world.  These particular ways of thinking and speaking about the world 
(discourses) are derived from the social structure, with its particular configuration of 
power relations, and so reflect them.  Texts encode these ways of thinking and speaking 
about the world and as such also reflect the social structure.  A linguistic analysis of 
texts can thus provide insights into both the structures of discourse and the larger social 
                                                          
14 Wilson argues that: ‘readers interpret texts in terms of their already existing mental schemas.  As a 
result, they are unlikely to change a negative view of a particular issue upon reading or hearing a text 
which represents this issue in a more positive way’.  People ‘may be biased in their mode of interpretation 
from the start.  For such individuals, manipulations of transitivity, or other aspects of structure, may have 
little effect on interpretation, which is not to say that such structural forms may not have an effect 
elsewhere’ (Wilson 2001, 406 and 409).  See also Widdowson 1995a, Fairclough 1996 and Widdowson 
1996 on questions of text interpretation.   
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 system from which these discourses are derived, with the qualification that texts may be 
interpreted in multiple ways.  Discourses are also historically and socially constructed 
and are defined in relation to other past and present discourses, captured in the notion of 
an ‘order of discourse’.  The relationships between discourses within an order of 
discourse are often characterised by contestation, which reflects the dynamic power 
relationships between groups and individuals in a particular society or institution.  
Change in discourse and in text originates at the level of social structure, in the 
transformations of power relations.  Since discourse is derived from the social structure, 
these transformations in power relationships have effects on both discourse and on text 
(see Fairclough 1992, 96-7). 
 
Constructing identity in discourse and text 
 
As noted in the preface, this thesis is concerned with the politics of identity of 
Indonesian university students.  The term ‘politics of identity’ as it is used in this study 
refers to the ways in which politics shapes social and political identities.  Rather than 
such identities being ‘given’, this study suggests, following Foucault, that they are 
articulated and rearticulated through discourse and text as well as through particular 
configurations of power relations at the level of social structure (Mottier 2002). 
 
The term identity is used in the broad sociological sense to refer to the sense of self and 
the feelings and ideas that individuals have about themselves (Marshall 1998, 296).  As 
Johnson expresses it, identity is concerned with ‘who we are in relation to ourselves, to 
others and to social systems’ (Johnson 2000, 277).  Throughout this thesis the term 
identity is used in the plural form since, as Foucault has pointed out, individuals have 
multiple identities, which reflect the various social domains which they occupy (see 
below).   
 
Identity is essentially an individual category.  However, it can also be used to describe 
the ways in which social groups define themselves and are defined by others.  It is this 
notion of group identity, and in particular the ways in which Indonesian university 
students defined themselves and were defined by others as a social group, which is the 
primary concern in this thesis.  To the extent that social groups are made up of 
individuals, however, group identity is not homogenous.  
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The notion of role is closely connected to identity.15  In this thesis the term role refers to 
the rights, obligations and duties that are associated with a particular social position or 
social status (Marshall 1998, 570-1).  Roles are socially determined, that is, they are 
based on expectations about how people who occupy particular social positions behave, 
what their goals and values are, what they are like as individuals and how they relate to 
others associated with their role (Johnson 2000, 263-4).  Like identity, the notion of role 
is also best thought of in a plural sense, since individuals occupy multiple roles in 
society (Marshall 1998, 570-1).16   
 
Foucault provides some useful insights into the processes by which roles and identities 
are formed in discourse.  As noted above, discourses provide particular ways of 
speaking and thinking about the world, including various ‘objects of knowledge’.  
These objects of knowledge may refer to social subjects.  In Discipline and punish 
(Foucault 1979a) for example, Foucault traced the ways in which ‘the criminal’ as an 
object of knowledge was produced.  By producing ways of speaking and thinking about 
‘criminals’, the discourse of crime and punishment provided the ‘raw material’ by 
which criminals formed their identity and the social roles associated with this identity 
(Marshall 1998, 294).17  Foucault’s later work made an important link between power 
and the production of identity in discourse.  As Barker expresses it:  
 
Power produces both objects of knowledge and the subject [individual] to which 
a particular knowledge/object relates.  Therefore it is the exercise of power that 
brings about the emergence of objects of knowledge … and the possible subjects 
that constitute themselves around them (Barker 1998, 27).   
 
Foucault also emphasised the fact that individuals occupy multiple and often 
fragmented identities.  These identities are produced in the various discourses to which 
individuals are subject.  As Philpott expresses it:  
 
                                                          
15 Marshall notes that: ‘It is sometimes assumed that our identity comes from the expectations attached to 
the social roles that we occupy, and which we then internalise, so that it [identity] is formed through the 
process of socialisation.  Alternatively, it is elsewhere assumed that we construct our identities more 
actively out of the materials presented to us during socialisation, or in our various roles’ (1998, 296).   
16 The multiple roles that individuals play often give rise to conflicts and contradictions.  The ways in 
which people play their roles in society is thus to some extent determined by how they resolve the 
contradictions between the multiple roles they play (Marshall 1998, 570-1; Johnson 2000, 263-4) 
17 Identities are also formed through the practices of various institutions.  Thus, types of discursive 
activity such as describing, forming hypotheses, formulating regulations and teaching, each have their 
own way of positioning social subjects (Foucault 1972, 50-1).   
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 identity is specific to the domain in which an individual is ‘governed’.  There 
may be a diversity of codes of conduct orienting any one individual depending 
on the particular domain in which they are being ‘governed’ (Philpott 2000, 
149).   
 
The various identities which individuals occupy do not exist in isolation: rather, they are 
interrelated (Marshall 1998, 294-5).   Moreover, identity is not a static phenomenon, but 
one which is constantly changing.  As Hall notes, identity is ‘formed and transformed 
continuously in relation to the ways we are represented or addressed in the cultural 
systems which surround us’ (Hall 1992, 276 cited in Thompson, 1996, 65). 
 
The extent to which the identities produced in discourse are ‘taken up’ by individuals 
depends in part on the ways in which individuals interpret texts.  Since identities are 
constructed in discourse and reflected in the representational choices made in text, 
whether text interpreters produce (fully or partially) compliant or resistant readings of 
texts will have an effect on readers’ acceptance or rejection of these roles and identities.  
 
Social structure: power 
 
It was suggested above that there is a link between discourse and social structure, 
namely that discourse is derived from and so reflects social structure, and in particular 
power relations.18  The following section explores this link further by providing an 
explanation of the terms ‘power’ and ‘power relations’ through briefly examining the 
nature of power, drawing once more, on insights from Foucault’s work.19  This is not 
                                                          
18 In the context of CDA, Teun van Dijk and Norman Fairclough have made the most systematic attempts 
to define the concept of power in relation to text and discourse (van Dijk 1989, 19-21; van Dijk 1993b; 
van Dijk 2001; Fairclough 1989). 
19 As noted above, critical discourse analysis grew out of an interest in neo-Marxist theories of ideology, 
in particular the work of Gramsci, Habermas and Althusser and much work in critical discourse analysis 
has used the concept to great effect (see for example Hodge and Kress 1988, Fairclough 1992 and various 
others).  There are, however, a number of difficulties associated with the use of the concept of ideology in 
critical discourse analysis, and in particular with the combination of Foucault’s view of discourse with a 
Marxist or even a liberal conception of ideology.  Firstly as Pennycook notes, Foucault’s notion of 
discourse has much in common with a neutral or liberal conception of ideology as ‘views of the world’ (a 
conception which Thompson has criticised for lacking critical force and which is the view ostensibly 
adopted in CDA, see Fowler 1987, 490).  Foucault explicitly rejected the Marxist notion of ideology as 
false consciousness since this view of ideology assumes that there is ‘truth’, and that ideology obscures 
this truth.  For Foucault, there is no ‘real truth’.  Rather, the various ‘truths’ of a particular society are 
‘constructed’ in discourse.  Adopting a Foucauldian view of discourse thus raises considerable difficulty 
when combined with a critical or Marxist conception of ideology (although Fairclough does not seem to 
have this difficulty, perhaps because of the two ways he defines discourse) and to represent a conceptual 
‘doubling up’ if defined in a more neutral or liberal way. 
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 intended to suggest that social structure can be reduced to issues of power and power 
relations, but rather that this is the particular concern of this thesis. 
 
In the Weberian sense, the concept of power is broadly defined as the ability of an 
individual or group to act in a desired way (or not to act), to influence events or to 
acquire social, political or economic resources despite opposition (Marshall 1998, 519-
20; Johnson 2000, 234; Jary and Jary 1991, 490).  It is also defined as the capacity to 
manipulate the beliefs and values of others in a way which favors the interests of the 
power holder, or to otherwise prevent opposition from arising (Marshall 1998, 520; 
Johnson 2000, 234; Jary and Jary 1991, 491).  This view of power is often referred to as 
‘power-over’ (Johnson 2000, 234).  Such power is dependent upon access to resources 
of power such as wealth, expertise, social status, and control of information (Marshall 
1998, 520).  There is a strong correlation between the unequal distribution of these 
resources amongst social actors and the differential distribution of power (Marshall 
1998, 519).  In this view, power is ‘a substance or resource that individuals or social 
systems can possess’ (Johnson 2000, 234).   
 
Foucault’s view of power differs from this conception in a number of significant ways.  
First, rather than power representing a resource or an object which can be possessed, 
Foucault sees it as a set of relationships:   
 
power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we 
are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical 
situation in a particular society (Foucault 1979b, 93, cited in Barker 1998, 27).   
 
Second, rather than focusing on a sharp distinction between powerful and powerless 
individuals and institutions and on the negative, repressive exercise of power by the 
powerful, Foucault suggests instead that power is productive.  Power, he argues, 
operates by directing the behaviour and actions of others in ways which are conducive 
to the interests of those exercising power (Foucault 1979a; Barker 1998, 25). As 
Fairclough expresses it: 
 
[p]ower does not work negatively by forcefully dominating those who are 
subject to it; it incorporates them, and is ‘productive’ in the sense that it shapes 
and ‘retools’ them to fit in with its needs (Fairclough 1992, 50; see also Philpott 
2000, 149).   
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 This view of power is captured in the notion of government, which, according to 
Foucault, represents one form of power.  Government is concerned with the ways in 
which those in positions of authority (be they the state, parents, teachers or prison 
wardens) aim to ‘[modify] the actions or conduct of others through maintaining a 
certain possibility of a choice of actions in them’ (Barker 1998, 38).  At the same time, 
it also aims to influence the ways individuals regulate their own behaviour (Hindess 
1996, 97 and 105).  This ‘self-policing’ is the ultimate aim of government, and of 
power. As Barker notes, ‘the perfection of power should tend to render its actual 
exercise unnecessary’ (1998, 60). 
 
The view that the exercise of power is concerned with influencing the choices that 
social subjects make has important implications since it requires that individuals must 
have the freedom to make choices.  This freedom in turn implies that social subjects 
have the ability to exercise power themselves (see Hindess 1996, 100-1; Rouse 1994, 
105 and 220-1).  The aim of government is thus not complete control of society.  
Rather, effective government is possible only when, and precisely because, it allows 
citizens the freedom to ‘make the right choices’.  
 
One of the mechanisms through which government operates is discipline.  According to 
Hindess, discipline: 
 
aims to provide [individuals] with particular skills and attributes, to develop 
their capacity for self-control, to promote their ability to act in concert, to render 
them amenable to instruction, or to mould their characters in other ways … 
[D]iscipline is productive power par excellence: it aims not only to constrain 
those over whom it is exercised, but also to enhance and make use of their 
capacities (Hindess 1996, 113).  
 
In many modern societies, government and discipline have increasingly replaced 
coercion as the primary mode of controlling the actions of social subjects (Hindess 
1996, 108).  As Rouse points out, while coercion can repress or destroy its object, 
‘[d]iscipline and training can reconstruct it to produce new gestures, actions, habits and 
skills, and ultimately new kinds of people’ (Rouse 1994, 94-5).  If the strategies of 
government and discipline have been successful, these ‘new kinds of people’ will 
possess the capacity to act ‘freely but responsibly’ in accordance with the interests and 
values of those in authority (see Rouse 1994, 220; Hindess 1996, 131). 
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 Yet an important corollary of the freedom which the exercise of power necessitates is 
that power is always linked to resistance.  As Barker expresses it:  
 
even though power dominates and subjects, because it is a relation and not a 
substance, by definition it always leaves open opportunities for resistance.  
Therefore, in its operation whenever power is being exchanged, being 
circulated, the possibility always exists that it can be reversed, transformed and 
resisted (Barker 1998, 37).   
 
Foucault’s work on power represented a refutation of the Weberian concept of power 
and of Marxist theories of ideology.  These theories suggest that dominant groups, by 
virtue of their possession of power, are able to manipulate knowledge and so control 
others.   Foucault suggests that power works in far more subtle ways, through the 
techniques of government and discipline, rather than coercion, although the aim remains 
the regulation of others’ behaviour.  He also recognises the role of social subjects in the 
exercise of power: since power is a set of relations, social subjects must be both present 
and complicit for power to be exercised in a relation of domination and subordination.  
At the same time, Foucault also clearly identifies the possibility of resistance to the 
exercise of power: in addition to complying with the exercise of power, social subjects 
may also choose various levels of resistance to it (see also below).  
 
A framework for text analysis  
 
Earlier it was suggested that the linguistic choices made in texts are socially, culturally 
and politically determined.  Texts, it was noted, encode particular social and 
institutional ways of thinking and speaking about the world (discourses).  In doing so, 
they reflect the social structure and its particular configurations of power relations.  
Text-based analysis, it was argued, can thus provide an insight into both the structures 
of discourse and the larger social system from which these discourses are derived.  In 
analysing texts, however, we must take into account the fact that meaning making is a 
two-part process involving both the ways in which texts are produced and the ways in 
which they are interpreted.  This section outlines the particular types of linguistic 
choices which have been chosen as the focus of the analysis of state and student texts.  
The discussion does not constitute a comprehensive account of Halliday’s method.  
Rather, it examines only those textual features which have particular significance for 
understanding the ways in which students and the state represented students’ roles and 
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 identities and how they attempted to socialise their readers into their identities as 
students.   
 
Critical discourse analysis as a method 
 
As noted above, the method of analysis on which this study is based draws on 
Halliday’s model of language as a social semiotic, or a social system of meaning-
making.  Halliday suggests that all language use takes place within a particular ‘context 
of situation’.  The context of situation can be described in terms of the field of the text 
(what the text is about), the tenor of the text (what relationships exist between the 
participants in a text) and the mode of the text (what role the language is playing in the 
text and how the text is organised) (Halliday 1978, 33; Halliday and Hasan 1985, 12).  
Language, in this view, has three functions: it simultaneously expresses meanings about 
the experiential and interpersonal dimensions of social life, as well as having a textual 
function.  Thus, the field of the text is expressed through the experiential function, the 
tenor of the text through the interpersonal function and the mode through the textual 
function (see Halliday 1978 64 and 143-4; Halliday and Hasan 1985, 24-6; see also 
Halliday 1994; Eggins 1994).  At the level of grammar, the field of the text is realised in 
the system of transitivity: the patterns of processes (verbs), participants (actors and 
patients) and circumstances in a text, as well as the vocabulary used.  The tenor of the 
text is realised in the systems of mood, modality and person and the mode of the text is 
realised in the patterns of cohesion and information structuring (Halliday 1978, 64 and 
143-5; Halliday and Hassan 1985, 24-6).   
 
Halliday’s model has been the basis for a range of critical studies of discourse, where it 
has proved a fruitful means of understanding the workings of language and power (see 
for example Fowler, Hodge, Kress and Trew 1979; Hodge and Kress 1988; Fairclough 
1989; 1992).20  However, in addition to Hallidayan-based approaches, critical discourse 
analysts have also employed concepts from a range of other fields (Chilton and 
Schaffner 1997, 211; Gastil 1992, 470).21  Of particular importance have been concepts 
drawn from pragmatics, in particular the speech act theory of Austin (1962) and Searle 
                                                          
20 Chilton and Schaffner 1997 note that Halliday’s model ‘made it possible to link linguistic form to 
social and hence also to political activity’ (Chilton and Schaffner 1997, 211).   
21 For sample checklists of categories for analysis see Fowler and Kress 1979; Fowler 1985; Fowler 1991, 
chapter 5; Fairclough 1989, chapters 5 and 6; Fairclough 1992, chapter 8; Gastil 1992; van Dijk 1993b; 
van Dijk 1995; Chilton and Schaffner 1997; De Cillia, Reisigl and Wodak 1999.   
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 (1969) (see Fowler 1985, 73; Fowler 1991, 87-90; Gastil 1992, 479-80) and Grice’s 
(1975) conversational implicature (see Fowler 1985, 73-4; Gastil 1992, 480-2), as well 
as conversation analysis (see Fowler 1985, 74; Fairclough 1992, 16-20; Gastil 1992, 
490-2), metaphor (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Gastil 1992, 488-9) and syntax (see 
Fowler 1985, 70-72; Fowler, Hodge, Kress and Trew 1979; Wilson 2001, 402-4; Gastil 
1992, 482-4; Fowler 1991, 76-80).  Chilton (1985) and van Dijk (1989; 1993b; 1995) 
have also employed more cognitive-based approaches.   
 
Some writers, most notably Henry Widdowson, have criticised this ‘eclectic’ method  as 
‘a kind of ad hoc bricolage which takes from theory whatever concept comes usefully to 
hand’ (Widdowson 1998, 137).  Even firm advocates of critical discourse analysis have 
identified the problematic nature of its current methodological fragmentation (Toolan 
1997, 99), and emphasised the need to standardise the method, preferably using a 
Hallidayan model (Fowler 1987, 492; see also Fowler 1991, 68-9).  As Widdowson 
points out, one of the central problems with this methodological fragmentation is that 
some of these concepts may be based on different (and even contradictory) theories of 
language (Widdowson 1998, 138).  There is also the problem of what conclusions can 
be drawn about the meaning and effect of texts from an analysis of textual features 
given that meaning-making involves both text production (of which the features of a 
text are a product) and text interpretation (see Widdowson 1998, 142-3 and 146-7; 
Widdowson 1995a, 168-9; Widdowson 1996, 62-9; for a refutation of this view see 
Fairclough 1996, 50-1; see also Fowler 1991, 68-9).   
 
Widdowson’s criticisms are valid ones.  In particular, they highlight the need for critical 
discourse analysts to be clear about the processes they are analysing and their own 
position as an ‘analyst’ and to think carefully about the theories and methodologies they 
apply in the analysis of texts.  Critical discourse analysts need to acknowledge the 
limitations which the two-part process of meaning-making places on their analyses (see 
Fairclough 1996, 50-1).  Without a detailed analysis of audience responses to particular 
texts or of writers’ and speakers’ intentions, most critical discourse analysis currently 
undertaken is concerned almost exclusively with an analysis of the products of 
processes of text production (and the discourses which inform them) and not with text 
interpretation (although such analysis inevitably involves some conjectures about its 
possible effects on other readers).  Critical discourse analysts should also avoid 
claiming any privilege for their interpretation of the texts, except to the extent that it is 
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 consistent with the broader social, cultural and political context in which the text was 
produced.   
 
Critical discourse analysts also need to consider questions of methodology.  This does 
not necessarily mean that critical discourse analysis must employ a standard theory and 
methodology.  The relative diversity of social theories employed and the variety of 
concepts used to analyse the texts has led to a wide variety of approaches being 
encompassed under the label of critical discourse analysis.  Yet the problem appears to 
lie in attributing a single label to a very diverse practice of text and discourse analysis 
and expecting uniformity (see also Fowler 1991, 68-9).  In a practical sense, the variety 
of concepts which critical discourse analysts have applied are not based on such 
divergent theories of language that they are mutually incompatible.  The use of a variety 
of concepts allows critical discourse analysts to describe different aspects of a text.  
That being said however, Halliday’s model does provide both a unified theory and 
method of textual analysis.  The broad scope of the model allows for the analysis of a 
wide range of textual features - including the analysis of keywords, irony and satire, 
style and intertextuality undertaken in the present study - as part of the analysis of 
experiential, interpersonal and textual meanings.   
 
Keywords  
 
The term keyword as it is used in this thesis refers to a word or phrase which articulates 
a significant area of meaning in a text.  Keywords and the lexical sets (see below) which 
they enter into are central to Halliday’s model and are one of the key means by which 
experiential meaning is conveyed.  Fowler notes, for example, that, ‘the vocabulary of a 
language, or of a variety of a language, amounts to a map of the objects, concepts, 
processes and relationships about which the culture needs to communicate’ (1991, 80).  
The concept of keywords is by no means limited to linguistic theory.  Raymond 
Williams’ definition of keywords as ‘significant, binding words in certain activities and 
their interpretation’ has been widely used as a means of analysing the ideas, interests 
and values of a society or culture (Williams 1976, 15-16; see for example van 
Langenberg 1986).  The analysis of keywords and their meaning is also a common 
element in most critical discourse analyses.22   
                                                          
22 In CDA, key words are also analysed under the headings of vocabulary (Gastil 1992, 474-5), lexical 
processes (Fowler 1985, 69), lexical structure (Fowler 1991, 80-5) and word meaning (Fairclough 1992, 
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Keywords and their meanings are often major sites of struggle and contestation.  Since, 
as noted above, meanings are not ‘given’ but rather, constructed in and through 
discourse, words may be given different meanings and their meanings interpreted in 
different ways (Fairclough 1992, 185; see also Williams 1976, 11).  This is often 
referred to as the ‘meaning potential’ of a word.  The meaning potential of a word 
includes its dictionary or denotative meanings and its connotative meanings, that is, the 
meanings which are given to it in a particular social, cultural or political context 
(Fairclough 1992, 187).  The meaning potential of a word is often a focus of conflict 
(Fairclough 1992, 236; see also 185-90).  Wilson notes, for example, that conflict over 
the interpretation of a word may be based on differences over ‘what one believes a word 
means, and what effect, beyond a word’s core or semantic meaning, the use of the word 
has’ (Wilson 2001, 408; see also Fairclough 1992, 185-90).  These differences, he 
suggests, ‘may become politically implicated in directing thinking about particular 
issues, and with real and devastating effects’ (Wilson 2001, 408; see also Fairclough 
1995, chapter 5).   
 
In addition to conflict over keywords, there is also conflict over how meanings are 
‘worded’ (Fairclough 1992, 236-7; see also 190-4; see also Halliday 1978, 164-6).  
Thus, there may be a variety of words or phrases used to denote a particular concept.  
These different wordings are derived from different ways of thinking and speaking 
about the world and reveal the speaker or writer’s position or perspective.  A significant 
aspect of the process of giving words to meanings is the concept of rewording or, to use 
Halliday’s term, relexicalisation (Halliday 1978, 165; Fairclough 1992, 194).  
Relexicalisation refers to the process of creating new vocabulary items for existing 
concepts (Halliday 1978, 165) or for new concepts (Fowler 1991, 84).  Discussing the 
‘antilanguages’ developed by alternative or oppositional cultures, Halliday suggests that 
relexicalisation most commonly occurs in areas of meaning that are ‘central to the 
activities of the subculture and that set it off most sharply from the established society’ 
(1978, 165).  Overwording or overlexicalisation of these areas of meaning is also a 
common practice (Halliday 1978, 165-6; Fairclough 1992, 193; see also Gastil 1992, 
474-5).  Overlexicalisation, or the use of a large number of synonymous terms to 
describe a particular area of meaning, indicates a preoccupation with a particular topic 
                                                                                                                                                                          
236; see also 185-90).  See also Gastil on imprecise words, euphemisms and loaded words, and on 
dominant and marginalised or oppositional political lexica (1992, 476-7 and 479). 
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 (Fowler and Kress 1979; Fairclough 1992, 193).  These words are often differentiated 
from each other by the different attitudes which they express (Halliday 1978, 166). 
 
Sets of words, or to use Halliday’s term, lexical sets, are also important in 
distinguishing socially and institutionally significant areas of meaning (Fowler 1991, 82 
and 84).  As Wilson notes:  
 
[I]t may not merely be the single occurrence of a term that is important but sets 
of collocational relationships, which in their turn produce and draw upon 
ideological schemas in confirming or reconfirming particular views of the world 
(Wilson 2001, 406).   
 
Lexical sets also have an important categorising function: they organise experience and 
enable detailed distinctions to be made between concepts (Fowler 1991, 84; see also 
Wilson 2001, 409).   
 
Representing social actors  
 
As the system in which we express meanings about our experience of the world, the 
transitivity system plays an important role in how speakers and writers represent social 
reality.  The system of transitivity allows speakers and writers to make choices about 
how they will represent actions and the participants in these actions.  A key element in 
the analysis of transitivity involves specifying who the participants are in a text, what 
grammatical roles they play, what types of processes they are involved in, whether they 
are active or passive participants in these processes, and what the objects of their 
actions are (see Fowler 1991, 70-76; Fowler and Kress 1979; Fairclough 1992, 177-181; 
Fairclough 1989, 120-5).  The different choices that speakers and writers make reveal 
their position in relation to particular ways of thinking and speaking about the world.23
 
Van Leeuwen (1996) suggests that processes such as exclusion and role allocation, and 
their grammatical realisation in transitivity structures, have important consequences for 
the representation of social actors.  He suggests that speakers and writers may ‘include 
or exclude social actors to suit their interests and purposes in relation to the readers for 
whom they are intended’ (van Leeuwin 1996, 38).  Social actors may be excluded 
                                                          
23 The analysis of transitivity systems has been used extensively in studies of political discourse, 
including those with a critical discourse analysis approach (see for example Trew 1979a, 1979b; Hodge 
and Kress 1988; Ilie 1998; see also see Kress 1985b; Wilson 2001, 402-4). 
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 altogether, suppressed (the actors are merely implied in the text) or backgrounded (the 
role of the actors is de-emphasised) (van Leeuwin 1996, 39).  Exclusion is most often 
expressed through transitivity structures such as passive clauses where the agent of the 
action is omitted, or abstract nouns which function as grammatical actors.  The 
grammatical roles that social actors are allocated in a text are also significant.  Van 
Leeuwin notes that social actors may be represented as either ‘the active, dynamic 
forces in an activity’ (the grammatical agent/actor) or as the passive objects of action 
(the grammatical patient/goal) (van Leeuwin 1996, 43-4; see also Halliday 1985, 
chapter 5).  Yet van Leeuwin notes that:  
 
there need not be congruence between the roles that social actors actually play in 
social practices and the grammatical roles they are given in texts. 
Representations can reallocate roles, [and] rearrange the social relations between 
the participants (van Leeuwin 1996, 43). 
 
These kinds of (re)presentations are often politically motivated, making them of 
particular interest in the present study. 
 
Representing social relationships 
 
The interpersonal function of the text mediates the personal roles and social 
relationships between the participants in a text (Fowler 1991, 85).  Choices from the 
systems of mood, modality and person allow speakers and writers to establish a 
particular subject position for themselves, to position others in particular ways, and to 
express attitudes about social reality.  The analysis of interpersonal meaning in the text 
is thus concerned with power relationships and the ways these power relationships are 
expressed in texts.  Interpersonal meaning also plays a significant role in speakers’ and 
writers’ attempts to socialise their readers into a particular version of social reality.  
 
The analysis of interpersonal meaning is concerned with describing the patterns of 
mood, modality, and person in a text.  The grammatical realisation of speech functions 
(statements, questions, commands, and offers) for example, positions speakers and 
writers and their audiences in particular ways (see Eggins 1994, 149-53).  As 
Fairclough notes, declaratives position the speaker or writer as the provider of 
information and the listener or reader as the recipient.  In an interrogative, the speaker 
or writer requests something of the listener or reader, which the latter is then expected 
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 to provide (1989, 125-6).24  These subject positions have important implications for the 
kinds of power relationships which are established in a text and reflect broader relations 
of power between social subjects.    
 
The choices that speakers and writers make from the system of modality to express 
truth, obligation, permission and desirability - encoded in the grammar of Indonesian 
through modal auxiliaries such as harus (must), sebaiknya (should) and akan (will), as 
well as through adverbs, modal adjectives and tense - enable speakers and writers to 
express ‘their authority with respect to the truth or probability of a representation of 
reality’ (Fairclough 1989, 126?).  Categorical modalities such as that expressed in the 
use of the simple present tense (Hanya ada satu kata untuk pendekatan ini. [There is 
only one word for this approach.]), for example, establish the speaker or writer’s 
authority to represent what is said as ‘truth’ (Fowler 1991, 85-87; Fairclough 1989, 126-
7; see also Fowler and Kress 1979; Fowler 1985).  Such truth claims, and the authority 
that is associated with them, are one of the techniques that speakers and writers use to 
persuade their audiences to accept the view of the world being presented in the text.  
 
Relationships between texts 
 
The basis of Halliday’s model is the connection between texts and their situational and 
broader cultural contexts.  However, it is also concerned with the ‘textual’ environment 
in which texts are produced and interpreted (Halliday and Hasan 1985, 47).  The idea 
that texts interact with and are in fact made up of prior texts is known as intertextuality.  
While the term intertextuality was first introduced in the 1960s by Julia Kristeva, it has 
its origins in Saussure’s work.  During the 1930s, the Russian literary theorist Mikhail 
Bakhtin developed Saussure’s ideas, proposing a dialogic view of the meaning of a text 
(Allen 2000, 2).  He argued that texts ‘always originate in and function as a part of a 
social dialogue’ (Lemke 1995, 23, emphasis in original).  As a result, he claimed: 
 
the linguistic significance of an … utterance [text] is understood against the 
background of language, while its actual meaning is understood against the 
background of other concrete utterances [texts] on the same theme (Bakhtin 
1981, 281, cited in Lemke 1995, 22-3).  
 
                                                          
24 Fairclough notes that ‘there is not a one to one relationship between modes and the positioning of 
subjects’ (1989, 126).   
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 In this view, texts do not have meaning in and of themselves.  Rather, as Allen notes 
‘meaning is something which exists between a text and all other texts to which it refers 
and relates’ (Allen 2000, 1).  Kristeva took this view one step further, suggesting that a 
text ‘absorbs and is built out of texts from the past’ and ‘anticipates and tries to shape 
subsequent texts’ (Fairclough 1992, 101-2; see also Lemke 1995, 22-23).  This view of 
intertextuality is also at the heart of Foucault’s archaeological works.  As Foucault 
suggests in The archaeology of knowledge, a text is part of a complex network of other 
texts.  This network is made up of the series of other contemporary texts of which a text 
forms a part, past texts to which a text refers, either implicitly or explicitly, as well as 
the texts which will follow (1972, 98; see also Fairclough 1992, 101). 
 
The concept of intertextuality has important implications for the analysis of power 
relations.  As Fairclough notes, intertextuality: 
 
points to the productivity of texts, to how texts can transform prior texts and 
restructure existing [texts] to generate new ones.  But this productivity is not in 
practice available to people as a limitless space for textual innovation and play: 
it is socially limited and constrained, and conditional upon relations of power 
(Fairclough 1992, 102-3).  
 
The textual network of which a text is a part thus provides certain parameters for it.  Yet 
these parameters are also to some extent able to be resisted and challenged.  
Intertextuality is thus an integral part of the processes of contestation and resistance 
which take place in texts and which, in turn, reflect the broader dynamics of power.  
Consequently, analysis of the intertextual patterns in texts can provide an insight into 
the kinds of power relationships which exists between social actors and their texts.  
Such analysis is concerned with which texts are most commonly drawn upon and how 
are they used, what directions of influence there are between texts, what parameters 
intertextual relations set for how people are able to think and speak about the world, and 
in what ways intertextual relations are restructured or contested.   
 
Speaking and writing 
 
The role that language is playing in an interaction is a dimension of its mode.  In terms 
of the medium used, a basic distinction can be drawn between spoken language and 
written language.  Halliday suggests that speaking and writing are not simply ‘different 
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 ways of expressing the same meanings’ but rather, that they construct different versions 
of the world.  He argues that:  
 
[s]peech and writing impose different grids on experience.  There is a sense in 
which they create different realities.  Writing creates a world of things.  
Speaking creates a world of happening (Halliday 1985, 93; see also ibid., 97).   
 
Written language, Halliday argues, presents a synoptic view of the world, defining it as 
a ‘product’: an object or thing.  Spoken language, on the other hand, presents a dynamic 
view of the world, representing the world in terms of actions and events (‘processes’) 
(Halliday 1985, 81 and 97; see also Kress 1985a, 44-6).  Not all texts are simply either 
‘spoken’ or written’.  There are also a number of ways in which these two mediums 
might be combined, for example in a formal speech, which is written to be spoken aloud 
(Halliday 1978, 33; Halliday 1985, 78; Halliday and Hasan 1985, 12).  Martin (1984, 
27) thus characterises spoken and written language as a continuum between ‘language 
as action’ (spoken language) and ‘language as reflection’ (written language).   
 
The idea that spoken and written language represents the world in different ways - the 
one as a ‘process’ and the other as a ‘product’ - has important implications.  The 
choices that speakers and writers make along the spoken-written continuum when they 
create texts may be socially, culturally or politically motivated.  Choosing to represent 
the world in terms of actions and the people involved in these actions may involve a 
desire to foreground the agency of a particular actor.  Similarly, the choice to represent 
phenomena as ‘product’ may reflect a speaker or writer’s desire to represent the world 
in an abstract way, to distance the text from the world of concrete actions and events. 
 
Speaking and writing are also positioned differently in relations of power.  Kress 
suggests that the characteristics of written language, including its use of abstract nouns, 
its concern with the relationships between things (expressed through processes of 
‘being’), as well as its hierarchical structuring means that it is more highly valued than 
speech in many industrialised societies.  For this reason, ‘writing is the medium of the 
domain of public social and political life while speaking is the medium of the domain of 
private life’ (Kress 1985a, 46).  As a result of this, Kress argues: 
 
Participation in public life and the power which that distributes depends on 
access to and mastery of the forms of writing.  The possibility of being a certain 
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 kind of speaking and writing subject and therefore certain kind of social and 
cultural agent depends on a person’s position in and relation to the forms and 
potentials of speech and writing (Kress 1985a, 46; see also Halliday 1985, 78). 
 
Since written language indicates access to power, Kress argues that public figures adopt 
a more ‘written’ style when speaking.  However, they may also choose to use a 
‘spoken’ style, thus bringing the ‘language’ of the private sphere into the public domain 
and creating a sense of solidarity between speaker and audience (Kress 1985a, 46).25  
Writing in a more ‘spoken’ style achieves a similar effect, while a highly ‘written’ style 
tends to maintain distance between writer and reader.   
 
Irony and satire  
 
There has been relatively little work to date in critical discourse analysis which explores 
the use of irony and satire in texts (see for example Hodge and Mansfield 1985; Tsang 
and Wong 2004).  However, as Hodge and Mansfield have shown, an analysis of 
political satire, including cartoons and jokes, is both compatible with Halliday’s method 
and an important means of examining expressions of dissent (Hodge and Mansfield 
1985). 
 
A key element in the effect of irony and satire lies in the ‘shared knowledge’ which 
exists or, more accurately, must be actively created between the satirist and the reader.  
Successful satire is usually based on shared hostility to an event or person that is 
common to both the satirist and his or her audience (Hodge and Mansfield 1985, 202).  
In order to avoid censorship or political reprisals, however, the political message of an 
ironic or satirical statement must be ‘hidden’ beneath subtle layers of meaning (see also 
Hodge and Mansfield 1985, 200).  In this way, irony and satire are highly intertextual: 
they depend on audiences’ understanding of the broader textual and social context and 
on their ability to make connections between texts (see also Hodge and Mansfield 1985, 
199; Fairclough 1992, 123).  In an ironic or satirical text, readers have to interpret the 
meaning for themselves using the ‘clues’ provided as well as their own knowledge of 
current events and issues.  This process of interpretation has important consequences for 
the ways in which writers and speakers attempt to socialise their audiences into 
particular roles and identities.  By making audiences do the interpretive ‘work’, 
                                                          
25 This comparison can be seen in the public speeches of Indonesia’s first president, Sukarno, and those of 
former president Suharto (see Matheson Hooker 1995). 
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 speakers and writers provide the ‘raw material’ by which collective identities can be 
constructed and reaffirmed.  This ‘shared knowledge’ also creates solidarity between 
the writer or speaker and the audience, making these attempts at socialisation doubly 
powerful (see also Hodge and Mansfield 201-3).   
 
Irony and satire also have significant implications for interpersonal meaning.  Hodge 
and Mansfield argue that political satire contains both positive and negative modality.  
The comic element in much political satire enables the speaker or writer to claim that 
the criticism was either unintentional or not intended to be taken seriously and at the 
same time indicate that at some level, the criticism was both intentional and genuine 
(Hodge and Mansfield 1985, 201).  It also enables him or her to make a positive 
comment about ‘truth’ and at the same time about his or her authority to speak ‘truth’.  
The negative aspects of the speaker or writer’s modality, however, provide the audience 
with the opportunity to evaluate the truth of the speaker or writer’s claim based on their 
own knowledge.   
 
Hodge and Mansfield suggest that modality and negation, including modality and 
negation in ironic and satirical texts, ‘derive from and reflect situations of conflict’ 
(1985, 200-201).  They argue that irony and satire is made up of opposing discourses 
and opposing levels (surface and deep).  In many anti-nuclear jokes, they suggest, the 
surface level of meaning is pro-nuclear.  At a deeper level, however, is the anti-nuclear 
discourse.  Anti-nuclear jokes thus undermine pro-nuclear discourse by using it in a 
humorous or satirical way (Hodge and Mansfield 1985, 200-201).  Interpreting irony or 
satire, as Freud has pointed out, involves overcoming those ‘repressions’ which have 
been constructed in individuals as a result of the introjections of the ‘voice of authority’.  
Satire or humour separates this voice of authority from other voices within the 
individual’s psyche and draws attention to their contradictions.  This has the effect of 
‘demystifying … conflict, disparity and contradiction’ (Hodge and Mansfield 1985, 
202).   
 
State and society in New Order Indonesia  
 
The central issue which this thesis seeks to address is the question of how relations of 
power between students and the state and, more generally, between the state and wider 
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 society under the New Order shaped the politics of identity of Indonesian university 
students.  In order to answer this question, the following section examines existing 
scholarly writing on the relationship between state and society in New Order Indonesia.  
It then examines the nature of opposition under the New Order.  The final section 
surveys the relevant literature on the politics of language practices and suggests that the 
present study can contribute to filling a significant gap in this literature.  
 
Following Hewison, Rodan and Robison’s definition, the terms ‘state’ and ‘New Order’ 
are used in this thesis to refer to the particular ‘amalgam of social, political, ideological 
and economic elements’ which existed under the thirty-two year rule of Indonesia’s 
second president, Suharto (1966-1998).  These authors suggest that ‘the state is not so 
much a set of functions or a group of actors as an expression of power’ (Hewison, 
Rodan and Robison 1993, 4).  Yet while the state itself is a rather abstract construct, it 
has a concrete form in the state apparatus, defined as ‘the real, existing institutional 
forms of state power, namely the coercive, judicial and bureaucratic arms of the state’ 
(ibid., 5).26  Thus, as Crouch points out, ‘the ministers, senior bureaucrats and military 
and police officers must be regarded as the key leaders of the state’ (Crouch 1998, 
110).27  Since there is such a close link between the state and its apparatus, this thesis 
does not draw a sharp distinction between the two, with the term ‘state’ being used to 
refer to both the abstract construct as well as its more concrete forms.  Yet it is 
important to recognise that neither the state nor the state apparatus are unified entities.  
As Joel Migdal suggests, different elements within the state may ‘pull in different 
directions’ such that ‘we cannot simply assume that as a whole [the state] acts in a 
rational and coherent fashion, or strategically follows a defined set of interests’ (cited in 
Crouch 1998, 109).   
 
The state and its apparatus can be broadly differentiated from ‘society’.  A useful entry-
point into understanding the relationship between the state and society is the concept of 
civil society.  Although it has been given a wide variety of meanings over its long 
history, Rodan suggests that the concept is most usefully defined as an ‘inherently 
political’ sphere between the state and the individual.  Civil society is political, he 
                                                          
26 Regime, in contrast, refers to ‘a particular type of organisation of the state apparatus’ including liberal 
democracy, dictatorship and totalitarianism while ‘government’ refers to ‘the legislative and executive 
branches of the state apparatus’ (Hewison, Rodan and Robison 1993, 5). 
27 Crouch also argues for the inclusion of ‘key ‘private’ individuals, groups or organisations outside the 
formal–legal state’ (1998, 110). 
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 argues, because it is concerned with ‘advanc[ing] the interests of members through 
overt political action’ (Rodan 1996, 20 and 28; see also Aspinall 2002, 12-13).  The 
groups which constituted civil society in New Order Indonesia encompassed a broad 
range of social and economic forces.  Up to the late 1980s, students and intellectuals 
were the most active civil society groups.  However, from this time, a variety of other 
actors, including journalists, non-government organisations, organised labour, political 
Islam and the Indonesian Democracy Party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, PDI), began to 
play a more active role (Aspinall 1996; James 1990, 18).   
 
However, Rodan argues that a sharp distinction between civil society and the state tends 
to neglect the interrelationship between the state and society (Rodan 1996, 23).  In 
particular, he suggests, it largely ignores ‘the way in which societal forces have been 
incorporated or coopted into some sort of relationship with state structures’ (Rodan 
1996, 23 and 25).  State corporatism, in which functional and interest groups are given 
representation in the state, is one of the ways in which this occurs (Rodan 1996, 24, see 
also below).   
 
As a result of this recognition, a number of scholars have advocated a ‘third realm’ 
where state and society interact.  Huang, for example, suggests that in post-
revolutionary China this third realm, which included judicial institutions as well as 
farmers’ cooperatives, was used by the state as a means of penetrating civil society 
(Rodan 1996, 26-7).  In the context of New Order Indonesia, the concept of a ‘third 
realm’ provides a useful means of understanding some of the complexities of the state-
society relationship.  However, the emphasis on state utilisation of the ‘third realm’ to 
further its interests perhaps overlooks some of the ways that civil society can use this 
sphere to its own benefit (see Aspinall 1996, 215; see also below).   
 
Observers of New Order Indonesia during the late 1970s and 1980s tended to 
characterise politics in terms of the increasing dominance of the state over society 
(Aspinall 2000, 29).  Anderson, for example, suggests that ‘the New Order is best 
understood as the resurrection of the state and its triumph vis a vis society and nation’ 
(Anderson 1990a, 109).  He takes an historical approach, suggesting that the particular 
form of the colonial state, the weakness of the state during the parliamentary democracy 
and Guided Democracy periods, and the form which the transition to the New Order 
took, shaped the way the New Order state developed.  Taking a more structural 
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 approach, Mackie and MacIntyre argue that the growth of a strong state during the New 
Order was the result of a number of interrelated factors including the dominance of the 
military in politics (at least until the mid 1980s), the strengthening of the bureaucracy 
and the calculated weakening of the political parties.  The opportunities for patronage 
provided by the economic growth of the 1970s, and the increasing influence of business 
and conglomerates as a result of the economic deregulation of the 1980s were also 
significant.  At the same time, the increasing restrictions placed on political 
participation by wider society brought about important shifts in state-society relations.  
The result was an increasing concentration of power at the highest levels and, in 
particular, in the person of the president (Mackie and MacIntyre 1994, 7-9; see also 
Crouch 1998, 100-108).   
 
Analyses of New Order Indonesia in the 1970s and 1980s drew attention to three main 
processes by which the state maintained its dominance over society.  The first was the 
New Order’s vast network of patronage, which extended from the highest levels down 
to village elites.  As James notes, those within this network were so well incorporated 
into it that they were often unable (or unwilling) to effectively challenge the state 
(James 1990, 18-19; see also Mackie and MacIntyre 1994, 3 and 6-7; Crouch 1998, 
101).  A second process - repression - worked by silencing ‘those sections of society 
which [constituted] a potential or actual threat to the regime, but which [were unable to] 
be influenced by patronage’ (James 1990, 19; see also Mackie and MacIntyre 1994, 
1).28  The third process involved securing and maintaining both material and symbolic 
legitimation for the regime.  The strong economic growth of the 1970s and 1980s meant 
that Indonesia’s middle class, often touted in the academic literature as the vanguard of 
reform, were prepared to tolerate the restriction of their civil liberties provided the New 
Order continued to deliver improvements to the material conditions of their lives (see 
Mackie and MacIntyre 1994, 3).  At the same time, the rigorous propaganda programs 
put in place during the late 1970s and 1980s, ensured that most Indonesians were well-
versed in New Order ideology (see Mackie and MacIntyre 1994, 25-7; Heryanto 1990a, 
290-1; see also Bourchier 1996, chapter 8; Leigh 1991; Parker 1992; Mulder 2000).   
 
                                                          
28 For example, critical elements of the middle classes, including university students and religious leaders, 
were marginalised politically through, for example, the weakening of Muslim political organisations and 
the disbanding of student councils (James 1990, 19).  Labels such as ekstrim kanan (extreme right) or 
subversif (subversive) were also used to discredit these groups.  Moreover, the vast internal security 
apparatus, which penetrated all regions and all levels of society, ensured an ever-present threat of 
violence, as did the not infrequent use of actual violence against dissenters.   
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 Jackson’s and Robison’s analyses of the New Order provide two very different 
frameworks for understanding the dominance of state over society in the late 1970s.  
Using Riggs’ (1966) classic study of Thailand, Jackson (1978) characterises the New 
Order as a ‘bureaucratic polity’, which he defines as ‘a political system in which power 
and participation in national decisions are limited almost entirely to the employees of 
the state, particularly the officer corps and the highest levels of the bureaucracy’ 
(Jackson 1978, 3).  However, as Mackie and MacIntyre note, the application of this 
label to New Order Indonesia tended to overstate the extent to which those outside the 
bureaucracy were excluded: at times, they argue, ‘elements outside the state structure 
have … been able to play roles of some importance in the political system’ (Mackie and 
MacIntyre 1993, 6). 
 
A second framework was Richard Robison’s class analysis of the ‘military-bureaucratic 
state’ (Robison 1978, 1986). Robison suggests that it was the growth of capitalism in 
Indonesia from the late 1960s onwards, rather than any other factors, that led to the 
particular form of the New Order state (1978, 17).  He argues that power relations in the 
New Order state were centred on the competition between the Muslim merchant class, 
foreign and Chinese business interests, military bureaucrats and a coalition of state 
bureaucrats, intellectuals and students (Robison 1978, 17-18).  He suggests that the 
opportunities for patronage provided by the development of bureaucratic capitalism 
during the 1970s enabled the military bureaucrats to triumph although not without some 
conflict (Robison 1978, 37).  Opposition to the regime during this period largely 
emanated from the Muslim merchant class who were disadvantaged by the emergence 
of bureaucratic capitalism, or from students and intellectuals, who objected to the large-
scale foreign investment and corruption not only on moral grounds but also because the 
system offered them few meaningful roles (Robison 1978, 37-9). 
 
Students and intellectuals had been key elements of the broad coalition which supported 
the New Order in its early years.  However, from the early 1970s, this coalition began to 
break down and the New Order began to take an increasingly intolerant attitude to 
criticism (Aspinall 1996, 216-7).  From this time, the state also began to put in place a 
corporatist strategy of political representation, ‘simplifying’ the political parties, 
creating a party of functional groups (Golongan Karya, Golkar) and functional 
representative bodies for youth, farmers, fishers and workers.  It also began to promote 
more vigorously the ideology of the ‘organic state’.   
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The idea of the ‘organic state’ has a long history in Indonesia and its application by the 
New Order was by no means new: during the early Guided Democracy period, for 
example, Sukarno had advocated a corporatist model for state-society relations (see 
Bourchier 1996, 11; Reeve 1985).  However, it was the New Order state, under the 
guidance of its chief ideologue Ali Moertopo, which institutionalised the organic state 
concept.   
 
Indonesian ideologues claimed that the organicist model was an authentically 
‘Indonesian’ framework for state-society relations.  They rejected individualistic, 
Western models such as parliamentary democracy which, it was stressed, were 
incompatible with Indonesian political culture.  The model of the organic state they 
offered emphasised harmony and consensus in decision-making.  The state was 
represented as a family, headed by a paternal figure (Bourchier 1996, 2).  Since society 
was an integrated or ‘organic’ whole in which each group had a specific role to play, 
social and political organisation was to be based on functional groups rather than 
competing interests (ibid., 2 and 6; Robison 1993, 45).  The role of the state in this 
model was to articulate and embody the common interests of society and there was to 
be no distinction (at least in theory) between the state and society (Bourchier 1996, 2 
and 7; Robison 1993, 43).  Opposition to the state was thus both contrary to the 
common interest and ‘un-Indonesian’ (Bourchier 1996, 2).   
 
Yet as Bourchier points out, the organic state was an ideal, rather than a political reality 
(ibid, 10).  Moreover, the New Order’s organicist ideology did not develop in a 
systematic or consistent way but rather as a response to the periodic challenges that the 
state faced from various social forces (ibid, 12).  He suggests that: 
 
The intense and continuing efforts on the part of the government to stress the 
harmonious nature of Indonesian society and of state-society relations 
stem[med] from a deep fear of explosive communal conflict and social 
upheaval, much of it a result of its own political and economic policies (ibid, 
10). 
 
The student demonstrations of the 1970s were, as Bourchier points out, one of several 
factors which led to the introduction in 1978 of a wide ranging program of ideological 
indoctrination based on organicist principles (ibid, 301).   
 44
  
In the late 1980s, and coinciding with the period of ‘openness’ (keterbukaan), more 
serious challenges to the organicist model emerged.  These challenges were the result of 
structural changes in Indonesian society brought about by the sustained economic 
growth of the 1970s and 1980s and the changing nature of Indonesian capitalism (ibid, 
303; Aspinall 1996, 215).  Bourchier suggests that the growth of a new, more politically 
aware middle class and the emergence of organised labour led to increased pressure for 
more meaningful political participation (ibid., 12-13 and 302-3).  At the same time, the 
deregulation of the economy and the increasingly global nature of business led to 
demands for more transparency and legal certainty.   
 
The ‘arts of resistance’  
 
The above analyses of Indonesian politics focused on explaining state dominance over 
society.  Yet despite the strategies of cooptation, repression and material and symbolic 
legitimation, opposition to the state, in various forms, was a consistent feature of New 
Order politics from the late 1960s onwards.  This study is concerned with the forms of 
opposition which students took towards the state in the context of the ‘war of words’ 
over students’ roles and identities.  This opposition was political in character in that it 
constituted a challenge to the state and its apparatus.  It also took place largely in the 
public sphere, within which student newspapers and magazines represented one of a 
variety of forums. 
 
A useful way of characterising opposition is to locate it along a continuum.  In his 
analysis of resistance against the Third Reich between 1933 and 1945, Detlev Peukert 
suggests that oppositional behaviour can be characterised along two parameters: the 
degree to which the behaviour is public and the scope of the challenge to the regime.29  
Thus, isolated complaints against the regime produced in the private sphere constitute 
‘non-conformist behaviour’.  More public acts of ‘refusal’ represent the next level of 
dissident behaviour.  Above this are public forms of ‘protest’, in which ‘some 
intentional effect on public opinion is involved’ (Peukert 1991, 36-37).  The final point 
on the scale is ‘resistance’, which for the purposes of this study can be considered as 
                                                          
29 This paper was drawn to my attention by Edward Aspinall (2000, 4) 
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 synonymous with ‘opposition’ (Peukert 1991, 37, emphasis in original; see also 
Aspinall 2000, 4-6; Rodan 1996).30
  
Aspinall suggests that much of the oppositional behaviour in New Order Indonesia was 
‘played out in the grey zone between ‘state’ and ‘society’’ (1996, 215).  In the 1970s, he 
suggests,  
 
…those most able to articulate dissent were those elements who had participated 
most centrally in the New Order coalition of the 1960s and who had been closest 
to the army at that time.  Students, secular intellectuals, former Action Front 
activists, and even retired military and civilian officials formed the core of the 
dissident circles of the 1970s.  Because of their former role, they had at least a 
modicum of political legitimacy in New Order discourse (Aspinall 1996, 221). 
 
These early regime opponents criticised the government from a position of relative 
commitment to the existing state structure (Aspinall 1996, 222).31  As the regime took a 
more intolerant approach to criticism, however, semi-opposition became more 
common.32  The prevalence of semi-opposition resulted in what Aspinall and Bourchier 
have called a ‘blurring between opposition and government, state and society’ (Aspinall 
1996, 223; see also Bourchier 1996, 184).  As social and political forces were 
increasingly subject to cooptation, dissidents were forced to adopt (either willingly or 
unwillingly) a strategy of ‘work[ing] from within’ (Aspinall 1996, 224).   
 
Semi-opposition (and the consequent blurring of state and society) remained a central 
feature of oppositional behaviour throughout the New Order (Aspinall 1996, 234).  
However, from the late 1980s, oppositional activity broadened in terms of the social 
actors involved, the ideological forms it took and its social support bases.  Thus, in 
addition to the elite level dissidents of the 1970s, labour groups also became more 
politically active (Aspinall 1996, 229-30; see also Uhlin 1997).  ‘[N]ationalist, populist 
and even leftist political moods and ideologies’ were also revived and the organisational 
base of opposition strengthened (Aspinall 1996, 230 and 232). 
                                                          
30 See also James Scott’s (1990) study of domination and resistance. 
31 See also Southwood and Flanagan’s (1983) characterisation of student activists during the 1970s 
adopting a strategy of partial accommodation in their role as ‘critical collaborators’  
32 According to Linz, semi-opposition ‘consists of those groups that are not dominant or represented in 
the governing group but that are willing to participate in power without fundamentally challenging the 
regime’ (Linz 1973, 191; cited in Aspinall 2000, 6; see also Rodan 1996, 11).  Semi-opposition may 
emanate from factions within the regime itself or from within institutions that are part of the state 
apparatus, from corporatist organisations as well as from a range of other ‘outside’ organisations 
(Aspinall 2000, 6-7).  As Aspinall notes, semi-opposition ‘does not ‘fundamentally challenge’ the regime, 
instead typically promoting modification of policies’ (2000, 7).   
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 Language and the New Order state 
 
There have been a number of studies of the language of the New Order state.  These 
have been undertaken both by Indonesian and non-Indonesian scholars.  The majority 
are in the form of short academic articles although two book-length studies have been 
produced (Berman 1998; Eriyanto 2000).  Of these studies a number focus on the use of 
single keywords (Heryanto 1995; Bowen 1986) or sets of keywords (van Langenberg 
1986, 1990).  Others have used presidential speeches as a means of analysing more 
global structures of New Order language use (Matheson Hooker 1995; Eriyanto 2000).  
A number have also examined the relationship between New Order language use and 
the dynamics of power (Saryono and Syaukat 1993; Berman 1998; Langston 2001).   
 
While the majority of these studies have focussed on the powerful aspects of New Order 
language use, most also acknowledge the presence of resistance to New Order language 
practices.  The amount of attention this receives is variable, however, ranging from a 
single line to a more substantial discussion and there is little attempt to analyse the 
relations between New Order language practices and practices of resistance.  A number 
of studies have approached the issue of resistance to the New Order from the 
perspective of literature and the performing arts (see for example Hatley 1990; Foulcher 
1990; Clark 2001; Errington 2001; Hill 1979; see also Matheson Hooker 1999) although 
the emphasis tends to be on the macro-level themes of resistance and not on more 
micro-level aspects.  This study is thus one of the first to consider in detail the linguistic 
aspects of opposition and resistance to the New Order.  It foregrounds analysis of one 
form of resistance by examining one of the key groups which consistently challenged 
the regime.  A significant strength of this study is that it focuses in detail on the role of 
language in the articulation of power and resistance to power.  As a result, this study 
will make a significant contribution to understanding the micro-level dynamics of 
opposition in New Order Indonesia.  
 
The seminal work on the political aspects of Indonesian language is Benedict 
Anderson’s 1966 paper, ‘The languages of Indonesian politics’, republished in 1990 in 
the collection Language and power: Exploring political cultures in Indonesia 
(Anderson 1990b).  As the title suggests, Anderson sees Indonesian politics in the late 
1960’s as encompassing a number of different ‘vocabularies’ or ‘languages’ 
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 (discourses), including bureaucratic colonial, Western democratic-socialist, nationalist-
revolutionary, and Javanese traditional.  Anderson’s primary concern is to trace the 
development of these discourses through the colonial and early post-colonial period to 
their synthesis in the language of Indonesian politics in the late 1960s.  The aim is to 
explain how this synthesis was and continues to be transformed ‘to adjust to the realities 
of urban Indonesia’ at the beginning of the New Order period.  This process of 
adjustment, Anderson claims, is best understood from the perspective of the growing 
imposition of Javanese language and cultural modalities onto ‘revolutionary Malay’.33  
This shift, he suggests, had its origins in the slowing of the revolutionary impulse, 
which came about as the result of changes in political, economic and social practices in 
the period after the revolution. 
 
Anderson’s article offers a unique perspective on language use at the beginning of the 
New Order given that it was another 20 years before any further detailed studies of New 
Order language use were produced.  His paper is the only one which seeks to identify 
the historical origins of the ‘languages’ of the New Order.  Yet the changes which took 
place in New Order language use, even in the period immediately following the initial 
publication of Anderson’s article, mean that his conclusions regarding the ‘fusion’ of  
bureaucratic colonial, Western democratic-socialist, nationalist-revolutionary, and 
Javanese traditional discourses were not borne out in precisely the way he envisaged.  
During the New Order’s first few years, for example, nationalist-revolutionary 
discourse took on a markedly different character, which the gradual disappearance of 
the term ‘revolution’ from official speeches and texts exemplified (see Cribb 1992, 
405).  Western democratic-socialist discourse was also quickly stripped of its socialist 
aspects and democracy redefined in uniquely ‘Indonesian’ terms as ‘Pancasila 
democracy’.  The bureaucratic character of New Order language also flourished (see 
Anderson 1994, 138-9; see also Bourchier 1996, 245-50).  At the same time, ‘Javanese’ 
linguistic and cultural frameworks continued to dominate at least in the language of the 
state and the bureaucracy (see Errington 1986, 2001; Sneddon 2003, 139-40; Kleden 
1998).   
 
During the 1980s and 1990s several studies of New Order language use employed 
Raymond Williams’ ‘keywords’ approach, focusing on either sets of keywords (van 
                                                          
33 The Javanisation of Indonesian has in fact been well documented by both Indonesian (Pabottingi 1991; 
Moeliono 1989, 40-1) and non-Indonesian (Siegel 1986) scholars. 
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 Langenberg 1986, 1990) or on single keywords (Heryanto 1995; Bowen 1986).  
Michael van Langenberg’s 1986 article ‘Analysing the New Order state: A keywords 
approach’ represents one of the first attempts to analyse the structure of the New Order 
state through ‘its own indigenous discourse’ (van Langenberg 1986, 1).  Van 
Langenberg identifies a basic lexicon of forty keywords, which he defines, following 
Raymond Williams, as ‘significant, binding words in certain activities and their 
interpretation’ (van Langenberg 1986, 1).  These keywords identify and provide the link 
between the five major facets of the state: power, accumulation, legitimacy, culture and 
dissent.   
 
Van Langenberg’s analysis provides a systematic account of the interaction between the 
key terms of New Order political discourse as the expression of the state’s ideology and 
the way in which the state maintains its hegemony.  It is concerned with how keywords 
both describe and are involved in the establishment and maintenance of state power.  
The keyword bapak (father), for example, which van Langenberg categorises as a 
keyword of power, articulates ‘the overall structure of social stratification in Indonesia’.  
Similarly, the keyword Gestapu (Gerakan September Tigapuluh, Thirtieth of September 
Movement) justifies the New Order’s authoritarian mode of rule by serving as a 
constant reminder of the danger posed by the ‘enemies of the state’.  In this way, van 
Langenberg’s analysis represents not only a novel contribution to the understanding of 
the New Order state formation but an explicit acknowledgement of the connection 
between language and power. 
 
The emphasis on ideologies of dissent is also of value.  As van Langenberg points out, 
dissent is both ‘a product of the state-formation and a determining factor upon it’.  The 
keywords of dissent he identifies are focused around religious belief, cultural identity, 
ethics, morality, and social justice (van Langenberg 1986, 28).  Such issues have, 
according to van Langenberg, been central to dissent since the New Order’s inception 
and remain important loci of opposition today.34
 
In a later paper van Langenberg revisits the keywords approach, making some 
adaptations to the original lexicon and incorporating new keywords (including 
deregulasi (deregulation) of the economy and regenerasi (regeneration), referring to the 
                                                          
34 Anders Uhlin, for example, has described Islamic pro-democracy discourses in which Islamic values 
and Islamic concepts are central aspects of opposition.  Similarly, a common goal of pro-democracy 
discourses is social justice and the demand for human rights (Uhlin 1997, 129-30 & 145) 
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 generational change in the leadership of the state) to fit in with recent events and 
changes in policy (van Langenberg 1990).  Of particular note is the redefinition of the 
state as encompassing eight major facets, including four main arenas: a state-system, 
civil society, private realms and public realms, and four processes: dominance, 
hegemony, production and markets.  However, this reformulation appears to have 
resulted in a loss of emphasis on dissent, which van Langenberg claims has been 
domesticated under the auspices of the policy of political openness (keterbukaan) (van 
Langenberg 1990, 136).35
 
Ariel Heryanto’s (1995) analysis of the term pembangunan (development) also takes a 
‘keyword approach’ (see also Heryanto 1988, 1990b). Heryanto’s central concerns are 
to outline the political, economic, and cultural variables involved in the construction of 
the various definitions of pembangunan, to trace the continuities and changes that have 
taken place in these definitions, and to explore the implications of these changes and 
continuities for contemporary Indonesian society.   
 
Like van Langenberg, Heryanto sees pembangunan as a keyword in New Order 
Indonesia.  Pembangunan, he suggests, has an all-pervasive presence in the official life 
of the nation.  In this sense, he argues, the word pembangunan defines reality: 
 
The keyword Pembangunan … is ‘constitutive’ because it gives Pembangunan 
its actual existence, as well as its recognisable and workable nature.  The 
metaphor, Pembangunan, provides a set of boundaries within which the general 
population is urged to concentrate their views of reality, from which and within 
which to explore the vast changes in which they are engulfed (Heryanto 1995, 
9).   
 
According to Heryanto, the all-pervasive nature of Pembangunan in qualifying 
individuals, institutions, concepts or activities:  
 
indicates the espousal of controlled or approved processes of social interaction, 
in thought and behaviour, which are conducive to maintaining or reproducing 
the state-desired economic, political, and cultural status quo (Heryanto 1995, 
10).36   
 
                                                          
35 As this study shows, dissent was by no means wholly domesticated.  Although the period of openness 
to some extent did assimilate soft-line opposition, student protest in fact escalated during this period.  
36 Vedi Hadiz suggests that the Pancasila indoctrination courses for civil servants (Pedoman Penhayatan 
dan Pengamalan Pancasila, P4) were successful in ‘totally stultify[ing] the minds of people’ (cited in 
Bourchier 1996, 247).  However, as Bourchier notes, pointing to Ramage’s 1994 study of Pancasila 
discourse, ‘lively and vigorous debates are possible within the framework of Pancasila discourse’ (ibid.). 
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 Heryanto recognises the possibilities for resistance to these approved processes of social 
interaction.  Pembangunan, he argues, has not ‘exhausted the population’s 
consciousness’ nor the potential of the language (Heryanto 1995, 10). 
 
The anthropologist John Bowen’s 1986 study of the concept of gotong royong (mutual 
assistance) in Indonesia takes a similar approach.  Bowen explores the ways in which 
the category of gotong royong ‘has provided ideological material for political discourse 
and for state intervention into rural society’ (1986, 545).  Yet, as Bowen points out, 
villagers themselves do not always interpret the term gotong royong in the way in which 
the state intends: alongside the official understanding of gotong royong as the authentic 
‘spirit’ of the Indonesian community are the ‘everyday’ understandings of gotong 
royong.  In these understandings, gotong royong is seen as either a convenient term for 
pre-existing local practices of reciprocity or as a euphemism for the labour demands 
made of villagers by the state.  Local responses to state intervention thus vary from 
‘acceptance based on a strategic misrecognition of the basis for the labour demand to 
tacitly ignoring the dictates of the state’ (Bowen 1986, 558-9).   
 
Van Langenberg’s analysis is undertaken from the perspective of state theory.  And 
while both Bowen and Heryanto take an anthropological approach, only Heryanto 
focuses on the linguistic aspects of the keyword pembangunan, and even then the focus 
is on single word.   As a result, despite their relative strengths, the keywords approaches 
offer little in the way of detailed linguistic analysis.  Moreover, while the keywords are 
considered in terms of their broader social, cultural and political contexts, the textual 
contexts, and the relationship between the textual context and the broader social, 
cultural and political contexts, is not considered.  
 
Virginia Matheson Hooker’s study of New Order presidential speeches offers 
considerably more in this regard.  Matheson Hooker applies Halliday’s register theory 
in examining ‘the interaction between the language of the New Order Independence 
Day addresses [Pidato Kenegaraan] and their social context’ (Matheson Hooker 1995, 
276; see also Hooker 1996).  She begins by discussing the New Order policy of 
language development.  One of the major policy goals, she notes, has been the 
standardisation of the language and the promotion of proper and correct (baik dan 
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 benar) use (see also Sneddon 2003, chapter 7; Errington 1998, 274-5).37  This, she 
claims, is not merely an aesthetic concern but rather represents an example of language 
manipulation and a means of establishing the hegemony of the officially sanctioned 
mode of expression (see also Heryanto 1987, 1992; Pabottingi 1991; Moeliono 1989; 
Sudjoko 1989).   
 
Matheson Hooker takes Suharto’s presidential addresses commemorating Independence 
Day as a benchmark for formal, baik dan benar (correct and proper) New Order 
language (1995, 274).  The speeches, she claims, have developed a regular format 
which enables them to be easily compared (see also Teeuw 1988).  Using as her 
framework the three register variables - field, tenor and mode - Matheson Hooker 
analyses the Independence Day Addresses in relation to the social and political context 
in which they were presented.   
 
In terms of their field, she notes, the Independence Day Addresses are concerned with 
the role and aims of the New Order.  According to the speeches, the primary role of the 
New Order is the pure and consistent implementation of the Pancasila and the 1945 
Constitution, which includes the correction of ‘deviations’ from the ideals expressed in 
the proclamation.  The New Order also functions as the provider of a ‘way of life’ 
(tatanan kehidupan) for the nation, which is consistent with the Pancasila and the 1945 
Constitution.  In addition to this, a number of other themes pervade the texts including 
the concept of demokrasi (democracy), stabilitas nasional (national stability), kemajuan 
(progress) and kekeluargaan (family principles).  
 
The tenor of the speeches is formal and authoritative.  A strong sense of distance is 
established between the president and the immediate and wider national audience.  The 
members of the MPR are addressed using conventional phrases.  The wider audience, 
however, is never addressed directly although they are included in the speech through 
the use of kita (we: inclusive) and through references to rakyat (the people), masyarakat 
(society) and bangsa (nation). 
                                                          
37 Errington notes, for example, that ‘Indonesian is considered … as part of the nation-state’s 
infrastructure, promoting homogeneity among citizens across national territory and so facilitating the 
modernisation of the economy and the stabilisation of social configurations.  It is likewise derivative of a 
state-supervised, ‘top-down’ process, through which Indonesian is superimposed on otherwise diverse 
communities through a bureaucratically hierarchised system of state-sponsored or state-supervised 
schools.  It resonates with the vision of bounded but socially and linguistically homogenous space 
characteristic of national forms of territoriality (1998, 275). 
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The mode of the speeches is written although they are intended to be read aloud.  
Rationality and forward planning are expressed through the constant repetition of 
vocabulary items such as dalam rangka (in the framework of), landasan (base, starting 
point) and tahapan (stage, phase).  A sense of continuous consolidation in the 
development of the nation is expressed through the repetition of the word lagi (again) 
and through the use of the memper- form of the verb, indicating intensification of the 
quality expressed in the base word.38
 
This New Order discourse is then compared with the type of public discourse used by 
former president Sukarno during his Independence Day address of 1966.  Matheson 
Hooker concludes that the differences between the two indicate that New Order 
discourse, with its formal style and emphasis on detailed planning, was ‘fashioned 
deliberately as a reaction and a contrast to the style of the previous government’ (1995, 
284-5).   
 
Eriyanto (2000) also uses presidential speeches as a means of analysing the language of 
the New Order regime.  His approach is based on Teun van Dijk’s method of discourse 
analysis and focuses on a detailed analysis of the linguistic features of the texts 
including theme, structure, semantic strategies, sentence level features, keywords and 
style.  These features are then linked to Suharto’s world view and to the consolidation 
of his power.  For example, Eriyanto suggests that linguistic strategies used in 
presidential speeches are aimed at controlling information.  In this way, information 
which is of advantage to the regime, such as economic successes or the reduction of 
debt, is given explicitly and the sentence structure is often active.  Information which 
presents the regime in a negative light, including the presence of social conflict or 
political opposition, is given in an implicit and vague way, and the sentence expressed 
in the passive voice (Eriyanto 2000, 116).  Active and passive sentences, nominalisation 
and abstraction are also used to foreground the positive actions and strengths of the 
regime or to deemphasise weaknesses or failures (Eriyanto 2000, 146-51).  In addition, 
Suharto uses the first person inclusive pronoun kita (we) as a means of demonstrating 
his representation of the wishes of the people and to cultivate a relationship of solidarity 
with his wider audience (Eriyanto 2000, 156-9).  Suharto also establishes semantic 
                                                          
38 In the verb mempercepat (accelerate), for example, is constructed from the base word cepat, meaning 
‘fast’ or ‘quick’. 
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 monopolies over the interpretation of certain key words, including pembangunan 
(development), Pancasila, kebudayaan nasional (national culture), and adil makmur 
(just and prosperous), and uses strategies such as euphemism, labelling and ‘newspeak’ 
in order to manipulate the meaning of certain words and obscure others (Eriyanto 2000, 
chapter 8).39   
 
Saryono and Syaukat also take a linguistic approach to the analysis of New Order 
power, suggesting that the New Order’s use of language reflects the dynamics of power.  
Their focus is on the ways that the New Order authorities consolidated and strengthened 
their power through language and the linguistic responses of wider society to the New 
Order’s power (Saryono and Syaukat 1993, 55-56).  One of the key ways that the New 
Order consolidated its power, they argue, was through the linguistic ‘smoothing’ 
(penghalusan) of concepts which might endanger the New Order’s power.  Terms such 
as komersialisasi jabatan (commercialisation of positions) for bureaucratic corruption 
and kekurangan gizi (nutritional deficiencies) for famine are examples of this.  The New 
Order also exaggerated perceived threats in order to deny or discredit non-state actors, 
classifying them as subversif (subversive), or applying the labels ekstrim kiri (extreme 
left) and ekstrim kanan (extreme right).  In addition, the use of phrases such as demi 
kepentingan umum (for the common good), demi pembangunan (in the interests of 
development) and kita perlu mengetatkan tali pinggang (we need to tighten our belts) 
were designed to direct the public’s attention away from negative aspects of 
development and unite them behind the New Order (Saryono and Syaukat 1993, 60-1).   
 
Despite these measures, Saryono and Syaukat argue that Indonesian society was able to 
exert some control on the New Order’s use of power in language.  The key means by 
which they did this was by satirising official acronyms and concepts.  The acronym for 
the Indonesian civil servants association, Korpri (Korps Pegawai Republik Indonesia), 
for example, was said to stand for koruptor pribumi (corrupt Indonesian official).  
Similarly, the term ganti rugi (compensation), used by the New Order to refer to the 
compensation given to villagers whose land had been taken over by the government for 
development projects (often promised and seldom given), was taken to mean ‘meskipun 
diganti ya tetap rugi’ (‘even though things have changed, we still lose out’).   They 
conclude that the position of the New Order authorities over wider Indonesian society 
                                                          
39 See also Hidayat (1999).  Lubis (1989) and Anwar (1989) discuss the use of euphemisms and other 
political aspects of New Order language practices.   
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 remains dominant and society’s power weak.  This is so, they suggest, because wider 
society is only able to express dissent in subtle linguistic ways while the New Order 
authorities are able to consolidate their power clearly and openly (Saryono and Syaukat 
1993, 66-7).   
 
The approaches of Matheson Hooker, Eriyanto and Saryono and Syaukat offer valuable 
insights into the micro-level aspects of power and language during the late New Order 
period.  In particular, Matheson Hooker and Eriyanto’s focus on the experiential, 
interpersonal and textual aspects of presidential speeches and their relationship to the 
broader social and political contexts of the texts enables both authors to provide rich 
linguistic detail.  From the point of view of this study, however, the main weakness of 
these analyses is the fact that the link between the linguistic features and the dynamics 
of power relations is not adequately explored.  In particular, these studies lack an 
underlying theory of power and power relations within which to frame the analysis of 
language.  A similar criticism can be made with regard to Saryono and Syaukat’s 
analysis.  Moreover, while Saryono and Syaukat’s treatment of dissenting language 
practices is of particular value, their conclusion that wider society remains weak in the 
face of the dominance of the New Order’s linguistic power seems somewhat 
unwarranted: as this study shows, despite its subtlety, the satirising of official acronyms 
and concepts is in fact a powerful and effective means of expressing dissent.   
 
Two studies which examine the relationship between language, power, and the politics 
of identity in New Order Indonesia are Langston (2001) and Berman (1998). Langston 
(2001) is a study of the production of the ‘ideal national citizen’ in Suharto’s speeches 
during the late New Order (1996 to 1998).  Her approach is based on Foucault’s concept 
of power, and in particular his claim that ‘government has particular rationalities … 
inherent to it’, the aim of which is to influence individual behavior (Langston 2001, 1).  
Langston argues that Suharto employed language to emphasise that the success of the 
aims of the New Order government relied upon the individual ‘becoming’ an ideal 
Indonesian national citizen’ (2001, 1).  Throughout the speeches the key values of the 
New Order - prosperity, stability and continuity- are reinforced through the repetition of 
key phrases and the standardised structure of the speeches themselves.  Opposition is 
represented as a threat to these values and Suharto himself as both the mentor of the 
nation and its protector and guide (Langston 2001, 2). 
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 Langston’s examination of the role of power relations in producing ‘ideal’ Indonesian 
citizens is particularly relevant for the present study.  Her emphasis on the role of 
individual agency in the production of national citizens is of particular value.  Langston 
argues that the success of the New Order’s attempts to construct ideal national citizens 
is dependant upon individuals internalising the New Order’s aims and values and 
regulating their conduct in accordance with these (Langston 2001, 26).  This is 
consistent with the claims made above that the production of texts is only one part of 
the process of meaning-making, the other being the process in which readers or listeners 
interpret texts and from this produce compliant or resistant readings.  As a result, 
Langston’s study, like the present study, is limited to an examination of one ‘half’ of the 
process of meaning-making. 
 
Laine Berman’s study of Javanese oral narratives to some extent redresses this.  In 
Speaking through the silence: Narratives, social conventions and power in Java (1998), 
Berman examines the ways that working class Javanese women both reproduce and 
challenge the macro structures of power and authority through the stories they tell.   
These stories are told against the backdrop of the New Order’s construction of Javanese 
identity, which taps into what Berman calls ‘traditional definitions of Javanese 
elegance’ (Berman 1998, 6-11).  Berman’s approach draws on both linguistic 
ethnography and Teun van Dijk’s socio-cognitive approach to discourse, suggesting that 
aspects of Javanese social hierarchy are reproduced through the structuring of oral 
narratives and the more micro-level linguistic patterns (Berman 1998, 12-17 and 21).  
By exploring the stories of ‘everyday’ Javanese women, Berman is able to draw some 
conclusions regarding the ways in which these women interpret and respond to the 
‘powerful’ texts that shape them. 
 
Berman (1999) continues this project by examining the ways in which the dominant 
metaphors of the Indonesian state position individuals as ‘good Javanese’ as well as 
how the ‘voice of authority’ maintains a position of power through the control of 
informational metaphors.  She also examines how a group of homeless children, by not 
recognising this discourse of power and, consequently, not taking up the powerless 
position in the discourse, are positioned ‘outside the system’. 
 
Berman begins by examining how ‘the masses’ are positioned in certain ways through 
the metaphor of ‘Javaneseness as a journey’.  According to this metaphor, which is 
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 reinforced through the centrally controlled media, the good Javanese chooses the path 
of self-sacrifice for the sake of prosperity and harmony for all, while the bad Javanese 
chooses the path of pamrih (greed and self-indulgence).  Such metaphors position the 
Javanese masses as ideally acquiescent to authority, accepting of their fate and with a 
strong sense of obligation to their immediate and wider community (the nation) 
(Berman 1999, 141-4).  She then explores the ways in which the ‘voice of authority’ 
establishes the exclusivity of its information-giving and decision-making roles.  The 
metaphor of ‘information is a sacred entity’ renders the voices who are authorised to 
provide it supremely powerful.  In addition, through the metaphor of ‘the nation is a 
family’, the voice of authority becomes a paternal figure or bapak (father) and the 
listeners anak (children).  The voice of authority also maintains its dominance through 
the creation of an invisible and unnamed enemy, often associated with communism 
(Berman 1999, 145-6).  Yet according to Berman, the homeless children who belong to 
GIRLI, a cooperative of homeless children in Yogyakarta, have never learned the 
metaphors that disempower them and position the voice of authority as powerful.  As 
such, these children in effect reject the state’s definition of them as powerless and enjoy 
considerable freedom to question and criticise (Berman 1999, 151-6).   
 
The strength of Berman’s analyses lies in the emphasis given to power relations and in 
the explicit links made between language practices and power relations.  She also 
presents substantial supporting evidence drawn from the texts themselves, making her 
analysis rich in linguistic detail.  Her analysis of the ways in which the GIRLI children 
resist the dominant discourse of the New Order state is of particular relevance for the 
present study.  Berman shows that the GIRLI children’s contestation of key concepts of 
the state discourse constitutes a direct rejection of the system.  Yet, she argues, for the 
GIRLI children the consequence of this challenge to the system was the silencing of 
their voices.  As this study shows, students’ challenge to the system was a combination 
of both ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ resistance.  This, coupled with students’ institutionalised 
status, enabled their criticisms to be much more effective than those of the GIRLI 
children. 
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 Conclusion 
 
The survey of the literature on critical discourse analysis suggests a need for practical 
case studies of the linguistic aspects of resistance.  The application of Weberian theories 
of power and Marxist conceptions of ideology, with their emphasis on dominance and 
‘false consciousness’, has meant that resistance to the exercise of power and to the 
discourses of those in authority, has been neglected.  Indeed, while some practitioners 
of CDA, including Norman Fairclough, have used Foucault’s concept of discourse, this 
study is unique amongst critical discourse analysis approaches in its application of 
Foucault’s concepts of power, government and discipline to the analysis of texts.  This 
study will thus assess the effectiveness of the critical discourse analysis method, and the 
application of Foucault’s concept of power, in examining power relations in Indonesia.   
 
The examination of the literature on Indonesia suggests that there is a need to build on 
the understanding of power relations between the state and wider society under the New 
Order.  It also suggests that there is a need to understand more about the micro-level 
aspects of power and resistance in New Order Indonesia.  Existing studies of state-
society relations have often emphasised the New Order’s success in securing the 
acquiescence of wider society for its rule and have offered political, economic or other 
explanations for this (see for example Anderson 1990a; Jackson 1978; Mackie and 
MacIntyre 1994; James 1990; Crouch 1998).  Those who have explored in detail the 
nature of resistance and opposition to the New Order have tended to focus on macro-
level phenomena - political organisations, NGOs, and political parties - or have traced 
the broad themes of opposition (see for example Aspinall 2000; Uhlin 1997).  Others 
have approached the issue of resistance to the New Order from the perspective of 
literature and the performing arts (see for example Hatley 1990; Foulcher 1990; Clark 
2001; Errington 2001; Hill 1979; see also Matheson Hooker 1999).  There is therefore a 
need to develop further the kind of close linguistic analysis undertaken by Heryanto 
(1995), Matheson Hooker (1995), Eriyanto (2000) and Saryono and Syaukat (1993) by 
linking it, as Langston (2001) and Berman (1998, 1999) do, with a theory of power and 
power relations.  Foucault’s concept of power enables the complex and reciprocal 
nature of power relations in New Order Indonesia to be examined.  Combined with a 
method of linguistic analysis in which the link between language and its social and 
political context is already theorised, this view of power prompts a reassessment of the 
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 apparent dominance of the state by suggesting that resistance is an inevitable and indeed 
integral part of the exercise of power. 
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 CHAPTER TWO 
 
Mahasiswa in New Order Indonesia 
 
This chapter examines the history of youth and student activism in Indonesia and 
introduces the youth and student population of the New Order.  This provides the 
background for the analysis in the remaining chapters.  Taking as a starting point 
Foucault’s view that discourses are historically constructed, the first part of the chapter 
locates the origins of Indonesia’s pemuda and mahasiswa at the beginning of the 
twentieth century.  The discussion does not constitute a comprehensive overview of the 
period.  Rather, it sketches a broad picture of youth and student activism in the late 
colonial and immediate post colonial period.  The aim of this is to introduce the 
tradition of youth and student activism in Indonesia and examines some of the ways in 
which these early student activists saw their roles and identities.  This tradition had a 
significant impact on the ways in which students’ roles and identities were defined 
during the New Order both by students themselves and by the state.   
 
The second part of the chapter examines some of the key New Order policies 
concerning the young generation (generasi muda) and students (mahasiswa).  These 
policies were designed to separate youth from their revolutionary past and integrate 
them into the key values of the organic state: harmony, consensus, self-sacrifice and a 
concern for the common interest.  At the same time, the policies also aimed to facilitate 
the practical utilisation of the young generation for development (pembangunan).  This 
approach was a response to the state’s recognition that the combination of a 
predominantly young population and a strong tradition of youth and student activism 
was potentially highly destabilising for the regime.  
 
The final part of the chapter provides a brief survey of student activism in Indonesia 
during the New Order period.  While the organisations, themes and character of 
Indonesian youth and student activism, particularly in the New Order period, have been 
well-documented, there remains a need to address questions of student identity in a 
more systematic way.  The examination of state and student representations of students’ 
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 roles and identities in this thesis, and the links it makes between discourse, identity and 
power, go some way towards addressing this.   
 
Origins: tracing pemuda and mahasiswa 
 
The roots of the identities of New Order mahasiswa can be found in the schools and 
colleges set up by the Dutch colonial administration from the mid 1800s.  A basic 
education had been available to a very small number of Indonesians since the seventh 
century through the Hindu-Buddhist asrama, and later through the Islamic boarding 
schools (pesantren or madrasah), and Christian missionary schools established by the 
Portuguese and later by the Dutch (Lee 1995, 1-2).  In the mid 1800s, education in the 
Dutch East Indies began to expand.  This early expansion was largely the result of the 
Dutch colonial administration’s recognition of the need for better educated Dutch-
speaking professionals and administrative personnel to staff for the growing 
bureaucracy.  To this end the Dokter Jawa medical school, which became the Training 
School for Native Doctors (School tot Opleiding van Inlandsche Artsen, Stovia), was 
established in Batavia in 1851.  In 1873 a number of vocational schools for civil 
servants, later renamed Training Schools for Native Administrators (Opleidings School 
voor Inlandsche Ambtenaren, Osvia), were established in Bandung, Magelang and 
Probolinggo (ibid., 3).   
 
Education expanded further under the Dutch colonial government’s Ethical Policy, 
introduced in 1901.  This policy was introduced in response to a growing sentiment 
within Holland that colonial policy should include a greater focus on the welfare of the 
indigenous people of the archipelago (Lee 1995, 4; Nagazumi 1972, 18-25).  One of the 
key priorities of the policy was the creation of more educational opportunities for 
indigenous Indonesians, including primary and secondary education (Lee 1995, 4; see 
also Nagazumi 1972, 22).  This included vocational education.  In 1909 the Training 
School for Native Lawyers (Opledingsschool voor Inlandse Rechtskundigen) was 
established. Vocational schools for veterinarians (Nederlandsch-Indische Veeartsen-
school) and agricultural specialists (Middelbare Landbouwschool) in Bogor (which 
were later amalgamated), and a number of teacher training schools were also created 
(Hardjasoemantri 1982, 19-20).  From the 1920s, institutions of higher education also 
began to be established, either through the conversion of vocational high schools into 
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 faculties or by the opening of new institutions, such as the technical college (Technische 
Hoogeschool) in Bandung, which was opened in 1920, and the colleges of law 
(Rechtshoogeschool) (1924) and medicine (Geneeskundige Hoogeschool) (1927) in 
Jakarta (Hardjasoemantri 1982, 20-1; Ingleson 1975, 63).  In addition, a select few of 
the most promising Indonesian students from the Dutch stream had the opportunity to 
undertake higher education overseas, mostly in Holland or the Middle East (Martha 
1992, 65-8; Ingleson 1975, 2-3 and 63-4).   
 
The schools and colleges set up by the Dutch attracted young people from villages and 
towns throughout the archipelago.  As Anderson notes, the bonds which developed 
between these students through their common educational experience contained the first 
seeds of the ‘imagined community’ which was to become Indonesia (Anderson 1991, 
121).  These seeds developed through organisations such as Budi Utomo (Noble 
Endeavour) and later in regional youth organisations such as Tri Koro Dharmo (later 
Jong Java), formed in Batavia in 1915, Jong Sumatrenen Bond (1917), Jong Ambon 
(1918), Jong Minahasa (1919), Jong Celebes (1919), Sekar Rukun (1920), Jong Bataks 
Bond (1926), as well as the Muslim youth organisation Jong Islamieten Bond (1925) 
(Martha 1992, 45-53; see also chapter three).1  It was these youth who in 1928 pledged 
an oath to unity which was later to be made into the symbolic foundation of the 
Indonesian state (see Foulcher 2000; 45 tahun 1974).  
 
Until at least the mid to late 1920s, the terms these students used to describe themselves 
were Dutch.2  In the 1910s, students studying in the Dutch secondary schools and 
vocational colleges - which at that time represented the highest level of education 
available within the Indies - were referred to as leerlingen (pupils).3  These students 
were mostly in their mid to late teens and came from privileged aristocratic or 
professional backgrounds (Anderson 1972, 16-17).  Students studying in universities 
and institutions of higher education outside of the Indies were differentiated from 
secondary and vocational school students by the use of the Dutch term student.  With 
the opening of institutions of higher education in the Indies in the early to mid 1920s, 
                                                          
1 For accounts of the youth organisations of the colonial period see Nagazumi (1972); Suryadinata 
(1978); Biro Pemuda (1965); Tomasoa (1972); Martha, Wibisono and Anwar (1984); Martha (1992); 45 
tahun (1974); van Miert (1996); Liem (1971); Reid (1979).   
2 The following discussion relies on Indonesian translations of Dutch language sources collected in Ihsan 
and Soeharto (1981) and Soeharto and Ihsan (1981, 1982). 
3 See for example the 1916 article which appeared in Tri Koro Dharmo, the newsletter of the organisation 
of the same name (later renamed Jong Java), reprinted in Soeharto and Ihsan (1981, 1-9). 
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 the term student was also applied to students studying at these institutions.  These 
students were aged in their late teens and early twenties and were a highly select (and 
small) minority.  Dutch-speaking youth and students in the Indies also used a variety of 
terms to describe young people in general including jongere generatie (younger 
generation), jonger geslacht and jong leven (young people, youth), as well as jongeren, 
jeugd and jongelieden (youth).4   
 
For the indigenous Indonesian students, speaking Dutch was a sign of their Western 
education and their membership of an elite group in society.  The prestige associated 
with the colonial language (and with those who used it) meant that the Dutch terms for 
student and youth also had a certain prestige.  As nationalist sentiment in the Indies 
grew, however, Dutch was gradually replaced by Malay (Indonesian).  Amongst the 
youth, the Malay terms for youth and student began to be used from the beginning of 
the 1920s.  In 1921, for example, the inaugural editorial of the Sundanese language 
newsletter of the youth organisation Sekar Rukun used the Malay term murid (pupil) 
(Soeharto and Ihsan 1981, 195).5  By the mid to late 1920s Malay terms such as murid 
and pelajar (student) were commonplace in Malay language writings produced by 
youth and students in the Indies.  The term murid tended to be reserved for secondary 
and vocational school students while pelajar was used to describe students studying in 
institutions of higher education both within the Indies and overseas.6   
 
The Malay term for youth - pemuda - was also widely used at this time.  In the context 
of the regional youth organisations the term usually referred to those between the ages 
of 14 and 30.  Since most of the youth who were active in the youth organisations were 
also students, the term pemuda often implied educated youth, either those who were still 
students or those who had recently graduated.7   
                                                          
4 See for example the variety of terms used in Mohammad Hatta’s 1928 statement at his trial in The 
Hague, reprinted in Soeharto and Ihsan 1982, 143-58. 
5 Sekar Rukun was the youth organisation formed by Sundanese students studying in Batavia. 
6 See for example its use to refer to the Stovia students (murid Stovia) who first established Jong Java in 
that organisation’s commemorative volume published in 1930, parts of which are reprinted in Soeharto 
and Ihsan (1981, 23).  The Indonesian Students Association (Perhimpunan Pelajar-pelajar Indonesia, 
PPPI) was formed in 1926 by students studying at the faculties in Batavia and Bandung (Tomasoa 1972, 
49). 
7 A 1925 Malay-language article in the newspaper Bandera Islam, reporting the founding of Jong 
Islamieten Bond, described the organisation as an association of Indonesian youth (serikat pemuda 
Indonesia) (Soeharto and Ihsan 1981, 257).  The organisation was intended for ‘Muslim youths between 
the ages of 14 and 30’ (pemuda-pemuda Islam umur 14 sampai 30 tahun) and especially for Dutch 
speaking Indonesians (anak-anak Indonesia jang berbahasa Belanda).  It was intended to be of interest to 
Indonesian youths who are still studying and those who had already graduated (pemuda-pemuda 
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The lack of a clear distinction between youth and students at this time was reflected in 
the compound forms which often appeared.  A 1916 article in Tri Koro Dharmo for 
example, described the organisation of the same name as providing the model for an 
association which would encompass all ‘student youths’ (studeerende jongelingen) in 
the Indies (Soeharto and Ihsan 1981, 4).  A 1928 Malay language editorial in Suluh 
Indonesia Muda (Torch of Young Indonesia) described the four Perhimpunan Indonesia 
students then under trial in the Hague as kaum pelajar Indonesia (Indonesian students), 
pemuda-pemuda (youths), pemuda-pemuda pelajar (student youths), and pemuda kita 
jang mengejar ilmu (our youth who are pursuing knowledge) (Soeharto and Ihsan 1982, 
159-161).  These terms suggest that for the youth and students of the late colonial 
period the categories of ‘youth’ and ‘student’ were not mutually exclusive: individuals 
could occupy both a ‘student’ and a ‘youth’ identity simultaneously.   
 
The youth of the colonial period saw themselves as having an important role to play as 
leaders of the rakyat or common people.  While this concern initially centred on a 
particular ethnic or regional grouping, it eventually encompassed a concern for ‘the 
people of Indonesia’ (Indonesische volk).8  Until at least the mid to late 1920s, however, 
most of the regional youth organisations were explicitly non-political.  Their aims were 
usually expressed in terms of improving ties between Dutch secondary and vocational 
school students from the same ethnic group and fostering an appreciation of their 
traditional cultures and languages (see Martha 1992, 46 and 49; Biro Pemuda 1965, 32 
and 38; Tomasoa 1972, 25 and 28).  From the end of the First World War, however, 
political events within the Indies, including the activities of the growing nationalist 
movement, began to have a more significant impact on Indonesian youth and students.  
The new, more political outlook which these organisations began to cultivate found 
expression in the growing efforts to foster unity (persatuan) amongst the youth groups.  
By the time of the Second Youth Congress in October 1928, Indonesian youth and 
students were representing their role as the pioneers of unity not only in the context of 
the youth organisations but within the wider ‘imagined community’ of Indonesia (see 
Anderson 1991).  In his address at the opening of the Second Youth Congress 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Indonesia yang lagi dalam pelajaran dan yang sudah tamat belajarnya sekolah) (Soeharto and Ihsan 
1981, 261). 
8 See for example the open letter to the press written on 23 July 1908, by Soewarno, the secretary of the 
Founding Committee of Budi Utomo (cited in Penders 1977, 225-6).  See also the 1916 article in Tri 
Koro Dharmo by Stovia student and first president of Tri Koro Dharmo Raden Satiman Wirjosandjojo 
cited in Soeharto and Ihsan 1981, 6-7 and the 1925 Malay language editorial in the newspaper Bandera 
Islam cited in Soeharto and Ihsan 1981, 258-9. 
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 Mohammad Yamin argued that the place of Indonesian youth (pemuda Indonesia) in the 
nationalism and unity of Indonesia (kebangsaan dan persatuan Indonesia) ‘is not 
outside or on the edge of unity and nationalism but in midst of our unity, if not at its 
centre’ (cited in Ihsan and Soeharto 1981, 144).   
 
Yet while the youth of the regional youth organisations remained somewhat cautious in 
their politics, the students of the Perhimpunan Indonesia (Indonesia Association) were 
from the beginning of the 1920s consciously involving themselves with the more radical 
end of the nationalist spectrum.  The Indonesia Association (originally called the 
Indonesische Vereeniging) was founded in Holland in 1908 as a non-political 
association of Indonesian students studying in the Netherlands. After its leaders came 
into contact with nationalist leaders exiled to the Netherlands in the mid 1910s and early 
1920s the organisation was gradually politicised.  Between 1919 and 1925 it played an 
important role in the development of a radical secular nationalist ideology (Ingleson 
1975, 1- 4 and 71).9  The organisation’s involvement in the nationalist movement in the 
Indies led to the arrest in September 1927 of four key leaders of Perhimpunan Indonesia 
- Mohammad Hatta, Ali Sastroamidjojo, Abdul Madjid and Nazir Pamuntjak - on 
charges of inciting violence against the Dutch government.10  In his 1928 defense 
speech, the young Sumatran Mohammad Hatta described the role of Indonesia’s youth 
in politics - and the role of the Perhimpunan Indonesia students in particular - as an 
appropriate and indeed central one.  This role, he argued, was based on their particularly 
keen understanding of the poor conditions under which the people of the Indies lived 
and of the colonial situation.  It was also a function of their status as ‘young 
intellectuals’ (kaum intelek muda) whose role was to ‘prepare and reawaken the 
Indonesian nation’ (Hatta 1976, 12-13, 18-19, 23-24). 
 
When the Japanese took over from the Dutch on 8 March 1942 they dissolved all 
political associations and organisations, including the youth and student organisations, 
and closed all institutions of higher education (Ricklefs 1993, 202; Saidi 1993, 24).11 
The use of Dutch was prohibited and the military authorities promoted the use of 
                                                          
9 To reflect the changing political orientation of the organisation, in 1924 the Indonesische Vereeniging 
changed its name to Perhimpunan Indonesia and its publication, originally called Hindia Putra, was 
renamed Indonesia Merdeka (Ingleson 1975, 26 fn 4; and 87). 
10 The arrests took place in the aftermath of the crackdowns which followed the communist uprisings of 
1926-1927.  They were tried 6 months later although all four were later acquitted (Ingleson 1975, 56 and 
58-61).   
11 The medical college in Jakarta was later reopened in April 1943 under the new name of Ika Daigaku 
(Saidi 1993, 19; Anderson 1972, 19).   
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 Japanese.  Since almost no-one in the Indies spoke Japanese, however, ‘Malay’ (as the 
Japanese referred to it) was used in education, administration and other areas of public 
life (Ricklefs 1993, 201; Sneddon 2003, 111).  As a result of this anti-Dutch policy, the 
Dutch terms for ‘youth’ and ‘student’ disappeared from public life.  Many of the new 
organisations set up by the Japanese for youth and students used the Japanese terms for 
youth (seinen) and student (gaku), although others used Indonesian names.12  It also 
seems likely that it was during the Japanese occupation that the term mahasiswa 
(university or college student) began to be used to refer to the few students studying at 
the medical college and in the other institutions of higher education set up by the 
Japanese.13  By the time the Republic’s first institutions of higher education were 
opened in 1949 and 1950, this term was in common usage.   
 
Mahasiswa comes from the term siswa, meaning ‘student’ and the Sanskrit prefix 
maha-, meaning ‘great’.  While the Dutch terms leerlingen (pupil, secondary school 
student) and student (university or college student) distinguished between students in 
different levels of education, the 1940s was the first time this distinction was drawn in 
Malay (Indonesian).  This was a result of the need to replace the now-banned Dutch 
term student and to describe the students of the newly created faculties.  There was a 
considerable element of prestige associated with the status of college or university 
student, reflected in the use of the Sanskrit prefix maha-.   
 
The closure of all Dutch-language schools, including the colleges, meant that many 
students were without employment.  Some of these youths found a new intellectual 
outlet in the informal meetings and discussions which took place in the asrama 
(dormitories) of Jakarta and Bandung (Anderson 1972, 19 and 39-60; see also Legge 
1988; Safwan 1973, Wirasoeminta 1995, Malik 1956; Diah 1983; see also Dahm 1969, 
302-315; Sukarno 1966, 200-220).  Others returned home or joined the new 
organisations being set up by the Japanese.  
 
                                                          
12 See for example, the Japanese name given to the semi-military scouting organisation Seinendan (Youth 
Corps) or to the organisation set up in 1943 for students from seventh grade through to high school, 
Gakutotai (see Kahin 1952, 110).  The Greater Asia Youth Corps (Barisan Pemuda Asia Raya), however, 
used the Indonesian term for youth (pemuda). 
13 One of the underground groups of the occupation which was closely connected to Sjahrir was called 
Student Union (Persatuan Mahasiswa).  It was made up of university students in Jakarta.  See also the 
name of the Jakarta Students’ Association (Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Jakarta).  However, the term pelajar 
also remained in use.  See for example Martosowejo 1984, 207-14.   
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 From early in the occupation, the Japanese had begun mobilising educated and 
uneducated, urban and rural youth into a range of new organisations created for the 
purposes of propaganda and defence.14  It was as a result of these efforts that the 
concept of pemuda broadened, both in terms of the educational level of the pemuda to 
which it referred and the socio-economic and demographic group it described.15  During 
the colonial period the term pemuda referred to those youth who were either students or 
recent graduates of the Dutch education system.  During the Japanese occupation, 
however, youth from a wide variety of socio-economic backgrounds and educational 
levels came together in organisations such as the Homeland Defence Force (Pembela 
Tanah Air, Peta) Seinendan (Youth Corps), Heiho (Auxiliary Forces), Keibodan 
(Vigilance Corps), and Barisan Pelopor (Vanguard Corps) (Anderson 1972, 20-30; 
Kahin 1952, 109-110).16   
 
The military training they received under the Japanese served the youth of Indonesia 
well when, in the aftermath of the proclamation pemuda from a wide range of social 
backgrounds joined the armed struggle to defend Indonesia’s independence against the 
returning Dutch.  The most important quality of these pemuda was their revolutionary 
semangat (spirit).  This spirit brought together ‘youthful’ qualities of the pemuda: 
‘vigour, courage and determination’ (Frederick 1997, 229).17  It also reflected a 
commitment to the struggle for independence which often went beyond age (Lucas 
1988, 157-8; see also Reid 1986, 188; Frederick 1989, 69, 151-2, 261-2; Frederick 
1997, 199-200, 203 and 227 ff; Anderson 1972; Hardjito 1952). 
 
                                                          
14 Kahin notes that the Japanese specifically targeted uneducated youth since their lack of exposure to the 
West made them ‘most easily and effectively indoctrinated to hate and fight against the Allies’ (Kahin 
1952, 109).  See also Sihombing 1962.  
15 Frederick suggests that ‘the Japanese occupation resulted in a widening of the meaning of pemuda … 
by extending the age limits (to 29 or 30)’ (Frederick 1997, 229).  In fact, colonial era youth organisations 
such as Jong Islamieten Bond had accepted members up to the age of 30 and some organisations did not 
set an upper age limit for members.  Sekar Rukun, for example, only specified that their members be 
above the age of 14.  Ordinary members and committee members had to be school students but honorary 
members and extraordinary members did not (see Soeharto and Ihsan 1981, 196).  The Japanese 
occupation did, however, result in the mobilisation of much greater numbers of pemuda under the age of 
30. 
16 The Barisan Pelopor, for example, which was established at the beginning of 1944, incorporated 
students and graduates of the Dutch secondary schools and vocational colleges as well as uneducated 
urban youths (Anderson 1972, 33).  In age the youth who joined these organisations were between 14 and 
35.  In the Seinendan, membership was open to those between the ages of 14 and 25 (although this was 
later dropped to 22).  The Keibodan, an auxiliary police force, accepted young men from 20 to 35 
(Anderson 1972, 26-7).   
17 Frederick (1997, 201) notes that for the Dutch the term pemuda at this time carried far more negative 
connotations, being associated with terms such as ‘terrorist’, ‘extremist’ and ‘mass murderer’.   
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 Lucas argues that the pemuda style which developed during the revolution was part of a 
long tradition of social protest in Indonesia, especially in Java and Sumatra, where 
youth trained in pesantren (Islamic boarding schools) under a kyai (religious teacher) 
were practised in martial arts.  It was also linked to the tradition of the jago (literally, 
champion) and village school teachers who were often at the centre of social protest 
against the Dutch and the pangreh praja (colonial administrative officials) (Lucas 1988, 
157; see also Frederick 1997, 200).  This pemuda style was reflected in the ‘practice of 
speaking bluntly [rather then with official-style politeness]’ and the ‘sharp, decisive 
way of giving commands’ which both Smail (1964, 127, cited in Frederick 1997, 200) 
and Reid (1974, 54-5, cited in Frederick 1997, 200) have described.  The pemuda style 
reflected what Lucas and others have identified as a rejection of hierarchy and a 
cultivation of oneness with the people, which was and important part of nationalist 
ideology in Indonesia from the 1930s (Lucas 1988, 159).  Thus, like the youth of the 
regional youth organisations, the pemuda of the revolution also saw their role in relation 
to the rakyat as one of leadership and defence.  As Frederick notes: 
 
A kind of populism which may be termed ‘rakyatism’ – an attentive, 
sympathetic, yet in many respects rather paternalistic view of the masses 
characteristic of intellectuals and educated, urbanized Indonesians generally – 
had its roots deep in the prewar pergerakan [nationalist movement] and was very 
much part of pemuda sensibilities from the very beginning of the Revolution 
(Frederick 1997, 237).   
 
Yet despite the rhetoric about ‘being one with the masses’, the pemuda of the revolution 
distinguished themselves clearly from the rakyat.   
 
With independence achieved, much of the youthful vigour of the revolutionary years 
was in the early 1950s channeled into education as those youth whose schooling had 
been interrupted by the call to arms returned to their studies (Lee 1995, 33 and 69).  
Education, including higher education, was one of the key priorities of the new republic.  
Indonesia’s first university had been established in November 1949 when the Balai 
Perguruan Tinggi Gadjah Mada (Gadjah Mada Institute of Higher Education), 
established in Yogyakarta in March 1946, was renamed Universitas Gadjah Mada 
(Gadjah Mada University).  The republic’s second university was formed when in 
January 1950 Universitas Indonesia (University of Indonesia), established in 1947 in the 
occupied territories, was transferred to republican hands (Hardjasoemantri 1982, 25-9; 
Cummings and Kasenda 1989; Notosusanto 1964, 6-7). Between 1950 and 1960, an 
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 additional six state universities were opened in various centres throughout the 
archipelago.18  Islamic education also expanded at this time with the establishment of 
the State Islamic Institutes (Institut Agama Islam Negeri, IAIN) and the State Islamic 
Universities (Universitas Islam Negeri, UIN).19
 
The 1960s saw further growth in the tertiary education sector.  In 1963 the government 
issued a decree to provide each of the then 25 provinces the opportunity to establish 
provincial state universities (Atmakusuma 1974, 6).  As a result, between 1960 and the 
end of 1965 an additional 30 state universities, institutes and teachers colleges (Institut 
Keguruan dan Ilmu Pendidikan, IKIP) were created throughout the archipelago (Oey-
Gardiner 1991, 85).  Private universities and colleges also flourished during this time. 
By 1968 there were 87 Islamic theological colleges and 236 registered private 
universities (Hardjasoemantri 1982, 37).  Government departments such as the 
Department of Public Works also established their own academies to provide vocational 
education (Atmakusuma 1974, 9). 
 
It took some time for the effects of this new emphasis on education to filter through to 
the tertiary sector in terms of student numbers.20  However, as more students graduated 
from senior secondary schools, and took up university studies, Indonesia’s university 
student population grew.  At the beginning of 1960 there were approximately 50 000 
university students in Indonesia.  By the end of 1965 it was estimated that there were 
more than half a million (Magenda 2001, xvi).  Like their colonial counterparts, the 
university students of the 1950s mostly came from relatively privileged socio-economic 
backgrounds (Magenda 1977, 4-5).  As a result, they were keenly aware of their role as 
the future elite.  By the early 1960s, however, university students were a much more 
socially and culturally heterogeneous group.  Of particular significance was the larger 
numbers of Muslim students studying at tertiary level where they had previously been 
underrepresented (ibid., 8).   
                                                          
18 These were Universitas Airlangga in Surabaya (1954), Universitas Hasanuddin in Makassar (1956), 
Universitas Andalas in West Sumatra (1956), Universitas Padjajaran in Bandung (1957), Universitas 
Sumatra Utara in Medan (1957) and Institut Teknologi Bandung (Bandung Institute of Technology, ITB) 
in Bandung (1959) (Hardjasoemantri 1982, 24-32).   
19 These institutions, which were run by the by the Department of Religious Affairs, aimed to develop 
Islamic knowledge and to train teachers for the rapidly expanding Islamic school (madrasah) system.  
The reformist Islamic organisation Muhammadiyah also established a number of universities to serve its 
need for teachers and several other private and Christian groups also began to set up their own institutions 
of higher education (Cummings, Malo and Sunarto 1997, 96-7). 
20 In the 1950/1951 academic year the total enrolment at universities and institutes was 6457.  By 
1961/1962 it was 97 210 and by 1963/1964 it was 184 489 (Hayden 1967, 496).  In 1965 student 
enrolment was 184 000 at 28 universities (Atmakusuma 1974, 6). 
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In the immediate post-revolutionary years these students were largely uninterested in 
political affairs: Indonesians had won political independence from the Dutch and 
economic conditions were generally felt to be satisfactory (Gunawan 1986, 130; 
Bachtiar 1968, 185).  In the lead up to the 1955 elections, however, the political parties, 
recognising the importance of students as a constituency, set about cultivating their 
support.  Some political parties established new student organisations, such as the 
Indonesian National Student Movement (Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia, 
GMNI), established by the Indonesian Nationalist Party (Partai Nasionalis Indonesia, 
PNI),21 and the Socialist Student Movement (Gerakan Mahasiswa Sosialis, Gemsos), 
established by the Indonesian Socialist Party (Partai Sosialis Indonesia, PSI).  Others 
cultivated relationships with existing student organisations, such as that between 
Masyumi and the Islamic Students Association (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, HMI) and 
between the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI) and local 
communist student organisations and later the Concentration of Indonesian Student 
Movements (Consentrasi Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia, CGMI) (see Bachtiar 1968, 
186-7, Gunawan 1986, 131; Raillon 1985, 8-9; see also Saidi 1993, 8-25).22  From the 
beginning of the 1960s these organisations began to play a more significant role on 
university campuses and in national politics (Douglas 1970, 131; Magenda 1977, 8-9).  
 
In his study of political socialisation and student activism in Indonesia in the Guided 
Democracy period (1959-1965), however, Douglas argues that despite the very visible 
presence of these organisations, most Indonesian university students in fact avoided real 
engagement in politics (Douglas 1970, 131 and 153; see also Fischer 1965, 112-13; 
Fischer 1964).  Moreover, these student organisations did not truly represent the 
political interests of their student members: their leadership was often dominated by 
older individuals, many of whom were not themselves students, and student 
involvement in the mass political rallies which characterised this period in Indonesian 
politics was often simply a symbolic show of mass support for their respective parties 
(Douglas 1970, 133-4). 
 
                                                          
21 Saidi notes that GMNI was established independently by a fusion of various student organisations and 
only later came under the influence of the PNI (Saidi 1993, 15-16). 
22 Ranuwihardjo 1979 discusses the activities of the youth and student organisations during the 
revolutionary period, including the formation of PPMI and the Kelompok Cipayung.  See also Saidi 1993 
for a history of the Kelompok Cipayung and its activists during the New Order. 
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 In addition to these mass student organisations, each of the political parties also had 
youth wings.  Ryter argues that these youth organisations were important assets in the 
political struggle between the president, the army and the parties which characterised 
the transition from parliamentary democracy to Guided Democracy (Ryter 2002, 77).  
The Youth-Military Cooperative Body (Badan Kerja Sama Pemuda Militer, BKSPM), 
formed in mid 1957, illustrates this struggle.  Its original membership was made up of 
the youth wings of four political parties: Pemuda Demokrat, Gerakan Pemuda Islam 
Indonesia (Masyumi), Pemuda Ansor, the youth wing of Nadhlatul Ulama and the 
communist party affiliated Pemuda Rakyat (Biro Pemuda 1965, 265; BKSPM 
Menjongsong 1959, 173; Martha, Wibisono and Anwar 1984, 242).23  The 
establishment of these bodies, on the instruction of Army Chief of Staff Major General 
A. H. Nasution, was intended to help strengthen the army’s position under Sukarno’s 
Guided Democracy and at the same time weaken the role of the political parties by 
emphasising political participation based on corporatist principles (Magenda 1977, 6; 
Feith 1962, 589).  To this end, the organisation was involved in supporting Sukarno’s 
Liberation of Irian Jaya campaign and the take-over of Dutch enterprises under the 
nationalisation scheme (BKSPM Menjongsong 1959, 174; Ryter 2002, 78-83).  Both 
these campaigns provided the army with significant financial and political returns and 
so strengthened its position. 
 
The key place of these youth and student organisations on the national political stage 
was reinforced by the qualities accorded to them in the president’s rhetoric.  Throughout 
the 1950s and 1960s, the pemuda spirit was progressively mythologised in Sukarno’s 
fiery political speeches, which recalled the heroic deeds of the pemuda of the 
revolution.  For Sukarno, one of the key qualities of a true revolutionary pemuda was 
semangat (spirit).  Sukarno defined this spirit in terms of dynamism, adventurousness, a 
love of hard work and a love of ideals.  He urged the youth to cultivate these qualities in 
the interests of the nation.  In his 1962 speech on Youth Pledge Day (Hari Sumpah 
Pemuda) for example, Sukarno recalled his comment at Sukabumi during the Japanese 
period:  
 
Give me a thousand, ten thousand, one million of the older generation [orang 
tua] to move Mount Semeru from there to here.  But give me a thousand youth, 
                                                          
23 In 1960, the Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia was disbanded, along with its parent party, Masyumi 
(Martha, Wibisono and Anwar 1984, 252). 
 71
 no, a hundred youth, no, ten youth whose hearts are aflame and I will shake 
(menggemparkan) the whole world (Sukarno 1988, 135-6).24   
 
Such was his admiration for these qualities that Sukarno often urged the older 
generation to have a ‘youthful spirit’ and talked about ‘making the nation young in 
spirit’ (meremajakan jiwa bangsa) (Sukarno 2001, 55).   
 
Sukarno also saw an important role for youth and students in the development of the 
nation.  In a 1952 speech to students in Bogor, for example, Sukarno urged his audience 
to:  
 
Become Heroes of Development!  Make your nation a strong one, one which is 
merdeka [free, independent] in the true sense of the word!  We must carry out a 
revolution of development … And you, youth throughout Indonesia, you must 
become the pioneers and the heroes in the development revolution (Sukarno 1987a, 
16-17)!25
 
Sukarno’s celebration of the heroic qualities of pemuda also extended to mahasiswa: in 
his addresses to university students, Sukarno did not make a clear distinction between 
pemuda and mahasiswa, instead using the terms pemuda and pemuda-pemudi in 
addition to mahasiswa.  After the events of 1965-1966 however, this distinction became 
an important one.  Indonesia’s mahasiswa had shown themselves to be a powerful 
political force capable of playing a significant role in the demise of the Sukarno 
government, even if they required the assistance of the army to do so.  New Order 
policy was thus directed towards redefining the identities of these mahasiswa in ways 
which were more in accordance with the role the new government saw as appropriate 
for them.  
 
From pemuda to generasi muda: New Order policy on youth  
 
In New Order policy the term generasi muda was generally understood to include 
young people aged between 0 and 30.  The Department of Education and Culture’s 
                                                          
24 …berikan kepadaku seribu, sepuluh ribu, seratus ribu, satu juta orang tua itu memindahkan Gunung 
Semeru dari sana ke sini.  Tetapi sebaliknya berikan kepadaku seribu pemuda, tidak, seratus pemuda, 
tidak, sepuluh pemuda, tetapi sepuluh pemuda yang hatinya berkobar-kobar.  Dengan sepuluh itu aku 
akan bisa menggemparkan seluruh dunia (Sukarno 1988, 135-6).   
25 Jadilah Pahlawan Pembangunan!  Jadikanlah bangsamu bangsa yang kuat, bangsa yang merdeka 
dalam arti merdeka yang sebenar-benarnya!  Revolusi pembangunan harus kita adakan …  Dan kamu 
pemuda-pemudi di seluruh Indonesia, kamu harus menjadi pelopor dan pahlawan dalam Revolusi 
Pembangunan itu (Sukarno 1987a, 16-17)!  
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 1978 policy on the development of the young generation (Pola Dasar Pembinaan dan 
Pengembangan Generasi Muda), for example, divided the young generation into 
children (anak) aged 0-12, adolescents (remaja) aged 12-15 and youth (pemuda) aged 
15 to 30.26  The category of pemuda was further divided into school students (siswa) 
aged 6 to 18, university or college students (mahasiswa) aged 18 to 25 and those young 
people neither at school or university aged between 15 and 30 (pemuda).  The policy 
also identified a transitional generation (generasi peralihan) of those aged between 30 
and 40 who remained active in youth organisations (Kansil 1986, 138-9).27
 
During the 1930s and continuing through the post-revolutionary period, Indonesia 
experienced rapid population growth (Yasin 1974, 11; Emmerson 1973, 261).  As a 
result, for the duration of the New Order Indonesia’s population was a predominantly 
young one.  In 1971, for example, the 0-24 year age group accounted for 61 per cent of 
the total population, or around 72 million people (Yasin 1974, 11).28  In 1995, those 
aged between 0 and 24 accounted for around 54 per cent of the total population, or 105 
million people.  Almost 70 per cent of the population, or over 136 million people, were 
aged under 34 (Visi 2020 1997, 24 and 8).29  
 
The need to address the particular problems associated with Indonesia’s young 
population was identified early in the New Order.  In addition to providing education, 
employment and health services to this population, the New Order was also concerned 
with matters of ideology.  From the beginning of the New Order, the regime set about 
redefining the roles and identities of the young generation in accordance with the new 
political and ideological order which was being put in place.  This necessitated the 
integration of pemuda both ideologically and practically into the New Order framework 
of nation-building and development (pembangunan) (Kiem 1993, 169-170).  In this 
view, the role of Indonesia’s pemuda was to continue the struggle to ‘give substance to’ 
(mengisi) independence in the form of development in the tradition of their forebears.  
                                                          
26 In common usage the term remaja is generally used to refer to the biological and social aspects of the 
transition from childhood to adulthood (Kiem 1993, 165).  However, Siegel and Ryter have argued that 
the term remaja emerged during the New Order as a direct result of the depoliticisation of the term 
pemuda (youth), which recalled the radical actions of youth in the nationalist movement and during the 
revolution (Siegel 1986, 224-5; Ryter 1998, 58).  See also Siagian (1985) and Sarwono (1985) for a 
socio-political perspective on remaja (adolescents). 
27 Kiem notes that some ‘youth’ organisations accepted members up to the age of 45 (Kiem 1993, 166). 
28 In the 1971 census data, children (anak) are defined as those aged between 0-9 years and youth 
(pemuda) as those aged between 10-24 (Yasin 1974, 12).  See also Emmerson 1973, 261-2. 
29 In the Visi 2020 policy, published by the Office of the State Minister for Youth and Sports in 1997, the 
term ‘child’ (anak) refers to those aged between 0-14, ‘adolescent’ (remaja) to those aged 13-18 and 
‘youth’ (pemuda) to those aged 15-34 (Visi 2020 1997, 24).   
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 As President Suharto noted at the opening of the Symposium on the Writing of the 
History of the Youth Movement in Indonesia in October 1980: 
 
if youth (pemuda) play a greater role in development now, then in fact they are 
continuing their historical task in the past.  If in 1908, youth were able to 
awaken national awareness, if in 1928 youth were able to sow the seeds of 
Indonesian unity, if in 1945, youth planted the spirit of independence and the 
spirit of the faithful warrior opposed to colonialism, then now and in the future 
we also wish for youth to become faithful forces (tenaga-tenaga) to develop our 
independent nation and country (Suharto 1980a, 175).30
 
Yet Suharto was quick to point out the differences between the role of pemuda in the 
past and the role of contemporary pemuda: 
 
it needs to be understood that there is a fundamental difference between the 
nature of the role of youth in the struggle to pioneer and uphold independence in 
the past and the struggle to give substance to independence now and in the 
future. In the past youth had to tear down the old system and overthrow colonial 
power, shoot the enemy and reduce everything to rubble if the enemy occupied 
our territory.  Now, in the era of development, we must cultivate … all aspects 
of our national life.  National development emphasises actions which are 
productive and constructive; not those which are destructive (ibid.).31
 
In addition to such explicit assertions of the differences between the historical role of 
Indonesia’s pemuda and their contemporary role, the integration of pemuda into the 
New Order framework of development necessitated an attempt to rid the term pemuda 
itself of its problematic past associations with revolutionary semangat.  Thus, in policy 
documents and official speeches, the terms kaum muda and generasi muda were used 
interchangeably with the term pemuda to designate ‘young people’ or ‘the young 
generation’ in general.  These terms referred to those youth who acted in the much 
celebrated key historical moments of the past, as well as the contemporary youth whose 
                                                          
30 … jika pemuda dapat berperan lebih besar dalam gerak pembangunan sekarang, maka sesungguhnya 
pemuda melanjutkan tugas sejarahnya di masa lampau.  Jika di tahun ‘08 pemuda mampu 
membangkitkan kesadaran nasional, jika di tahun 28 pemuda menaburkan benih-benih persatuan 
Indonesia, jika di tahun 45 pemuda menanamkan jiwa merdeka serta jiwa pejuang menentang 
penjajahan yang terpercaya, maka sekarang dan di masa datang kita juga mengingkan agar pemuda 
menjadi tenaga-tenaga terpercaya untuk membangun bangsa dan negara kita yang telah merdeka ini 
(Suharto 1980a, 175). 
31 Namun perlu disadari adanya perbedaan besar antara watak peranan pemuda dalam perjuangan 
merintis dan menegakkan kemerdekaan dahulu dengan perjuangan memberi isi kepada kemerdekaan 
sekarang dan selanjutnya.  Dahulu pemuda harus meruntuhkan sistem lama dan melumpuhkan 
kekuasaan penjajah, menembak musuh dan membumihanguskan segala-galanya jika musuh dapat 
menduduki wilayah kita.  Sekarang, dalam zaman pembangunan, kita harus membina … segala segi 
kehidupan kita.  Pembangunan bangsa menonjolkan kegiatan-kegiatan yang produktif dan konstruktif; 
bukan yang destruktif (ibid.). 
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 task it was to continue the struggle through development.  Since the terms kaum muda 
and generasi muda did not have the radical and revolutionary connotations that could be 
associated with the term pemuda, their regular use had the effect of making the term 
pemuda appear as though it merely denoted ‘youth’ or ‘young people’.32   
 
At the same time, the parameters of term mahasiswa were also being delimited.  In New 
Order speeches and policy documents, mahasiswa almost invariably referred to 
contemporary university students.  In speeches commemorating Youth Pledge Day, for 
example, only the terms pemuda, kaum muda and generasi muda were used to refer to 
the key actors of the generations of 1908, 1928, and 1945, despite the fact that the 
generations of 1908 and 1928 were mostly made up of students.  Moreover, in a speech 
on the nineteenth anniversary of the Tritura in 1985, Suharto referred to the 1966 
generation not as mahasiswa but as pemuda and kaum muda (Suharto 1985).  This 
pattern reflected the New Order’s reluctance to associate the radical actions of past 
generations of youth and students with contemporary mahasiswa.  In the state’s view, it 
was as pemuda, kaum muda and generasi muda and not as mahasiswa that the youth of 
the past had acted.   
 
One of the New Order government’s particular concerns was the issue of ‘generational 
change’ and the need to instil the new generation of leaders with appropriate values.  In 
its narrowest sense, the concept of generational change referred to the process of 
attrition taking place within the army, as those who had participated in or experienced 
the revolution retired or passed away (McGregor 2002, 254; citing Jenkins 1984, 80-
81).  In a broader sense, however, it also highlighted the generational change taking 
place in wider Indonesian society.  In his address to the 1972 army seminar on the topic 
of the transfer of the ‘1945 values’ Suharto highlighted the importance of the seminar’s 
goals: 
 
The urgency of the transfer is now pressing, because in the 1980s and 1990s the 
ABRI leadership in particular and the leadership of the Indonesian nation in general 
will be in the hands of the young generation, who have not been directly instilled 
with the values of 1945 which are the primary asset and strength of the nation 
(Suharto 1972, 7). 
                                                          
32 The term kaum muda did have associations with Islamic revivalism (see Abdullah 1971).  It also 
suggested generational conflict between the older generation (kaum tua) and the younger generation 
(kaum muda).  However, generational conflict was much more easily dealt with than the revolutionary 
connotations of pemuda since it could be defined as ‘natural’ (see chapter three). 
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In a speech at a seminar on the role of the young generation in national defence on 24 
October 1975, the deputy commander of the armed forces General Surono explained 
that the 1945 values were those values ‘born of the struggle to achieve, defend and give 
substance to independence’.  These values included the unity and territorial integrity of 
the nation, popular sovereignty, anti-colonialism, Indonesian identity, a focus on the 
common interest and the interests of the nation and state as well as the values enshrined 
in the Pancasila (Surono 1975, 50-55; see also Suharto 1972, 2-4; Bourchier 1994, 51-2; 
Emmerson 1973, 291-2; Antlov 1996, 16-18).   
 
To help encourage the adoption of these values amongst the young generation, the New 
Order developed a number of policies and put in place various programs over the course 
of the 1970s.  One of the first practical steps taken was the establishment of the 
Indonesian National Youth Committee (Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia, KNPI). 
Formed in July 1973, KNPI was an umbrella organisation which aimed to unite and 
coordinate existing youth organisations (see Pemuda pembangunan 1987, chapter 3).33  
Its establishment, on the initiative of Golkar figures Ali Moertopo, Midian Sirait, and 
Abdul Gafur, together with David Napitupulu, was part of a larger program of 
consolidating existing political and social groupings within a corporatist framework 
(Menyongsong masa depan 1993, 5-6; see also van Dijk 1978a, 111-15).34  David 
Napitupulu, the former presidium chair of the Indonesian Student Action Front 
(Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia, KAMI) and a close associate of Midian Sirait, 
was appointed general chairperson and Abdul Gafur, the deputy coordinator of Golkar’s 
central youth division, as first chairperson (Menyongsong masa depan 1993, 21, 24, 16, 
and 39; Ryter 2002, 152; Anwar 1980, 208).  The involvement of Golkar in the 
establishment of the organisation provided a means by which the government was able 
to monitor and direct the activities of the youth organisations (Kiem 1993, 173).  After 
the riots of January 1974, the government took an increasing interest in KNPI, forming 
                                                          
33 Over the course of the early 1970s Golkar formed a number of similar corporatist organisations.  These 
included the Civil Servants Corps of the Republic of Indonesia (Korps Karyawan Pegawai Republik 
Indonesia, Korpri), the All Indonesia Labourers Federation (Federasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia, FBSI), 
the All-Indonesia Fisher's Association (Himpunan Nelayan Seluruh Indonesia, HNSI) and the Association 
of Indonesian Farmers Cooperatives (Himpunan Kerukunan Tani Indonesia, HKTI) (Menyongsong masa 
depan 1993, 16 and 21; see also Bourchier 1996, 207-214; Reeve 1985, 329-30). 
34 In 1972 Gafur had been appointed (with the backing of Ali Moertopo) the chairperson of the National 
Youth Committee for Family Planning (Panitia Nasional Pemuda untuk Keluarga Berencana, PNPKB) 
(Menyongsong masa depan 1993, 19-20).  Between 1972 and 1978 he served as a member of the DPR 
(Roeder and Mahmud 1980, 86).  Midian Sirait was Golkar’s Secretary for Youth, Students, Women and 
Intellectuals (Sekretaris Bidang Pemuda, Pelajar, Mahasiswa, Wanita dan Cendekiawan, Papelmacenta) 
(Menyongsong masa depan 1993, 16).   
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 branches in the regions, and using the organisation to help coordinate government 
development programs for youth (Menyongsong masa depan 1993, 22; see also Ryter 
2002, 152-3; Bourchier 1996, 214).35   
 
In 1978, the government’s Broad Outlines of State Policy (Garis Besar Haluan Negara, 
GBHN) identified the development of the young generation as a significant policy goal.  
According to the guidelines: 
 
The development of the young generation is directed towards preparing cadres 
for the continuation of the Nation’s struggle by providing a stock of skills, 
leadership, physical fitness, creativity, patriotism, idealism and noble character.  
…  In this framework there needs to be efforts to develop the young generation 
to involve them in the process of national and state life and the implementation 
of national development (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat 1989, 485). 
 
Later that year, on 28 October 1978, the first comprehensive policy to specifically target 
youth was introduced by Minister of Education and Culture Daud Yusuf.36  The Basic 
Guidelines for the Improvement and Development of the Young Generation (Pola 
Dasar Pembinaan dan Pengembangan Generasi Muda), provided a detailed 
explanation of the ‘potential’ (potensi) which the young generation possessed and 
which the policy would harness and develop.  It was couched in terms of the young 
generation’s obligation to achieve the national goals, and in particular their obligation to 
participate in development.  To this end, the policy provided a comprehensive program 
of activities (see Kansil 1986).  This policy was followed by the introduction in 1982 of 
a policy on ‘Political Education for the Young Generation’ (Pendidikan Politik Bagi 
Generasi Muda) (Instruksi Presiden No. 12 Tahun 1982) (see Kansil 1986).  Together 
with the Pancasila Moral Education (Pendidikan Moral Pancasila, PMP) and civics 
courses introduced in schools in 1975 (Parker 1992, 51; Thomas 1981, 390), the new 
policy sought to educate the young generation in Pancasila and other key national 
values. 
                                                          
35 Other officially sponsored youth organisations which come under the governments’ national youth 
policy include the Intra-School Students Organisation (Organisasi Siswa Intra Sekolah, OSIS), Karang 
Taruna (Youth Association), a nation-wide local level youth organisation which coordinates sporting and 
other activities in an effort to prevent juvenile delinquency, the scout movement (gerakan pramuka), and 
various other sporting and cultural organisations.  The Young Generation for Indonesian Renewal 
(Angkatan Muda Pembaharuan Indonesia, AMPI) was formed by Abdul Gafur (with the backing of Ali 
Moertopo) in 1978 as Golkar’s youth wing (Ryter 2002, 155).   
36 Keputusan Menteri Pendidikan dan Kebudayan No 0323/V/1978, revised as Keputusan Menteri Negara 
Pemuda dan Olahraga No 023/MENPORA/85.  See also Direktorat Pembinaan Generasi Muda 1977; 
Gafur 1979; Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan 1979; Sekretariat Satuan Pengendali 1982; 
Pendidikan politik 1982; Gafur 1982. 
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 Mahasiswa in the New Order 
 
As part of the young generation, university students throughout the New Order were 
also subject to these policies.  However, from the mid to late 1970s they also became 
the objects of a number of additional policies which aimed to define their roles in 
intellectual rather than political terms and so limit their involvement in political life.  
The demonstrations of 1965-1966 in which university students, acting in their role as 
mahasiswa, had been a central force, had demonstrated to the new regime that a 
mahasiswa identity which legitimated such demonstrations was potentially destabilising 
(see also Ryter 1998, 57-8).  The continued outspokenness of some students during the 
late 1960s and early 1970s was further evidence that a politically-engaged mahasiswa 
identity was undesirable in a regime that valued consensus (mufakat) above all.  As a 
result, in addition to their pemuda identity, New Order mahasiswa became the objects 
of a separate set of policies which aimed to control representations of their roles and 
identities as mahasiswa, particularly as it related to their involvement in ‘practical 
politics’.   
 
The mahasiswa who were the objects of these policies were students in one of the 
largest higher education systems in Southeast Asia.  There are 78 state institutions of 
higher education, including universities, institutes, colleges (sekolah tinggi), academies 
and polytechnics (Priyono 1999, 178).  Most of these institutions are the responsibility 
of the Department of Education and Culture (renamed in 1998 as the Department of 
National Education), although a number come under the Department of Religious 
Affairs.  For the 1998/1999 academic year, the Department of National Education was 
responsible for 1634 public and private tertiary institutions with a total enrolment of 
over 3 million students.  For the same period, 298 public and private universities, 
institutes, including the fourteen IAIN, and colleges came under the Department of 
Religious Affairs (Departemen Pendidikan Nasional n.d).   
 
With over 1500 institutions in total, private higher education institutions for the 
1998/1999 academic year accounted for around 95 per cent of institutions of higher 
education in Indonesia but only 53 per cent of total student enrolments (Departemen 
Pendidikan Nasional n.d).37  Yet while private higher education is numerically 
                                                          
37 All private higher education institutions are subject to a national accreditation system (Toisuta 1991, 
98; Soemardjan 1973, 51; Atmakusuma 1974, 9).   
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 predominant, public institutions in general surpass most private institutions in terms of 
quality and prestige.38  The growth of private universities under the New Order 
provided additional opportunities for higher education.  Like state universities, private 
universities vary in terms of the quality of education and the fee structure.  The course 
fees at the largest and most prestigious of the private universities, and even those which 
are less so, mean they are available only to the upper middle class (Oey-Gardiner 1991, 
86; Prijono 1999, 163, 165 and 173).   
 
Student numbers grew exponentially during the New Order period.  A 1997 publication 
of the Department of Education and Culture reported that in 1969, there were 176 900 
students enrolled at universities and colleges throughout the archipelago.39  Six years 
later, in 1975, there were over 250 000.  By the 1984/1985 academic year, however, this 
number had increased almost four-fold to 977 302 students and by 1994/1995 had 
doubled again to over two million students (Office of Educational and Cultural 
Research and Development 1997, 50, table 2.12; see also Heneveld 1979, 148-9).  This 
growth in student numbers was a result of the expansion of primary and secondary 
education during the 1950s and 1960s, as students graduating from secondary schools 
increasingly sought higher education.  Recognising the importance of having trained 
professionals, the New Order made a concerted effort to improve the quality of 
education at all levels.  Strong economic development under the New Order also meant 
that higher education was increasingly available to those who desired it.  As elsewhere, 
it was Indonesia’s expanding middle class which took advantage of these educational 
opportunities. 
 
The largest universities are concentrated in and around the major urban centers.  This is 
largely a legacy of the colonial period when Dutch high schools and, later, colleges and 
faculties, were located in centres such as Batavia (Jakarta), Bandung, Malang, 
Yogyakarta, Semarang, Medan and Solo (Fischer 1965, 95 and 106; see also above).  
With the exception of Medan, all of these cities are located in Java.  The expansion 
which took place as a result of the Sukarno government’s policy of giving every 
province a state university to some extent addressed this imbalance.  At the beginning 
                                                          
38 There are some notable exceptions to this, particularly among the universities located in the capital.  
Private institutions tend to focus on the less expensive social science and the humanities programs rather 
than programs requiring costly facilities and staff such as technical and applied science programs (Toisuta 
1991, 98).   
39 Estimates of student numbers, particularly in the 1960s, vary considerably.  Bachtiar (1968, 185-6 and 
fn 20), for example, suggests that in 1965, student numbers may have been as high as 279 624. 
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 of the New Order, however, Universitas Gadjah Mada in Yogyakarta and Universitas 
Indonesia in Jakarta remained by far the largest universities in Indonesia, enrolling over 
half of all students (Fischer 1965, 95).  As the oldest and largest universities in 
Indonesia, Universitas Gadjah Mada and Universitas Indonesia are also the most 
prestigious.  Together with three other state universities, Institut Teknologi Bandung, 
Institut Pertanian Bogor (Bogor Agricultural Institute), and Universitas Airlangga in 
Suraybaya, as well as the oldest Islamic university, Universitas Islam Indonesia in 
Yogyakarta, these universities are the most highly sought after by prospective students. 
 
Despite the growth of the past few decades, Indonesian university students remain an 
elite within their society.  As Fischer notes, the limited opportunities for high school 
and tertiary education for Indonesians during the colonial period meant that for the 
children of civil servants (Javanese priyayi) and professionals, education was the key to 
social mobility.  The shortage of trained professionals at the beginning of independence, 
a situation which also faced the New Order, meant that educated individuals were 
highly valued (Fischer 1965, 94-5 and 103-4).  By 1986, only 7 per cent of those in the 
20-24 age group were enrolled in tertiary education, a figure which fell well below that 
of other Southeast Asian nations (Jones 1994, 165).  However, the additional 
educational opportunities provided by the continued growth in private universities and 
colleges have increased this figure to around 10 per cent (Visi 2020 1997, 24; Office of 
Educational and Cultural Research and Development 1997, 50, table 2.12).    
 
Tritura to reformasi: student activism, 1966-1998  
 
In the 1960s, student political activism in South and Southeast Asia, Europe and the 
Americas generated a wealth of academic interest.  Much of this literature sought to 
explain the factors underlying university students’ involvement in national and campus 
politics (see for example Coleman 1965; Emmerson 1968; Lipset 1964; Altbach 1968, 
van Wolferen 1970; Feuer 1969).  One of the most important factors appeared to be 
students’ delayed entry into the ‘adult’ world of work and family responsibilities.  This 
transitory period, in which students enjoy relative freedom from parental and familial 
control and financial responsibilities, means that they are able to take risks which others 
can not (Altbach 1968, 3).  In addition, the university environment, it was argued, 
provides students with an awareness of social and political issues, which their idealism 
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 encouraged them to seek to redress (Altbach 1968, 4; Lipset 1964, 31).  In many cases, 
students also see themselves as the leaders of the working class and the bearers of 
knowledge (Feuer 1969, 4; Altbach 1968, 3).  More practically, the pressures of 
academic life, and in particular, the threat of unemployment after graduation, often 
manifests itself in political and social activism (Altbach 1968, 7-8).  Many authors also 
attribute student activism to a ‘conflict of generations’ (Feuer 1969; Lipset 1964, 30-35) 
or to the cultural alienation which students experience when attempting to reconcile 
their modern Western education and values with the traditional values of their societies 
(Altbach 1968, 6-7; Lipset 1964, 17).  Finally, the privileged status of students in many 
developing societies, coupled with a perception that they are largely without interests in 
the status quo, and as such have greater ideological ‘purity’ (Altbach 1968, 3), means 
that students are often expected to play an active role in social and political life (Altbach 
1968, 5; van Wolferen 1970, 6). 
 
Until the mid 1960s, research on Indonesia tended to seek explanations for the lack of 
political activism amongst Indonesian university students in the post independence 
period, given that many of the same conditions which had led to student activism in 
other developing nations were also present in Indonesia (see for example Fischer 1965; 
Douglas 1970).  After the events of 1965-1966, however, student politics in Indonesia 
took on a markedly different character.   
 
Since the 1950s the student organisations which were associated with the major political 
parties had been divided along ideological lines.  In the early months of 1965 a bitter 
conflict had been developing between the powerful communist-affiliated CGMI and the 
modernist Islamic HMI (Bachtiar 1968, 189-90; Mohammad and Kats 1969, 30-33; 
Saidi 1989, 84).  The Communist Party’s alleged masterminding of the murder of the 6 
generals on 30 September, led to a significant change in their fortunes.  HMI took 
advantage of the new political mood, organising the first anti-PKI rally on 5 October 
and later establishing itself as one of the dominant members of KAMI (Kesatuan Aksi 
Mahasiswa Indonesia), the staunchly anti-communist organisation formed with the 
‘advice and encouragement’ of Minister of Higher Education and Science General 
Sjarif Thajeb on 25 October 1965 (Douglas 1970, 154-6; Bachtiar 1968, 191-2; Pemuda 
pembangunan 1987, 38-9).40  
 
                                                          
40 See also Raillon (1985, 12-19) and Abdul Mun’im D.Z (1999, 27-42) for an account of this period. 
 81
 KAMI’s initial actions focused on practical issues such as the rising price of basic 
goods and petrol.  These were the issues which had most affected ordinary people, as 
well as students themselves.  By the beginning of 1966, however, the focus had shifted 
to political and economic issues (Douglas 1970, 157; Mohammad and Kats 1969, 38).  
This new concern found clear expression in the announcement in January 1966 of the 
‘Threefold People’s Demands’ (Tri Tuntutan Rakyat, Tritura): dissolve the PKI 
(bubarkan PKI), replace the Dwikora Cabinet (rombak Kabinet Dwikora) and reduce 
the price of basic goods (turunkan harga) (Anwar 1980, 11).  The movement was 
largely Jakarta-based, although students in Bandung also played an important role.  The 
largest protests were organised by university students.  After KAMI was banned, youth 
and high school students in KAPPI (Kesatuan Aksi Pemuda Pelajar Indonesia) 
continued to pressure the Sukarno government. 
 
KAMI enjoyed considerable support from the Indonesian military, in particular the 
army (Saidi 1989, 77; Southwood and Flanagan 1983, 179-80).  Official accounts of the 
events describe this relationship as a ‘partnership’ between students and the military 
(see for example Wibisono 1980; Anwar 1980; Imawan 1966; Orde Baru: Koreksi total 
1995; Dipodisastro 1997).  The concept of a partnership was criticised by later 
generations of student activists, who felt that the 1966 students had been exploited by 
the army for its own purposes (Aspinall 1993, 31; also Mangiang 1981; Simandjuntak 
1973; Simbolon 1977). 
 
The Order of March Eleven (Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret, Supersemar) effectively 
fulfilled KAMI’s first demand, the dissolution of the PKI, and with steps to fulfill the 
second and third demands already being taken, the students’ service to the nation was, 
at least in the eyes of the new regime, effectively completed and students were urged to 
‘return to the campus’.  Yet between 1966 and 1974 students were far from disengaged 
from politics.  As Raillon’s (1985) study of the Bandung-based student newspaper 
Mahasiswa Indonesia shows, students continued to engage actively in social and 
political life and in the debates surrounding the formation and consolidation of the ‘new 
order’.  Moreover, as disappointment with the regime’s failure to fulfill its initial 
promises grew towards the end of the 1960s, students once again took to the streets, 
albeit in much smaller numbers than had rallied in 1966.  The students’ growing 
disillusionment with the new regime found expression in various movements protesting 
against corruption and economic mismanagement, the restrictions placed on the 1971 
 82
 elections, including the ‘simplification’ of the parties, and the building of the Beautiful 
Indonesia in Miniature (Taman Mini Indonesia Indah, TMII) project (see Budiman 
1973; Southwood and Flanagan 1983, 180-1; Sanit 1999).41  Yet while these students 
were critical of aspects of the state’s political and economic practices they remained 
committed to the underlying aims of the New Order, leading Southwood and Flanagan 
to describe the students of the 1970s as ‘critical collaborators’ (1983, 175). 
 
By 1973, in addition to these issues, students were also arguing that the state’s entire 
development strategy was misguided.  Protest regarding these and other issues gathered 
pace during 1973 and in January 1974 this unrest culminated with a demonstration 
against foreign, in particular Japanese, investment in Indonesia, subsequently dubbed 
the ‘Fifteenth of January Disaster’ (Malapetaka Limabelas Januari, Malari) (see van 
Dijk 1975, 2-3).42  The protest sparked several days of mass riots (see Crouch 1974; 
Gunawan 1975; Bourchier 1996, 217-8).43  As a result, universities in the capital were 
closed and a number of student leaders were arrested.  Three people were tried, 
including Hariman Siregar, the chairperson of Universitas Indonesia’s student council.44  
Official accounts of the incident emphasise the role of rogue PSI/Masyumi elements 
(Southwood and Flanagan 1983, 185; Gunawan 1975, 65; Crouch 1974, 5).45 
Underlying the unrest, however, was an elite level power struggle between General 
Sumitro, the deputy commander of the armed forces and commander of Kopkamtib 
(Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban, Operational Command for the 
Restoration of Security and Order), and the head of the Special Operations Command 
(Operasi Khusus, Opsus) and one of the president’s personal assistants (asisten pribadi, 
aspri) Major General Ali Moertopo (Crouch 1974, 2).   
 
                                                          
41 In January 1970, students acting as the ‘Action Movement for Student Demands’ (Gerakan Aksi 
Mahasiswa Menggugat) demonstrated against corruption and economic mismanagement.  Later that year, 
they formed the White Group (Golongan Putih, Golput) in response to the restrictions placed on the 1971 
elections.  The Austerity Movement (Gerakan Penghematan) was formed in December 1971 to protest 
against the building of Taman Mini Indonesia Indah (see Budiman 1973; Southwood and Flanagan 1983, 
180-1; Mangiang 1981).   
42 The protesters pronounced the Tritura ’74: abolish aspri, reduce prices, and end corruption (Southwood 
and Flanagan 1983, 184; Gunawan 1975, 69; Crouch 1974, 4).  The president’s personal assistants had 
been the target of students’ corruption allegations in 1970. 
43 Bourchier notes that the acronym Malari ‘conjur[es] up associations with fever and disease (1996, 217). 
44 See van Dijk 1975, 2000 for an account of Hariman Siregar’s trial. Syahrir and Mohammad Ani Chalid 
were also tried (Southwood and Flanagan 1983, 185; van Dijk 1975, fn 1).  
45 See Peristiwa 14-15-16 January 1974 for a detailed ‘official’ account of the developments of 1973, the 
riots themselves and the steps put in place by the government.  The PSI and Masyumi had been disbanded 
by Sukarno in 1960.   
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 In the aftermath of the affair, the Minister of Education and Culture Sjarif Thajeb issued 
a ministerial decision detailing guidelines for the ‘improvement’ (pembinaan) of 
university campuses, popularly known as SK028.46  The decision prohibited students 
from undertaking any political activities which would ‘lead to the disturbance of peace 
and order in the nation’ (Thajeb 1974, 7; Thomas 1981, 388; Siregar 1983, 131-5).47  
This did not, he noted, include discussions and seminars as these represented the 
academic community’s contribution towards solving the nation’s problems.  Since the 
opinions expressed were the result of ‘concrete and constructive thinking based on a 
scientific analysis of the situation’, they were therefore a legitimate channel for the 
much vaunted ‘academic freedom’ and ‘freedom of expression’ said to be in place on 
Indonesian university campuses (Thajeb 1974, 7-8).48
 
In 1977, students again took to the streets.  Their criticisms of the regime went further 
than they had in earlier waves of protest, calling for the abolition of Kopkamtib and 
criticising the cukong (Chinese conglomerates) phenomena, foreign investment, 
unregulated state power and the state’s development strategy (van Dijk 1978a, 1978b; 
Bourchier 1996, 224; Aspinall 1993, 5).  In Bandung, students at Institut Teknologi 
Bandung published the White book of students’ struggle (Buku putih perjuangan 
mahasiswa) detailing the regime’s failings (Buku putih 1978).  Finally, in the lead-up to 
the General Session of the MPR in March 1978, student demonstrators called for 
Suharto to withdraw as a presidential candidate.49  The anti-Suharto character of student 
protest at the time of the 1977 elections and in the lead-up to the 1978 General Session 
of the MPR invited a harsh response from the state (van Dijk 1978a, 1978b; Supriyanto 
1998, 78).  On 21 January 1978 a Kopkamtib decision froze the activities of all student 
                                                          
46 Ministerial Decision No. 028 1974 on Policy Guidelines for the Improvement of University Campus 
Life (issued on 3 February) [Surat Keputusan No. 028 1974 tentang petunjuk-petunjuk kebijaksanaan 
dalam rangka pembinaan kehidupan kampus perguruan tinggi].  See also Instruction No. 2 1974 on the 
Reopening of Institutions of Higher Education in Greater Jakarta (issued on 28 January) [Instruksi No. 2 
1974 tentang Pembukaan Kembali Perguruan Tinggi di Jakarta Raya] and Joint Instruction No. 8 1974 
between the Minister of Education and Culture, the Minister of Internal Affairs and the Minister for 
Religion on the Implementation of the Improvement of the Young Generation (issued on 6 February) 
[Instruksi Bersama No. 8 Menteri Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, Menteri Dalam Negeri dan Menteri 
Agama tentang Pelaksanaan Pembinaan Generasi Muda].   
47 The decision was revoked by Sjarif Thajeb on 1 July 1977 following student protest.  Sjarif Thajeb’s 
appointment as Minister of Education and Culture one week after the Malari riots was a judicious one.  
He was a strong educationalist with a military background.  From 1962 to 1964 he served as rector of 
Universitas Indonesia.  Between 1964 and 1966 he was the Minister for Higher Education and Science.  
Following this, he served as the Deputy Chairperson of the DPR and Chairperson of the Armed Forces 
Faction before his posting to Washington as ambassador to the USA and Brazil (1971-74) (Apa dan siapa 
1981, and Roeder and Mahmud 1980, 349). 
48 Keputusan Menteri Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan tanggal 17 April 1975 No. 079/0. 
49 See Budiyarso 2000; Hariyadhie 1994; Stamp [1979?] for detailed studies of the 1977-1978 student 
movement. 
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 councils in universities and institutes of higher education throughout the archipelago.50  
Troops occupied the campuses, and all student newspapers had their publication 
licenses revoked.  A number of student leaders were also arrested.  At their trials, most 
of which took place during 1979, these students produced lengthy defense speeches 
which systematically critiqued the New Order.51   
 
The state’s response to this wave of student protest was a new policy orientation which 
aimed to curtail student activity on campuses and effectively stem the power of the 
student councils (dewan mahasiswa), which had been the prime organisational vehicles 
for the 1977-1978 protests (Aspinall 1993, 6).  Over the course of 1978 and early 1979, 
the new Minister of Education and Culture Daud Yusuf, put in place a series of policies 
designed to return the campuses to their ‘proper’ state as apolitical scientific 
communities and students to their proper status as members of these scientific 
communities (see also Thomas 1981, 388-9).52  The Normalisation of Campus Life 
(Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus, NKK) and Campus Coordination Body (Badan 
Koordinasi Kampus, BKK) policies, the Minister explained in an interview with the 
news magazine Tempo, aimed to ‘normalise’ the campuses:  
 
The word normalisation was included because the NKK concept as a whole 
means ‘to normalise’ (‘menormalkan’) campus life, that is, to return the campus 
to the norms which should prevail and be developed on the campus.  Until now, 
these norms have increasingly been forgotten, and have even been allowed to be 
destroyed slowly but surely.  As a result, until the NKK concept was introduced, 
our campuses were in an abnormal condition (Majalah Mahasiswa 3 (15) 1980, 
3). 
 
On 24 February 1979 the Minister issued a follow-up policy on campus student 
organisations.  This policy was known as the BKK policy, after the Student 
Coordination Body (Badan Koordinasi Kemahasiswaan, BKK) which, under the new 
system, represented the key student organisation at the university level.  At the same 
                                                          
50 Surat Keputusan Pangkopkamtib tanggal 21 January 1978 No SKEP 02/KOPKAM/I/1978. 
51 Thirty four students were tried in 1979 (Southwood and Flanagan 1983, 190).  Many of them published 
their defence speeches (see Akhmadi 1979, Hakim 1980, Tjahjono 1979, Hamid 1979, Zakir 1980, Yusuf 
1979, Al Hilal 1979, Tarsono 1979, Silalahi 1979, Menggugat Pemerintahan 1979).   
52 A former member of the Student Army (Tentara Republik Indonesia Pelajar, TRIP) and lecturer in 
economics at Universitas Indonesia, Daud Yusuf earned himself a reputation for taking a harsh approach 
to student demonstrations (Harahap and Basril 2000, 129).  In 1978, he was criticised for postponing the 
new academic year by six months (starting from July 1978) as well as for his NKK concept.  His dislike 
for compromise was indicated by his refusal in November 1979 to meet a delegation of Universitas 
Indonesia students seeking a compromise solution to the NKK policy and by his appearance on national 
television in defence of the policy (Apa dan siapa 1981, 263).   
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 time, all non-curriculum related student activities which took place on the campus 
became a formal part of the university bureaucracy (Siregar 1991, 217).  Extra-
university student organisations such as HMI, GMNI and PMKRI were also banned 
from operating on the campuses (Aspinall 1993, 9; van Bruinessen 2002, 131).  The 
largest and most influential student newspapers were also closed at this time leaving 
students very few legitimate means by which to express their criticisms of the regime.  
Student criticisms of the policy fell on deaf ears  
 
One further initiative which impacted on student life in a very practical way was the 
introduction of the Semester Credit System (Sistem Kredit Semester, SKS) in 1979.  
The policy aimed to reduce the amount of time students took to complete their course 
and so relieve some of the pressure on the higher education system (Heneveld 1979, 
148-9; Hardjono 1991, 160).  At a practical level, however, this had the fortuitous 
consequence that, since students’ study loads increased under the new system, they had 
less spare time to spend organising demonstrations (Aspinall 1993, 9).   
 
With campus representative bodies now under the bureaucratic control of the university 
and the extra-university mass student organisations banned from operating on the 
campuses, students in the 1980s sought other organisational means of expressing their 
dissent.  Aspinall (1993) identifies two main forums through which students channelled 
their dissent during this period.  The first was involvement in the rapidly expanding 
NGO sector.  Through these NGOs, students became involved in campaigns on 
environmental and human rights issues as well as in supporting community 
development projects on a local level (Aspinall 1993, 12-13).  This experience was to 
have an important impact on students’ perceptions about their role in relation to the 
rakyat in the late 1980s and 1990s.  The second was study groups.  Under the NKK 
policy, one of the few remaining activities within which students could engage was 
intellectual discussion (Denny 1989, 76; see also chapter five).  Drawing on a tradition 
which dated to the 1930s, students in the early 1980s established various ad-hoc 
kelompok diskusi (discussion groups) in which they discussed a wide range of social, 
economic and political issues, drawing on Western social and political theories for their 
inspiration.  The intellectual nature of these activities provided them with a modicum of 
legitimacy and, for the most part, safeguarded them against state repression.53  These 
                                                          
53 In 1990, three study group activists, Bambang Isti Nugroho, Bambang Subono and Bonar Tigor 
Naipospos, were arrested and later tried for subversion (see Heryanto 1993).   
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 study groups mostly engaged in ‘information action’ (aksi informasi), holding 
discussions and seminars attended by key public figures and distributing information 
about social and political issues to students (Denny 1989, 76; see also Denny 1990).   
 
At the end of the 1980s, however, pressures for political and economic reform ushered 
in a period of ‘openness’ (keterbukaan) in national politics.  On campuses, the new 
Minister of Education and Culture Fuad Hassan, who assumed the post in July 1985 
after the death of Nugroho Notosusanto, was taking a more moderate approach to 
student and campus life.54  From the beginning of 1987, student protest re-emerged, 
gathering pace over the next two years as students protested against various campus 
issues, including the NKK/BKK policy (which was eventually replaced by Fuad 
Hasan’s University Student Senate (Senat Mahasiswa Perguruan Tinggi, SMPT) policy 
in 1990) (Harahap and Basril 1999, 264-9).55  From 1989, students raised issues of 
human rights and social justice (Aspinall 1993; Denny 1989, 77).56  Prominent among 
these were local issues, including the campaigns in support of communities affected by 
development projects including the Kedung Ombo dam project in Central Java, and the 
land rights dispute in Badega in West Java (Inside Indonesia 18 (April) 1989, 12-14; 
Harahap 1993, 96-102; Harahap and Basril 1999, 269-74).57  The exploitation of local 
issues had the advantage of enabling students to avoid direct confrontation with the 
state at a time when they were still weak politically as a result of the depoliticisation 
policies of the 1980s (Denny 1989, 77).   
 
Throughout the 1990s the student movement gathered pace.  The student press once 
again became a significant means by which students expressed their dissent and 
students demonstrated against a wide variety of issues, from the state lottery 
(Sumbangan Dermawan Sosial Berhadiah, SDSB) in 1988 and 1993, boycott of the 
                                                          
54 Fuad Hassan received an undergraduate degree in psychology from Universitas Indonesia in 1958 and a 
doctorate in 1967.  He served as a political advisor to Suharto between 1966 and 1968 before becoming a 
member of the DPR (1968-1970).  In 1968 he was made professor at Universitas Indonesia and in 1972 
he became the dean of the Faculty of Psychology serving concurrently as Director of the National 
Security Council (1972-1976).  Between 1966 and 1976 he also taught at the National Defence Institute 
(Lemhannas) and the armed forces command school (Sesko ABRI).  Before his appointment as Minister 
of Education and Culture, Fuad served as ambassador to Egypt (1976-1980) and as the head of the 
Research and Development Body of the Department of Foreign Affairs (1980-1985) (Apa dan siapa 
1986, 299-300).   
55 The SMPT was repealed after the fall of Suharto by Minister of Education and Culture Juwono 
Sudarsono and universities were given the freedom to determine the form which student representative 
bodies would take and the process by which students would be elected (Harahap and Basril 1999, 231).  
56 See also Aspinall 1995 (especially 29-44) for a characterisation of the 1980s and early 1990s student 
movement and its relationship to the military.  
57 See Aditjondro (1990, 1991) and Budiman (1990) for an evaluation of the Kedung Ombo campaign.   
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 1992 elections, the 1994 press bannings, human rights abuses perpetrated by the 
military and the state and the state’s economic policy.  Students also called for the 
repeal of the subversion law, the dissolution of Bakorstanas (the security agency), the 
abolition of dwifungsi (the dual political and military function of the armed forces) 
(Harahap and Basril 1999, 278-80; Aspinall 2000, 172).  The 1990s also saw the 
emergence onto the political stage of more radical leftist groups such as the People’s 
Democratic Party (Partai Rakyat Demokratik, PRD), founded by university drop-out 
Budiman Sudjatmiko, and its student wing SMID (Solidaritas Mahasiswa Indonesia 
untuk Demokrasi, Indonesian Students Solidarity for Democracy) (see Hearman 1996).  
During this period, student activism also became more geographically diverse, with 
urban centres other than Jakarta and Bandung becoming increasingly important.  In line 
with the expansion and consolidation of private institutions of higher education during 
the 1970s and 1980s, private universities also became important, in part because they 
had not been the primary targets of the depoliticisation efforts of the previous decade 
(Aspinall 2000, 165-6; Denny 1989, 75).58
 
The Asian financial crisis which hit Indonesia in late 1997 severely damaged the 
regime’s ability to deliver the economic growth and stability which had been at the core 
of its performance legitimacy for the past three decades.59  As the price of basic goods 
soared, students took to the streets demanding a reduction of prices.60  Students in 1998, 
however, were much quicker to call for political solutions than had been the 1966 
demonstrators with early protests also rejecting the practice of ‘corruption, collusion 
and nepotism’ (Korupsi, Kolusi dan Nepotisme, KKN) and calling for reformasi 
(reform) (Aspinall 2000, 300).  The shooting of four students outside Jakarta’s 
prestigious Trisakti University on 12 May marked a turning point in the student 
movement (as had the shooting of Arief Rachman Hakim in January 1966) and sparked 
widespread rioting in Jakarta and Solo, Central Java.  Beginning on 18 May, students 
staged a sit-in of the DPR building, demanding that a special session be convened to 
                                                          
58 See also Gayatri 1999 and Soewarsono 1999 for an account of the student movement from the early to 
mid 1990s. 
59 For more general accounts of the events of late 1997 and early 1998 see Aspinall, Feith and van 
Klinken 1999; Forrester and May 1998; Budiman, Hatley and Kingsbury 1999; Habeahan, Tobing and 
Sipahutar 1999; Gafur 2000.  In 1998 and 1999 a large number of assessments of the 1998 student 
movement were produced.  A sample of these are: Aritonang 1999; Yunanto 1998; Harjanto 1998; Sujito 
et al 1998; Widjojo et al 1999; Fadhly 1999, Culla 1999; Nusantara, Putra, and Sudarmanto 1998. 
60 For an account of student mobilisation between February and May 1998 see McRae (2001, 7-15) and 
Bhakti (1998, 173-178).  See McRae (2001, 15-25); Aspinall (1999, 215-225); Aspinall (2000, 301-308); 
Wimhofer 2001 discuss the organisational forms the 1998 movement took and the themes of student 
protest.  Madrid (1999) and Kraince (2000) discuss the role of Muslim students. 
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 call for the presidents’ resignation.61  Finally, on 21 May, with the support of ABRI and 
key ministers largely eroded, Suharto resigned.62  There was a strong sense of history 
repeating itself in these events given that it was students, in partnership with the 
military, who helped to topple Sukarno in 1966.    
  
Conclusion  
 
The secondary and vocational schools established by the Dutch under the Ethical Policy 
provided the context within which the youth of the Netherlands Indies first began to 
identify as youth.  Their status as an educated elite was reflected in the Dutch terms 
they used to describe themselves.  As the nationalist movement grew, these youth and 
students began to see themselves as part of the imagined community of Indonesia, and 
to refer to themselves using Malay (Indonesian) terms.  The experiences of the Japanese 
occupation and the revolution added a new dimension to the roles and identities of 
Indonesian youth and students.  In the first decades of the twentieth century educated 
youth had acted as the vanguard of change.  The para-military organisations of the 
Japanese occupation and the armed groups who joined in the struggle for independence 
brought together youth from a wide variety of socio-economic and educational 
backgrounds.  In the process, the term pemuda acquired revolutionary connotations 
which often transcended biological age.  After the revolution, there was a strong 
emphasis on the expansion and development of education.  New universities were 
opened although the university students of the 1950s remained a privileged elite.  The 
1950s and 1960s were also the era of mass politicisation with large youth and student 
organisations affiliated to the major political parties.  The new regime’s policies sought 
to restore order and stability to the nation.  To this end, it embarked on a wide-ranging 
program of depoliticisation.  Youth and, in particular students were key targets of these 
policies, which aimed to redirect the energies of the large numbers of young people 
away from politics and towards development.  Yet as the preceding survey of student 
activism during the New Order period showed, students’ role in Indonesian politics and 
society continued to be a significant one, albeit not consistently so.  Precisely what part 
representations of students’ identities played in the roles students were able to play is 
the topic of the remainder of this thesis. 
                                                          
61 The calls for a Special Session of the MPR were made in the aftermath of the Trisakti incident (Culla 
1999, 178-9). 
62 For an account of the elite’s final abandonment of Suharto see Aspinall (2000, 315-319). 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
Making history, making mahasiswa 
 
In every crucial historical moment, the young generation of our nation always stepped 
forward as pioneers (Suharto 1982, 470). 
 
In official histories produced during the New Order, youth and students were portrayed 
as playing a key role in the defining moments of Indonesia’s modern history.  In each of 
these key moments, it was claimed, a new ‘generation’ (generasi or angkatan) was 
born.  The contribution of these generations of youth took a standard form in official 
New Order historiography.  Thus, the generations of 1908 and 1928 were celebrated as 
the pioneers of the nationalist movement and of national unity, the revolutionary 
Angkatan ’45 as enabling independence to be declared and struggling to uphold it, and 
the 1966 generation as launching the protests which gave voice to the aspirations of the 
wider populace and enabled the New Order to embark on a program of ‘correcting’ the 
deviations of the previous government.  This role was celebrated in the large body of 
commemorative literature and in the biographies of key pemuda figures.  It was also 
commemorated in annual celebrations of Hari Sumpah Pemuda/Hari Pemuda (Youth 
Pledge Day/Youth Day) on 28 October and in official speeches on other significant 
occasions (see Aspinall 1999, 229-30).1   
 
This celebration of the role that youth had played as youth in key historical moments 
was by no means a new phenomenon in Indonesian historiography.  In the late 1920s, 
Indonesia’s youth already saw themselves as continuing a tradition that had been begun 
by their predecessors in 1908.2  In official histories of the youth movement written 
                                                          
1 The date 28 October was designated Hari Sumpah Pemuda (Youth Pledge Day) in 1955 (Foulcher 2000, 
388).  In 1978, it acquired the additional title of Hari Pemuda (Youth Day).  According to Suharto it was 
named Hari Pemuda as a form of ‘gratitude from the Indonesian nation to their youth, who throughout the 
history of the struggle to open the way to and uphold independence have always emerged as a pioneering 
force at important moments’ (penghargaan dari bangsa Indonesia kepada pemuda-pemudanya, yang 
sepanjang sejarah perjoangan merintis dan menegakkan kemerdekaan selalu tampil sebagai kekuatan 
pelopor pada saat-saat yang penting) (Suharto 1980b, 427). 
2 In his welcome address to the 1928 youth congress, for example, Sugondo Djojopuspito, the chairperson 
of the congress, asked: ‘Whose movement was Budi Utomo … it was none other than ours [i.e. the 
 during the 1950s and 1960s, the contribution of youth to the nation centres on key 
events and periods in Indonesia’s modern history, including the founding of Budi 
Utomo, the youth movement of the 1920s and 1930s, the declaration of the Sumpah 
Pemuda (Youth Pledge), the mobilisation of youth during the Japanese occupation, the 
proclamation of independence and the revolution of 1945-49 (see for example Hardjono 
1950; Hardjito 1952; Biro Pemuda 1965).   
 
In the official histories of the New Order, as in those of the Guided Democracy period, 
the pioneering role that Indonesia’s youth played in the national awakening, in the drive 
for national unity, and in the struggle for independence was crucial to the ‘national’ 
version of history on which Indonesia’s territorial integrity was based.3  For the Suharto 
regime, the large-scale demonstrations by youth, and in particular students, in 1966 
were also central to the claim that the actions Suharto took following the Order of 
March Eleven (Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret, Supersemar) were a response to the 
aspirations of the broader populace and not a military takeover.4  Yet the active role that 
Indonesia’s youth had played in the past posed particular challenges for the New Order 
(Ryter 1998, 57-8).  The demonstrations of 1966 had proven decisively that Indonesia’s 
youth and students were a powerful force, capable (with the assistance of the army) of 
toppling Sukarno.  Consolidating the new regime thus entailed discouraging the post-
1966 young generation from seeing their role as extra-parliamentary political agents.  
Since the historical precedent set by previous generations of youth served as a 
significant motivating factor for the students of the New Order period, one of the tasks 
for the state’s official historians was to reframe the roles that Indonesia’s youth had 
played in the past in terms of the new regime’s emphasis on harmony, consensus and 
the interests of the nation.   
 
This chapter is a close reading of the New Order’s authoritative national history, the 
Sejarah Nasional Indonesia (National History of Indonesia, henceforth Sejarah).  
                                                                                                                                                                          
youths’] (Pergerakan siapakah B.U itu … tidak lain juga kita punya) (cited in Ihsan and Soeharto 1981, 
140). 
3 Keith Foulcher reminds us of ‘nationalism’s need for a teleological history of its own origins’ and of 
how ‘the post-colonial construction of the past is always tied to the exigencies of contemporary political 
visions and ideologies.  A nation must have a history, and its history is part of the shaping of its present’ 
(2000, 378). 
4 The Order of March Eleven, signed by Sukarno, gave General Suharto, at that time the head of the 
Army Strategic Command (Komando Strategis Angkatan Darat, Kostrad),  the authority to restore order 
to the nation.  Suharto interpreted the order broadly and immediately banned the Indonesian Communist 
Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI) and took steps to remove communist sympathisers from 
government positions.   
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 Through a detailed examination of the Sejarah’s account of the key moments in 
Indonesia’s modern history in which the role of youth is celebrated, the chapter explores 
the ways in which official New Order historiography constructed the historical roles and 
identities of Indonesia’s youth.  These moments include the founding of Budi Utomo, 
the development of the regional youth movement, the role of youth in the proclamation 
of independence and their role in the events of 1966.5
 
As an official history used at tertiary level and the reference source on which junior and 
senior high school history textbooks were based, one of the main audiences of the 
Sejarah was the young generation, including both mahasiswa and pelajar.6  This 
chapter suggests that the Sejarah’s representation of the historical roles of Indonesia’s 
youth and students provided a series of ‘lessons’ for the young generation of the 1970s, 
1980s and 1990s about the roles which they were expected to play within the New 
Order state.  These lessons were constructed within an organicist framework of state-
society relations with its emphasis on mutual cooperation, the achievement of consensus 
through deliberative decision-making processes, self-sacrifice and the placing of the 
interests and rights of the whole over those of the individual (see Bourchier 1996, 241, 
255).  The chapter argues that in its representations of the historical roles and identities 
of Indonesia’s youth and students, the Sejarah’s account both manifests and attempts to 
resolve the essential tension between recognising the pioneering role of Indonesia’s 
youth in history and the need to ensure that the youth and students of the New Order 
saw their role not as radical political agents and revolutionaries but as heroes of 
development (pahlawan pembangunan) who were loyal to the regime.  This tension is 
manifested on two levels.  On one level, the youth of the past are represented as an 
altruistic group working in the interests of the nation and the Indonesian people, who 
pioneered Indonesia’s unity, were ‘radical’ in their defence of the interests of the nation, 
and who acted in the interests of the wider populace in helping to bring about the fall of 
a corrupt leader and his government.  On another level, however, the Sejarah’s account 
marginalises the role that youth played in the past by transforming them into symbols 
and by playing down their active role in events.   
 
                                                          
5 For an analysis of the role of youth during the Japanese occupation and the revolution see Anderson 
1972; Frederick 1989; Reid 1974.  A number of accounts were also produced under the New Order by 
former student revolutionaries.  See for example Sagimun 1989; Asmadi 1985; Asmadi 1980; Imran and 
Ariwiadi 1985.  
6 For a discussion of school textbooks see Thomas 1981; Leigh 1991; Parker 1992; Mulder 2000; 
Bourchier 1994, 1996, 225; Antlov 1996; Siegel 1986, 145.  
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 These representations aimed to delimit what it was possible to say about the historical 
roles of Indonesia’s youth and students.  In doing so, the New Order’s official historians 
aimed to regulate the ways in which contemporary youth and students could act.  Of 
particular importance was the need to separate contemporary youth and students from 
the radical and revolutionary actions carried out by their predecessors and to reorient 
their behaviour towards the ‘constructive’ project of national development.  At the same 
time, the didactic nature of the Sejarah, and its use as an educational text, provided the 
conditions within which contemporary students could regulate their own behaviour. 
 
Idealists, patriots and pioneers: re-interpreting history  
 
The production of the Sejarah Nasional Indonesia was an integral part of the new 
regime’s history project.  Although the need for a national history of Indonesia to 
replace Dutch histories had been identified soon after the end of the revolution, it was 
not until 1970 that any substantial steps were taken towards writing it.  It was also part 
of the refashioning of history in the context of the post-1965 political realignments.  
The versions of events propagated during the Guided Democracy period, with their 
emphasis on revolutionary action, anti-imperialism and socialist orientation were no 
longer appropriate in the new regime.  Instead, new versions of events which 
emphasised stability, order and development had to be constructed.   
 
The Sejarah Nasional Indonesia was first published in six volumes in 1975 by the 
Department of Education and Culture.7  It was written and edited by a team of historians 
led by the preeminent Indonesian historian Sartono Kartodirdjo.  Joining Sartono as 
general editors were Marwati Djoened Poesponegoro and the New Order military 
historian Nugroho Notosusanto.8  From the third edition, only Poesponegoro and 
Notosusanto appear as editors.  The editor for volume five, The era of national 
                                                          
7 The first edition of the Sejarah was published in 1975.  This chapter uses volumes five and six of the 
fourth edition of the text, published in 1990.  No substantial changes were made to the text of volume five 
of the fourth edition.  The revisions made to volume six were largely concerned with presentation, 
including the division of the material into five chapters rather than the three of previous editions and a 
chronological rather than thematic arrangement.  A number of important events from the New Order 
period were also added (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 6: xvii).   
8 As a teenager, Nugroho served as a member of the Student Army (Tentara Republik Indonesia Pelajar, 
TRIP) during the Revolution.  After the transfer of power, he chose to forego a military career in order to 
pursue higher education at the University of Indonesia. In 1964, he joined a team of historians engaged in 
writing an army version of the history of the independence struggle and later headed the Armed Forces 
History Centre (Pusat Sejarah ABRI) before being appointed Minister for Education in 1984 (McGregor 
2001).  For further information on Notosusanto’s career see McGregor 2001, 2002 and Brooks 1995. 
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 awakening and the end of the Dutch Indies, was Yusmar Basri.  Together with Nugroho 
Notosusanto, Basri was also responsible for the preparation of the primary and 
secondary school history textbooks which were based on the Sejarah.  Volume six of 
the Sejarah, The Japanese era and the era of the Republic of Indonesia, was edited by 
Nugroho Notosusanto.  Nugroho’s version of these events caused some controversy.  
According to van Klinken, this volume is characterised by ‘a stark anti communism 
[which] privileged the military as national saviours at every crucial moment’ (van 
Klinken 2001, 325).  This volume was also controversial for its negative representations 
of Sukarno and the role of the political parties in the 1950s.  As a result, several 
historians associated with the project withdrew from it (Bourchier 1994, 57; McGregor 
2002).   
 
The Sejarah’s version of history was an integral part of the broader program of 
ideological ‘education’ which was at the basis of programs such as the Pancasila 
courses for civil servants and curriculum initiatives such as Pancasila Moral Education 
(Pendidikan Moral Pancasila, PMP), the History of the National Struggle (Pendidikan 
Sejarah Perjuangan Bangsa, PSPB) and civics courses for primary, secondary and 
tertiary students.  In addition to these were the broad range of propaganda tools, 
including museums and statuary, documentary films such as the Pengkhianatan G30S 
(The Treason of the Thirtieth of September Movement), a propaganda film on the 
events of 1965-1966 which was compulsory viewing for all school students, and the 
celebrations which accompanied commemorations of days of national significance such 
as the Sacred Pancasila Day (Hari Kesaktian Pancasila) on 1 October (see Thomas 
1981; Leigh 1991; Parker 1992; Bourchier 1994; Antlov 1996; Mulder 2000; McGregor 
2002).  These programs and tools aimed to socialise Indonesian citizens, and especially 
the young generation, into the key values and ideologies of the state.    
 
The founding of Budi Utomo: students and the rakyat 
 
In New Order histories as well as those written during the 1950s and 1960s, the 
formation of Budi Utomo by students based at the colonial-era medical college (School 
Tot Opleiding van Inlandsche Artsen, Stovia) on 20 May 1908 signals the awakening 
(kebangkitan) of the nation and the beginning of the nationalist movement (see for 
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 example Hardjito 1952, 10; Biro Pemuda 1965, 25-6; Tomasoa 1972, 13-19).9  The 
founding of Budi Utomo is described in volume five of the Sejarah, ‘The era of national 
awakening and the end of the Dutch Indies’.  Since the establishment of the 
organisation is considered the beginning of the nationalist movement, this event opens 
the chapter entitled ‘The national movement’.10  The Sejarah’s account of the founding 
of Budi Utomo portrays the Stovia students as acting in the interests of the Indonesian 
people as a whole and as opening the way to national unity.  This pioneering role is, 
however, tempered by the use of passive sentences, which plays down the active role of 
the Stovia students.   
 
In the Sejarah’s version of events, the Stovia students are described as pelajar and 
murid (student) as well as pemuda (youth).  While the former establishes their status as 
educated individuals, the latter indicates their membership of a broader demographic 
group, the young generation.11  The Sejarah’s account emphasises the Stovia students’ 
principal motivation for establishing Budi Utomo as being their concern for the people.  
The main term used to describe this group is rakyat, which appears in phrases such as 
martabat rakyat (status of the people), nasib rakyat (fate of the people) and kedudukan 
dan martabat rakyat (position and status of the people).  The action most often 
associated with these phrases is meningkatkan (to increase or improve).   
 
In contemporary usage the term rakyat is both a general term for ‘the people’ or ‘the 
inhabitants of a nation’ as well as a more specific term meaning ‘the masses’ or ‘the 
common people’ (KBBI 2001, 924).  In the Sejarah’s description of Budi Utomo, the 
term rakyat is primarily used in the more general sense of ‘the people’.  The other terms 
associated with the concept of ‘the people’ highlight this understanding of the term 
rakyat.  Thus, terms such as penduduk pulau Jawa dan Madura (the inhabitants of Java 
and Madura), penduduk Hindia seluruhnya (the inhabitants of the Indies as a whole), 
                                                          
9 Tomasoa represents Budi Utomo as a ‘continuation of the regional struggles against the Dutch’ 
(kelanjutan dari perjuangan daerah-darerah melawan Belanda) (1972, 14; see also Martha 1992, 30-1).  
Pringgodigdo also represents Budi Utomo as the beginning of the nationalist movement although he does 
not mention that it was formed by students (1986, 1).  20 May is now celebrated annually as Hari 
Kebangkitan Nasional (National Awakening Day).   
10 The organisation is also mentioned in the section on ‘Indonesia and the Indonesian language as national 
identity’ (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 5: 279-80).  See also Martha (1992, 31 and 33) for a 
discussion of the pemuda pelajar who founded Budi Utomo and the motivations for it. 
11 Between May and the beginning of October 1908, when the organisations’ first congress was held, 
Budi Utomo is also described as being a ‘student organisation with Stovia students as its core’ 
(organisasi pelajar dengan para pelajar Stovia sebagai intinya) (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 5: 
177).  In contrast, Biro Pemuda (1965, 29) explicitly rejects the notion that Budi Utomo was a youth 
organisation although, it notes, its founders were youth.   
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 penduduk pribumi (the native inhabitants) and penduduk pribumi pada umumnya (the 
native inhabitants in general) underscore the Sejarah’s emphasis on the Stovia students’ 
concern for all the people, be they the Javanese and Madurese people or the people of 
the Indies as a whole. 
 
This concern for the rakyat is evident from the very beginning of the Sejarah’s 
account.12  The marked word order of the opening sentence of the chapter establishes 
the ‘status of the rakyat’ as the central theme in the establishment of Budi Utomo: 
 
With the motto of a desire to improve the status of the people, Mas Ngabehi 
Wahidin Sudirohusodo, a lower priyayi [aristocratic] Javanese doctor in 
Yogyakarta, in 1906 and 1907 began a campaign amongst the priyayi of Java 
(Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 5: 177).13
 
While these efforts were largely unsuccessful amongst the priyayi, the Stovia pelajar 
were more receptive to Dr. Wahidin’s ideas.  In this version of events, it is ‘the desire to 
improve the position and status of the people (rakyat)’ that motivates the Stovia 
students to broaden Dr. Wahidin’s original aim of setting up a scholarship fund and 
establish Budi Utomo (ibid.).  
 
This emphasis on the Stovia students’ concern for all the people is somewhat 
problematic historically.  As Nagazumi has noted, Budi Utomo was primarily an 
organisation which aimed to advance the interests of the lesser priyayi, who formed the 
core of the student body at institutions such as Stovia (Nagazumi 1972).  While the 
Stovia students did advocate a program which included the interests of non-priyayi 
during the initial stages of the organisation’s development, the program which was 
eventually accepted at the first congress emphasised education for priyayi.14
                                                          
12 Hardjito (1952, 10) and Biro Pemuda (1965, 25-6) also represent Budi Utomo as an organsiation 
concerned for the rakyat in a broad sense, rather than only an organisation concerned with the interests of 
the priyayi indicating that the history of Budi Utomo was already being used for political purposes as 
early as the 1950s. 
13 Dengan semboyan hendak meningkatkan martabat rakyat, Mas Ngabehi Wahidin Sudirohusodo, 
seorang doctor Jawa dan termasuk golongan priyayi rendahan, dalam tahun 1906 dan 1907 mulai 
mengadakan kampanye di kalangan priyayi di pulau Jawa (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 5: 177).  
14 In a statement issued in September 1908, for example, Soewarno, the secretary of the Weltevreden 
(Jakarta) branch of Budi Utomo, which was dominated by students, advocates the advancement of all the 
people of the Indies, ‘without regard to traditional distinctions’ (Nagazumi 1972, 41; see also Penders 
1977, 225-7).  To this end, the draft program for the organisation, drawn up by students at this branch in 
the same month, included education for the common people and care for the poor as goals (Nagazumi 
1972, 43).  Yet while these goals were included in the party’s first program, according to Nagazumi, they 
were not considered particularly important.  The emphasis in both the Weltevreden students’ draft 
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The Sejarah’s representation of Budi Utomo as an organisation concerned for the rakyat 
in a broad sense is consistent with the New Order’s interpretation of the historical role 
of youth as struggling for ‘the interests of all’ (kepentingan keseluruhan).  It is also 
consistent with the emphasis in the regime’s organicist model of the state on the 
precedence of the collective good.  This model, New Order ideologues argued, was an 
authentic ‘Indonesian’ mode of social organisation and a counter to the individualistic 
systems found in Western countries.  It was also a key means by which the social justice 
mandated in the Pancasila could be achieved.  As Suharto argued in his 1967 
independence day address: 
 
It would be ideal if in the implementation of Pancasila democracy one could 
always achieve a balance between individual and general interests, between the 
interests of groups and of the nation, and between people and the state.  But if a 
problem arises where there is a conflict between individual and general interests 
or the interests of specific groups and the national interest, then we must 
sincerely, voluntarily and unselfishly sacrifice the relevant individual or group 
interest for that of society and the nation.  That is the just principle and law of 
Pancasila democracy, and this is in our opinion the most appropriate recipe for 
achieving a just and prosperous society materially and spiritually based upon 
Pancasila (Bourchier and Hadiz 2003, 41). 
 
The lesson for the Sejarah’s contemporary student audience is that they, like their 
predecessors, should sacrifice their narrow individual or group interests in the interests 
of the nation as a whole. 
 
Pioneers of nationalism 
  
The Sejarah’s description of Budi Utomo’s first months emphasises the Stovia students’ 
vision of ‘national unity’ and the pioneering role which the students played in forging 
this unity.  It notes that the original goals of the organisation were ‘formulated in vague 
terms as ‘progress for the Indies’ (kemajuan bagi Hindia)’.  This was initially limited to 
‘the inhabitants of Java and Madura’ (penduduk pulau Jawa dan Madura).  Before the 
first congress was held, however, it had expanded to include ‘the inhabitants of the 
Indies as a whole’ (penduduk Hindia seluruhnya).  This emphasis on the ‘national’ 
character of Budi Utomo represents a reframing of the past in terms of the present.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
program and the program eventually accepted at the first congress was instead on secondary and 
advanced Dutch education, something which was only possible for the upper classes (ibid., 49-50).   
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 While the concept of the Indies was present in the Stovia students’ initial ideas, in part 
because of the influence of nationalist figures such as E.F.E Douwes Dekker, the 
organisation was primarily concerned with the promotion of Greater Java (Jawa Raya).  
Indeed, as Nagazumi notes, the antipathy between the Javanese, who were the 
ethnically dominant group in institutions such as Stovia, and the non-Javanese, militated 
against any practical cooperation (Nagazumi 1972, 37).  This emphasis on the ‘national’ 
character of the Stovia students’ vision represents the founding of Budi Utomo as the 
first of many milestones in Indonesia’s journey towards unity.  The implication is that 
Indonesia’s status as a nation was always implicit in history and that its current and 
future unity is historically predetermined (see also Philpott 2000, 58 and 61).   
 
In the Sejarah, the pioneering role that the Stovia students played in the founding of 
Budi Utomo is reflected in the grammatically active role ascribed to the Stovia pelajar 
in the action of mendirikan (establishing) Budi Utomo.  This representation of the 
Stovia students as both the grammatical and real agents of concrete actions such as 
mendirikan is consistent with their designation as the visionary pioneers of national 
unity in speeches and policy documents.  Since Budi Utomo was, in the Sejarah’s 
account, an organisation which aimed to improve the status of all the people of the 
Indies, the Stovia students’ pioneering role is sanctioned because the students had the 
interests of the nation at heart.15   
 
However, the grammatical patterns throughout the remainder of the Sejarah’s account 
of the founding of Budi Utomo shift the emphasis away from the Stovia students’ 
agency.16  For example, in the discussion of the motivations for the founding of the 
organisation the Sejarah notes that:    
 
The ideals of improving the position and status of the people (rakyat) were also 
already present in the Stovia students, and because of this, Dr Wahidin’s 
campaign encouraged and increased those ideals (Poesponegoro and 
Notosusanto 1990, 5: 177).17
 
                                                          
15 The only other concrete actions where the Stovia students are the grammatical agents are menyingkir 
dari barisan depan (stepping aside from the front line) and berhenti sebagai anggotanya (ceasing to be 
members) (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 5: 178-9).   
16 The backgrounding of human agents and agency is in fact a feature of New Order state discourse more 
generally.  For this argument with regard to former president Suharto’s accountability speeches see 
Jackson (1999) and Jackson (2000).   
17 Cita-cita untuk meningkatkan kedudukan dan martabat rakyat itu sebenarnya juga sudah ada pada 
para pelajar Stovia, karena itu kampanye dr. Wahidin makin mendorong dan memperbesar cita-cita 
tersebut (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 5: 177). 
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 The Stovia pelajar are here represented not as actively developing or expounding ‘the 
desire to improve the status of the people’ but rather as being the ‘receptacles’ for it, 
indicated by the phrase sudah ada pada para pelajar Stovia (already present in the 
Stovia students).   Moreover, Dr Wahidin’s campaign is described not as encouraging 
the Stovia pelajar themselves, but rather the abstract noun ‘ideals’ (cita-cita). 
 
The Stovia students’ role in Budi Utomo is also backgrounded through the use of 
passive verbs.  For example, in the Sejarah’s account of the crucial step of formulating 
the organisation’s goals in the months leading up to the first congress, it is noted that 
the original aims of the organisation ‘were broadened’ (diperluas) and ‘were 
formulated’ (dirumuskan) in a vague way.  Passivisation is, as Sneddon suggests, far 
more common in most registers of standard Indonesian than it is in English (1996, 254-
5).  However, in some cases, there does appear to be a political motivation for the use of 
the passive form of the verb.  In particular, as noted in Jackson (2000), the fact that the 
passive form enables the agent responsible for the action to be omitted represents a 
useful means of obscuring agency (see also van Leeuwin 1996, 39 and 43-4).  In the 
Sejarah’s account, the use of passive verbs has the effect of representing the 
formulation of Budi Utomo’s goals as occurring without the intervention of human 
agents.  A similar pattern is evident in the description of the broadening of the 
organisation’s goals outside of Java and Madura, where it is noted that the organisation 
‘expanded (meluas) to the inhabitants of the Indies as a whole’ (Poesponegoro and 
Notosusanto 1990, 5: 178).  The emphasis is thus not on the central role that the Stovia 
students played in formulating and broadening the organisations’ goals but on the action 
itself.  In this view, the Stovia students are the embodiment of the will to Indonesian 
nationhood and the personification of the historically predetermined concept of the 
Indonesian nation, rather than its active formulators.   
 
For the Sejarah’s contemporary student audience, the representation of Budi Utomo as 
the first ‘nationalist’ organisation, and the Sejarah’s version of Indonesia’s history as a 
whole, was intended to reinforce the New Order state’s assertion that Indonesia’s unity 
as a nation was always inherent in its history.  This claim was not a new one: histories 
produced during the Guided Democracy period had a similar aim.  In the context of the 
New Order’s history project, this representation of Indonesian history was intended to 
legitimise the current borders of the nation and safeguard the nation’s territorial 
integrity.  It also aimed to socialise the young generation, and Indonesian citizens as a 
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 whole, into the nationalist and patriotic values which would enable them to fulfil their 
role in the contemporary nation by serving the state-defined national interest.  At the 
same time, the Sejarah’s representation of the historical roles of Indonesia’s youth and 
students as passive rather than active agents was consistent with the role of compliant 
agents of development which the New Order saw as appropriate for contemporary 
students.   
 
The youth movement: unity and disunity 
 
The Sejarah’s account of the nationalist movement proceeds chronologically.  Thus, 
following the account of Budi Utomo is a two-page section devoted to the Sarekat Islam 
(Muslim Union), founded in 1911, and a five page section discussing the Indische Partij 
(Indies Party), founded in 1912.   A five-page description of youth movements (gerakan 
pemuda) of the 1910s to 1930s immediately follows this.  In this account, the main 
participants are pemuda and their organisations.  These pemuda are represented as 
paving the way for national unity through the unity forged between the regional youth 
organisations.  At the same time, the ethnic and religious discord which was present in 
the regional youth movement is largely written out of the Sejarah’s version of events. 
 
The key term in the Sejarah’s account of the youth movement is persatuan (unity).  
This term is usually associated with verbs meaning ‘to strengthen’ and ‘to consolidate’.  
Thus, the aims of the various youth organisations are described in terms of 
memperkokoh rasa persatuan (strengthening the sense of unity), mempererat persatuan 
(strengthening/consolidating unity), menggalang persatuan (providing a firm basis for 
unity) and menanamkan dan mewujudkan cita-cita persatuan seluruh Indonesia 
(planting and realising the aims of unity for the whole of Indonesia).  Other terms and 
phrases associated with persatuan in the Sejarah’s account include mempersatuan 
(unify), bermufakat (to reach a consensus), disetujui (agreed upon) and semangat 
kerjasama (spirit of cooperation).  The focus on persatuan presents a contrast to the 
representation of disunity.  The term ‘division’ (perpecahan) appears only once in the 
Sejarah’s description of the youth movement and this is in connection with Jong Java’s 
efforts to ‘avoid divisions’ (menghindari perpecahan).  Disunity is, however, implied in 
the use of the terms Jawa-sentris (Java-centric) and rasa kedaerahan (regional 
sentiment), both of which are represented as obstacles to unity. 
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The Sejarah’s focus on persatuan in its account of the regionally-based youth 
organisations represents the youth movement as the precursor of national unity.  The 
concern of the regional youth organisations with advancing their regional cultures, for 
example, is interpreted as a means of developing the future nation of Indonesia through 
the development of its unique cultural heritage.  According to the Sejarah, all of the 
regionally-based youth organisations ‘aimed (bercita-cita) towards the progress of 
Indonesia, especially advancing their respective regions and cultures’ (Poesponegoro 
and Notosusanto 1990, 5: 191, emphasis added).   The composition of the organisations 
is also interpreted in terms of persatuan.  Concluding the discussion of Jong Java, Jong 
Sumatranen Bond and a number of other regionally-based youth organisations, the 
Sejarah notes that ‘several of these organisations contained in their structure or form 
the seeds of Indonesian national unity’ (ibid., 192, emphasis added). 
 
Yet while the Sejarah interprets the desire for unity amongst the regional youth 
organisations as a desire for national or ‘Indonesian’ unity, there is little indication that 
these organisations saw themselves in this way, at least not until the 1920s.  As 
Foulcher observes, while these organisations were ‘driven by a proto-nationalist sense 
of identification with their regions and homelands’, it was not until the mid-1920s that 
the regional youth groups began to identify more closely with the nationalist movement 
(Foulcher 2000, 379).  Indeed, the term persatuan, which the Sejarah attributes to the 
pre-1920 youth organisations, was not yet present in the vocabulary of these groups, not 
least because, aside from their regional languages, the language they shared as educated 
youth was Dutch.  Like the emphasis on the ‘national’ character of the Stovia students’ 
vision for Budi Utomo, the Sejarah’s focus on persatuan in its account of the 
regionally-based youth movement contributes to the representation of Indonesian unity 
as historically predetermined.   
 
In addition to its emphasis on unity, the Sejarah’s account also plays down ethnic and 
religious discord within the regional youth movement.  This is consistent with the denial 
of a place for political, ideological, ethnic or religious conflict in the New Order’s 
organicist model of the state.  In the Sejarah’s account of the youth movement, for 
example, the journey towards a unitary youth organisation, and with it the Indonesian 
nation’s journey towards unity, is represented as a relatively uncontested process.  This 
focus on unity glosses over significant ethnic and religious divisions within the youth 
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 movement and the nationalist movement as a whole.  In particular, it dismisses those 
aspects of the youth movement of the 1920s and 1930s which show it to have been 
deeply involved in the essentially political contest regarding the future basis of the 
Indonesian nation.  This contest, which was taking place just as the youth groups were 
finding their voice in Indonesian society, pitted the ‘Indies nationalism’ promoted by 
nationalist figures such as E.F.E Douwes Dekker and Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo, 
against the Javanese and Sumatran cultural nationalism which developed as a reaction 
against it.  While the Indies nationalists saw the geographical limits of the future 
Indonesian nation as determined by the limits of Dutch hegemony, the cultural 
nationalists of Budi Utomo and, later, Jong Java and Jong Sumatranen Bond saw 
cultural identity as the essence of the nationalist movement (Reid 1979, 282-7; see also 
van Miert 1996).   
 
In the Sejarah’s account, however, ethnicity, whether Javanese, Sumatran, Minahasan 
or Batak, is represented not as a focus of political allegiance but rather as the focus of 
an idealised cultural identity in which the youth organisations aimed to promote their 
regional cultures as the means for developing the future nation of Indonesia.  Yet while 
promoting regional culture is seen in the Sejarah as part of the development of the 
nation, the Sejarah counsels that regional sentiment (rasa kedaerahan) should not be so 
strong as to represent an obstacle to unity. At the first youth congress, the Sejarah 
observes, the Indonesian Students Association (Perhimpunan Pelajar-Pelajar Indonesia, 
PPPI), suggested that all youth associations unite to form a single youth organisation.18  
This first attempt to forge unity however, ‘could not be implemented because regional 
sentiment was still strong’ (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 5: 192).  Regional 
sentiment, in this view, prevents the regional youth organisations and, by implication, 
the nation, from forming a productive unity.   
 
The Sejarah also plays down religious divisions, in particular, the conflict between the 
regionally-based secular youth organisations and the Muslim youth organisations Jong 
Islamieten Bond (Young Muslims League) and Pemuda Muslimin (Muslim Youth).  
One of the key themes of the early nationalist movement was the conflict between 
secular-oriented nationalism and Islamic nationalism.  The conflict between these two 
nationalisms was, as Suryadinata notes, clearly reflected in the youth movement 
                                                          
18 The PPPI was formed in 1926 by students at Stovia and the colonial-era college of law 
(Rechtschoogeschool) (Martha 1992, 83-4).  It had links to the Indonesian National Party (Partai Nasional 
Indonesia, PNI) (Foulcher 2000, 379). 
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 (Suryadinata 1978, 113).  In the Sejarah’s account of the youth movement, however, 
the role of the Muslim youth organisations is reduced to merely a few lines.  In the 
discussion of the August 1926 conference which followed the first youth congress, for 
example, the Sejarah notes that the motion that ‘a permanent body for the imperative of 
Indonesian unity’ be established was accepted by all attending organisations ‘with the 
exception of Jong Islamieten Bond’ (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 5: 192).  
Moreover, at the formation of Indonesia Muda (Young Indonesia), the first truly 
‘national’ youth organisation, in 1930, the Sejarah notes only that both Jong Islamieten 
Bond and Pemuda Muslimin did not join.  In fact, as Suryadinata notes, Jong Islamieten 
Bond’s opposition to the efforts to unite the youth movement was based on the 
organisation’s desire that a unified youth organisation be based on Islam (Suryadinata 
1978, 109-11).19  The Sejarah’s silence surrounding the role of the Muslim youth 
organisations, in particular the powerful Jong Islamieten Bond, reflects the New Order’s 
limitation of discursive space for political Islam.  In a practical sense, this took place 
through the incorporation and hence disempowerment of the voices of political Islam 
through, for example, uniting the Islamic parties into the United Development Party 
(Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP) in 1973.  It was also achieved by demonising 
‘radical’ forms of Islam by labelling it as ekstrim kanan (extreme right).20  These 
measures stemmed from the New Order’s fear that Islam would emerge as a powerful 
political force and a serious challenge to state power if not kept in check.  By not 
examining the reasons behind the Islamic nationalist oriented youth organisations’ 
consistent refusals to cooperate in the broader efforts to forge unity amongst Indonesian 
youth, the Sejarah in effect ‘silences’ the voices of these groups.  At the same time, it 
reinforces the view that Indonesia’s journey towards unity was an uncontested (and 
distinctly secular) process. 
 
Where the Sejarah does give a voice to political Islam, it is often represented in a 
negative way, as a divisive rather than a unifying force.  The potentially divisive nature 
of political Islam is evident in the Sejarah’s account of the split within Jong Java 
following the 1924 congress.  It was this split which led to the formation of Jong 
                                                          
19 In 1927, for example, when the PPPI first suggested the creation of a youth federation, the president of 
Jong Islamieten Bond, Wiwoho, asserted that his organisation would not participate unless the proposed 
body was based on Islam.  Moreover, at the second youth congress in 1928, Jong Islamieten Bond refused 
to endorse the Sumpah Pemuda because of its secular content (Suryadinata 1978, 106-7, 109, 110).   
20 McGregor (2002) notes that New Order historiographers overstated the threat which these types of 
conflict posed to the unity and stability of the nation by highlighting historical events in which ‘extreme 
right’ (ekstrim kanan) (Islamic) or ‘extreme left’ (ekstrim kiri) (communist) groups had rebelled against 
the unitary state.   
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 Islamieten Bond.  The Sejarah’s account of this congress represents the disagreement 
which leads to the formation of the Jong Islamieten Bond as a rejection of political 
Islam.  At the congress, the Sejarah notes, Jong Java’s chairperson, Raden Sam, who 
was close to Sarekat Islam leader Haji Agus Salim, put forward a proposal.  Sam 
suggested that while Jong Java should remain a non-political organisation, those 
members who were over the age of 18 and who wished to engage in politics be 
permitted to do so.  Salim then addressed the congress on the topic of ‘Islam and Jong 
Java’ (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 5: 191; Pringgodigdo 1986, 101-2).  The 
Sejarah notes that Salim used the opportunity to ‘attempt to bring religious issues into 
Jong Java with the opinion that religion had a great influence on the realisation of the 
organisation’s ideals’ (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 5: 191).21  Sam’s proposal, 
however, was rejected, and as a result ‘those who agreed to engage in politics (setuju 
berpolitik)’ formed the Jong Islamieten Bond, which had ‘Islam as the basis of the 
struggle’ (ibid.).   
 
The Sejarah implies that Salim’s ‘attempt to bring religious issues into Jong Java’ was a 
divisive act.  His speech at the congress and his support for Sam’s proposal were, in this 
view, an attempt by an ‘adult’ political figure to infiltrate a religiously neutral 
nationalist youth organisation (which represents the common interest) in order to 
advance the interests of Sarekat Islam’s brand of political Islam (which represents the 
interests of one particular group).22  Salim’s attempt is thus implied to be counter to the 
interests of the nation as a whole.  There is also an implicit rejection in the Sejarah of 
the fact that Islam ‘had a great influence on the realisation of the organisation’s ideals’ 
(Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 5: 191).  More generally, the Sejarah’s history of 
the nationalist movement is the history of the development of secular nationalism.  In 
the discussion of Sarekat Islam, for example, the Sejarah, while acknowledging the 
Islamic character and basis of the organisation, emphasises its status as a nationalist 
organisation concerned for the rights of the rakyat bumiputra (native people), and not as 
an Islamic political organisation (see ibid., 183-5).  This reflects the New Order’s 
                                                          
21 … mencoba memasukkan soal agama dalam Jong Java dengan pendapat bahwa soal agama ini adalah 
sangat besar pengaruhnya dalam mencapai cita-cita (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 5: 191).  
Pringgodigdo (1986, 101-2) also represents Salim’s proposal in negative terms, as a divisive attempt by 
the forces of political Islam to infiltrate a secular organisation and describes the rejection of the proposal 
as successful in ‘warding off the attack on Jong Java’s neutral stance on religious issues’ (menangkis 
serangan terhadap pendiriannya netral dalam hal agama) (Pringgodigdo 1986, 102).   
22 Pringgodigdo is more direct in suggesting that Salim was behind the proposal (1986, 101). 
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 emphasis on the secular yet ‘spiritual’ basis of the contemporary Indonesian state, 
enshrined in the first principle of the Pancasila, ‘belief in one God’.    
 
In the Sejarah, then, conflict is largely written out of history or is represented as 
detrimental to the struggle to achieve the nation’s goals: it was only by forging ethnic 
and religious unity that the nationalist movement was able to achieve kemerdekaan 
(independence).  For the Sejarah’s contemporary student audience, the focus on unity, 
and the denial of discursive space for contestation, represents an important lesson about 
the appropriate form of social and political organisation in the contemporary nation.  
During the New Order, ethnic and religious conflict were represented as potentially 
divisive sources of ideological conflict, neatly summed up in the acronym SARA (Suku, 
Agama, Ras, Antar-Golongan), a reference to ethnic, religious, race and inter-group 
tensions.  Such conflict was anathema to the regime’s model of the ideal organic state, 
which emphasised a harmonious, cooperative and consensual model of social and 
political organisation.  This model rejected the idea of a political system based on 
ideological competition between parties which, it was claimed, threatened the stability 
and order which was so essential to development.  This had been demonstrated by the 
political and ideological conflict of the previous regime which, New Order ideologues 
stressed, had resulted in political, economic and social chaos.  The rejection of ethnic 
and religious political interests was also a product of the influence of the military in 
politics during the first few decades of the New Order.  As Bourchier and Hadiz point 
out, the military’s negative perceptions about political forms of Islam and ethnic politics 
reflected the dominance of syncretic Muslim (abangan) and Javanese officers, in 
particular in the army (2003, 13, 27).  It was also a product of the army’s role in 
quelling regional and Islamic rebellions during the 1950s and early 1960s, which led to 
a distrust of these forces and a conviction that they were a threat to the unitary state.   
 
Pemuda as agents of history  
 
In the Sejarah’s description of the youth movement, pemuda and murid are central 
participants in the events and function as the agents of the concrete process of 
‘establishing’ (mendirikan) both Jong Java and Jong Sumatranen Bond.  Yet the 
Sejarah’s account also backgrounds the role of the pemuda by using passive sentences 
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 and omitting the agents of the actions.  The description of the formation of Indonesia 
Muda (Young Indonesia) for example, notes that: 
 
In a congress held in Yogya [Yogyakarta] on 24-28 December 1928, a decision 
was made to undertake a fusion [of the youth organisations].  The decision was 
approved by Jong Java, Jong Sumatra (which had in 1928 become Pemuda 
Sumatra), and Jong Celebes.  Then a committee, subsequently known as the 
Indonesia Muda Committee, was formed to prepare the steps for 
implementation.  Finally, on 31 December 1930 in a conference in Solo, the 
establishment of the Indonesia Muda organisation was determined 
(Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 5: 193, italics indicate passive verbs).23
 
Of the passive verbs located within main clauses in this paragraph only one, disetujui 
(approved), has an agent specified.  The remainder – diambil (was made), dibentuklah 
(was formed) and ditetapkan (was determined) – are all without agents.  This pattern, 
which is consistent throughout the Sejarah’s description of the youth movement, 
represents the formation of Indonesia Muda as occurring largely independent of pemuda 
and their organisations: decisions are made, committees are formed and organisations 
are established but the pemuda who were presumably central to these decisions and 
actions are largely absent.  Moreover, although an agent for the action disetujui is 
specified, it is the organisational actors Jong Java, Jong Sumatra and Jong Celebes, and 
not pemuda, which are responsible for ‘approving’ the fusion of the organisations.  
Thus, although the pemuda are central participants in the Sejarah’s account, they are 
not active participants.  Rather, their role is as onlookers in the processes of making 
decisions and forming organisations.  
  
The Sejarah’s account of the declaration of the Sumpah Pemuda (Youth Pledge) also 
marginalises the role of the pemuda, in this case by transforming this pledge into a 
symbol.  The Second Youth Congress, held in October 1928, and in particular the 
resolutions of the congress, known as the Sumpah Pemuda, were in both Guided 
Democracy and New Order histories celebrated as the ‘founding moment’ of the 
Indonesian nation.  In ‘Sumpah Pemuda: The making and meaning of a symbol of 
national identity’, Keith Foulcher argues that in the post-independence period the 
Sumpah Pemuda, and the meanings attached to it, were actively constructed as ‘a 
                                                          
23 Dalam kongres yang diadakan di Yogya pada tanggal 24-28 Desember 1928 diambil keputusan untuk 
mengadakan fusi (gabungan).  Keputusan tersebut disetujui oleh Jong Java, Jong Sumatra (tahun 1928 
menjadi Pemuda Sumatra), dan Jong Celebes.  Kemudian dibentuklah suatu komisi, kelak disebut Komisi 
Besar Indonesia Muda, untuk mempersiapkan langkah pelaksanaannya.  Akhirnya pada tanggal 31 
Desember 1930 dalam konperensi di Solo ditetapkan berdirinya organisasi Indonesia Muda 
(Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 5: 193). 
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 symbol of Indonesian nationhood’ (2000, 378).    During the 1950s, he argues, the 
Sumpah Pemuda and its meanings were progressively integrated into Sukarno’s 
ideological machinery.  The New Order continued this process albeit with a new 
emphasis on the Sumpah Pemuda as embodying the essence of ‘an ideology of 
corporatism that subordinated the interests of the group to the state-defined national 
interest’ (ibid., 394).   
 
The status of the Sumpah Pemuda as a symbol of national unity is reflected in the way 
in which it is represented in the Sejarah’s account.  Thus, in the Sejarah’s account of 
the Second Youth Congress, it is ‘the Congress’ which is the principal participant in the 
events: 
 
Again on the initiative of the PPPI, on 27-28 October 1928 the Second 
Indonesian Youth Congress was held to unite all existing Indonesian youth 
associations into one collective body.  The Congress produced the youth pledge 
known as the Sumpah Pemuda.  The substance of this pledge was the three 
principles of Indonesian unity, namely, the unity of homeland, nation and 
language.  The Congress was also made acquainted with the anthem Indonesia 
Raya, composed by Wage Rudolf Supratman, and the Red and White flag, 
regarded as the heirloom flag of the Indonesian nation (Poesponegoro and 
Notosusanto 1990, 5: 193).24
 
Here a collective, ‘the Congress’, produces (menghasilkan) the Sumpah Pemuda, not 
those individual pemuda attending the conference, or even the organisations to which 
they belonged.  This collective body is ‘made acquainted with’ (diperkenalkan) the 
future anthem and flag of the nation.  The role of pemuda in formulating and pledging 
the Sumpah Pemuda is also played down: the Sejarah describes the Sumpah Pemuda as 
merely possessing a ‘substance’.  In the Sejarah’s account, the Sumpah Pemuda has 
taken on an existence of its own, separate, in all but a nominal way, from the pemuda 
who first gave it life.  It is the Sumpah Pemuda as a symbol, and not the pemuda 
themselves, which is responsible for uniting the nation.   
 
                                                          
24 Atas inisiatif PPPI kembali pada tanggal 27-28 Oktober 1928 dilangsungkan Kongres Pemuda 
Indonesia II untuk mempersatukan segala perkumpulan pemuda Indonesia yang ada dalam satu badan 
gabungan.  Kongres menghasilkan sumpah pemuda yang terkenal dengan nama Sumpah Pemuda.  Isinya 
tiga sendi persatuan Indonesia, yaitu persatuan tanah air, bangsa dan bahasa.  Kepada Kongres juga 
diperkenalkan lagu Indonesia Raya yang diciptakan oleh Wage Rudolf Supratman, dan bendera Merah 
Putih yang dipandang sebagai bendera pusaka bangsa Indonesia (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 
5: 193). 
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 The Sejarah’s focus on organisational and institutional rather than individual actors is 
consistent with the New Order’s aim of controlling the effects of history through 
controlling the subjects with which it deals.  New Order historiography, continuing the 
tradition of Dutch historiography and the historiography of the 1950s and 1960s, 
recognised an official pantheon of pahlawan (heroes), who were celebrated for their 
contribution to Indonesia’s ancient and modern history (see Reid 1979, 292-5; see also 
Schreiner 1997).  As in earlier periods, the New Order state closely managed the 
interpretation of the historical role of Indonesia’s pahlawan, representing them as 
national heroes, rather than local heroes.  Moreover, as Schreiner suggests, the official 
biographies of these heroes which were produced in the early 1980s:  
 
create a series of depersonalised and stereotyped icons which can no longer 
represent personal actions.  Instead, they have become emblems of the state 
(1997, 275). 
 
Beyond this official pantheon of pahlawan, New Order historiography tended to focus 
on the actions of collectives rather than individuals, hence distancing action from 
individuals likely to become a focus for mobilisation in the contemporary period (see 
also Antlov 1996, 5).  This same incorporation of powerful images and figures into the 
discourse of the state also underlies the Sejarah’s account of the Sumpah Pemuda.  The 
Sejarah’s focus on the actions of ‘the Congress’ and its representation of the Sumpah 
Pemuda as symbolic of the will to unity represents an attempt to prevent the pemuda 
associated with the Sumpah Pemuda from becoming a focus and embodiment of 
contemporary aspirations.25   
 
Politics and radicalism 
 
The involvement of pemuda and mahasiswa in politics was one of the key areas of 
contestation between the New Order state discourse and student discourses.  The 
pemuda of the 1910s to 1930s played a significant and active role in national politics 
and in the nationalist movement.  This role presented a particular challenge for the New 
Order state, which aimed to thoroughly ‘depoliticise’ the roles of pemuda and 
mahasiswa.  In order to resolve the problematic aspects of students’ role in politics in 
                                                          
25 The limited success of this aim is demonstrated in the clever new rendition of the Sumpah Pemuda 
developed by the student movement of the late 1980s and 1990s which subverted the official symbolism 
and used the Sumpah Pemuda to oppose the state (see Foulcher 2000, 298-99). 
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 the past and the non-political role which students were expected to play in the New 
Order, the Sejarah subtly shifts the emphasis away from the role of the pemuda in 
practical politics, omitting particular details and foregrounding others.   
 
The Sejarah’s account emphasises the fact that the youth organisations were not 
political organisations.  It notes, for example, that Jong Java ‘distanced itself completely 
from the field of political action and propaganda’ (menjauhkan diri sama sekali dari 
medan aksi dan propaganda politik) (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 5: 191).  
While the youth organisations did largely refrain from political action in an 
organisational capacity, they were by no means apolitical.  As both Pringgodigdo 
(1986) and van Miert (1996) point out, discussion of national political issues was a 
common feature in the congresses of individual organisations and in their publications, 
as well as in the national youth congresses.  The Sejarah also omits certain aspects of 
the youth movement which show it to have been increasingly influenced by political 
developments within the nationalist movement.  The fact that in 1926 Jong Java agreed 
to allow its adult members to engage in politics is not mentioned in the Sejarah, for 
example (Suryadinata, 1978 107).  Instead, the youth movement is represented as being 
drawn into politics against their will.  The Sejarah notes that political developments 
‘dragged in’ (menyeret) Jong Java (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 5: 191).  This 
representation of the youth organisations as avoiding ‘practical politics’ and as reluctant 
to allow their members to engage in such politics provides an important lesson for the 
Sejarah’s contemporary student audience.  Under Daud Yusuf’s 1978 campus 
normalisation policy, students were regarded as intellectual beings (manusia penalar), 
whose role in politics was a conceptual one, rather than a practical one (see chapter 
five).  The focus in the Sejarah’s account on the non-practical aspects of the youth 
movement provides a model for contemporary students about their role in politics in the 
New Order state as political ‘thinkers’ rather than political actors. 
 
In contrast to this, Perhimpunan Indonesia, the student organisation based in the 
Netherlands, is represented in the Sejarah as playing an active and indeed radikal role 
in nationalist politics.  This role appears to be inconsistent with the passive political role 
assigned to students during the New Order.  Yet by redefining radikal in a positive 
sense, playing down the organisation’s socialist leanings and their calls for mass 
mobilisation, and limiting the discussion of their radikal actions the Sejarah is able to 
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 characterise the radikal nature of Perhimpunan Indonesia not as oppositional but as 
nationalistic. 
 
The ‘meaning potential’ of a word incorporates both its ‘dictionary’ or denotative 
meanings and the meanings or connotations which are given to it in a particular social 
and historical context.  The denotative or dictionary meaning of the term radikal defines 
it in broad terms as ‘exceedingly resolute in demanding change’ and ‘progressive in 
thought or action’ (KBBI 2001, 919).  In the Sejarah, the term radikal is defined in 
relation to the political position an individual or organisation took in relation to 
nationalism, and the struggle for democracy, social justice and Indonesian 
independence.  These denotative meanings are mediated by the ways in which the 
Sejarah portrays the organisations it designates as radikal.  For example, a clear 
distinction is made between the radical attitudes of Perhimpunan Indonesia which are in 
the interests of the nation and radical actions such as those of the Indonesian 
Communist Party which aim only to disrupt order and stability.  The Sejarah’s 
description of the communist movement during 1910s and 1920s, for example, 
represents the movement as subversive, opportunistic and seditious and hence 
detrimental to the development of the future nation.  The Indies Social-Democratic 
Association (Indische Sociaal-Democratische Vereeniging, ISDV), the precursor of the 
Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI) founded in 1914, is 
described as ‘using infiltration tactics’, ‘increasing its influence by exploiting 
(menunggangi) the adverse situation following World War I’ and the attitude of its 
leaders as ‘too radical’ (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 5: 199-200).  The PKI’s 
‘1926 Rebellion’ (Pemberontakan 1926), is described as ‘an escapade (petualangan) 
which [brought] disaster (malapetaka) for thousands of Indonesian patriots’.  Moreover, 
as a result of the rebellion, the Sejarah notes, ‘the Indonesian National Movement 
experienced such extraordinary repression that it could not progress at all’ (ibid., 208).  
The radikal politics of ISDV and PKI are thus represented as obstructing the efforts to 
achieve unity and independence.  In direct contrast to this, Perhimpunan Indonesia is 
described as: 
 
…actively struggling and even pioneering from afar the struggle for 
independence for the entire people of Indonesia with a pure and cohesive spirit 
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 of unity and integrity of the Indonesian nation (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 
1990, 5: 196).26
 
Thus, while the communist movement’s radikal-ism undermines and divides the nation, 
Perhimpunan Indonesia’s radikal-ism is ‘pure’ and its struggle for independence 
undertaken with a spirit of unity.  This understanding of radikal enables the actions of 
Perhimpunan Indonesia to be defined not as oppositional but as working in the interests 
of the future nation and its people.  The emphasis is not on the students’ resistance 
against the Dutch but rather on their patriotism in pioneering the struggle for 
independence.  Insofar as it is in the retrospective interests of the nation, then, the 
radikal-ism of Perhimpunan Indonesia is sanctioned in the Sejarah.   
   
A second means by which the Sejarah reframes the meaning of the Perhimpunan 
Indonesia students’ radikal nature is by playing down some aspects of the 
organisation’s ideology and actions.  In Perhimpunan Indonesia and the Indonesian 
nationalist movement 1923-28, for example, John Ingleson highlights the Marxist, 
Leninist and socialist orientation of Perhimpunan Indonesia members.  This socialist 
orientation included a focus on the creation of a mass-based political movement from 
the mid-1920s, as well as some cooperation with communist groups.  The organisation 
was also involved in a variety of activities within Indonesia, notably, encouraging 
infiltration of existing nationalist parties and youth organisations which were seen as 
too conservative, producing nationalist propaganda for distribution in Indonesia, and, 
perhaps most importantly, the creation of a new radical nationalist party, the Indonesian 
National Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia, PNI) by former members of Perhimpunan 
Indonesia (Ingleson 1975, chapters two and three).27  In the Sejarah’s account, however, 
the socialist orientation of the Perhimpunan Indonesia is not explored.  Instead, there is 
an emphasis on the organisation’s nationalist character, with the Sejarah describing it as 
having anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist sentiments, as national-democratic, 
international, non-cooperative and as having a desire for independence and the right of 
Indonesia to self-determination (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 5: 195-7).  This 
emphasis on the nationalist character of the organisation is a reflection of the New 
Order’s demonising of leftist ideologies.  And while the Sejarah mentions Perhimpunan 
                                                          
26 …aktif berjuang bahkan memelopori dari jauh perjuangan kemerdekaan untuk seluruh rakyat 
Indonesia dengan berjiwa persatuan dan kesatuan bangsa Indonesia yang murni dan kompak 
(Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 5: 196). 
27 See also the discussion of the Indonesian Nationalist Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia, PNI) which is 
represented as having a unifying and radical nationalism similar to Perhimpunan Indonesia 
(Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 5: 209-17). 
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 Indonesia’s links with the Comintern and the League against Imperialism and Colonial 
Oppression, which was sponsored by the Comintern, it does not elaborate on the full 
extent of the organisation’s cooperation with international communist forces (see 
Ingleson 1975, 31-7).  Instead it mentions only briefly the short-lived confidential 
agreement signed by Mohammad Hatta’s on behalf of Perhimpunan Indonesia with the 
PKI leader Semaun and Perhimpunan Indonesia’s withdrawal from the League in 1927 
because of its domination by communists (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 5: 
198). 
 
The third means by which the Sejarah reframes the radikal nature of Perhimpunan 
Indonesia is by limiting the discussion of its radikal actions.  The Sejarah represents 
Perhimpunan Indonesia as playing an active role in politics.   It notes, for example, that 
the organisation ‘actively struggled’ (aktif berjuang) and ‘pioneered’ (memelopori) the 
struggle for independence.  Perhimpunan Indonesia is also described as being 
‘increasingly resolute in entering the field of politics’ (semakin tegas bergerak 
memasuki bidang politik) (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 5: 196).  Yet the 
radikal-ness of Perhimpunan Indonesia primarily refers to its political ideology rather 
than to overt political action.  This is indicated by the kinds of actions in which 
Perhimpunan Indonesia is involved.  For example, the Sejarah’s account of 
Perhimpunan Indonesia’s activities focuses on activities such as the change in the name 
of the organisation from Indische Vereeniging (Indies Association) to Indonesische 
Vereeniging (Indonesia Association) in 1922 and again to the Indonesian form 
Perhimpunan Indonesia in 1925.  Similarly, the Sejarah also observes that:   
 
The next step in the PI’s radikal approach (sikap) was to change the name of its 
magazine from Hindia Putra [Sons of the Indies] to Indonesia Merdeka 
[Indonesia Free] in 1924 (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 5: 196).28
 
While significant, these activities were by no means the Perhimpunan Indonesia’s most 
overtly political activities, nor their most radikal.  Their selection for inclusion, and the 
omission of more radikal actions such as those mentioned above, represents 
Perhimpunan Indonesia’s radikal-ism as a political attitude, rather than political action.  
For the Sejarah’s contemporary student audience, this representation of the 
Perhimpunan Indonesia students’ radicalism as largely concerned with their attitudes 
                                                          
28 Langkah selanjutnya dari sikap radikal PI ini adalah merobah nama majalahnya dari Hindia Putra 
menjadi Indonesia Merdeka tahun 1924 (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 5: 196). 
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 rather than their actions, serves to highlight the non-active political role which the New 
Order designated as appropriate for contemporary students. 
 
The Rengasdengklok Affair: pemuda and their bapak 
 
Early on the morning of 16 August 1945, a group of youths associated with a number of 
student dormitories (asrama) in Jakarta, kidnapped Sukarno and Hatta in an effort to 
convince them to announce Indonesia’s independence.29  Assisted by members of local 
Peta (Pembela Tanah Air, Homeland Defence Force) groups, the youths took the two 
leaders to the small town of Rengasdengklok, east of Jakarta.  The kidnapping was the 
culmination of the youths’ frustration at the slow pace of official preparations for 
independence and their awareness of the growing gap between their own ideas about 
how and when independence should be declared and those of the older nationalist 
leaders.  The view of Sukarno and Hatta was that independence should be declared 
through the Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence (Panitia 
Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia, PPKI).30  They also wished to abide by the 
conditions and time-frame outlined by Japan.31  The youth, however, saw the PPKI as a 
Japanese-made body and disagreed with Japan’s conditions.  They wanted 
independence declared on Indonesia’s terms without any involvement from the 
Japanese (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 6: 77).   
 
The Sejarah’s account of the events leading up to the Rengasdengklok Affair and the 
proclamation of independence appears in the first chapter of the sixth volume of the 
Sejarah in a 10-page section entitled ‘Prelude to the proclamation’.  A two-page section 
preceding this examines the formation of the organisation Angkatan Muda Indonesia 
(Youth of Indonesia) in mid-1944 as well as other activities amongst youth in the early 
months of 1945.  The Sejarah’s account emphasises the contrast between the youthful 
                                                          
29 These included the Prapatan 10 asrama associated with the medical faculty, the Asrama Angkatan Baru 
Indonesia at Menteng 31, to which Chairul Saleh and Sukarni, belonged, and the Asrama Indonesia 
Merdeka at Kebon Sirih 80, sponsored by Admiral Maeda and with which Subardjo, Wikana, Jusuf 
Kunto and Singgih were associated.  These groups, and others like them, had been pressing the older 
nationalist leaders to declare independence since the youth congress held in Bandung in May 1945 
(Anderson 1972, 70-1).   
30 The PPKI was formed by the Japanese on 7 August 1945 as a replacement for the Investigating Body 
for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence (Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan 
Indonesia, BPKI). 
31 Field Marshal Hisaichi Terauchi, commander of Japan’s Southern Area Armies, outlined the conditions 
and time-frame for the declaration of independence in a meeting with the nationalist leaders on 9 August 
(Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 6: 78). 
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 idealism and semangat (spirit, fervour) of the young generation and the conservatism 
and caution of the older generation.  Nevertheless, the youth are portrayed as respecting 
the authority of the nationalist leaders and as finding appropriate means to deal with the 
‘differences of opinion’ between the older and younger generations.  And while the 
youth are applauded for their willingness to take risks and to make sacrifices in the 
defence of the interests of the nation, the radical nature of their actions is played down, 
both by omitting certain details about the events and by the linguistic choices made.   
 
In Young heroes: The Indonesian family in politics, Saya Shiraishi suggests that ‘the 
very moment of revolution’ occurred with the reversal of power which came with the 
pemuda’s challenge to the older nationalists Sukarno and Hatta, their bapak (fathers) 
(Shiraishi 1997, 38-9).32  On the night of 15 August, acting in the name of the 
Indonesian people, the pemuda paid a visit to their bapak’s house.  The aim of 
pemuda’s visit was not to pay respects to their bapak.  Instead, Wikana demanded that 
his bapak take action.33  Several hours later, in the early hours of 16 August, the 
pemuda took the drastic step of kidnapping their bapak.34  This reversal of the power 
relationship between the pemuda and their bapak was a dangerous one in that it set an 
undesirable precedent for the relationship between contemporary pemuda and their 
bapak, Bapak Presiden Suharto (Father President Suharto).  In the developments which 
follow, however, the Sejarah rectifies this power relationship once the kidnapping has 
taken place and the party has arrived at Rengasdengklok: 
 
The youth’s intention to pressure them [Sukarno and Hatta] into immediately 
announcing the Proclamation of Independence without association with Japan, 
was it seems not carried out.  It appeared the two senior leaders possessed an 
authority (wibawa) which made the youth who brought them to Rengasdengklok 
reluctant to pressure them (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 6: 82).35
 
                                                          
32 The terms bapak and anak imply an asymmetrical power relationship.  According to Shiraishi, in New 
Order politico-familial language, subordinates refer to their superiors as bapak and superiors in turn refer 
to their subordinates as anak or anak buah.  Suharto, as Bapak Presiden, was not only president but also 
supreme father.  This association between politics and family, she notes, is not merely a linguistic 
convention but is deeply embedded in New Order ideology (Shiraishi 1997, 9).   
33 Malik (1956, 36 -7) represents this meeting as proceeding in a more orderly way than the Sejarah does.  
In particular, in Malik’s account Wikana does not state that there will be bloodshed and Sukarno does not 
respond angrily (see below).  
34 Legge notes that the kidnapping of a leader in order to assert influence by moral suasion was a method 
employed by youth both during and after the revolution (1972, 199). 
35 Maksud para pemuda untuk menekan mereka berdua supaya segera melaksanakan Proklamasi 
Kemerdekaan terlepas dari setiap kaitan dengan Jepang, rupa-rupanya tidak terlaksana.  Agaknya kedua 
pemimpin senior itu mempunyai wibawa yang cukup besar, sehingga para pemuda yang membawanya ke 
Rengasdengklok segan untuk melakukan penekanan (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 6: 82). 
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 In this account, the pemuda’s recognition of the natural authority (wibawa) which their 
bapak possessed brought them to their senses and they withdrew.  The bapak did not, it 
seems, take any actions which overtly demonstrated their authority over the pemuda.  
On the contrary, Sukarno and Hatta appear to have willingly submitted to the 
kidnapping (see Anderson 1972, 74; Shiraishi 1997, 39).  Yet their authority is clearly 
apparent to the pemuda.  Recognition of and respect for the authority of the state was a 
central lesson for New Order youth.  Within the framework of organicism, the state was 
modelled on the traditional family.  In this conception, the president was the head of the 
state-family, and the population were as members of the state-family.  This model was 
plainly hierarchical, with clear lines of authority flowing unidirectionally from the 
bapak to his anak (children).  At Rengasdengklok, the pemuda recognise their bapak’s 
authority and, as a result of this experience, learn self-restraint. For the Sejarah’s 
contemporary student audience, this representation of the pemuda’s recognition of the 
nationalist leaders’ authority reminds them that even their heroic predecessors were able 
to recognise and respect those senior to them and in positions of authority.   
 
Conflict, deliberation and consensus 
 
The Sejarah’s version of the Rengasdengklok Affair also provides important lessons 
about the place of conflict in the New Order organic state and in particular, inter-
generational conflict.  In the Sejarah’s version of events, the actions which the youth 
take are described as arising out of a ‘difference of opinion’ with the conservative and 
pragmatic older nationalists:   
 
The climax of the struggle towards the Proclamation of Independence for 
Indonesia was evidently brought about by youth.  Both old and young held the 
same opinion that the proclamation should be declared immediately and it was 
only in the way of implementing it that there was a difference of opinion 
(Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 6: 77, emphasis added).36   
 
It is this difference of opinion which leads the youth to kidnap the nationalist leaders.  
The Sejarah notes that: 
 
                                                          
36 Memuncaknya perjuangan menuju Proklamasi Kemerdekaa Indonesia nampaknya disebabkan oleh 
golongan muda.  Baik golongan tua maupun golongan muda sama-sama berpendapat bahwa 
kemerdekaan Indonesia harus segera diproklamasikan, hanya mengenai caranya melaksanakan 
Proklamasi itu terdapat beda pendapat (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 6: 77). 
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 The presence of that difference of understanding motivated the youth (golongan 
pemuda) to take Ir Sukarno and Drs Moh Hatta outside the city (Poesponegoro 
and Notosusanto 1990, 6: 81).37
 
In the New Order, ‘differences of opinion’ were the only legitimate form of dissent.  In 
a chapter of his autobiography entitled ‘The issue of opposition’, Suharto explains that: 
‘In a Pancasila democracy there is no place for opposition in the Western sense.’38  
Western-style opposition, he argues, which is the kind of opposition which ‘opposes for 
the sake of opposing, for the sake of being different’ (asal saja menentang, asal saja 
berbeda) can destroy democracy (Suharto 1989, 346).   
 
Differences of opinion, however, are natural (wajar) in a Pancasila democracy and 
represent ‘a force to enrich our perspective, to broaden our horizons, to refresh the body 
of our nation, [and] to find the best answer for the problems we face together’ (Suharto 
1991, 431).  The concept of a ‘Pancasila democracy’, as opposed to ‘Western’ 
democracies, which were deemed unsuitable for Indonesia, was thus a key source of 
legitimacy for the New Order’s mode of rule.  The Sejarah’s representation of the 
pemuda’s opposition to the older generation as a difference of opinion reinforces 
Suharto’s claim that Indonesia does not ‘recognise’ (mengenal) any opposition.  Such a 
representation depicts the New Order’s system of rule as the product of popular 
consensus and hence presents it as the will of all the rakyat.  In the state’s perception, 
groups who stepped outside the boundaries of what was defined as ‘difference of 
opinion’ and opposed the regime were in effect opposing what the nation had 
collectively agreed upon through the process of deliberation and consensus.  This 
perception enabled the state to justify its consistent repression of opposition as ‘in the 
interests of the collective will of the nation’.  At the same time, it also allowed the state 
to delegitimise the actions of opposition groups as ‘contrary to the interests of the 
nation’.   
 
The Sejarah’s representation of the pemuda’s opposition to the older generation’s 
position on declaring independence as a ‘natural’ difference of opinion also reflects the 
New Order’s perception about youth.  In this view, youth are seen as being intrinsically 
idealistic, progressive and dynamic while the older generation is regarded as naturally 
                                                          
37 Adanya perbedaan paham itu telah mendorong golongan pemuda untuk membawa Ir Sukarno dan Drs 
Moh Hatta ke luar kota (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 6: 81). 
38 Dalam demokrasi Pancasila tidak ada tempat untuk oposisi ala Barat (Suharto 1989, 346).   
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 more conservative, a natural consequence of their maturity.  According to former 
Minister of Education and Culture Daud Yusuf: 
 
In general the younger generation looks forward; both their thinking and their 
actions are oriented to the future.  Because of this, the younger generation is in 
general impressed by any innovation which they believe can accelerate the 
realisation of the future they portray, regardless of whether this portrait of the 
future is accurate or not.  Thus, the younger generation is often called the 
‘generation of innovators’ (novatrice).  It is in connection with the attitude of 
these novatrice that conflicts often arise with the older generation who in 
general tend to defend existing values or institutions (Yusuf 1987, 58).39
 
In this view, differences of opinion between the older generation and the younger 
generation centre on different perceptions about change: the youth desire change, while 
the older generation desire continuity.  Moreover, these differences of opinion are a 
‘natural’ consequence of the generation gap.  Southwood and Flanagan suggest that the 
trials of student activists in 1979 served to deflect attention from criticisms originating 
from within the regime.  ‘If students can be scapegoated,’ they note, ‘political conflict 
can be portrayed as merely inter-generational (Southwood and Flanagan 1983, 176).’  
The representation of the conflict between the pemuda and the older nationalist leaders 
as a conflict between the younger and the older generation, and not as a political 
conflict, redefines students’ oppositional role in the past in a way deemed appropriate 
by the New Order.    
 
The Sejarah’s account of the Rengasdengklok Affair also provides a lesson about the 
appropriate way to deal with differences of opinion.  Central to the Sejarah’s version of 
events is the process of deliberation (musyawarah) which leads to the eventual 
resolution (mufakat) of the difference of opinion between the older generation and the 
younger generation.40  Deliberation and consensus were, in the New Order state, the 
appropriate and authentically Indonesian method of decision-making in a Pancasila 
democracy, in which differences of opinion were resolved through the people’s 
representatives (the DPR and MPR) (Suharto 1989, 346-7).  This consensual mode of 
                                                          
39 Pada umumnya generasi muda sering melihat ke depan, baik pikiran maupun tindakannya sering 
diarahkan ke masa mendatang.  Berhubung dengan itu ia pada umumnya selalu terkesan pada setiap 
pembaruan yang dianggap dapat mempercepat realisasi masa depan yang digambarkannya, terlepas 
dari soal apakah gambaran masa depan itu tepat atau tidak.  Maka itu generasi muda ini sering pula 
disebut sebagai ‘generasi pembaru’ (novatrice).  Berhubung sikap novatrice ini pula sering menimbulkan 
bentrokan dengan generasi tua yang pada umumnya cenderung untuk mempertahankan nilai atau 
lembaga yang telah ada (Yusuf 1987, 58). 
40 Malik (1956, 35-47) also represents the process in terms of a series of perundingan (negotiations). 
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 politics is enshrined in the fourth principle of the Pancasila: ‘democracy guided by the 
wisdom of representative deliberation’.  According to Bourchier (1996, 240-1) the 
function of musyawarah ‘is not to facilitate ‘democratic’ participation in decision 
making but rather to guarantee harmony’, with unanimous agreement the ultimate aim 
of the process.  Such unanimity is essential to the maintenance of stability and order.   
 
In the Sejarah, the difference of opinion between the youth and the older generation is 
resolved through a six-step process of deliberation and consensus in which the youth 
discuss and debate various issues relating to the declaration of independence both 
amongst themselves and with the older generation.  In the first step, the youth meet at 
the bacteriology laboratory to discuss their position in the light of recent developments, 
namely the rumours of Japan’s surrender, and agree to send a delegation to Sukarno.  At 
a meeting later that night at Sukarno’s house, Wikana and Sukarno present the positions 
of the groups they represent.  The atmosphere is tense and nothing is resolved.  
Following this meeting, the youth meet again to deliberate amongst themselves and 
discuss their options.  They agree to kidnap Sukarno and Hatta in an attempt to persuade 
them to declare independence.  At Rengasdengklok, the older generation and the 
younger generation again present their positions.  As in the meeting between Wikana 
and Sukarno, however, nothing is resolved, although Singgih returns to Jakarta on the 
false assumption that Sukarno agreed to declare independence.41  Meanwhile, in Jakarta, 
Subardjo, representing the older generation, and Wikana, representing the young 
generation, have agreed that the proclamation will be announced in Jakarta.  Finally, the 
older generation and the younger generation deliberate over the wording of the text of 
the proclamation, its signatories and the appropriate place to announce the 
proclamation.  Consensus is reached and independence declared.  
 
The Sejarah’s representation of the conflict between the older and younger generation 
as a difference of opinion and its resolution through deliberation and consensus 
provides an important lesson in New Order organicist ideology for the Sejarah’s 
contemporary student audience.  In this lesson, students learn that while there may be 
                                                          
41 According to the Sejarah, in the course of a discussion with Sukarno, Singgih gained the impression 
that Sukarno was willing to announce the proclamation in Jakarta as soon as he was returned.  Based on 
this assumption, Singgih returned to Jakarta to convey the plan for the proclamation to his fellow youth 
leaders.  On this point, the Sejarah differs from other accounts.  Malik (1956, 42-3), Anderson (1972, 75-
6) and Martha, Wibisono and Anwar (1984, 170) agree that the leaders refused to move from their 
original position and that Jusuf Kunto was sent back to Jakarta to report the leaders’ unchanged attitude to 
the youth there.  
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 differing views about the manner in which a political decision is carried out, provided 
the overall aim is the same, these differences can be resolved through appropriate 
means.  Conflict between idealistic youth and conservative members of the older 
generation is also to some extent natural, and therefore able to be tolerated.  This is 
particularly so where the interests of the future nation are concerned and where the 
older generation are being overly cautious.   
 
Pemuda and politics  
 
By kidnapping the nationalist leaders in an effort to pressure them to accede to their 
demands the youth involved in the Rengasdengklok Affair clearly acted in a political 
way.  Yet not only was the kidnapping a political act, it was also a radikal political act.  
This is acknowledged openly in the Sejarah.  Thus, for example, the resolutions of the 
youths’ meeting at the bacteriology laboratory on the night of 15 August 1945 are 
described as radikal in their assertion that Indonesia’s independence was an issue for 
the Indonesian people themselves and could not be entrusted to ‘other people or 
empires’ (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 6: 80).  The term radikal is also used 
throughout the Sejarah’s account to describe the pemuda: pemuda radikal (radical 
youth), golongan pemuda radikal (group of radical youth), sifat gerakan tersebut lebih 
radikal (the nature of the group was more radical), sesuatu gerakan pemuda yang lebih 
radikal (a more radical youth group), and tuntutan-tuntutan radikal golongan pemuda 
(the radical demands of the youth group).  Yet the radikal and political actions of the 
youth in the Rengasdengklok Affair also presented a problem for the New Order as it 
strove to limit the boundaries of acceptable political behaviour for contemporary youth.  
How are these problematic aspects of the Rengasdengklok Affair resolved in the 
Sejarah? 
 
One of the ways in which the Sejarah plays down the radical nature of the youths’ 
actions is by omitting certain historical details which demonstrate their radical 
opposition to the older nationalists and the Japanese.  In this connection, one significant 
point on which the Sejarah is notably silent is the so-called youth uprising.42  In his 
                                                          
42 Martha, Wibisono and Anwar mention a meeting on the morning of 16 August in which the youth 
resolved to ‘stage an assault (gerakan memukul) against the Japanese forces’ (1984, 139). Although 
Anderson suggests that the seriousness of the preparations for an uprising in Jakarta has been somewhat 
exaggerated, he concedes that various small groups did gather at certain points in the city and plans seem 
to have been made to seize the radio station (Anderson 1972, 77-8).  Kahin states that in Sukarni’s 
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 autobiography, Sukarno: an autobiography as told to Cindy Adams, Sukarno recalled 
the words of Chairul Saleh, the head of the pemuda delegation which visited Sukarno at 
his house on 15 August: 
 
Let us make a large-scale revolution tonight.  We have Peta troops, pemuda, 
Barisan Pelopor men, even the Hei Ho auxiliary soldiers are all prepared.  At 
your signal Jakarta will be in flames.  Thousands and thousands of armed and 
ready troops will surround the city and carry out a successful armed revolt and 
topple the whole Japanese army (Sukarno 1966, 206). 
 
In the Sejarah, however, the resolution of the youths’ initial meeting at the bacteriology 
laboratory is described in terms which indicate the youths’ willingness to engage in 
dialogue with the older leaders: the pemuda, it is noted, ‘hoped that negotiations could 
be held with Ir Sukarno and Drs Moh Hatta so that they could be involved 
(diikutsertakan) in announcing the Proclamation’ (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 
1990, 6: 80).  Moreover, in the account of Wikana’s meeting with Sukarno, no allusion 
is made to the supposed ‘thousands of armed and ready troops’ set to revolt at 
Sukarno’s word.43  The absence of the pemuda uprising in the Sejarah’s account is 
significant.  Because such a situation was likely to antagonise the Japanese authorities, 
and perhaps ruin Indonesia’s chances of independence, Sukarno and Hatta were 
unwilling to support it.  A youth uprising which did not have the support of the older 
nationalists would have meant yet another aberration from the normal bapak-anak flow 
of authority and would have disturbed the stability and order necessary at such a crucial 
time.  By omitting the plans, however vague, for a pemuda uprising, the Sejarah avoids 
setting an undesirable precedent for New Order youth that uprisings are a legitimate 
way to achieve goals and resolve differences of opinion.44
 
One of the other ways in which this is achieved is by rewording the kidnapping itself.  
In its account of Sukarno and Hatta’s removal to Rengasdengklok, for example, the 
Sejarah avoids use of the term menculik (to kidnap), instead using the terms membawa 
                                                                                                                                                                          
discussions with Sukarno and Hatta at Rengasdengklok, he maintained that there were ‘15 000 armed 
youths on the outskirts of Jakarta ready to march against the city as soon as the proclamation was made’ 
(1952, 134).  Legge also mentions a planned coup (Legge 1972, 201).   
43 In the Sejarah’s account, it is Wikana, accompanied by Darwis, who visits Sukarno and not Chairul 
Saleh.   
44 The fact that the Sejarah omits to mention that Sukarno’s wife Fatmawati and his infant son Guntur 
were also taken to Rengasdengklok, which both Legge and Anderson mention, may also indicate a desire 
to represent the pemuda as principled.  The kidnapping of women and children not involved in the 
political proceedings could not be endorsed as ethical.  Compare this to the public outrage which 
accompanied the death of General Nasution’s daughter in October 1965 after she was accidentally shot in 
her home by the military officers of the Thirtieth of September Movement  who came to take her father. 
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 (to take), menyingkirkan (to evacuate, remove) and mengamankan (to secure, protect).  
These terms represent the youth’s actions not as the actions of a radical group without 
respect for their bapak, but rather as those of a group concerned to remove their bapak 
from a position of danger to one which is ‘secure’ (aman).45  The youths’ actions are 
thus able to be represented as in the interests of the nation, namely, protecting its future 
leaders. 
 
In the discussion of the youth movement, it was suggested that the term radikal referred 
to a political ideology rather than to overt political action.  In the Sejarah’s account of 
the Rengasdengklok Affair, the emphasis on students as thinking, feeling, and saying 
rather than acting suggests that in this context too, radikal refers to a political 
perspective rather than to political action.  This reflects the emphasis in New Order 
policies on students, and in particular in Daud Yusuf’s 1978 campus normalisation 
policy, that students’ role in the politics was as ‘thinkers’ engaged in political analysis 
and not political actors.  For example, in the Sejarah’s account, the active processes in 
which pemuda are involved are mostly not concrete processes but processes to do with 
agreeing (bersepakat) and disagreeing (tidak menyetujui), being determined (bertekad), 
not taking part (tidak mengambil bagian), intending (bermaksud), desiring 
(menghendaki), pressuring (mendesak), stating (menyatakan), and suggesting 
(mengusulkan).  The few exceptions to this pattern include actions such as holding 
(mengadakan) (a meeting) and implementing the decisions of the meeting 
(melaksanakan keputusan rapat).   
 
The Sejarah also represents students’ radikal acts in an abstract way.  In the account of 
Wikana and Darwis’ visit to Sukarno on the night of 15 August, for example, it is noted:  
 
Wikana’s demand that the Proclamation be announced by Ir Sukarno on the 
following day made the atmosphere tense because he also stated that bloodshed 
would occur if their wishes were not carried out (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 
1990, 6: 80).46
 
Here it is Wikana’s ‘demand’, and not the actions of Wikana himself, which make the 
atmosphere tense.  Wikana’s threat of bloodshed - Wikana does not say that he will 
                                                          
45 This is in fact the pretext on which the youth took Sukarno and Hatta from their homes, telling them 
that a youth uprising was imminent and they were no longer safe in the city (Anderson 1972, 74). 
46 Tuntutan Wikana agar Proklamasi dinyatakan oleh Ir Sukarno pada keesokan harinya menegangkan 
suasana karena ia juga menyatakan bahwa akan terjadi pertumpuhan darah jika keinginan mereka tidak 
dilaksanakan (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 6: 80). 
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 cause the bloodshed, only that it ‘will occur’ if the youth’s demands are not met (tidak 
dilaksanakan) - is not addressed directly to Sukarno but rather to an unknown or 
unspecified person(s).  The implication of this is that pemuda can make demands and 
request that they be implemented (dilaksanakan) but it would be disrespectful of the 
bapak-anak relationship to demand them directly of the bapak.  Wikana’s threat is thus 
represented in a less radikal way.  This is highlighted by the contrast made with 
Sukarno’s response to Wikana, in which he melontarkan kata-kata (literally, to throw 
words) which constitute a direct response to Wikana himself.  ‘Here is my neck,’ a 
visibly angry Sukarno exclaims, ‘you can kill me now (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 
1990, 6: 80).’   
 
The Sejarah thus represents the youth’s radikal actions as in the interests of the nation.  
Just as Sukarno never punished the radical pemuda for their actions in the aftermath of 
the Rengasdengklok Affair, so the Sejarah does not condemn the pemuda of 1945 for 
their ‘revolutionary act’.  The reason the Sejarah is able to do this is that the pemuda, 
unlike the older generation, whose position is motivated by ‘political considerations’, 
are motivated only by the desire to announce the proclamation ‘immediately and 
without recourse to Japan’s conditions’, an act clearly in the (retrospective) interests of 
Indonesia as an independent nation.  The Sejarah’s representation of the pemuda as 
without vested political interests enables their revolutionary act to be sanctioned as ‘in 
the interests of the nation’.  
 
Tritura: legitimising the New Order 
  
The New Order’s representation of the events of 1965-1966 was central to its claims to 
legitimacy.  In the official version of events the regime represented itself as having 
rescued the nation from the communist threat and as having restored political, social 
and economic order to a nation in chaos.  Students played a crucial part in the New 
Order’s account, primarily as a means of justifying the actions taken by Suharto 
following the Order of March Eleven (Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret, Supersemar) as 
‘the will of the rakyat’.   
 
The Sejarah’s account of the demonstrations of 1965-1966 and Sukarno’s response to 
them appears in a six-page section under the sub-heading of ‘The Tritura actions’ (Aksi-
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 Aksi Tritura) (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 6: 404-411).  It follows a section 
which examines the coup attempt and the overthrow of the ‘communist rebels’ and 
precedes a short section dealing with the events surrounding the issuing of the 
Supersemar (ibid., 411-415).  In the Sejarah’s version of events, pemuda, pelajar and 
mahasiswa, acting on behalf of the rakyat, play a central role in the unfolding of events.  
At the same time, however, the Sejarah draws attention away from the students’ role in 
producing key concepts such as the Tritura (Tri Tuntutan Rakyat, Three People’s 
Demands), instead representing the students as passive symbols of the people’s 
discontent.   
 
The principal participants in the Sejarah’s account of the 1966 demonstrations are 
students.  These students are described using a variety of terms, including pemuda, 
mahasiswa, pelajar, and para demonstran (the demonstrators).  They are also described 
in organisational terms: as kesatuan-kesatuan aksi (action fronts), KAMI (Kesatuan 
Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia, Indonesian Student Action Front), and Front Pancasila 
(Pancasila Front), the coalition of anti-PKI parties and mass organisations which 
included the action units.  As in previous ‘crucial historical moments’, the Sejarah 
represents the pemuda, pelajar and mahasiswa of 1966 as playing an active role in the 
events.  The Sejarah notes that the demonstrations calling for the dissolution of the PKI 
were ‘initiated’ (dipelopori) by action fronts made up of ‘university students, high 
school students, and mass organisations loyal to the Pancasila’ (Poesponegoro and 
Notosusanto 1990, 6: 396).  These action units are described as the ‘outward reflection’ 
of the New Order.47  Students, or their action units, are also the actors in a broad range 
of concrete actions including meminta agar kenaikan harga barang ditinjau kembali 
(requesting that the rise in the price of goods be reviewed), mengeluarkan pernyataan 
(issuing statements), memberi nama kabinet (naming the cabinet), melakukan aksi 
serentak (carrying out simultaneous action), mengempeskan ban-ban mobil (letting 
down car tyres), and membentuk Resimen Arief Rachman Hakim (forming the Arief 
Rachman Hakim Regiment).48  They are also the agents in actions such as diboikot 
(boycotted), dibalas (responded to), and diserbu dan diobrak-abrik (attacked and 
ransacked). 
 
                                                          
47 … pihak Orde Baru … dicerminkan ke luar oleh kesatuan-kesatuan aksi (Poesponegoro and 
Notosusanto 1990, 6: 408). 
48 The organisation was named for the Universitas Indonesia student who died of a bullet wound fired by 
a member of the Cakrabirawa regiment, Sukarno’s palace guard, on 24 February 1966.   
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 A second participant in the Sejarah’s account of the events of 1965-66 is the rakyat.  
Unlike the students and their action units, however, the rakyat are not represented as 
actors in concrete processes.  Instead, they appear as ‘thinkers’ in verbs such as ingat 
(remember), berpikir (think), or dipandang (considered) or as the objects of 
disappointment (sangat mengecewakan harapan rakyat, disappointed the people’s 
hopes) at Sukarno’s reshuffled Dwikora cabinet, or astonishment (sangat 
mencengangkan rakyat, astounded the people) at the dismissal from the cabinet of 
figures opposed to the attempted coup and the appointment of figures allegedly 
involved in it (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 6: 409).   
 
The rakyat also function as the post-modifying element in simple noun phrases such as 
erosi kepercayaan rakyat (erosion of the people’s confidence), kesabaran rakyat 
(mencapai batasnya) (the people’s patience (reached its limit)), kesejahteraan rakyat 
(jauh merosot) (the welfare of the people (drastically declined)), keinginan keras dari 
rakyat (the strong desire of the people), and ketidakpuasan masyarakat luas (the 
dissatisfaction of wider society).  This backgrounding of the rakyat in simple noun 
phrases represents them as third parties rather than active participants in the events.  
Moreover, the fact that these noun phrases refer predominantly to emotional states - 
confidence, impatience, desire and dissatisfaction – represents the rakyat not as ‘doers’, 
but as ‘feelers’.  This represents the student demonstrations and the actions Suharto took 
as a response to the lack of confidence, impatience, and dissatisfaction of the wider 
populace.  It also highlights the fact that Sukarno no longer represented the people’s 
desires nor did he have their confidence. 
 
In the Sejarah’s description of the Tritura demonstrations, the rakyat is linked to the 
military (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, ABRI).  As noted in chapter two, in 
most official accounts of the events of 1965-66, the relationship between the rakyat, 
represented by the students, and the military was described as a partnership.   In the 
Sejarah, the relationship between ABRI and the rakyat is described as ‘co-operation’ 
(kerja sama), a dwitunggal yang terdiri dari rakyat dan ABRI (duumvirate made up of 
the rakyat and ABRI) and a kekompakan antara rakyat dan ABRI (union between the 
rakyat and ABRI).  ABRI is also described as an experienced and astute political player 
(telah matang menghadapi intrik-intrik politik) (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 
6: 406 and 408).   However, apart from this, ABRI plays a very minor role in the 
account of the three months of the Tritura protests.  Indeed, after the description of the 
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 army’s efforts to destroy the Thirtieth of September Movement in Jakarta and in Central 
Java following the coup (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 6: 392-404), ABRI is 
not mentioned again.  Suharto is similarly absent in the Sejarah’s account of the Tritura 
protests: after he is mentioned in the context of the efforts to secure the capital in the 
immediate aftermath of the coup, he is not mentioned again until the account of the 
Supersemar (ibid., 391, 393, 413-4).  This reflects the New Order’s concern to divert 
attention away from role of the military in encouraging the student protests which led to 
Suharto’s assumption of power.   
 
The active role that mahasiswa and pelajar play in events, and the key place of the 
rakyat in the Sejarah’s version of events serves to legitimise the actions Suharto took 
following the Supersemar by representing it as a response to the demands and 
aspirations of ‘the people’.  The student demonstrations are portrayed as the 
consequence of the erosion of the people’s confidence in the Sukarno government and 
the decline in their welfare from late 1965.  The focus on the actions which the students 
take in response to the frustration and disappointment of the rakyat also represents the 
transition from the so-called Old Order to the New Order not as a military takeover, but 
rather as a transition originating with the rakyat.49  It is the rakyat, through the students, 
who demonstrate against the legal head of state and his government.  This action is 
justified because of the failure of the head of state to fulfil his promise to provide a 
political solution to the crisis.   
 
The Sejarah’s representation of the chaos which threatens to overtake the country as a 
result of Sukarno’s failure to provide a political solution also legitimises Suharto’s 
actions following the Supersemar as a necessary step in taking control of the situation.  
The shooting of Arief Rachman Hakim on 24 February 1965 by a member of Sukarno’s 
palace guard is described as ‘exacerbating the national leadership crisis’ (menyebabkan 
makin parahnya krisis kepemimpinan nasional).  The banning of KAMI by President 
Sukarno on the following day also adds to the chaos.  The situation is described as 
‘increasingly unsafe’ (bertambah tidak aman) and the national crisis ‘increasingly 
uncontrollable’ (makin tidak terkendalikan).  In contrast, Suharto’s banning of the PKI 
immediately following the issuing of the Supersemar is represented as decisive and as 
                                                          
49 The name ‘Old Order’ was given to the Guided Democracy period as a means of contrasting it to the 
new regime. 
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 obtaining ‘the support of the people’, since this was one of the three demands of the 
people, expressed in the Tritura (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 6: 413). 
 
A third group of participants in the Sejarah’s account is President Sukarno and the 
political figures and organisations which supported him.  Several authors have noted 
that in New Order imagery and literature surrounding the events of 1965-66, Sukarno 
and the Old Order were consistently represented in an unfavourable way (see for 
example Leigh 1991, 28-31; Maurer 1997; Brooks 1995).  In the Sejarah, the Old Order 
(Orde Lama) is described in disapproving terms as golongan yang merasa terdesak oleh 
aksi-aksi Tritura, terutama Dr Subandrio cs (groups which felt pressured by the Tritura 
actions, especially [First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs] Dr 
Subandrio and his cronies) and pihak yang tidak senang terhadap Tritura, yaitu Orde 
Lama (those who disliked the Tritura, that is, the Old Order).  The Sukarno regime is 
discredited by its association in the Sejarah’s account with the Cakrabirawa Regiment 
and the Central Intelligence Body (Badan Pusat Inteligen, BPI), both of which were 
alleged to have been involved in the coup attempt, as well as with orang-orang kriminal 
(criminals) and cabinet ministers whose ‘good intentions for the struggle were 
questionable’ (diragukan iktikad baik perjuangannya) (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 
1990, 6: 406).  It is also represented as having vested political interests (kepentingan 
politik), as being involved in political intrigue (intrik-intrik politik) and as being 
exploited (ditunggangi) by the PKI.  Figures associated with the Old Order are 
described as inciting the masses (menghasut massa) to perpetrate acts of terror 
(perbuatan teror, aksi teror) (ibid., 407-10).  The Sejarah’s reiteration of Sukarno’s 
failure to respond to the people’s demands for a political solution to the crisis also 
brings his abilities as a leader into question.  In a cabinet meeting held on 6 October 
1965, the Sejarah relates, President Sukarno had undertaken to provide a political 
solution to the national crisis (ibid., 395).  However, the Sejarah notes that even in the 
face of mounting evidence of the PKI’s involvement in the attempted coup and the 
escalation of demonstrations demanding the party’s dissolution, Sukarno ‘had still not 
yet taken steps towards a political solution for the G-30-S/PKI issue’ (ibid., 395 and 
396).  In the same cabinet meeting, Major General Suharto had been given the task of 
restoring security and order.  In the Sejarah’s account, Suharto’s actions in 
systematically and efficiently carrying out this task are presented as a contrast to 
Sukarno’s failure to provide a political solution (ibid., 396-403).  These negative 
representations of Sukarno and his government enables the student demonstrations and 
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 Suharto’s actions following the Supersemar to be justified as a necessary ‘correction’ of 
the Old Order. 
 
Representatives of the rakyat’s demands 
 
Above it was suggested that the Sejarah’s account of the 1966 demonstrations 
represented pemuda, pelajar and mahasiswa as playing a grammatically active role in a 
range of concrete actions.  This, it was argued, served as a means of legitimising the 
actions Suharto took following the Supersemar as a response to the demands of the 
wider populace.  Yet students are also represented as passive representatives of the 
rakyat’s demands, as in, for example, the Sejarah’s description of the demonstrations:  
 
The accumulating dissatisfaction of wider society eventually erupted in the form 
of demonstrations carried out by university and high school students.  Pioneered 
by KAMI, demonstrations by students of Universitas Indonesia with their 
yellow jackets were begun on 10 January 1966… (Poesponegoro and 
Notosusanto 1990, 6: 406).50
 
The metaphor of ‘eruption’, signalled by the use of the words menumpuk (to accumulate 
or mount, as of pressure), and meledak (to erupt), signifying a spontaneous and 
uncontrolled occurrence, plays down the active role of the students in planning and 
carrying out the demonstrations.   The use of the passive form of the verb in the phrase 
dimulailah aksi-aksi demonstrasi (demonstrations were begun) also backgrounds the 
students’ active role.  In this view, the student demonstrations are simply the 
spontaneous expression of the rakyat’s dissatisfaction, manifested in the physical form 
of demonstrations.  
 
The Sejarah’s description of the formulation of the Tritura also transforms students into 
passive instruments of the rakyat’s demands.   In the Sejarah’s account, students are 
merely the channels through which the demands of the people are communicated: 
 
The feeling of dissatisfaction moved the conscience of the pemuda, and the Three 
Demands of the People’s Conscience, better known as the Tritura (Tri Tuntutan 
Rakyat) was ignited.  On 12 [sic] January 1966, initiated by KAMI and KAPPI, the 
                                                          
50 Ketidakpuasan masyarakat luas yang menumpuk itu akhirnya meledak dalam bentuk demonstrasi-
demonstrasi yang dilakukan oleh mahasiswa dan pelajar.  Dengan dipelopori KAMI dimulailah aksi-aksi 
demonstrasi mahasiswa Universitas Indonesia dengan jaket kuningnya pada tanggal 10 Januari 1966 … 
(Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 6: 406). 
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 action fronts united in the Pancasila Front approached the People’s Representative 
Council of Mutual Cooperation to put forward three demands (Tritura) namely: the 
dissolution of the PKI; the cleansing of the cabinet of elements of the Thirtieth of 
September Movement/PKI; and the lowering of prices/improvement of the economy 
(Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 6: 404).51
 
The students’ actions are here represented as a response to an uncontrolled emotion: the 
hardship faced by the people in the face of price rises moves the conscience 
(menggugah hati nurani) of the youth, and leads to the announcement of the Tritura.  
Similarly, the use of the ter- form of the verb in tercetuslah (was ignited) suggests that 
the formulation of the Tritura was a sudden and spontaneous process, rather than an 
intentional process directed by the students.  The impression this gives is that the 
Tritura was not conceived by the students but instead simply ‘came into existence’.  The 
students are also described as ‘putting forward’ (mengajukan) the three demands to the 
parliament.  In this view, students are merely the medium through which the people’s 
demands are conducted.   
 
The symbol Tritura also abstracts students’ role in events.  In the Sejarah’s account, the 
Tritura as a symbol occupies a central place, in phrases such as pihak yang tidak senang 
terhadap Tritura (those who disliked the Tritura), perjuangan Tritura (Tritura struggle), 
aksi-aksi Tritura (Tritura actions), tuntutan Tritura (Tritura demands), demonstrasi 
Tritura (Tritura demonstrations), and salah satu di antara Tritura telah dilaksanakan 
(one of the Tritura had been carried out).  Ben Anderson has pointed to the tendency of 
the language of Indonesian politics to bury ‘words of great symbolic power … within 
hermetic acronyms’.  These acronyms, he argues, are not functional in the sense of 
being convenient abbreviations for specific policies and concrete institutions but rather 
represent ‘synthetic syntheses of ideas that refer to no concrete reality but that by verbal 
manipulation acquire a life of their own’ (Anderson 1990b, 147).  For the students of 
1966 the acronym Tritura represented ‘a theme for the struggle which was easily and 
quickly understood by the public’ (Martha, Wibisono and Anwar 1984, 315-6).  Its use 
by the New Order, however, effectively embedded the politically potent words tuntutan 
(demands) and rakyat (people) within an abstract concept.  Moreover, far from 
                                                          
51 Perasaan tidak puas menggugah hati nurani para pemuda, dan tercetuslah Tri Tuntutan Hati Nurani 
Rakyat yang lebih dikenal dengan sebutan Tritura (Tri Tuntutan Rakyat).  Pada tanggal 12 Januari 1966 
dipelopori oleh KAMI dan KAPPI [Kesatuan Aksi Pemuda Pelajar Indonesia], kesatuan-kesatuan aksi 
yang tergabung dalam Front Pancasila mendatangi DPR-GR [Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Gotong 
Royong] mengajukan tiga buah tuntutan (Tritura) yakni: pembubaran PKI; pembersihan kabinet dari 
unsur-unsur G-30-S/PKI; penurunan harga/perbaikan ekonomi (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 6: 
404).  KAPPI was the Indonesian Youth and Student Action Front. 
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 representing the easily comprehended concept which the students intended, during the 
New Order the Tritura became a concept which required deep reflection in order for its 
true meaning to be revealed.  In his address on the occasion of the nineteenth 
anniversary of the Tritura in 1985, for example, Suharto stated:  
 
If we reflect on it deeply, the Tritura has a deeper and more fundamental 
significance than that which was formulated.  The dissolution of the PKI 
embodied a will to defend, uphold and implement the Pancasila…  The 
cleansing of the Cabinet from PKI elements manifested a determination to build 
a clean and authoritative government…  The lowering of prices/improvement of 
the economy embraced a resolution to rectify the uncontrollable economic 
decline at the time, since it was only by putting the economy back on its feet that 
the development which provided progress and prosperity to the entire 
Indonesian people … could be achieved (Suharto 1985, 18).52   
 
In this view, the Tritura was a concept to be meditated upon, recalled and celebrated on 
key historical occasions.  It was the Tritura as a symbol, and not the students, which 
occupied the central place in Indonesia’s history.  This focus distances responsibility for 
action from the students themselves. 
 
In the Sejarah’s version of events, then, students do not play an active role in 
representing the rakyat’s interests.  Instead their demonstrations are the spontaneous 
expression of the rakyat’s dissatisfaction, and the students merely the medium through 
which the people’s demands are channelled.  This representation aimed to ‘discourage’ 
the Sejarah’s contemporary student audience from seeing their role as leaders of the 
rakyat or as playing an active role in speaking on behalf of the rakyat’s interests.  In the 
New Order view, it was not students who were to represent the interests of the rakyat 
but rather the state itself.  The concept of the family-state to which the regime 
subscribed held that the state was the ultimate embodiment of the aspirations and 
interests of the rakyat.  The state and the people were united within the state-family and 
the people’s aspirations were represented in the political system through the practice of 
functional representation within the legislative bodies.  Moreover, since the New Order 
state had not yet come into existence at the time of the 1966 demonstrations, the Tritura 
                                                          
52 Jika kita renungkan secara dalam, maka Tritura itu mempunyai arti yang lebih dalam dan lebih 
mendasar dari apa yang dirumuskan.  Pembubaran PKI mengandung tekad untuk membela, menegakkan 
dan melaksanakan Pancasila … Pembersihan Kabinet dari unsur PKI mengandung tekad untuk 
membangun pemerintahan yang bersih dan berwibawa … Penurunan harga/perbaikan ekonomi 
mengandung tekad untuk membenahi segala kemerosotan ekonomi yang merajalela waktu itu, sebab 
hanya dengan pembenahan ekonomilah akan dapat dilaksanakan pembangunan yang memberikan 
kemajuan dan kesejahteraan kepada seluruh rakyat Indonesia (Suharto 1985, 18). 
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 both highlights the failures of the previous regime and provides a justification for the 
transfer of power to Suharto. 
 
Students, politics and the state 
 
The 1966 student demonstrations demanding the dissolution of the PKI, and the 
restructuring of the cabinet were clearly political in nature.  Yet from almost 
immediately after the issuing of the Supersemar, the New Order was concerned to 
reorient students’ roles and identities away from politics and back to the campus.  It was 
this concern which motivated the introduction of a number of policies throughout the 
1970s, including the campus normalisation policy of 1978.  In this context, the political 
nature of the student demonstrations of 1966 set an undesirable precedent for the 
Sejarah’s contemporary student audience about their role in national politics and the 
relationship between the bapak of the state-family and his citizen-children.   
 
In the Sejarah, this problem is in part resolved by representing the student 
demonstrations as a legitimate response to the political and economic failures of 
Sukarno and his government.  In the Sejarah’s version of events, the student 
demonstrations are the physical manifestation of the rakyat’s frustration at the 
president’s failure to provide a political solution to the crisis.  Sukarno and his 
government are represented as having deviated from the Pancasila and the 1945 
Constitution (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 6: 404).  The president is also 
represented as failing to fulfil his promise to provide a political solution to the crisis.  
The political role of the students in their demonstrations against the president and his 
cabinet are legitimate because Sukarno represented in the Sejarah as no longer 
representing the aspirations of the people, as having deviated from the Pancasila, and as 
siding with the communist party.  These failures also justify the students’ undermining 
of the normal hierarchical power relationship between students and the head of state and 
others in positions of authority.   
 
Yet students are also represented as politically inexperienced and hence more easily 
exploited by those with vested political interests.  As noted above, the Sejarah’s version 
of events contrasts ABRI’s political astuteness and the political inexperience of other 
groups, including the students.  In the face of mounting political pressure, on 16 January 
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 1966 Sukarno called for the formation of a Sukarno Front (Barisan Sukarno) as a means 
of shoring up what little public support he had left.   The Sejarah notes that the 
president’s command was supported by the rakyat, and ‘even by no less than’ (bahkan 
tidak kurang) Universitas Indonesia’s student council, which was ‘the backbone of 
KAMI’ (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 6: 407-8).  ABRI, however, notes the 
Sejarah, ‘as a group which was ‘experienced’ (matang) in facing political intrigues’ (of 
which, it is implied, the call for the formation of a Sukarno Front was an example) 
declared that the formation of the Sukarno Front was not necessary since the rakyat, 
including ABRI, already represented a Sukarno Front.  The designation of ABRI’s 
response to Sukarno’s call as that of a politically ‘experienced’ group suggests that by 
initially supporting the formation of the Sukarno Front, students (and the rakyat) are 
still ‘inexperienced’ in matters of politics, especially in recognising the signs of 
‘political intrigue’.  This inexperience means that students may be more easily deceived 
by those with vested political interests (in this case, Sukarno) and as such more open to 
being exploited (ditunggangi).  The accusation that students are susceptible to 
exploitation delegitimises their criticisms of the state.  As Naipospos argues, following 
the 1974 demonstrations:   
 
[t]he term ditunggangi became the government’s official designation for 
subsequent student movements.  The government’s use of the term gave the 
impression of sympathy and openness to students’ criticisms.  But on the other 
hand, if there were demonstrations with which the government disagreed, they 
were immediately stamped as being ditunggangi (1996, 26).53  
 
By describing students’ actions as those of a politically inexperienced group, the 
Sejarah implies that were it not for the political maturity of ABRI, students might have 
been deceived by the political intrigues of Sukarno.  This is consistent with the broad 
emphasis in New Order policy on students from the 1970s on the need to ‘improve and 
develop’ (membina) the young generation and to educate them in key national values 
and ideologies so that they develop ‘political maturity’.   
 
 
 
                                                          
53 Istilah ‘ditunggangi’ kemudian menjadi istilah resmi pemerintah bagi gerakan mahasiswa berikutnya.  
Dengan istilah itu pemerintah seolah-olah menunjukkan kesan simpati dan terbuka terhadap kritik 
mahasiswa.  Tapi di pihak lain, bila ada aksi yang tidak berkenan di mata pemerintah dengan segera 
dicap ditunggangi (Naipospos 1996, 26).   
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 Conclusion 
 
The Sejarah’s version of these key moments in Indonesia’s modern history portrays 
youth and students as a group concerned for the interests of the rakyat as a whole and as 
the pioneers of the idea of the nation and national unity.  Students are also represented 
as recognising and respecting the authority of their leaders and, even if there were 
occasional differences of opinion between the old and the young generation, these were 
resolved through culturally appropriate means of deliberation and consensus.  Students’ 
historical role in politics was, on occasion, as radical defenders of the nation and of 
Indonesia’s independence.  In keeping with the New Order’s concern to limit 
contemporary students’ involvement in politics to ‘analysis’, however, this role was 
largely represented as a symbolic one and students’ active role in political events 
backgrounded.   
 
Throughout the Sejarah’s account, the role of youth and students is framed in terms of 
the organicist values of the New Order state, which emphasised family values, including 
respect for elders, placing the interests of the collective over those of the individual, and 
order, harmony and stability, achieved through the consensus produced by deliberative 
decision-making.  In this sense, the Sejarah’s representation of the historical roles of 
Indonesia’s youth and students was an integral part of the state’s program of ideological 
indoctrination, which aimed to education and socialise Indonesian citizens, including 
the young generation, into the key values and ideologies of the regime.  More 
specifically, the Sejarah’s account of these moments was an attempt to delimit what it 
was possible to say about the historical roles of Indonesia’s youth and students in the 
context of the state’s efforts to depoliticise students’ roles and identities.  This strategy 
of government aimed to modify the ways in which contemporary youth and students 
were able to act in their identities as students.  It also aimed to provide the conditions 
within which contemporary students could police their own behaviour.  The success of 
these efforts is the subject of the following chapter. 
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 CHAPTER FOUR 
 
Between silence and subversion: the student 
press, 1976-1980 
 
dissent v. & n. • v.intr. (often followed by from) 1 think differently, disagree; express 
disagreement … • n. a difference of opinion (Moore 1997, 381). 
 
The previous chapter argued that the New Order’s official history text, the Sejarah 
Nasional Indonesia, provided a series of lessons for the students of the 1970s, 1980s 
and 1990s about the roles and identities they were expected to fulfil in New Order 
state.1  These lessons were constructed within an organicist framework of harmony, 
consensus, and national interest above individual interest.  The aim of these lessons was 
to provide a set of parameters within which the contemporary young generation could 
think about their roles and identities.  In doing so, they also aimed to limit the practical 
ways in which students could act in their capacity as mahasiswa.   
 
This chapter explores the ways in which students who wrote in the student press in two 
of the nation’s most prestigious universities responded to these parameters.  These 
responses were formulated in the context of the increasing restrictions on political life 
and freedom of expression put in place after the Malari riots in January 1974 and the 
introduction of the campus normalisation policies in 1978.  The analysis focuses on two 
student publications from the period between 1974 and 1980: Salemba, the student 
newspaper of Universitas Indonesia in Jakarta and Gelora Mahasiswa published at 
Universitas Gadjah Mada in Yogyakarta.  These two newspapers, together with 
Kampus, Institut Teknologi Bandung’s student newspaper, had the largest circulation of 
the student publications of the period, and were arguably the most influential both 
within and outside their home campuses.  
 
                                                          
1 The first edition of the Sejarah Nasional Indonesia was published in 1975. 
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 The chapter traces the processes by which students who wrote for these newspapers 
developed an alternative ‘discourse of dissent’ regarding their roles and identities 
through the meanings they gave to a set of six interlinked keywords.  It also explores 
the ways in which these students sought to socialise their fellow students into these 
identities.  It suggests that the New Order’s celebration of the pioneering role of youth 
and students in Indonesia’s nationalist history, together with students’ membership of 
the by then largely defunct coalition that had helped to install the New Order, provided 
them with some degree of ‘space’ in which to challenge some aspects of the state 
discourse in defining their roles and identities.  More important than this however, was 
students’ ability to promote their role as a force for ‘social control’ and ‘correction’ of 
the New Order state and its practices, as a moral rather than a purely political force, as 
leaders of the common people (rakyat) and as intellectuals without presenting a 
fundamental challenge to the state or its discourse.  This strategy was a response to the 
very real threat of repression that students faced as the state tightened its grip on 
political life over the course of the decade.  And while it entailed concessions to the 
state discourse on the part of students, it also enabled them to continue to play the role 
of government critic, at least in the short term. 
 
The chapter begins by introducing in detail the two newspapers examined in this 
chapter.  It then examines the keywords which students used in defining their roles and 
identities in Salemba and Gelora Mahasiswa between 1976 and 1980.  These keywords 
include kontrol sosial (social control), politik (politics), kekuatan moral (moral force), 
rakyat (the common people), intelektaul (intellectual) and mahasiswa.  It argues that 
through the meanings they gave to these keywords, students developed a discourse of 
dissent which enabled them to continue their role in national politics without presenting 
a threat to the state.  The chapter then examines some of the linguistic strategies that the 
student publications used to attempt to socialise student readers of the newspapers into 
the student identities constructed through the keywords.  
 
Student newspapers of the 1970s 
 
During the 1950s, most of the then small number of university campuses had a student 
press.  These campus publications existed alongside publications associated with all the 
major mass student organisations (Siregar 1983, 37-41).  The student press of the early 
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 to mid 1950s enjoyed considerable freedom (Supriyanto 1998, 70) and this period also 
saw the establishment of the first student press and student journalists’ associations.2  
Under Guided Democracy, however, this freedom was curtailed by the strict controls 
put in place on the press, including the student press.   
 
The events of 30 September 1965 led to the closure of around thirty national level 
publications considered sympathetic to the PKI and the Guided Democracy regime.  
These bannings created space for what Raillon refers to as the ‘Angkatan 66’ 
(Generation of 66) press to emerge (Raillon 1985, 20).  During the late 1960s and early 
1970s, the student press was actively engaged in the debates surrounding the formation 
and consolidation of the ‘new order’ (Raillon 1985; see also Supriyanto 1998, 71).  In 
June 1966 Harian Kami was established, followed by the West Java edition of 
Mahasiswa Indonesia in July 1966 (Raillon 1985, 21-2).  These two publications were 
published by independent bodies affiliated with the Indonesian Student Press 
Association (Ikatan Pers Mahasiswa Indonesia, IPMI) and were based outside the 
campuses (Siregar 1983, 47 and 61).3  Campus-based publications also re-emerged at 
this time including Campus (later renamed Kampus), published by Institut Teknologi 
Bandung’s student council from February 1968, and  Muhibbah published by 
Universitas Islam Indonesia in Yogyakarta from March 1967 and later continued as 
Himmah.   
 
After 1971 however, the student press experienced a decline.  From this time, 
publications such as Harian Kami were forced to reclassify themselves as ‘general 
press’ (pers umum) and compete with commercial publications (Supriyanto 1998, 75-6; 
Siregar 1983, 53).   In addition, the increasingly critical stance of many publications 
towards the New Order government after 1971 meant that they occupied a precarious 
position (Raillon 1985, 90; Supriyanto 1998, 71).  In the period immediately following 
the Malari riots, the government closed a number of newspapers and magazines, 
                                                          
2 The Indonesian Student Journalists Association (Ikatan Wartawan Mahasiswa Indonesia, IWMI) and the 
Indonesian Student Press Union (Serikat Pers Mahasiswa Indonesia, SPMI) were established in August 
1955.  In 1958 IWMI and SPMI were fused into the Indonesian Student Press Association (Ikatan Pers 
Mahasiswa Indonesia, IPMI) (Siregar 1983, 41-2 and 44). 
3 At its peak in 1966-67 the circulation of Harian KAMI was 70 000 copies, the largest of any newspaper 
in Indonesia at the time (Siregar 1983, 101).  In addition to its Jakarta based daily, Harian Kami was also 
associated with a number of weekly publications based in other regions, including the Makassar-based 
Mingguan Kami established at the end of 1966, and two other papers of the same name set up in 1968 and 
based in Pontianak, West Kalimantan and Surabaya, Central Java.  Mimbar Demokrasi, established in 
September 1966, was based in Bandung, Malang’s Gelora Mahasiswa Indonesia began publication in 
1967 and Mimbar Mahasiswa based in Banjarmasin, was published from 1968 (Siregar 1983, 47).   
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 including Harian Kami and Mahasiswa Indonesia (Raillon 1985, 113; Siregar 1983, 54; 
Supriyanto 1998, 72).4  In November 1975 the Minister of Information Mashuri 
released a new set of regulations on ‘special publications’ (penerbitan khusus).  The 
new regulations deemed that publications such as those published by the student 
councils were for limited consumption and could not publish material which dealt with 
‘practical politics’.  All special publications had to obtain a Certificate of Registration 
(Surat Tanda Terdaftar, STT) from the Minister of Information (Siregar 1983, 100 and 
136-41).  As a result of these regulations, the student press languished and it was not 
until the mid 1970s that new publications began to emerge.   
 
The student publications of the mid to late 1970s were campus-based publications, 
usually managed under the auspices of the student councils.  Among the largest and 
most significant publications of the period were Gelora Mahasiswa, published at 
Universitas Gadjah Mada, Salemba (Universitas Indonesia), and Kampus (Institut 
Teknologi Bandung).5  At their peak in 1978, Salemba and Kampus had a circulation of 
30 000 while Gelora Mahasiswa’s circulation remained consistent at 16 000 (Siregar 
1983, 101).6  Salemba, Kampus and, after 1978, Gelora Mahasiswa were also circulated 
outside of their home campuses, giving them a wider significance in the Indonesian 
student community (Siregar 1983, 101).7  Unlike other student publications, these three 
newspapers were published on a regular basis, primarily due to the subsidies they 
received from their home universities.   
 
The first issue of Gelora Mahasiswa (Students’ Passion) went to print in May 1974.  It 
was published monthly in tabloid form by the publications unit of Universitas Gadjah 
Mada’s student council and usually ran to between 10 and 12 pages.8  A message in 
Gelora Mahasiswa’s inaugural edition expressed the hope that the newspaper would 
‘encourage students as members of the campus community to hold in high esteem the 
name of the alma mater and to cultivate the unity, oneness and family atmosphere 
(kekeluargaan) of the campus’ (Gelora Mahasiswa May 1974).  The newspaper was 
also to function as a ‘media for the presentation of academic writing by students and 
                                                          
4 These included Mahasiswa Indonesia and Nusantara (15 January), Harian Kami, Indonesia Raya, 
Abadi and the Jakarta Times (21 January), and Pedoman and Ekspres (23 January) (Raillon 1985, 113).  
5 Other publications of this period include Mimbar (Universitas Brawidjaya, Malang), Derap Mahasiswa 
(IKIP Negeri Yogyakarta) and Identitas (Universitas Hasannudin, Makassar) (Dhakidae 1977, 63).   
6 The actual readership would have been larger than these figures indicate since newspapers and 
magazines were often passed on to others to read (Dari Kampus 1979, 33; see also Supriyanto 1998, 114). 
7 See Dari Kampus (1979, 35) for Salemba’s circulation within and outside Jakarta. 
8 Once Gelora Mahasiswa resumed publication after its banning in 1978, it appeared twice a month. 
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 other members of the university community as well as for the expression of opinion’ 
(Gelora Mahasiswa May 1974).9   
 
Salemba’s first edition was published two years later, on 14 January 1976.  According 
to the inaugural editorial, the name Salemba was chosen: 
 
…based on romanticism, that the role of the UI [Universitas Indonesia] campus 
which was originally located in Salemba had made an important contribution to the 
struggle of the Indonesian nation. It was felt that the romanticism of this historical 
struggle needed to be eternalised (Salemba 14 January 1976, cited in Dhakidae 
1977, 63 and Dari Kampus 1979, 43).10
 
The 8-page tabloid, which was published fortnightly, aimed, according to a booklet 
commemorating its three year anniversary, to facilitate communication between 
members of the academic community and to accommodate the opinions and ideas of 
students and the broader campus community (Dari kampus 1979, 23-24).11  As a media 
of ‘people of analysis’, Salemba aimed to provide ‘objective information’ in order to 
‘support the analytical abilities of the campus community’.  It was also intended to 
accommodate students’ interest in the field of journalism, to develop their ability to 
express their ideas in a systematic and analytical way and to offer students a place to 
practice organisational and leadership skills (Dari kampus 1979, 23-24).  
 
The bulk of both newspapers consisted of news items and feature articles which covered 
a broad range of topics including politics, the economy and development, society, 
culture and the arts as well as issues affecting the university and the higher education 
sector in general.  The main news items were often based on interviews with student 
leaders or key public figures.  Opinion pieces were generally contributed by students 
                                                          
9 Gelora Mahasiswa featured a number of regular sections including an editorial, cartoons, a pojok 
(corner column) entitled Interupsi!!, Etalase (‘Shop Window’), as well as readers’ letters, an information 
column for students, and readers’ poems.  For an explanation of pojok see the section ‘Irony and identity’ 
below. 
10 …berdasarkan romantisme, bahwa peranan kampus UI yang pada awalnya terletak di Salemba telah 
memberikan catatan-catatan penting bagi perjuangan bangsa Indonesia.  Romantisme juang yang 
historis itu rasanya perlu diabadikan (Salemba 14 January 1976, cited in Dhakidae 1977, 63 and Dari 
kampus 1979, 43).   
11 In addition to its main news items and feature articles, Salemba regularly featured a number of other 
sections.  These included Apokromat, a profile of public personalities, editorials (Induk Karangan and 
Surat dari Salemba 4), a pojok (corner-column) entitled Senggol (Nudge or Bump), cartoons, and readers’ 
letters.    
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 associated with the newspaper or the university although student journalists 
occasionally wrote for publications other than that of their home campus.   
 
In the lead-up to the 1977 elections, reporting and opinion in the student press became 
increasingly political.  Universitas Indonesia sociology student and a contributor to 
Salemba Tonny Ardie’s content analysis of Salemba during 1976 found that just under 
one quarter of articles, editorials, and other features dealt with political issues (Dari 
kampus 1979, 37-42).  During the second half of 1977, however, this figure had 
increased to just over 40 per cent.  For Gelora Mahasiswa the figure was around 25 per 
cent (Siregar 1983, 71).12  The increasingly political orientation of the student press at 
this time reflected the fact that the student councils responsible for organising the 
protests also managed many of the campus publications (Supriyanto 1998, 78).13   
 
In the month leading up to the 1978 MPR Session a number of student newspapers were 
closed (Supriyanto 1998, 74).14  Following the Kopkamtib freeze on all student council 
activities in January 1978, Salemba’s publication license was revoked in February 1978 
and Gelora Mahasiswa was closed by Universitas Gadjah Mada Rector Sukadji 
Ranuwihardjo soon after (Salemba 20 October 1979).  In June 1978, however, with 
Suharto’s presidency ratified for a third term, Salemba’s publishing license was 
reinstated and in September Gelora Mahasiswa was again permitted to publish.  Under 
the NKK/BKK policy, responsibility for student and campus publications was shifted 
from the disbanded student councils to the new ‘campus coordination bodies’.  During 
the transition to the new structure, however, the student presses at Universitas 
Indonesia, Universitas Gadjah Mada and Institut Teknologi Bandung were able to retain 
a degree of independence because of the support of the university rectors (Supriyanto 
1998, 77-8; Salemba 20 October 1979).   
 
                                                          
12 Daniel Dhakidae (1977, 65) also conducted a content analysis of Salemba and Gelora Mahasiswa.  
Although the three analyses vary, they nevertheless indicate an increase in reporting on political issues 
during 1977. 
13 The political orientation of the student press at this time led Dhakidae to conclude that, ‘…student 
publications are journals of opinion, and not news bulletins (koran berita).  What they show is [students’] 
ideological perspective [and] their political outlook’ (1977, 68).  Dhakidae also writes that ‘Within 
university campuses there has developed what is called adversary journalism … The campus press is a 
guard dog who observes political events and then brings them to [the attention of] wider society, 
highlighting the adversarial and oppositional aspects’ (Dhakidae 1977, 67). 
14 A number of other newspapers and weeklies including Kompas, Sinar Harapan, Merdeka, Indonesia 
Times, Sinar Pagi, Pelita and Tempo were also closed at this time (Supriyanto 1998, 78).   
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 This situation did not last long.  In September 1979, only a year after it had been 
allowed to republish, Gelora Mahasiswa was again closed.  According to Universitas 
Gadjah Mada’s rector Sukadji Ranuwihardjo, despite warnings, the newspaper had 
continued to ‘confuse (mengacaukan) editorial opinion with facts’ (Salemba 20 October 
1979).15  On other campuses, the student newspapers’ reporting of the trials of the 
student activists arrested in 1977 and 1978 together with their criticism of the 
NKK/BKK policy and of the Minister of Education and Culture himself, led the 
Department of Information to revoke their publishing licenses.  Kampus was prohibited 
from publishing in April 1980 and Salemba in May 1980 (Supriyanto 1998, 79).16  
 
Negotiating identity, negotiating power 
 
As noted in chapter one, during the late 1960s and early 1970s, the coalition of students, 
intellectuals, journalists and other professionals which had been the New Order’s key 
support base in its early years began to break down.  Beginning in 1968, there was an 
increased mood of disaffection among these groups with official corruption, 
manipulation of the elections and excessive and misdirected state spending.  
Nevertheless, despite low-level repression, students continued to enjoy considerable 
freedom in expressing their criticisms largely because of their membership of this 
coalition (Aspinall 1996, 221; see also chapter one).  Thus, as Southwood and Flanagan 
(1983) note, the student activists of the early 1970s played the role of ‘critical 
collaborators’, remaining committed to the original ideals and aims of the New Order 
but adopting an increasingly critical stance regarding their implementation.  This was a 
characteristic of what Aspinall and Bourchier have identified as a blurring of the 
boundaries between state and civil society during this period (Aspinall 1996, 223; 
Bourchier 1996, 184).  
 
The Malari riots of January 1974 marked a turning point in the relationship between 
students and the New Order state.  What began as a peaceful student protest against 
                                                          
15 The ‘facts’ at issue were the publication of a cartoon on the front page of the 7 September 1979 edition 
of Gelora Mahasiswa which criticised the rector for his inconsistent approach to students’ activities.  The 
rector also objected to an article published in the 21 September 1979 edition which quoted him as saying 
that students need not concern themselves too much with the formal aspects of the BKK policy (Salemba 
20 October 1979).   
16 Alma Mater (Institut Pertanian Bogor), Airlangga (Universitas Airlangga), Derap Mahasiswa (IKIP 
Yogyakarta) and Mahasiswa Bicara (ISTN Jakarta), among others, were also closed (Supriyanto 1998, 
79). 
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 Japanese investment, ended in several days of mass rioting (see Crouch 1974; Gunawan 
1975; Peristiwa 1974; Bourchier 1996, 217-8).  In the aftermath of the event, avenues 
for tolerated dissent began to narrow sharply.  As the most visible actors in the drama, 
students were a central target of these measures.  Soon after the riots, the Minister of 
Education and Culture Sjarif Thajeb issued a ministerial decision detailing regulations 
for the ‘improvement’ (pembinaan) of university campuses (Surat Keputusan No. 
028/U/1974), popularly known as SK028.  The regulations prohibited students from 
undertaking any political actions which would ‘lead to the disturbance of peace and 
order’ and introduced the requirement that all student activities obtain the permission of 
the university’s rector (Thajeb 1974, 7; see also Bourchier 1996, 218; Thomas 1981, 
388).   
 
If the period before 1978 had been characterised by the introduction of practical 
measures aimed at defining the limits within which students could act, then the period 
after 1978 was characterised by a focus on ideological issues.  This was both a response 
to increased student activity in 1977-1978 and an integral part of the New Order’s 
nationwide program of ideological indoctrination which began with the launching of the 
P4 program in 1978 (see Wandelt 1994; Bourchier 1996, chapter 8; Thomas 1981, 391-
2).  In the lead-up to the General Election (Pemilihan Umum, Pemilu) in May 1977 and 
the General Session of the MPR in March 1978, students staged mass demonstrations 
protesting against corruption, social inequality and, most importantly, against Suharto 
(van Dijk 1978a, 1978b, 123-7 and 130-4; Bourchier 1996, 224; Aspinall 1993, 5). It 
was in response to this that the new Minister of Education and Culture Daud Yusuf 
introduced his NKK/BKK policies (see chapter two).  These policies aimed to 
thoroughly depoliticise students and limit the organisational influence of the previously 
powerful student councils. 
 
The consequence of these measures was a shift in the power relationship between the 
state and wider society, including students.  This shift resulted in a contraction of the 
limits within which students were able to act in their capacity as mahasiswa and a 
narrowing of the parameters within which they could speak and think about their roles 
and identities.  Thus, while students continued to represent their role as a dissident one, 
they increasingly had to contend with intimidation, the threat of arrest, and the all-
pervasive presence of a security apparatus with the capacity to conduct surveillance of 
suspected dissenters.  Students who wrote in the student press of the mid to late 1970s 
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 negotiated the consequences of this shift in power relations by developing a new 
awareness of the boundaries for tolerated political expression.17  This process of 
negotiation, together with the broader social, political and economic changes taking 
place at that time, shaped the ways in which students articulated their roles and 
identities. 
 
The previous chapter suggested that the aim of the New Order state’s restrictions on 
political expression, its depoliticisation policy and its program of ideological 
indoctrination (of which the Sejarah Nasional Indonesia was a part) was to ensure 
students’ conformity to the organicist values of order, stability, harmony and consensus 
(see also Philpott 2000, 151; Langston 2001, 26).  This process of ‘government’ (in the 
Foucauldian sense) aimed to regulate students’ behaviour and at the same time create 
the conditions under which students could modify their own behaviour (Hindess 1996, 
105-6 and 109).  The threat of repression which students faced in the more restrictive 
political climate of the mid to late 1970s provided just such conditions by compelling 
students to police themselves as they defined their roles and identities. 
 
Yet students were far from powerless.  Foucault emphasises that power, of which 
government is one form, is exercised over free individuals (Hindess 1996, 100-101).  As 
a result, students themselves remained capable of exercising power in their own right.  
One way in which students who wrote in Salemba and Gelora Mahasiswa exercised 
their power was by challenging the state’s definitions of their roles and identities 
through the meanings they gave to the keywords kontrol sosial, politik, rakyat and 
intelektual.  However, the student publications also exercised power over other students, 
by attempting to socialise them into the identities constructed through the keywords and 
so to regulate the ways in which their student readers could think, speak and act in their 
capacity as students.  This was in part an attempt to counter the widespread apathy of 
students which was the result of the ‘success’ of the state’s repressive measures.  Yet 
the efforts of the students associated with Salemba and Gelora Mahasiswa to socialise 
their fellow students into their mahasiswa identities were also the result of a genuine 
                                                          
17 Aspinall notes of opposition groups during the late New Order period that: ‘Most activists have a more 
or less instinctive feel for the boundaries of tolerated political action beyond which their activities will 
attract repression.  Numerous factors have a bearing , including the degree to which the oppositional 
activities involved are mass-based (especially if those mobilising are from the lower classes), the extent 
of explicit ideological challenge to Pancasila orthodoxy involved, the level of direct confrontation, and 
the particular issues raised’ (Aspinall 1996, 233). 
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 conviction that students had an important role to play in the nation.  In this sense, their 
idealism was not mere rhetoric. 
 
The keywords of the student press of the mid to late 1970s articulate those areas of 
meaning which are of primary significance to students’ discourse on their roles and 
identities.  These keywords and the lexical sets they enter into provide ‘a map of the 
objects, concepts, processes and relationships’ (Fowler 1991, 80) which students 
employ in speaking and thinking about their roles and identities.  Since keywords and 
their meanings are often a focus of conflict, they provide an insight into the ways in 
which students who wrote in the student press negotiated the new relations of power 
within which they found themselves in the 1970s.   
 
Perhaps the most important of these keywords was kontrol sosial (social control).  
Through the meanings they gave to this keyword, students negotiated their relationship 
to the state in the context of the shift in power relations taking place during the 1970s.  
The keywords politik (politics) and kekuatan moral (moral force) expressed students’ 
ideas about their role in politics.  These two keywords reflect the essential tension 
within student discourse between students’ conviction that their role was a political one 
and the need to avoid adopting a position which threatened the state and hence would 
invite repression.  Rakyat (the people) articulates students’ perceptions of their role as 
the spokespersons and leaders of wider Indonesian society while the keyword 
intelektual (intellectual) represents one of the principal means by which students 
justified their role in national political life.  In addition, the meanings given to the terms 
pemuda and mahasiswa linked contemporary students to the celebrated youth and 
students of the past, providing students with a key source of authority for their 
‘discourse of dissent’.  Finally, students’ use of satire and irony in cartoons and pojok 
(corner-columns), the patterns of language use they employed and the social 
relationships they cultivated with their readers were some of the principal means by 
which the student publications attempted to socialise their readers into the student 
identities constructed through the keywords. 
 
Kontrol sosial, social control 
 
In the student press of the mid to late 1970s the keyword kontrol sosial (social control) 
together with the related terms koreksi (correction) and kritik (criticism) were integral to 
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 the way in which students defined their roles and identities.18  The status of these terms 
as keywords is demonstrated by their prominent position in numerous editorials and 
articles and by their use in framing much of the discussion of students’ roles and 
identities.  For example, in a 1976 article in Salemba on the topic of the need for 
criticism to be scientific (ilmiah) in character, the term kontrol sosial appears nine times 
and kritik four times (Salemba 16 June 1976).  The issue of students’ social control was 
also the topic of an editorial in Gelora Mahasiswa the following month (Gelora 
Mahasiswa July 1976), which included eleven mentions of the term kontrol and two 
mentions of koreksi.  Students’ role as a force for social control was also the subject of a 
long article in the 18 July 1979 edition of Salemba.  In addition, an editorial in the 15 
December 1976 edition of Salemba on the topic of students’ role in practical politics 
includes four mentions of the term kritik. 
 
The term koreksi was neither new nor unique to student discourse, although its addition 
to the Indonesian political vocabulary was relatively recent.  It appears to have emerged 
in the context of Sukarno’s calls during the Guided Democracy period for a return to the 
‘rails of the revolution’.  In a 1960 speech at the opening of the All Indonesia Youth 
Congress in Bandung on 15 February 1960, for example, Sukarno urged his audience to 
participate in the efforts to ‘correct the deviations’ (mengoreksi penyelewengan-
penyelewengan) from the revolution (Sukarno 1987b, 153).  The role which youth were 
to play in this process is further demonstrated by the resolution made at this congress 
‘that Indonesian youth support the efforts to realise National Unity and correct 
(mengoreksi) the leaders of the revolution who do not implement the Political Manifesto 
of the Republic of Indonesia’ (cited in Biro Pemuda 1965, 293).19  
 
In the aftermath of the attempted coup of 30 September 1965, koreksi became a key 
means by justifying the military’s ‘restoration of order’ and a source of legitimacy for 
the new regime.  In speeches given between 1967 and 1969, Suharto regularly described 
the events of 1966 in terms of a ‘correction’ (koreksi) of the deviations of the previous 
                                                          
18 See the October 1977 edition of Prisma, which was devoted to the topic of ‘Social Criticism: Threat or 
Necessity?’ (Kritik sosial: Ancaman atau Kebutuhan?), for a non-student perspective on the role of critics 
in the state.  The term kontrol sosial was occasionally expressed in English as ‘social control’ or with 
English word-order as sosial kontrol.   
19 The Political Manifesto referred to Sukarno’s political program for Guided Democracy, outlined in 
1959.  The five main themes of this program were summarised in the acronym USDEK: Undang-Undang 
Dasar 45 (1945 Constitution), Sosialisme a la Indonesia (Indonesian Socialism), Demokrasi Terpimpin, 
(Guided Democracy), Ekonomi Terpimpin (Guided Economy), Kepribadian Indonesia (Indonesian 
Personality). 
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 government (Matheson Hooker 1995, 277).  This remained a consistent theme for much 
of the following decade.  In his address at the opening of the national conference of the 
’45 Generation on 25 June 1980, for example, Suharto asserted: 
 
Is not the New Order the order which struggles for a system of society and the 
State which is truly based on the purity of the Pancasila and the 1945 
Constitution; which strives to carry out a total correction (koreksi total) of all 
deviations which occurred in the previous period … (Suharto 1980c, 113-4)?20   
 
Students in the late 1960s and early 1970s also used the term koreksi in reference to 
their own role.  A 1970 article in the Bandung-based student newspaper Mahasiswa 
Indonesia justified students’ intervention in national politics in 1966 in terms of 
‘correction’, arguing that their role in ‘political struggle’ (perjuangan politik) 
encompassed ‘opposing injustice and correcting (mengoreksi) leadership which was 
proven to have failed’ (Mahasiswa Indonesia November 1970, cited in Raillon 1985, 
193-4).   
 
The term kontrol sosial also has its origins in the final years of the Guided Democracy 
period.  A history of the youth movement published in 1965, for example, describes the 
‘revolutionary movement of youth’ as ‘a force for ‘social-support and social-control’ of 
the government’ (Biro Pemuda 1965, 235).21  The same history also uses the term kritik 
in relation to students’ actions (ibid., 237).  In this context, the role of youth as 
institutionalised and loyal critics of the Sukarno government is represented as a crucial 
element of their political role.   
 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the idea that students represented a force for social 
control of the government became a central element in student discourse.  Raillon, for 
example, suggests that for the students who wrote for Mahasiswa Indonesia, kontrol 
sosial entailed supporting ‘modernisation and the strengthening of the New Order’ and 
at the same time condemning the ‘old forces’ and when necessary taking a critical 
stance against the military and those who misused their positions in the new political 
structure (Raillon 1985, 62-3).   
 
                                                          
20 Bukankah Orde Baru adalah orde yang memperjoangkan tatanan masyarakat dan Negara yang benar-
benar didasarkan kepada kemurnian Pancasila dan Undang-Undang Dasar ’45; yang bertekad untuk 
mengadakan koreksi total terhadap segala penyelewengan yang terjadi pada masa sebelumnya … 
(Suharto 1980c, 113-4)?   
21 The terms ‘social support’ and ‘social control’ appear in English.   
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 The use of the English term ‘social control’ and later the Indonesianised kontrol sosial, 
indicates that the term was most likely Western in origin.  In sociological theory, ‘social 
control’ refers to the control which is exerted upon members of a society to ensure their 
conformity to established norms.  It is exercised through systems such as the law (for 
crime), the medical profession (for mental illness), the church (for sin) or by social 
pressure (Waters and Crook 1993, 142; see also Marshall 1998, 610; Johnson 2000, 
288).  While unfashionable during the 1940s and 1950s, in the early 1960s there was 
renewed interest in the concept, particularly as an explanation for social deviance (Liska 
1992, 1818).  Yet in the context of discussions on the role of youth and students in 
Indonesia, social control refers not to control exercised over society but to political 
forms of control directed at government and originating from groups in society.  It is in 
this ‘Indonesian’ sense that the term kontrol sosial was used in the student newspapers 
of the 1970s.22
 
For students who wrote in the student press during the 1970s, kontrol sosial and koreksi 
were essential means of providing checks and balances on the political process.  An 
editorial in Gelora Mahasiswa of July 1976, for example, argued that since power was 
often misused, correction and control by society were always necessary (Gelora 
Mahasiswa July 1976).  The object of students’ kontrol sosial was usually expressed as 
‘the system’ (sistem), ‘power’ (kekuasaan) or, more directly, ‘the government’ 
(pemerintah).  In Salemba of 18 July 1979, for example, Lukman Mannuntungi argued 
that the aim of students’ social control was not to bring about a fundamental 
transformation of the economic, social and political order, as was the aim of the 1928 
and 1945 generations of students, but rather to ‘correct’ deviations from the basis of the 
current system, namely the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, in order to improve it 
(Salemba 18 July 1979, 5).  The current political conditions were described using terms 
such as ketidakberesan (irregularities), ketidakadilan (injustice), ketidakwajaran 
(deviations), ketimpangan (imbalances) and kepincangan (defects).  The fault for this, 
however, as Mannuntungi argued, lay not with the system itself but rather with ‘those 
who had caused the system to deviate’ (orang-orang yang menyebabkan sistem itu 
menyimpang).  Students’ task was thus to correct (mengoreksi) the system, to return it to 
its proper state (mewajarkan) and to straighten out (meluruskan) its kinks.   
 
                                                          
22 A 1977 article by the Bappenas (Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional, National Development 
Planning Body) social scientist Astrid S. Susanto uses the term kontrol sosial in its sociological sense but 
links it to the concept of kritik sosial (social criticism). 
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 In chapter one it was suggested that the relationship of a particular text to other texts in 
its intertextual ‘network’ provides an insight into relations of power between social 
actors.  Students’ emphasis on their role as a force for kontrol and koreksi of the New 
Order state and its practices suggests that the state discourse, with its emphasis on 
‘correcting’ the previous government’s deviations, set the parameters within which 
students in the mid to late 1970s were able to define their own roles and identities.  As 
the state became increasingly intolerant of students’ criticisms, students had to seek 
ways of representing their dissent which were legitimate in the view of the state.  
Koreksi provided this framework by emphasising students’ loyalty to the New Order 
and to its professed commitment to correcting deviations from the Pancasila and the 
1945 Constitution.   However, in doing so, it limited the ways in which students were 
able to represent their role in national political life by defining criticism which was not 
undertaken in the spirit of koreksi as unacceptable.  At the same time, it was because 
koreksi was a legitimate form of dissent that students were able to use it so effectively 
to critique the New Order.  Students’ use of state texts in this way reveals the dynamic 
relationship of power between students and the state: while the state’s discourse of 
koreksi limited the ways in which students were able to think and speak about their 
roles (and, consequently, how they were able to act), it also provided students with an 
authoritative framework within which to express their criticisms of the New Order’s 
own ‘deviations’.   
 
An example of how students used other aspects of the state discourse as a framework 
for their role as kontrol and koreksi of the state comes in the form of a cartoon which 
appeared in the March 1977 edition of Gelora Mahasiswa (Figure 4.1).  The cartoon 
criticised the hypocrisy of Kopkamtib Chief of Staff Admiral Sudomo’s accusation that 
students had experienced ‘ideological erosion’ (erosi ideologi) and were no longer 
committed to the principles of the Pancasila.  Pointing to those aspects of the New 
Order state and its practices which students saw as most in need of koreksi – the lack of 
justice for the rakyat, the suppression of free speech, and the gap between those who 
have reaped rich rewards from the New Order’s economic development and those who 
have not – the cartoon asks ‘Is this Pancasilaist?’ (‘Pancasilais…?’). 
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Figure 4.1 Cartoon: Is this Pancasilaist? 
Like koreksi, Pancasila both limited what students could say about their roles and 
identities and provided a means by which they could justify their role as a force for 
kontrol sosial and koreksi of the state.  In 1966, the Pancasila was declared to be the 
‘source of all sources of law’ (Bourchier 1996, 169).  Over the course of the 1970s, the 
New Order formulated a single interpretation of the Pancasila, based on organicist 
principles of family (kekeluargaan), harmony and order (see Wandelt 1994; Bourchier 
1996, 229-34).  The Pancasila was promoted as the ideology which held the nation 
together and deviations from it were perceived as threatening to the nation’s stability 
and so to development.  Throughout the New Order, critics were often discredited by 
claims that they lacked commitment to the Pancasila or were seeking to undermine its 
status as the state ideology.  For students, then, framing their criticisms of the injustices 
suffered under the New Order in Pancasilaist terms was a political necessity.  As the 
state increasingly restricted the use of political symbols and discourses other than that 
of the organicist and development-oriented Pancasila, using ‘familiar and accepted 
symbols … [became] perhaps the only possible ... [means to express] public criticism’ 
(Antlov 1996, 19).  At the same time, the Pancasila also provided students with a means 
of criticising the state in its own terms.  The New Order depicted itself as having 
safeguarded the Pancasila in 1965-1966 and as the embodiment of the pure and 
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 consistent implementation of the Pancasila, in the form of demokrasi Pancasila 
(Pancasila democracy) (Bourchier 1996, 228).  Students’ use of the Pancasila attacks 
these claims in terms which the state itself acknowledged as legitimate.  In doing so, 
students ‘turn … the powerful’s own instruments against them…’ (Antlov 1996, 19). 
 
Although students acknowledged that social control could be carried out by anyone, 
‘from jamu [traditional medicine] sellers, becak [bicycle rickshaw] drivers, teachers, 
university students, soldiers to formal and informal community leaders’, students 
believed that they were the group best placed to carry out social control.  An editorial in 
the July 1976 edition of Gelora Mahasiswa, for example, argued that students’ 
education, as well as their natural idealism and understanding of social issues placed 
them in a unique position to undertake social control and gave their social control more 
quality (Gelora Mahasiswa July 1976).  Students also represented their role as a force 
for kontrol sosial in terms of tanggung jawab (responsibility) and beban (burden), 
arguing that as educated individuals, they had an obligation to contribute to the 
understanding of and provision of solutions for social problems.  The belief that 
students were the primary agents of social control was reflected in the way they 
represented their role grammatically.  In both Salemba and Gelora Mahasiswa, 
mahasiswa (students) were represented as playing an active role in melakukan (carrying 
out), menjalankan (exercising), mengadakan (conducting) and melaksanakan 
(implementing) kontrol sosial (Salemba 16 June 1976; Gelora Mahasiswa July 1976).   
 
There was also an important link between kontrol sosial and change.  Since the aim of 
students’ kontrol sosial was not to bring about a fundamental transformation of the 
economic, social and political order, but rather to correct the ‘deviations’ and ‘defects’ 
in the current system, the concept of change (perubahan) was often expressed in terms 
of ‘improvement’ (perbaikan).  Students’ own part in processes of social and political 
change was an active one, reflected in their designations as ‘agents of change’ (in 
English), kader perubahan masyarakat (cadres of social change) and katalisator 
perubahan politik (catalysts for political change).23  Students’ active role in perubahan 
was also reflected in the grammatically active role they play: throughout the texts it is 
students who ‘melakukan’ (carry out) the activities which will lead to change and 
                                                          
23 Perubahan politik in this context referred to the process of ‘improving the political system to make it 
more democratic’ and ‘making political decisions in accordance with the aspirations of the people’ 
(Salemba 5 March 1980, 4).   
 148
 improvements to the system and who are responsible for ‘creating’ (menciptakan) a 
better future.  
 
As noted above, the threat of repression that students faced in the mid to late 1970s 
limited the kinds of actions that they could undertake in their role as agents of social 
control.  It also provided the parameters within which they were able to represent their 
social control role in their publications.  As a result, the strategies students advocated 
for undertaking kontrol sosial were often verbal rather than physical.  Thus, the term 
kontrol sosial was part of lexical set which also included terms such as protes (protests), 
used here in the sense of ‘a statement of dissent or disapproval’, lobbying (in English), 
kelompok penekan (pressure groups), petisi (petitions), memorandum (memoranda), 
resolusi (resolutions), statement (statements), puisi (poems), diskusi (discussions), kritik 
(criticism), konsultasi dengan pemerintah (consultation with the government), and 
komunikasi massa (mass communication) (see Gelora Mahasiswa July 1976; Salemba 
16 June 1976; Salemba 15 December 1976).24  These terms suggest that the aims of 
students’ kontrol sosial were not to be achieved through physical confrontation with the 
state but rather by bringing the ‘deviations’ and ‘defects’ of the system to the attention 
of the state in a critical but non-hostile way.     
 
In certain circumstances, however, more physical forms of kontrol sosial were deemed 
appropriate by students.  In a 1976 article in Salemba, Universitas Indonesia student 
council chairperson Dipo Alam warned that tensions would arise if student delegations 
were always ‘distrusted and obstructed’ (dicurigai dan dihalang-halangi).  
Demonstrations, he argued, were both a reflection of demokrasi and an essential 
characteristic of it.  Moreover, as the student demonstrations of 1966 had proven, if 
other channels for political expression were blocked, students would not hesitate to 
berdemonstrasi (demonstrate) or ‘take to the streets’ (turun ke jalan) (Salemba 16 June 
1976, 1; see also Salemba 18 July 1979, 5). 
 
The fact that many of the terms used in the student press to describe the methods for 
carrying out kontrol sosial are derived from English is not insignificant.  Some of these 
terms have equivalent or near equivalent Indonesian terms.  The term pernyataan, for 
example, incorporates the meanings of ‘statement’ and ‘resolution’ (in the sense of 
                                                          
24 Komunikasi massa referred to the publication of newspapers as well as pamphlets.  Since the audience 
of these publications was primarily a student one, the term massa (mass) is somewhat misleading. 
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 ‘decree’ or ‘declaration’), kecaman is a near-synonym for criticism, and diskusi can also 
be rendered as pembahasan or pembicaraan in standard Indonesian.  On the other hand, 
equivalent terms for protes, lobbying, and petisi are more difficult to find.  The choice 
of these English-derived terms in the student press reflects students’ desire to 
distinguish their language (and hence themselves) as modern and educated, indicated by 
their access to Western concepts and to Western languages (English) (see also Errington 
1986, 345-47).  This is linked to the emphasis on students’ status as intellectuals and 
functions as a means of legitimising students’ methods of social control by presenting it 
as the response of educated, modern intellectuals (see below).   
 
The use of Indonesianised English terms also allows students to tap into a discourse of 
protest which is already political in its original Western cultural setting.  Taken 
together, the English terms ‘protest’, ‘lobbying’ ‘pressure group’, ‘petitions’, 
‘resolution’ and statement’ form part of a discourse of protest and opposition and have 
explicitly political connotations.   Their ‘translation’ (both linguistic and conceptual) 
into standard Indonesian, provides students with a new ‘political vocabulary’.  This 
vocabulary replaces Indonesian terms and concepts which have less distinctly political 
connotations.  For example, the term pernyataan (statement) can be used across a range 
of contexts, not all of which are political.  In contrast, the terms statement and resolusi 
as they are used in the student press clearly refer to a political statement issued to those 
in authority by a dissenting group.  The political connotations of these terms, which are 
a function of their membership of a discourse of protest and opposition in English, 
make them a logical choice for students wanting to emphasise their active role as 
kontrol sosial.  Similarly, the terms permintaan and permohonan, which denote polite 
forms of requesting or appealing, have connotations of respect for authority that the 
term petisi does not.  Petisi is also without the cultural connotations of terms such as 
pepe.  Pepe describes the pre-colonial Javanese form of protest in which peasants took 
their complaints to the ruler (Aspinall 1993, 41; Shiraishi 1990, 17)25 and as a result is 
closely associated with the Javanese tradition of passivity and respect for those in 
authority.  The term petisi, however, is without these associations and thus available to 
students to be invested with a more active, and non-hierarchical set of meanings. 
 
                                                          
25 Aspinall (1993, 41) notes that student protesters in the late 1980s sometimes described themselves in 
these terms. 
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 Protests, petitions, statements, resolutions, criticisms and discussions did not represent 
new forms of politics in Indonesia.  Most recently, they had been used during the 
student actions of 1965-1966.  Their appearance as part of a lexical set associated with 
the concept of social control in the student press of the 1970s was, however, crucial to 
the ways that students redefined their roles and identities in the atmosphere of 
increasing repression.  In particular, by framing their role in terms which were 
acknowledged as legitimate by the state, students avoided presenting their criticisms in 
terms which might be perceived as threatening to the existing political order.  At the 
same time, students invested the concept of kontrol sosial and koreksi with their own, 
more political meanings and so used the state’s own discourse to critique it.   
 
Practical politics  
 
In the student press, the keyword politik (politics) articulates students’ definitions of 
their role in national political life.  The meanings given to this keyword reflect the ways 
in which students sought to justify their ongoing role in politics in the context of the 
New Order’s progressive depoliticisation of society.  In the state’s view, students’ role 
in politics was limited to a conceptual one.  Students’ response to this was to define 
their role in politics as one of the practical manifestations of their role as social control 
and a product of their sense of social responsibility.  After the introduction of the NKK 
policies, however, students also began to emphasise their constitutional right to engage 
in politics.   
 
The topic of politics, and in particular the idea that students had a role to play in 
practical politics, was a significant one in the student newspapers.  Consistent with the 
content analyses cited above (Dari kampus 1979, 37-42; Siregar 1983, 71), Salemba 
offers a particularly rich source of articles and editorials dealing directly with students’ 
role in politics, many of which are from the period leading up to the 1977 elections.  
The editorial in the 15 December 1976 edition of Salemba, for example, dealt explicitly 
with the issue of students’ role in ‘practical politics’ (politik praktis).  In the 15 
February 1977 edition, this topic was again raised in an article on the 1977 elections and 
an editorial on the role of the student press in practical politics.  Gelora Mahasiswa’s 
February 1977 edition also featured a number of articles on this topic.  Salemba’s 20 
March 1980 edition, published only two months before the newspaper was banned, 
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 featured both an article and an editorial on students’ role in politics.  These were very 
clearly a response to the introduction of the campus normalisation policy and Daud 
Yusuf’s redefinition of politics as ‘concept, policy and arena’ (see below; see also 
chapter five) as well as to the arrest and trial of student activists in 1978-1979.  As a 
result, the article and editorial argued strongly that students’ role in politics was a 
constitutional right and part of a long historical tradition of activism stemming from 
students’ sense of social responsibility. 
 
The New Order policy of depoliticisation was a response to the conflict and disorder of 
the Guided Democracy period.  In a series of speeches in 1967-1968 Suharto outlined 
his vision for the nation.  The new political order would provide order, social harmony 
and economic reform.  In such a society, there was no place for the political and 
ideological struggles and thoroughgoing politicisation of society which had been the 
hallmark of the last years of Guided Democracy (Elson 2001, 160-1).  Over the course 
of the 1970s, the New Order introduced a number of measures designed to depoliticise 
Indonesian society.  These included the progressive ‘simplification’ of the political 
parties over the course of the early 1970s, the introduction of the ‘floating mass’ policy, 
and the creation of corporatist bodies designed to incorporate all segments of society 
into the state (see Bourchier 1996, 199-214; Reeve 1985, 328-31 and 333) 
 
This policy also impacted on students.  Having served their purpose, the students who 
had rallied against the Old Order in 1965-1966 were urged to ‘return to the school 
benches’ (kembali ke bangku sekolah) and ‘politically-motivated’ demonstrations 
(student or otherwise) were banned in the capital (Elson 2001, 160-1).  Young people 
were expected to join KNPI, the corporatist organisation created for youth in 1973, and 
to contribute their skills to state-run development programs (see chapter two).26  Despite 
their short term acquiescence to this directive, as noted above, many of the students who 
wrote in the student newspapers of the late 1960s and early 1970s viewed ‘political 
struggle’ (perjuangan politik) as an essential part of their role.  
 
After 1974, avenues for student involvement in politics became increasingly restricted.  
One of the more subtle means by which the state achieved this was by separating 
practical forms of politics from conceptual forms and limiting students’ role to the latter 
(see also chapter five).  Thus, while the SK028 policy introduced by Minister of 
                                                          
26 Bourchier notes that some youth organisations were able to remain independent of KNPI (1996, 214).  
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 Education and Culture in 1974 prohibited students from engaging in ‘political activities 
leading to the disturbance of peace and order’ such as demonstrations, it did allow them 
to engage in discussions and seminars on political topics.  These, the Minister pointed 
out, represented a means by which the opinions of the academic community could be 
channelled into solving the nation’s problems (Thajeb 1974, 7).  This separation 
between practical political activities and intellectual political activities was consolidated 
under Daud Yusuf’s 1978 campus normalisation policy.  In his explanations of the 
policy, Yusuf distinguished between politics as a concept, politics as policy and politics 
as an arena.  As citizens of a democratic country, he argued students were permitted to 
engage in ‘politics as policy’ and ‘politics as an arena’, but only as ‘youth’ (pemuda) 
and only outside the campus.  Students as students could only engage in conceptual 
politics (see chapter five).  In doing so, both Thajeb and Yusuf appeared to be making 
concessions to students’ desire (and indeed right) to be involved in political life and at 
the same time setting the conditions within which this political role could be carried out.  
 
In Salemba and Gelora Mahasiswa during 1975 and 1976 the limitations students faced 
in undertaking their social and political roles in the light of the SK028 policy was a key 
concern.  While in the mass media government figures bemoaned students’ lack of 
interest in social issues, arguing that they had become ‘apathetic’, in their own 
publications students countered that it was the Minster’s decision that had caused the 
stagnation of student activity on campuses and the consequent apathy and loss of 
idealism of many in the student body. The dilemma students faced and their frustration 
at the measures taken by the government led Universitas Pajajaran student Didin S. 
Damanhuri to comment ‘…if we’re silent, we’re called apathetic, if we act, we’re 
subversive’ (diam dibilang apatis, bergerak dianggap subversif) (Salemba 15 
December 1976, 4). 
 
Students rejected, both implicitly and, after the introduction of the NKK/BKK policy, 
explicitly, the separation of political ideas and practical action, continuing to define 
their role in politik as encompassing both political thinking (pikiran politik) and 
political action (tindakan politik).  However, students emphasised that their involvement 
in political life was not that of a political party or faction but rather was connected to 
their role as kontrol sosial and to the sense of moral and social responsibility which 
students felt as educated and socially aware individuals.  A 1976 editorial in Salemba 
for example, argued that ‘activist students’ (mahasisiwa aktivis) who wanted to be 
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 involved in politik praktis should focus on their role as morally motivated social 
control: 
 
For those idealistic students it is clear that social inequalities and the problems 
faced by society are a moral burden for which they must seek a solution in 
accordance with their identity as part of the next generation who are lucky 
enough to be able to undertake higher education.  This means that students’ 
involvement in politics is only as a moral institution which puts forward 
criticism, ideas and advice to the government and the society (Salemba 15 
December 1976, 4).27  
 
Throughout the student press, politik was often linked to kontrol sosial through a 
common lexical and conceptual set.   Thus, students’ involvement in politics was 
conceived in terms of correcting ‘irregularities’ (ketidakberesan) within the state and 
responding to the discrepancy between ‘ideals and practice’ and to ‘the political realities 
of the states’ practices’ (Salemba 20 March 1980, 4).   
 
As the 1977 election approached, however, students’ role in politics became a central 
issue, both on and off the streets.  In their demonstrations, students called for the 
abolition of Kopkamtib and criticised the cukong (Chinese conglomerates) phenomena, 
foreign investment, unregulated state power and the state’s development strategy 
(Aspinall 1993, 5).  As the March 1978 General Session of the MPR approached, 
student demonstrators also called for Suharto to withdraw as a presidential candidate.  
Yet despite the fact that the student councils largely responsible for organising the 
protests also managed the student press, Salemba and Gelora Mahasiswa remained 
cautious, emphasising social responsibility as the motivation for students’ role in 
politics.  An article in the February 1977 edition of Gelora Mahasiswa, for example, 
argued that while the campus need not become an actor in practical politics (pelaku 
politik praktis), it must be engaged with the aspirations of wider society, if it did not 
want to become an ivory tower for an elite alienated from society (Gelora Mahasiswa 
February 1977).  Students also defined politics itself in terms which accorded with the 
organicist values of prosperity and the welfare of all Indonesians which were a central 
feature of the language of the state’s development policies.  In an article in the 15 
                                                          
27 Bagi mahasiswa yang punya idealisme sudah jelas.  Bahwa kepincangan-kepincangan sosial, 
problema-problema yang dihadapi masyarakat adalah beban moral baginya untuk dicarikan 
pemecahannya.  Sesuai dengan identitasnya sebagai bagian dari generasi penerus yang beruntung 
mengenyam pendidikan tinggi.  Ini berarti keterlibatan mahasiswa dengan politik hanyalah sebagai 
lembaga moral yang mengajukan kritik, gagasan dan saran-saran kepada pemerintah dan masyarakat 
(Salemba 15 December 1976, 4). 
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 February 1977 edition of Salemba, for example, Universitas Indonesia student council 
chairperson Zainal AS defined ‘practical political life’ (kehidupan politik praktis) as 
‘the efforts and activities of all citizens to realise common aims and goals, namely 
prosperity and the welfare of the people’ (Salemba 15 February 1977, 4).   
 
Students’ rejection of the state’s separation of conceptual forms of politics from 
practical forms, particularly after the introduction of the 1978 campus normalisation 
policy, was reflected in the mode of language they employed.  As suggested in chapter 
one, writing and speaking construct different versions of the world: the one as a 
‘product’ or ‘thing’ and the other as a series of events and actions.  In producing texts, 
speakers and writers make linguistic choices about the kind of ‘mode’ they will use.  
These choices, it was suggested, may be socially, culturally or politically motivated.  In 
Salemba and Gelora Mahasiswa the choices which students make often give their 
writing a more ‘spoken’ feel than many of the state texts, representing the world in 
terms of actions and actors.  For example, an article in the 20 February 1980 edition of 
Salemba on the implications of the campus normalisation policy for students’ role in 
politics argued that: 
 
…the question that arises is: why can’t students engage in politics?  I think 
because each and every student activity which suggests an element of politics is 
in the end about securing influence over society.  And in this connection, the 
Government is in a weak position to defend itself against anything that students 
put forward because students can be more explicit in stating the mistakes and 
weaknesses of the Government.  In fact, the Government still has to prove that it 
can be trusted by the People.  Because of that it is understandable that the 
Government has a direct interest in ‘depoliticising’ students … (Salemba 20 
February 1980, 7).28
 
In the above example, the simple abstract nouns pemerintah (the government) and 
mahasiswa (students) are the primary actors.  These actors are engaged in concrete 
process of ‘doing’ such as berpolitik (engage in politics), merebut (seize, secure), 
membela (defend) and men‘depolitisiasi’kan (‘depoliticise’), as well as processes 
concerned with thinking and feeling such as dipercaya (trusted) and verbal processes 
                                                          
28 …pertanyaan yang muncul ialah: mengapa mahasiswa tidak boleh berpolitik?  Saya kira, karena 
setiap kegiatan mahasiswa yang berbau politis itu pada akhirnya adalah juga merebut pengaruh 
masyarakat.  Dan dalam hubungan ini, Pemerintah mempunyai posisi lemah untuk membela diri tentang 
apa-apa yang dikemukakan oleh mahasiswa, karena mahasiswa memang bisa lebih gamblang 
mengatakan kesalahan dan kekurangan Pemerintah.  Padahal, sampai sekarang Pemerintah masih harus 
membuktikan apakah dirinya bisa dipercaya oleh Rakyat. Karena itu bisa dimengerti kalau Pemerintah 
mempunyai kepentingan langsung untuk men‘depolitisiasi’kan mahasiswa… (Salemba 20 February 1980, 
7). 
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 such as mengatakan (to state) and dikemukakan (put forward).  This concern with actors 
and actions constructs students’ role in politics in an active and dynamic way by making 
action rather than ‘things’ the locus around which meaning is created.  In the context of 
state’s attempts to separate students from practical action, both in official histories (see 
chapter three) and in the campus normalisation policy, this active representation of 
students’ role in politics represents a significant challenge to the state’s definitions of 
students’ role in politics as a conceptual one.  At the same time, it also highlights the 
government’s active role in attempting to prevent students from engaging in politics and 
the need for the government to actively cultivate the support of wider society by 
attributing responsibility for actions such as men‘depolitisasi’kan (‘depoliticise’), 
membela (defend) and membuktikan (prove) to the government. 
 
The links made between students’ role in politics and their role as a socially responsible 
force for social control was a response to the very real threat of repression which 
students faced.  By defining their role in politics in terms of social control and the 
moral-ethical calling of educated youth, students hoped to avoid a political response 
from the state (see Budiman 1978, 620 and Budiman 1999, 19).   This, they hoped, 
would enable them to continue their role as ‘loyal’ critics of the regime.  
  
A moral force 
 
The state’s attempts to define students’ political role as a conceptual one set limits for 
the ways in which students were able to speak about their roles and identities in the 
student press.  In response to this, students stressed that the motivations for their 
participation in ‘practical politics’ were not political but moral.29  Thus, while students 
defined their role as a ‘force’ (kekuatan) in national politics, they prefixed this with the 
term moral.  As with their emphasis on social control and social responsibility as the 
justification for their role in practical politics, students’ emphasis on their moral 
motivations aimed to provide a framework which would enable them to continue their 
role in political life without presenting themselves as a threat to the state. 
 
                                                          
29 Budiman suggests that students’ emphasis on their role as a moral force can be likened to the role of 
the reclusive Javanese sages or resi (see Budiman 1976, 57-8 and 61; Budiman 1978, 622).  See also 
below. 
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 The term kekuatan moral emerged in student discourse in the aftermath of the 1966 
student demonstrations.  In the late 1960s, students’ increasing disillusionment with the 
failures of the new regime led them to seek ways of justifying their continuing role in 
the political process.  Douglas notes, for example, that after 1966 students responded to 
the ‘political and moral deviations of the nations’ leaders’, and their failure to adhere to 
ideals of the struggle for independence, by defining their movement in moral terms 
(1970, 165; see also Budiman 1973, 79; Budiman 1978, 618; Raillon 1985, 26).  For 
some, such as the student leaders appointed to the DPR in 1968, this role was best 
undertaken through direct participation in the political process.30   For others, however, 
students’ place was outside the formal political system.   
 
In the student press of the mid to late 1970s the idea of students’ morality, idealism and 
conscience as the motivation for their actions occupied a key place.31  Significantly, the 
terms for these concepts appeared most often in articles and editorials on the topic of 
students’ role as kontrol sosial (see for example Salemba 16 June 1976 and the editorial 
in Gelora Mahasiswa July 1976).  Concepts of morality and idealism also framed 
discussions of students’ role in practical politics (see for example the editorials in 
Salemba 15 December 1976 and Salemba 1 September 1977).   In these articles and 
editorials, students’ role as a kekuatan moral (moral force) was reflected in their 
designation as a principled and politically disinterested force committed to truth 
(kebenaran) and justice (keadilan).   The term kekuatan moral was also defined by its 
links to a broader lexical set describing students’ moral characteristics.  The terms 
murni (pure) and hati nurani (conscience), for example, signified students’ integrity: the 
idealism (idealisme) and sensitivity (kepekaan) which called them ‘to struggle to uphold 
justice and truth’ (berjuang menegakkan keadilan dan kebenaran) (Salemba 1 
September 1977, 1).32  Murni also referred to students’ ‘purity’ from external political 
                                                          
30 Those appointed included 1966 activists Cosmas Batubara, Fahmi Idris, Mar’ie Muhammad, Johnny 
Simandjuntak, David Napitupulu, Liem Bian Koen, Soegeng Sarjadi, Nono Anwar Makarim, Yozar 
Anwar, Slamet Sukirnanto, and Sofyan Wanandi (Culla 1999, 68; Raillon 1985, 59-60).  Many of these 
individuals went on to have successful political careers under the New Order. 
31 Emmerson (1973, 291) notes that W.S. Rendra was ‘the leader of a briefly active group whose 
pretentious name – the Gerakan Moril (Moral Movement) – was intentionally ridiculed by its own 
acronym – GERMO (PIMP)’. 
32 Students’ idealism and morality was also a feature of the state discourse on students.    The Basic 
Guidelines for the Improvement and Development of the Young Generation (Pola Dasar Pembinaan dan 
Pengembangan Generasi Muda), introduced by Minister of Education and Culture Daud Yusuf in 1978 
stated that ‘Purity of idealism, courage, a spirit of service and sacrifice and a strong sense of social 
responsibility are the elements which need to be fostered and developed as the ‘Noble Attitude’ of 
Indonesia’s young generation as the defenders and upholders of truth and justice for society and the 
nation (cited in Kansil 1986, 108).  [Kemurnian idealisme, keberanian, semangat pengabdian dan 
pengorbanan serta rasa tanggung jawab sosial yang tinggi adalah unsur-unsur yang perlu dipupuk dan 
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 interests.  This was articulated in the use of terms such as ketanpapamrihan 
(disinterestedness), tanpa pilih bulu (impartiality), kebebasan (freedom) and 
independen (independent) (Salemba 15 December 1976, 4; Salemba 15 January 1977, 
8; Salemba 1 September 1977, 8).   
 
Students’ representations of their role as a kekuatan moral in national political life 
served an important legitimating function.  By arguing that they undertook their role as 
kontrol sosial and koreksi from a position of morality and political disinterestedness, 
students represent their criticisms not as those of a group seeking political power but as 
in the best interests of the nation and the rakyat as a whole.  In this view, students are 
the voice of integrity, justice and truth and the conscience of the nation.  As a 1977 
article in Salemba argued, criticism (kritik) is more valuable when it is undertaken by 
those who are respected, either because of their knowledge, position or personal 
integrity and when it is motivated by a sense of responsibility and devotion (Salemba 1 
March 1977, 5).  The emphasis in the discourse of the student press on students’ moral 
integrity, coupled with their status as future intellectuals (see below) and their strong 
sense of responsibility, thus validates students’ criticisms.  At the same time, by 
representing their own role as moral and without political interests, students position the 
state in an antithetical way.  By implication, to the extent that the state chooses to 
‘suspect’ (mencurigai) students’ actions and accuse them of being exploited 
(ditunggani), rather than act on their suggestions, then it is not acting in the best 
interests of the nation and the rakyat,  nor are its actions guided by the ‘moral’ 
principles of justice and truth.   
 
Students’ representation of their role as a moral force neatly articulates the 
contradictions in their definitions of their roles and identities in the context of the 
shifting power relationships between themselves and the state.  The term kekuatan 
moral represents a juxtaposition of two seemingly contradictory meanings.  While 
kekuatan (force) evokes strength and power, moral connotes principled and ethical 
behavior.  By using the term kekuatan, students represent themselves as powerful 
political actors able to exert an influence on national politics and so advance their 
interests and the interests of those they represent.  The use of the term moral to pre-
modify kekuatan, however, emphasises the fact that students’ motivation is not political 
                                                                                                                                                                          
dikembangkan menjadi ‘Sikap Ksatria’ di kalangan generasi muda Indonesia sebagai pembela dan 
penegak kebenaran dan keadilan bagi masyarakat dan bangsa].  See also chapter five. 
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 but moral, stemming from their desire for ‘ideal’ government.  By representing their 
motivation as a moral one, students define their political role in a way which does not 
constitute a threat to the regime.  Moreover, since the New Order represented itself as 
having restored the ‘purity’ of the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, in contrast to the 
‘adulterations’ perpetrated by the previous government, students’ use of terms such as 
murni enables them to frame their criticisms in a way which the New Order has 
acknowledged as legitimate. 
 
The rakyat  
 
One of the key elements in students’ conceptions of their roles and identities was the 
notion that they acted as the spokespersons for the aspirations of the rakyat (the 
common people) and that they had a responsibility to guide and educate them in matters 
of politics.  In the New Order’s conception of the family state, it was the bapak or head 
of the family, Bapak Presiden Suharto, who was responsible for the welfare of the 
national family.  Students’ definitions of their role in these terms thus reflected the 
state’s paternalistic approach to the rakyat and at the same time implied that the national 
family was not functioning in an ideal way, a situation which required students’ 
intervention.   
 
In the student press, the concept of wider society or the common people was expressed 
using the terms rakyat (the common people) and masyarakat (society).  These terms 
appeared frequently in articles on a wide range of topics concerning students’ roles and 
identities: from their role in kontrol sosial, in politics and democracy education and in 
articles dealing with the nature of the student movement.  For example, in an article in 
the 16 June 1976 edition of Salemba on students’ role in social control, the term 
masyarakat appeared 11 times.  Similarly, an article on the student movement in the 1 
September 1977 edition of Salemba included three mentions of the term rakyat and ten 
of masyarakat.   
 
In its denotative or dictionary meaning, the word rakyat refers to ‘the people of a 
nation’ (penduduk suatu negara) and to ‘the masses’ (orang kebanyakan) or ‘the 
common people’ (orang biasa).  The latter sense differentiates the rakyat from the 
aristocracy or the affluent upper classes as well as from the leaders of the nation (the 
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 ruling class).  In the discourse of the student press in the mid to late 1970s, the word 
rakyat was usually used to refer to ‘the common people’.  Yet through the meanings 
given to it by students, it developed connotations of ‘disempowered’, ‘low levels of 
education’ and a ‘lack of awareness’ as well as ‘politically immature’.  The term 
masyarakat was used in a similar way to highlight the problems faced by wider society, 
which were seen as requiring students’ interest and involvement.   
 
This understanding of the rakyat was by no means new in Indonesia.  Discussing the 
attitude of the nationalist intellectuals and party leaders of the 1930s, Frederick points 
out that the concept of the rakyat was a central element in the view of society held by 
this new elite. Among this elite, there was both a dedication to, and an admiration of, 
the ‘common people’, even if this was conceived of in a ‘naïve and often overly 
romanticised’ way:   
 
The rakyat, although the subject of endless rhetoric by intellectuals, was … ill-
defined and reduced to vague terms such as kromo, murba, and marhaen which, 
despite the ideological associations they acquired, meant essentially the same 
thing: an undifferentiated mass or ‘common man’, an abstract or even imaginary 
social construction around which a good deal of romantic fantasy grew up 
(Frederick 1989, 55; see also McVey 1967, 138-40). 
 
The idea that the rakyat was an object of admiration and at the same time required the 
leadership of those more educated and politically aware than themselves was also a 
central theme in Sukarno’s political rhetoric during the Guided Democracy period.  
Sukarno’s designation of himself as the penyambung lidah rakyat (extension of the 
people’s tongue) and his claimed concern for the interests of the marhaen, the symbol 
of Indonesia’s rural masses, emphasised the importance of the rakyat while at the same 
time representing their interests as embodied in the person of Sukarno.33   
 
In the New Order’s concept of the ‘family state’ the interests of the rakyat were 
similarly depicted as represented in the structures of the state itself: the DPR and MPR.  
These structures, as the military ideologue and at that time secretary-general of the 
Interim People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementera, 
MPRS) Abdulkadir Besar suggested in 1969, were ‘set up to reflect the popular will’ 
(cited in Bourchier and Hadiz 2003, 41, see also ibid., xi; Bourchier 1996 171-2).  In 
reality, however, the role of the rakyat was largely a symbolic one: they were passive 
                                                          
33 During the 1930s the term marhaen was associated with PNI (Frederick 1989, 57). 
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 objects to be represented by appointed ‘delegates’ of regional and functional groups 
(ibid., 42).  This role was clearly reflected in the concept of the ‘floating mass’, 
introduced after the 1971 general elections.  In order to prevent the political parties 
from mobilising widespread support, party branches below the district (kabupaten) level 
were disbanded and mass organisations affiliated with the parties were reorganised into 
the new corporatist organisations (Ward 1973, 73; Bourchier and Hadiz 2003, 12).  
Indonesia’s urban and rural masses, it was asserted, were not to be distracted by politics 
but, rather, were to focus their energies on national development (Ward 1973, 73).   At 
the same time, the New Order also promoted a strong sense of hierarchy in the idea of 
the bapak or father as the head of the national family.  As a textbook for the primary 
school course in Pancasila Moral Education stated, the role of the bapak in this 
framework was to work ‘in the interests of the whole family’, putting their needs and 
interests above his own (cited in Bourchier 1996, 239-40; see also Shiraishi 1997).  Like 
Sukarno, in his role as Bapak Presiden (Father President), Suharto was the principal 
spokesperson for the interests of the national family. 
 
Concern for the rakyat and a claim to act on their behalf was also an integral part of the 
way earlier generations of youth and students had seen their role.  As noted in chapter 
two, the youth of the colonial period saw themselves as having an important role to play 
as leaders of the rakyat.  This role was based on the special understanding of the rakyat 
which these students claimed to have.  The pemuda of the revolution also saw their role 
in terms of leadership and defence of the rakyat and their aspirations, from whom they 
saw themselves as distinct.  In 1965-1966 the student demonstrators claimed to 
represent the demands of the people through their formulation of the Tritura (Tri 
Tuntutan Rakyat, Three People’s Demands) (see chapter three).  And in the late 1960s, 
students associated with the Bandung-based student newspaper Mahasiswa Indonesia 
wrote of the need for a modernising elite to lead the ‘ignorant’ (masih bodoh) and 
‘backward’ (terbelakang) masses and free them from poverty, injustice and oppression 
(Raillon 1985, 183-4).  
 
This view of the rakyat was also central to the ways in which students who wrote in the 
student press of the mid to late 1970s defined their relationship to wider Indonesian 
society.  A variety of terms were used to describe this relationship including penyalur 
aspirasi rakyat (channels of the peoples’ aspirations), pembawa suara hati nurani 
rakyat (spokespersons for the people’s sentiments) (Salemba 15 January 1977, 1 and 8), 
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 pembela rakyat jelata (defenders of the common people), pejuang rakyat (warriors of 
the people), juru bicara perasaan rakyat (spokespersons for the sentiments of the 
people) and even ratu adil, the legendary ‘just king’ of Javanese mythology (Gelora 
Mahasiswa 21 June 1979).  Students justified this role in terms of their more advanced 
education, the historical example set by their predecessors, the lack of representation of 
social sentiments in the current system, as well as their special awareness of social 
issues.  An article by the 1974 student activist Hariman Siregar in the May 1980 edition 
of Salemba, for example, argues that the students of the early nationalist movement had: 
 
… a high level of awareness that they were not merely the leaders of students 
but in fact leaders of the people of Indonesia whose education and access to 
information was very poor.  Their position as leaders of the people was made 
easier because the people themselves accepted their leadership, as they too were 
aware of their weaknesses (Salemba 5 May 1980, 4-5).34   
 
Similarly, under the New Order, Siregar maintains, the persisting low levels of 
education and lack of access to information (one of the key ‘weaknesses’ of the rakyat) 
continues to validate students’ role as spokespersons for the rakyat.  Moreover, since 
both before and after independence no movement existed which ‘truly represented 
(mewakili) wider social sentiment’, the task has fallen to students ‘to comply with 
(menurut) the demands of the people’ and ‘struggle for their fate’ (memperjuangkan 
nasibnya) (Salemba 5 May 1980, 5).  This role was represented as an ‘obligation’ 
(kewajiban) which was based on students’ awareness of disparities in wider society and 
their sensitivity to social issues (Salemba 16 June 1976, 5).35
 
A further dimension to students’ relationship to wider society was the notion that they 
acted as educators and guides for the rakyat.  In an article which appeared in the 15 
February 1977 edition of Salemba, former Universitas Indonesia student council 
chairperson Zainal A. S. argued that in the political arena the role of students was to 
provide ‘explanations’ (pengertian) and ‘guidance’ (bimbingan) as well as education in 
                                                          
34 Kesadaran mereka yang tinggi bahwa mereka bukan sekedar memimpin mahasiswa saja tetapi justru 
untuk memimpin rakyat Indonesia yang sangat kurang pendidikan dan informasi yang didapatnya.  
Kedudukan mereka sebagai pemimpin rakyat ini juga dipermudah oleh karena rakyat sendiri menerima 
kepemimpinan tersebut sebab rakyat juga sadar akan kekurangan mereka (Salemba 5 May 1980, 4-5). 
35 Students’ perceptions of themselves as an educated elite with a social and political responsibility to the 
masses remained a consistent feature of their discourse in the 1980s.  Aspinall, for example, argues of 
students’ collaboration with wider social forces during the 1980s that ‘the poor were seen primarily as an 
object of sympathy, or as recipients of student assistance and pembinaan (guidance)’ although there were 
parts of the discourse of the protest movement which represented the rakyat as ‘an independent and 
potentially decisive force for social change’ (1993, 37-38).  See chapter six for a discussion of the 
development of the latter view in the student press of the 1990s.   
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 the meaning and importance of elections for the ordinary people (kalangan bawah or 
rakyat jelata), and to attempt to ‘mature’ (mendewasakan) this group so that their votes 
were objective and impartial (tidak terpengaruh oleh aspirasi masing-masing) (Salemba 
15 February 1977, 4).  
 
Students’ role as spokespersons of the rakyat is reflected in the grammatical roles 
mahasiswa play in the student publications and in the roles played by rakyat.  
Throughout the student publications the actors carrying out actions on behalf of the 
rakyat are mahasiswa: students are penyalur (channels), pembawa (bearers), pembela 
(defenders) and pejuang (warriors) of the rakyat and their interests.  Students also act as 
the grammatical actors in processes such as mendewasakan (to (cause to) mature) and 
memperjuangkan (to struggle for).  In contrast, the rakyat are almost invariably 
depersonalised in student discourse, becoming the post-modifier in simple abstract noun 
phrases, as in for example kehendak rakyat (the people’s desires), nasib rakyat (the 
people’s fate), aspirasi rakyat (the people’s aspirations) and kepentingan rakyat (the 
people’s interests).36  The focus is thus not on the rakyat themselves but rather on (what 
students perceive to be) their ‘desires’, ‘fate’ ‘aspirations’, and ‘interests’.   
 
The terms rakyat and masyarakat, and the meanings students gave to them, thus 
differentiated educated and socially aware mahasiswa from the majority of Indonesians, 
whose interests students were called to represent.  Students claimed, for example, that 
they were ‘different from the rest of society’ (berbeda dengan masyarakat lainnya) and 
represented a ‘special group within society’ (kelompok khusus dalam masyarakat) 
(Salemba 15 March 1977; Salemba 1 September 1977).  This clear distinction between 
students and the rakyat was both a reflection of students’ paternalistic understanding of 
their relationship to the common people and of the parameters which the threat of state 
repression set for the ways in which students were able to represent their roles and 
identities.  As Aspinall notes, small, elite-level movements tend to attract less 
repression than lower-class movements or movements with a mass support base 
(Aspinall 2000, 9; see also chapter one).  Students’ emphasis on the clear separation 
between their movement and the rakyat, and in practical terms, their reluctance to 
                                                          
36 I found only three instances where the rakyat were not in the position of a post-modifier.  In two of 
these instances the rakyat functioned as the object of a passive verb.  In an article in the 16 June 1976 
edition of Salemba, for example, a dynamic balance between elements of society was described as being 
‘demanded by the rakyat’ (dituntut rakyat).  An article which featured in the 20 February 1980 edition of 
Salemba stated that the government still needs to prove whether or not it ‘can be trusted by the rakyat’ 
(bisa dipercaya oleh rakyat).   
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 involve the rakyat in protests and demonstrations, which in part stemmed from a 
characteristically middle-class fear of mass movements (see Liddle 1973, 200), meant 
that students were able to avoid the kind of repression which might have been leveled at 
them had they sought to identify themselves with the rakyat and mobilise a wider 
support base. 
 
As noted above, students’ paternalistic view of wider society was a product of 
conceptions of the rakyat which dated to the nationalist movement and to the views of 
earlier generations of youth and students about their relationship to the common people.  
Yet it was also consistent with the state’s own view of the rakyat as a depoliticised mass 
and as passive objects, whose interests were to be represented by the state, and in 
particular by its bapak.  By representing their relationship to the rakyat in a way which 
was consistent with the New Order’s own discourse, students presented their role as in 
harmony with the state’s own view of state-society relations in the ideal ‘family state’.  
At the same time, students’ designation as the channels for the rakyat’s aspirations was 
also a means of criticising the state.  As noted above, the role of the bapak in the family 
state is to work ‘in the interests of the whole family’ as its principal spokesperson.  
Students’ claim to represent the interests and aspirations of wider society thus implies 
that there are inconsistencies between rhetoric and practice within the national family.  
If the bapak was performing his role adequately, there would be no need for students to 
act on the rakyat’s behalf.  In this view, it is because the state is not functioning in the 
way it should, that students’ involvement is necessary.   
 
The keyword rakyat thus plays an important role in constructing subject positions not 
only for the rakyat themselves but also for students.  By representing their role as 
spokespersons for the rakyat, students position themselves in an asymmetrical power 
relationship with the rakyat, not as their equals but as their future leaders, who will give 
them a voice and who will struggle on their behalf.  This view both empowers and 
disempowers the rakyat.  On the one hand by raising issues concerning the rakyat, 
students give a public voice to their concerns.  On the other hand, by speaking on behalf 
of the rakyat, students deny the validity of the rakyat’s own voice and so legitimise a 
system in which only certain groups have the right to express dissent.  Students’ 
growing appreciation of these issues led to a significant transformation in their views of 
their relationship to the rakyat in the student discourse during the 1980s and 1990s. 
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 Students as intelektual 
 
In the student press of the mid to late 1970s, one of the defining characteristics of 
mahasiswa was their status as young intellectuals.  For example, a 1976 article in 
Gelora Mahasiswa claimed that the true sprit of the campus was an intellectual one 
(Gelora Mahasiswa October 1976).  Articles on the Indonesian student movement also 
routinely referred to students’ status as intellectuals. An article in the 1 September 1977 
edition of Salemba, for example, included four mentions of the keyword intelektual as 
well as numerous references to students’ role in upholding and defending truth (see 
below).  The term intelektual also appears three times in an article reflecting on 
students’ role in politics in Salemba’s 20 March 1980 edition.  In these and other 
articles, the meanings students gave to the keyword intelektual served as a key means of 
justifying their role as a force for kontrol sosial.  At the same time, by framing this role 
in terms of rationality and objectivity, students defined their role in terms which the 
state itself acknowledged as legitimate.   
 
In the New Order, the role of intellectuals was seen as central to the management of 
Indonesia’s development (Ward 1973, 73).  In a paper given to an international 
conference on the role of the intelligentsia in contemporary Asian societies in 1976, for 
example, the Western-trained academic and early New Order strategist Selo 
Soemardjan (Elson 2001, 148) characterised the intellectuals of the New Order as those 
who used their capacity for independent thought in practical ways to assist in policy-
making and planning for development (Soemardjan 1981, 150-2).  This, he argues, is a 
social obligation:  
 
…intellectuals in less developed countries cannot ignore the mission assigned to 
them by society to utilise their trained intellect for the development of the 
country and the people (ibid., 152; see also chapter five).  
 
This view of intellectuals as technocrats in the service of the state was a product of the 
influence of a group of secular modernising intellectuals on the development of the 
political, economic and ideological format of the early New Order.  Students and young 
intellectuals associated with newspapers such as Bandung’s Mahasiswa Indonesia were 
key members of this group, which drew its membership from the urban middle and 
upper classes (Liddle 1973, 199).  These intellectuals saw strong government as central 
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 to the development process (Liddle 1973, 185).  They also saw their own role as key.  A 
1968 pamphlet on the role of intellectuals in modernisation published by the study club 
associated with Mahasiswa Indonesia, argued that ‘a secular intellectual elite which can 
contribute the necessary brains and organisational ability’ was central to the success of 
Indonesia’s modernisation (cited in Liddle 1973, 186).37   
 
Students who wrote in Salemba and Gelora Mahasiswa also saw their role as 
intellectuals as key.  However, the meanings which they gave to the keyword intelektual 
indicated that they no longer saw their role as being to contribute ‘the brains and 
organisational ability’ for development but rather to act as independent critics of the 
political system.  By defining their role in this way, students tapped into oppositional 
definitions of the role of intellectuals such as that offered by Julien Benda in The 
treason of the intellectuals (La traison des clercs, 1927), who argued that intellectuals 
should not align themselves with particular social or political groups or ideologies but 
should instead ‘engage in the disinterested pursuit of universal truth and justice’ (Jary 
and Jary 1991, 316; see also Marshall 1998, 319).  The role of such intellectuals was to 
point out the gap between political realities and the professed ideals of the state, a role 
which was best undertaken from a position of relative independence from the state 
(Lipset 1992, 937-41).     
 
One of the ways in which students distinguished between ‘intellectual labour in the 
service of the state’ and their own role as critical intellectuals was to draw on the 
oppositional connotations of Western definitions of the role of the intellectual by using 
the English/Dutch-derived term intelektual.  Standard Indonesian has two words for the 
concept of ‘intellectual’.  The first is the Sanskrit-derived term cendekiawan, meaning 
‘a person possessing a high level of intelligence’ or ‘an educated person’.38  The second 
                                                          
37 The modernising ideas to which this group subscribed date to the 1920s.  During the Guided 
Democracy period, however, Sukarno’s highly charged nationalism relegated these ideas to the 
background (Liddle 1973, 178-180).  The events of 1965 provided the opportunity the modernisers had 
been looking for. In 1966, an army seminar held in Bandung brought military thinkers together with 
Western-trained economists and social and political scientists.  The aim of the seminar was to debate an 
economic and political strategy which would see Indonesia develop into a ‘modern’, politically stable and 
economically prosperous nation (ibid., 185; Elson 2001, 148).  During the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
ideas on modernisation and development were successfully integrated into the Soeharto government’s 
economic policies through the efforts of a team of modernising economists from the University of 
Indonesia (MacDougall 1976, 1166; MacDougall 1979, 340).  By 1971, Liddle notes, the modernisers 
had ‘successfully imposed their vision of modernisation and begun the process of structural reform 
central in their eyes to the achievement of modernity’ (Liddle 1973, 197). 
38 Anderson (1990b, 145-6) notes that the prestige words and phrases of modern, standard Indonesian are 
often Sanskrit derived.  See also Errington (1986, 344). 
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 is the English/Dutch-derived term intelektual, sometimes spelt intelektuil (intellectual).  
The Sanskrit derivation of the term cendekiawan, which connotes mastery of esoteric 
knowledge, contrasts to the political and oppositional connotations of intelektual which 
derive from the original Western setting in which this term was used.  Students’ desire 
to present themselves as intellectuals in the Western sense meant that in Salemba and 
Gelora Mahasiswa, the term intelektual occupied the more prominent place, with the 
term cendekiawan largely reserved for non-student intellectuals.  Forming part of a 
broader lexical set with intelektual are the terms insan akademis (academic beings), 
pelajar ilmu pengetahuan (students of knowledge), calon akademis (future scholars),39 
intelektual muda (young intellectuals) as well as calon intelektual (future intellectuals), 
and those who menuntut ilmu (pursue knowledge).40   
 
One of the key characteristics of intelektual as it is defined by students is their concern 
for the pursuit of truth (kebenaran).  A 1976 article in Gelora Mahasiswa on the role of 
intellectuals, for example, defined intellectuals in general as ‘those who continuously 
question truth’ (mereka yang selalu mempertanyakan kebenaran sesuatu) (Gelora 
Mahasiswa October 1976, 2).  Accordingly, in the student newspapers, students’ role is 
defined as being to ‘seek truth’ (mencari kebenaran), ‘reveal truth in a scientific way’ 
(mengemukakan kebenaraan secara ilmiah) and ‘uphold truth’ (menegakkan 
kebenaran).  Throughout the student newspapers, students emphasise their superior 
reasoning abilities and scientific objectivity.  As a 1976 editorial in Gelora Mahasiswa 
argued 
 
…students, by virtue of their position as students of knowledge, possess certain 
abilities.  [They have] a broader perspective.  Their analytical abilities are 
sharper.  With the knowledge they have gained from their studies, they can 
easily identify social inequalities [and] disparities in social and political 
behaviour (Gelora Mahasiswa July 1976).41
 
                                                          
39 The word akademis is usually used as an adjective meaning ‘scientific’ and ‘theoretical’.  As a noun, it 
refers to those who think in a scholarly, academic, or scientific way. 
40 Although the terms calon intelektual and calon akademis suggest a differentiation between students as 
‘future’ intellectuals and fully-fledged intelektual, this distinction does not appear to have been made in 
the student press.  A 1980 article in Salemba did, however, draw a distinction between calon intelektual 
and the pekerja intelektual (intellectual workers) of Minister of Education and Culture Daud Yusuf’s 
NKK policy, arguing that the latter devalued students’ true role as intelektual (Salemba 20 March 1980, 
4). 
41 Khususnya mahasiswa, oleh kedudukannya sebagai pelajar ilmu pengetahuan, memiliki kemampuan-
kemampuan tertentu.  Horison pemikirannya lebih luas.  Daya analisanya lebih tajam.  Dengan ilmu 
yang diperoleh dari bangku kuliah, ia dapat dengan mudah melihat ketimpangan sosial, ketimpangan 
perilaku kehidupan masyarakat dan ketatanegaraan (Gelora Mahasiswa July 1976).     
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 Students’ status as intelektual is delineated by a rich lexical set describing their 
intellectual characteristics: kemantapan berpikir (steadiness of thinking), objektivitas 
(objectivity), daya kritis (critical ability), kemampuan menganalisa (analytical abilities), 
ilmiah (scientific), and rasional (rational).  The outcomes of students’ intellectual 
processes include ide (ideas), gagasan (concepts), kritik (criticism) and saran 
(suggestions).   
 
The term intelektual was also linked to other keywords, in particular to students’ role as 
kontrol sosial.  A 1976 article in Salemba, for example, described students’ kontrol 
sosial as an appropriate and pure ‘intellectual response’ (‘respon intelektuil’ yang wajar 
dan murni) to the realities of social and political life (Salemba 15 December 1976, 4).  
Intelektual was also linked to ideas of social responsibility and the rakyat.  As 
Universitas Indonesia student leader Dipo Alam argued in Salemba of 15 March 1977, 
students, as future intellectuals, ‘are concerned to think in a rational manner [and] as far 
as their knowledge [will allow them], about how a society or humanity in general can 
live a better life’ (Salemba 15 March 1977, 4).42  Students’ status as intellectuals also 
clearly distinguished them from the uneducated and politically naïve rakyat, who 
required students’ guidance and leadership. 
 
The emphasis on students’ intellectual abilities was in part a response to the state’s 
frequent charge that students were susceptible to outside influences, manifested in the 
term ditunggangi (ridden, exploited).  Naipospos notes that after 1974 the term 
ditunggangi was used to discredit students if their actions were perceived to encroach 
on the unspoken boundaries set by the state (Naipospos 1996; see also Radjab 1991).  
An article which appeared in the March 1977 edition of Gelora Mahasiswa, for 
example, argued that: 
 
Previously, we often heard that students (campuses) were forbidden from 
engaging in practical politics, especially in those activities which aimed towards 
a student movement in a physical sense.  So those in power were quick to say: 
Watch out! Be careful!  You could be ridden like donkeys.  You could be duped 
by those outside the campus ... Students responded to such statements [by 
stating] … that our authorities are too insulting to students, as though they 
consider students as dopey little kids, snotty-nosed and gullible.  In fact, 
students are a critical group in their society.  And this sensitive and critical 
                                                          
42 …merasa berkepentingan untuk memikirkan secara rasional sepanjang pengetahuannya, tentang 
bagaimana sesuatu masyarakat atau kemanusiaan pada umumnya bisa hidup lebih baik (Salemba 15 
March 1977, 4).   
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 group has been acknowledged since the establishment of the first campus up to 
the present time (Gelora Mahasiswa March 1977, 7).43  
 
The terms goblok (stupid, dopey) and masih ingusan (snotty-nosed) as well as the suffix 
–in (dikibulin), a feature of the colloquial variety of Indonesian used in Jakarta, 
highlight students’ resentment of the demeaning nature of the government’s perception 
of them as ‘little kids’ (anak kecil).  The sentence which immediately follows this, in 
which such terms are notably absent, draws attention to the difference between the 
state’s perception of students as ‘dopey little kids’ who are easily duped by those who 
would wish to exploit them for their own purposes and their long-established ‘actual’ 
role as critical intellectuals.   
 
The term intelektual also had an important connection with students’ role as a ‘moral 
force’ (kekuatan moral).  The discussion of kekuatan moral above indicated that 
students who wrote in the campus newspapers of the 1970s were concerned to represent 
their role as a morally motivated and disinterested element in the political system.  As 
Arief Budiman has pointed out, in Julien Benda’s view, intellectuals derive their 
prestige, and hence their authority, from ‘the moral and ethical realm’.  It is because 
intellectuals seek truth, rather than worldly power, that their political criticisms are 
legitimate (Budiman 1978, 616 and 615; Budiman 1999, 14-15).44  Drawing on 
Anderson’s work on the concept of power in Javanese political culture (Anderson 
1990c), Budiman draws a parallel between Benda’s intellectuals and the resi, the 
reclusive Javanese sages whose task it was to ‘diagnose decay within the kingdom and 
to give warning of the impending downfall of the dynasty’ (Budiman 1978, 616; see 
also Anderson 1990c, 19-27).  Since the resi have no worldly interests, their criticisms 
represent ‘truth’.  In Budiman’s view, in traditional Javanese society the actions of the 
resi represented a legitimate cultural mechanism for expressing dissent.  In expressing 
their criticisms of the New Order regime, Budiman argues, the student demonstrators of 
                                                          
43 Dahulu sering kita mendengar bahwa mahasiswa (Kampus) dilarang berpolitik praktis, apalagi dalam 
setiap aktivitas yang menjurus pada gerakan mahasiswa dalam artian physic (sic).  Maka cepat-cepat 
beliau yang berkuasa akan mengatakan: Awas! Hati-hati!  Kamu bisa ditunggangi seperti keledai.  Kamu 
bias diakalbulusi oleh orang-orang luar kampus. … Pernyataan ini pernah dijawab oleh mahasiswa … 
[b]ahwa penguasa-penguasa kita terlalu menghina kepada mahasiswa.  Seolah-olah menganggap 
kelompok mahasiswa sebagai anak-anak kecil yang goblok, masih ingusan dan mudah dikibulin.  
Sedangkan mahasiswa adalah suatu kelompok yang kritis di dalam masyarakatnya.  Tentang kelompok 
yang peka dan kritis ini diakui sejak berdirinya kampus pertama sampai sekarang (Gelora Mahasiswa 
March 1977, 7). 
44 See also Legge (1988, 13-20) on intellectuals in Indonesia. 
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 the late 1960s and early 1970s emphasised their morality and political disinterestedness 
and so tried ‘to show that they [were] playing the role of resi’ (ibid., 622).45   
 
Yet while the resi metaphor was occasionally employed in later writings on the student 
movement (see for example Radjab 1991; Naipospos 1996; Mangiang 1981), for 
students who wrote in Salemba and Gelora Mahasiswa in the mid to late 1970s, such 
cultural metaphors were less appealing than the idea that students acted as ‘modern’ 
intellectuals.  Throughout their publications students emphasised the scientific (ilmiah) 
and rational (rasional) nature of their thinking and behaviour.  Students’ appeals to the 
modern mode of expressing dissent of the intelektual rather than to the traditional 
cultural trope of the resi reflect their orientation to the modern (Western) world, an 
outlook no doubt strongly influenced by their education. 
 
Rationality and objectivity were also key to the way the New Order state defined itself 
and its program of economic, social, cultural and political modernisation.  This program 
would see the replacement of outmoded and traditional world views with modern, 
rational, pragmatic and secular ones (Liddle 1973, 181).  Modernisation thus involved 
practical economic development as well as intellectual and cultural transformation.  The 
values of rationality and objectivity were also central to the way the state defined 
students’ roles.  Minister of Education and Culture Sjarif Thajeb’s 1974 decision on the 
‘improvement’ of university campuses, issued in the aftermath of the 1974 Malari riots, 
emphasised the contribution which students’ ‘concrete and constructive thinking’ could 
make to the nation.  He argued that students’ opinions, based as they were on a 
‘scientific analysis of the situation’, were a valuable and legitimate means by which 
students could help to solve the nation’s problems (Thajeb 1974, 7-8).  Students’ 
emphasis on the scientific and rational nature of their role as intellectuals in Salemba 
and Gelora Mahasiswa is thus in part a product of the state’s own discourse on 
modernisation.  At the same time, this discourse provides students with a means of 
                                                          
45 Although the student demonstrators of the late 1960s and early 1970s did not make an explicit link (as 
Budiman does) between their role and that of the resi, they did occasionally frame their dissent in cultural 
terms.  Writing of the student protest of the late 1960s and early 1970s Polomka notes that: ‘The students 
also defend their often unruly behaviour in traditional terms.  In replying to the criticism of their ‘un-
Oriental behaviour’, they argue that, in fact, Javanese culture has a place for rude and disrespectful 
behaviour which has the function of ‘social renewal’.  They refer to the cruder figures of classical 
Javanese art, asserting that these had the task of giving vent to the people’s frustrations and drawing 
attention to society’s shortcomings.  Nor could those in authority show irritation and impatience with 
such behaviour since, according to Javanese custom, this was the reaction only of authorities who felt 
they were in the wrong’ (1971, 212-213). 
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 justifying their role as a force for social control of the state and its practices by defining 
this role in terms which the state itself acknowledged as legitimate.  
 
Echoes of the past 
 
Reinforcing students’ reflections on their role and identity, in national politics and in 
wider social life, was the sense that they were continuing a long tradition of 
involvement, dating back to the beginnings of the nationalist movement in 1908.  This 
historical framework both provided students with a powerful source of legitimacy for 
their actions and at the same time set limits for the ways in which they were able to 
define their roles and identities.   
 
In Salemba and Gelora Mahasiswa, the tradition of youth and student activism in 
Indonesia was an important point of reference for students’ definitions of their roles and 
identities.  A March 1977 edition of Gelora Mahasiswa, for example, argued that 
students’ involvement in social and political life was a continuation of the pioneering 
role played by their older student brothers and sisters (kakak-kakaknya mahasiswa) 
Sukarno, Hatta, Syahrir, Sutomo and Mohammad Yamin as well as the 1966 generation 
of students.  As such, students’ current involvement in social and political life 
represented ‘a logical passing on of the baton’ from these pioneering students of the 
past to the new generation:   
 
Doesn’t what students now strive for paint ‘their vision of the future’ but also 
represent an ‘echo from the past’.  Namely a kind of transformation of the 
values of the Indonesian Student movement’s struggle since Boedi Oetomo, the 
youth congress, Perhimpunan Indonesia in the Netherlands and so on until 
today, which has been adapted to the latest situation and conditions (Gelora 
Mahasiswa March 1977, 7).46
 
These ‘historical facts’ would, the article concluded, counter the recent attempts to limit 
students’ role in social and political life.  
 
                                                          
46 Bukankah apa yang diperjuangakan oleh mahasiswa Indonesia sekarang menggambarkan ‘their vision 
of the future’ tetapi juga merupakan ‘echo from the past’.  Yakni semacam transformasi nilai-nilai 
perjuangan dari Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia sejak Boedi Oetomo, kongres pemuda, perhimpunan 
(Mahasiswa) Indonesia di Negeri Belanda dan seterusnya sampai hari ini; dengan diadaptasikan pada 
situasi dan kondisi mutakhir (Gelora Mahasiswa March 1977, 7). 
 171
 The designation of figures such as Sukarno, Hatta, Syahrir, Sutomo and Mohammad 
Yamin as mahasiswa and the reference to an Indonesian ‘student movement’ establishes 
a link between the past and the present.47  The reference to these key nationalist figures 
as mahasiswa, and the representation of organisations such as Budi Utomo and 
Perhimpunan Indonesia as part of a unitary historical movement of Indonesian students, 
connects the struggle of contemporary mahasiswa to the struggle of the youth of the 
past, and in particular to the generations of 1908 and 1928.  The differences between the 
generations are represented in terms which emphasise the continuities between them: 
each generation, including the present one, responded to the social and political 
conditions around them in different ways albeit ways which were consistent with the 
idealism and spirit of youth so celebrated in New Order accounts of their role (see 
chapter three).   
 
The idea that the youth and students of the New Order were continuing a long historical 
tradition was also central to the way the state defined students’ role and identities.  As 
noted in chapter two, Suharto saw the role of contemporary youth and students as being 
to implement development and so ‘give substance to’ (mengisi) Indonesia’s 
independence.  However, as the president noted at the opening of the Symposium on the 
Writing of the History of the Youth Movement in Indonesia in October 1980, there was 
a key difference between the role of youth in the past and their role in the contemporary 
nation.  In the past, the president asserted, youth had played a significant part in the 
destruction of colonialism.  In the era of development, however, their role was a 
‘productive and constructive’ one (Suharto 1980a, 175; see chapter two).  Moreover, as 
chapter three suggested, official New Order histories such as the Sejarah Nasional 
Indonesia celebrated the role of youth and students in the nationalist movement, the 
revolution and the events of 1965-66.  At the same time, the lessons contained the 
Sejarah provided a set of parameters within which the contemporary young generation 
could think about their roles and identities.  In doing so, the Sejarah aimed to limit the 
practical ways in which students could act in their capacity as mahasiswa.   
 
                                                          
47 Students who wrote in the student press of the mid to late 1970s did not make a clear and consistent 
distinction between the terms pemuda and mahasiswa.  In some articles, pemuda was used as an 
overarching term in reference to the pioneering pemuda of the Sumpah Pemuda, the pemuda of the 
revolution and the spirit of the ‘pemuda’ of 1966 (see for example Salemba 1 February 1977, 3).  In 
others, the terms used to represent the young political actors of the past include pemuda mahasiswa 
(youth student), mahasiswa dan pemuda (students and youth) or pemuda/mahasiswa (youth/students).   
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 The New Order’s celebration of the role of past youth and students provided students 
with a powerful source of legitimacy for their actions in the contemporary period.  By 
framing their role in politics and social life in terms of a tradition which the state itself 
saw as an integral part of Indonesia’s development as a nation, students were able to 
claim that they, like their ‘older brothers and sisters’, were rendering a vital service to 
the future of the nation.  At the same time, this historical framework also set limits for 
the ways in which the students of the New Order period were able to define their roles 
and identities.  As avenues for tolerated dissent narrowed and opposition became ‘un-
Indonesian’, the tradition of student involvement in politics remained one of the few 
legitimate bases on which students could justify their contemporary role.   
 
Irony and identity  
 
Indonesia has a rich tradition of political humour and satire, from the clown figures 
(punakawan) of the wayang, to word play (permainan kata or plesetan) and modern 
political cartooning.  In this tradition, the political satirist occupies a somewhat 
privileged position, able to criticise those in power provided the criticism is expressed 
in a humorous way and the satirist does not cross into overt enmity (Anderson 1990d, 
162; Budiman 1978, 616; see also Wijaya 1996, 15).  The political climate of the mid to 
late 1970s was a particularly fertile one for critical political cartooning and satire.  
Tempo cartoonist Priyanto Soenarko has pointed out that it is in political systems where 
free expression is curtailed that political cartoonists and political satirists are at their 
most ‘creative’ (Soenarko 1996, 38; see also Wijaya 1996, 4).  In such systems, 
cartoonists and satirists must find ways of ‘concealing’ the political message beneath 
subtle layers of meaning in order to avoid censorship or political reprisals.48   
 
Both Salemba and Gelora Mahasiswa regularly featured both political cartoons and the 
satirical pojok (corner columns).  These cartoons and pojok were in many ways not 
unique.  Cartoonists drawing for national-level publications during the 1970s also used 
satire and humour to express their criticisms of the New Order.49  Nor was the pojok 
                                                          
48 In spite of this, cartoonists have often been targets of recrimination (Redaksi 1996, 32).  The closure of 
Gelora Mahasiswa in September 1979, for example, was partly the result of a cartoon which appeared on 
the front page of the 7 September issue of the newspaper (Salemba 20 October 1979; see also above). 
49 During their student years in the mid to late 1960s several prominent New Order cartoonists, including 
Priyanto Soenarko and T. Sutanto drew cartoons for student newspapers such as Bandung’s Mahasiswa 
Indonesia (see Soenarko 1996, 33; Sutanto 1996, 42).   
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 genre new in Indonesia.  During the Dutch colonial period, Indonesian-language 
newspapers included a pojok column where newspaper editors could express their 
criticism of the colonial state; newspapers published during the Japanese occupation 
included a similar section (Makah 1977, 33).  Writing in 1966, Ben Anderson described 
the pojok of the metropolitan newspapers of Jakarta as providing ‘biting, anonymous 
comment on the latest news or the general political or economic situation’ using a 
combination of ‘allusion, innuendo, sarcasm, and mock surprise’ (1990b, 142-3; see 
also Makah 1977).   
 
The cartoons and pojok of Salemba and Gelora Mahasiswa provided a medium for 
students’ criticisms of the state.  Yet they had the additional aim of socialising student 
readers into their identities as students.  In chapter one it was suggested that the shared 
knowledge which is created between the cartoonist or satirist and the reader has 
important implications for socialising readers.  Unlike feature articles or editorials, 
cartoons and pojok do not explain political issues in detail.  Instead, the cartoonist or 
satirist uses visual and verbal cues to help readers interpret the meaning.  This cueing, 
and the interpretive work which readers must do in order to make sense of a cartoon or 
pojok, is one of the key ways in which collective identities are constructed and 
reaffirmed.   
 
An example of how such cues position readers comes from a pojok which appeared in 
the March 1977 edition of Gelora Mahasiswa.  This pojok used the example of a 
student allegedly killed as a result of his investigations into corruption in his home 
village in order to construct students’ roles as pejuang (freedom fighters), struggling to 
expose ‘irregularities’ and so act as a ‘control’ mechanism on the state: 
 
Sunan Gunung Jati State Islamic Institute student Maming was ‘sorted out’ 
because he was going to investigate corruption in his West Javanese village.  
 
There are no words except: deepest sympathy for the loss of Maming.  For the 
freedom fighters who will follow, remember that going against the flow in our 
country at this time is very dangerous (Gelora Mahasiswa March 1977).50
 
                                                          
50 Maming, mahasiswa IAIN Sunan Gunung Jati ‘dibereskan’ karena akan usut masalah korupsi di 
desanya Jawa Barat. 
Tak ada ucapan lain kecuali: duka cita sedalam-dalamnya atas kepergian Maming.  Buat pejuang yang 
akan menyusul, ingatlah bahwa melawan arus di negara kita saat ini adalah sangat berbahaya (Gelora 
Mahasiswa March 1977). 
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 In order to make sense of the pojok, student readers must make a connection between 
Maming as an individual student and their own role as ‘the freedom fighters who will 
follow’.  The pojok charges these pejuang, their readers, to remember that while their 
role as a force for ‘control’ and ‘correction’ is worthy, it is also sometimes dangerous.  
This discourse of ‘martyrdom for the cause’ was a common theme in reflections on 
students’ identity (see chapter six).  It dates at least to the Indonesian revolution of 
1945-1949, when pemuda fought to defend Indonesia’s independence against the 
returning Dutch and Allied forces.  By using the term pejuang, which has a powerful 
resonance in the Indonesian political vocabulary, the pojok cues readers to make the 
connections which the pojok writer wants them to make, namely that they, like Maming 
and the pejuang of earlier generations, are contemporary ‘freedom fighters’ working to 
‘control’ and ‘correct’ the state.  
 
The pojok which appeared in the November 1977 edition of Gelora Mahasiswa uses a 
similar technique in commenting on the issue of the presidential succession in the lead 
up to the March 1978 parliamentary session: 
 
Christmas and New Year 1978 are almost here.  
Geloora and friends wish you the compliments of the season.  May soul and 
spirit be renewed. (Oh, except for the national leadership) (Gelora Mahasiswa 
November 1977).51  
 
The pojok offers an apparently innocuous expression of Christmas and New Year 
wishes: ‘may soul and spirit be renewed’.  The ‘real’ comment, however, presented as 
an afterthought, is contained within the brackets and is signalled by the use of the 
particle eh (oh), which indicates that the ‘speaker’ wishes to correct him or herself.  By 
presenting the comment in this way, the pojok writer draws attention to the exception to 
this wish for renewal, that is, the national leadership, a euphemism for Suharto.  The use 
of brackets and the particle eh to mark this as an ‘exception’ signals an awareness of the 
‘self-consciousness’ required when writing about such sensitive issues in the public-
sphere of a newspaper, albeit one with a limited audience.  At the same time, however, 
it also manages to subvert this self-consciousness, by marking it as precisely that.  The 
surface level of the pojok comment thus appears to favour Suharto’s re-election in the 
                                                          
51 Hari Raya Natal dan Tahun Baru 1978 hampir tiba.   
Geloora dan kawan-kawan ucapkan selamat.  Semoga jiwa dan semangat juga baru. (Eh kecuali 
kepemimpinan nasional) (Gelora Mahasiswa November 1977). 
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 March 1978 MPR session.  At a deeper level of meaning, however, it advocates a 
change of leadership.  Moreover, while at the surface level of meaning the pojok 
writer’s role is as a supporter of the president, at the deeper level of meaning, this role 
shifts to that of critic of the political system.  What implications does this have for 
socialising readers into their identities as students?  In order to understand the meaning 
of the pojok, readers must ‘uncover’ this deeper level of meaning.  The use of brackets 
and the particle eh ‘cues’ readers to understand this deeper level of meaning in the way 
in which the pojok writer wants them to.  Understanding the meaning of this pojok thus 
entails seeing the world from the pojok writer’s position and, most importantly, 
positioning oneself alongside the pojok writer as a critic of the political system.   
 
The visual symbols and imagery used in the cartoons also help to socialise readers into 
their identities as mahasiswa, particularly in relation to students’ role as spokespersons 
and defenders of the rakyat.  These symbols reflect a view of the world in which there is 
a clear distinction between the powerful and the powerless and in which students act as 
the ‘defenders’ (pembela) of the latter.  For example, Dhakidae notes that cartoons 
which appeared in the student newspapers often had the repression of civil liberties as a 
theme and used military symbolism to characterise the relationship between the 
powerful and the powerless (1977, 71).  In a cartoon which appeared in the 10 October 
1976 edition of Salemba (Figure 4.2), for example, an oversized military boot 
symbolising the military’s function as the ‘guardian’ of national stability tramples on 
figures representing the common people (Dhakidae 1977, 71; see also Dari kampus 
1979, 71).  In another cartoon (Figure 4.3), the rakyat are represented as fearful, with 
their mouths tightly closed or even without mouths (Dhakidae 1977, 67).  These 
representations of the common people as oppressed and ‘without a voice’ reflect the 
ways they were represented in articles and editorial in Salemba and Gelora Mahasiswa.   
 
Unlike the rakyat, when students appear in cartoons they usually have a ‘voice’.  In a 
cartoon which appeared Salemba in 1976 (Figure 4.4), for example, students are 
represented as bringing a petition before their representatives in the parliament (Dari 
kampus 1979, 39).  The authority figure in the cartoon takes the form of a military 
officer with exaggerated features who appears significantly larger than other figures in 
the cartoon (see Dhakidae 1977; Sutanto 1996, 41).  The character Tuan Salem, BA (Mr 
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 SalemBA)52 appearing at the front of the scene provides the ‘comment’ on the situation: 
a large bold ‘?!’, an expression of surprise and disbelief.    Yet even though they are 
prevented by the military authority figure, the students retain both the right to petition 
and the voice with which to do so. 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Cartoon: National stability 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Cartoon: The rakyat silenced 
 
                                                          
52 My thanks to Sandy Sukmana for drawing this to my attention. 
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Figure 4.4 Cartoon: Students’ petition 
 
 
Figure 4.5 Cartoon: Breaking free 
 178
 
 
A similar theme is evident in a cartoon which appeared in Gelora Mahasiswa of 
November 1977 (Figure 4.5).  Even though the students’ movements are restricted by 
the sack in which they are trapped and they are threatened by the military’s bayonets, 
they remain able to break free and express their criticisms. 
 
These representations of authority figures, the rakyat and students provide visual cues 
for students which help them to interpret the messages contained in the cartoon.  These 
messages construct and reaffirm students’ identities as the leaders and defenders of the 
common people and as an active force in social and political life.   
 
‘Speaking’ the language of students  
 
Another important means by which the pojok writers attempted to socialise student 
readers into their identities as mahasiswa was through the use of a non-standard variety 
of Indonesian based on Jakarta Malay.  Jakarta Malay, the variety of Malay traditionally 
spoken in Jakarta, has been an important influence on the colloquial variety of 
Indonesian used in Jakarta as well as on standard Indonesian and the non-standard or 
colloquial varieties of Indonesian spoken outside the capital (Sneddon 2003, 153-4; see 
also Errington 1986, 335; Oetomo 1990, 69-71).  For students who wrote in Salemba 
and Gelora Mahasiswa, this non-standard variety of Indonesian cultivated a relationship 
of solidarity with their readers and a sense of shared identity as members of a ‘student’ 
subculture. 
 
The pojok which appeared in Salemba’s 8 October 1979 edition, for example, 
incorporated various elements of non-standard or colloquial Indonesian: 
 
At Ujung Pandang’s Univeritas Hasanuddin, [Minister of Defence] General M. 
Jusuf said, next year three hundred thousand students throughout the country 
will be involved in student regiment activities. 
 
In terms of numbers, wow - that’s nearly all the students in Indonesia, you know.  
May Bookworm please ask a question:  do we still not have enough soldiers?  If 
it’s really thought there are not enough, this request will of course be accepted 
wholeheartedly.  But in fact it seems everywhere Bookworm goes there are 
soldiers (Salemba 8 October 1979).53
                                                          
53 Di Unhas Ujung Pandang, Jenderal M. Jusuf bilang, tahun depan tiga ratus ribu mahasiswa diseluruh 
tanah air akan dilibatkan kedalam kegiatan Menwa.   
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The pojok comment begins in an informal style, marked by the use of the standard 
Indonesian particle wah, expressing surprise, and the particle dong, used in the 
colloquial variety of Indonesian used in Jakarta and roughly translated as ‘of course’ or 
‘obviously’, which expresses both surprise and disbelief at the general’s assessment of 
the number of students who would be able to be ‘involved’ (dilibatkan) in the student 
regiments.   The tone then shifts to one of cynical politeness, using the respectful form 
for making a request or inquiry (numpang) and ‘prestige’ words such as permintaan 
(request) and ikhlas (sincerely, wholeheartedly).  The pojok writer has also ironically 
‘translated’ the term dilibatkan - (caused to be) involved -  implying a lack of agency on 
the part of students, into the polite request permintaan.  This shift to polite standard 
Indonesian suggests respect for the person or authority to whom the question is 
addressed, namely General Jusuf and the military authorities more generally.  In the 
context of the pojok rejoinder, however, this politeness represents a cynical play on the 
respect expected to be shown to those in such positions of authority.  The final sentence 
shifts back to an informal tone, using the colloquial Indonesian particle kok (indeed, in 
fact) and the non-standard suffix ke- in ketemu (to meet).    
 
The variety of colloquial Indonesian used in this pojok provides the medium for the 
pojok writers’ questioning of the need for a further militarisation of the campus, given 
the presence of military personnel on campuses following the crackdowns of 1978.  At 
the same time, this pattern of language use also constructs a relationship of familiarity 
with readers.  The use of particles such as dong, kok, and the suffix ke-, which are a 
feature of colloquial varieties of Indonesian based on Jakarta Malay, mark the pojok 
rejoinder as ‘belonging’ to the sub-culture(s) to whom the student newspapers were 
addressed, namely educated youth in urban centres (see Errington 1986, 338-9 and 348; 
Sneddon 2003, 155-6).  By using this language, the pojok of the student newspapers 
bring their own language and that of their readers into the public domain, using it to 
express their criticism of the all-pervasive presence of the military.54  At the same time, 
by ‘speaking’ in the language of its audience, the pojok also purports to represent the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Dari sudut jumlah, wah – itu sudah hampir seluruh mahasiswa Indonesia dong.  Kutu Buku numpang 
tanya.  Apakah tentara kita masih kurang?  Kalau memang dirasa kurang, permintaan tersebut tentu 
diterima dengan ikhlas.  Tapi rasa-rasanya kok, dimana-mana Kutu Buku selalu ketemu serdadu 
(Salemba 8 October 1979). 
54 Anderson (1990b, 142) argues that the popularity of the colloquial variety of Indonesian used in Jakarta 
as a language of political satire derived from its ‘intimate, jazzy, cynical character’, which created a 
satisfying contrast to ‘the formal, official Indonesian of public communication’.   
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 opinions of this audience and so solicit their agreement: ‘we’ speak like this and ‘we’ 
think like this. 
 
It must be emphasised that the use of this colloquial variety of Indonesian was limited 
to the pojok.  For the most part, students expressed their ideas in a standard variety of 
Indonesian.  As Dede Oetomo argues, the standard variety of Indonesian retains a high 
degree of prestige because of its association with higher social status, a modern 
education and a modern life-style (Oetomo 1990, 77; see also Sneddon 2003, 141; 
Errington 1986, 335 and 339).  Students’ use of standard Indonesian in their 
publications thus showed their command of the national language and as such lent their 
writing a certain authority, the authority of educated intelektual (see above).  
 
Positioning readers  
 
In chapter one it was suggested that language has an interpersonal function and that the 
choices that speakers and writers make from the system of interpersonal meaning have 
important implications for how power relationships are expressed in texts. This applies 
in particular to the kinds of subject positions that speakers or writers establish for 
themselves and how they position others.  These subject positions play a significant role 
in speakers’ and writers’ attempts to socialise their readers into a particular version of 
social reality and their position in it.  
 
One of the ways that students who wrote in Salemba and Gelora Mahasiswa positioned 
their readers was by using rhetorical questions.  In her analysis of former British Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher’s political speeches criticising the anti-nuclear movement, 
Kay Richardson suggests that rhetorical questions provided a means by which Thatcher 
characterised opponents of nuclear weapons for her audience.  By ‘ask[ing] a question 
to which she knows the answer, and in the knowledge that her audience will come up 
with the same answer’, Thatcher positions her audience as supporters of her view 
(Richardson 1985, 30).   
 
Students who wrote in Salemba and Gelora Mahasiswa used rhetorical questions to 
similar effect.  In Gelora Mahasiswa of November 1976, for example, Salemba activist 
Pamusuk Eneste discussed the Thai government’s efforts to ‘sterilise’ students in the 
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 wake of their role in the coup of October 1976, a process which he saw as mirrored in 
the Indonesian government’s approach to students after Malari: 
 
Will these efforts at ‘sterilisation’ be successful?  And if they are successful, 
what will the government do then? … It seems the Thai government doesn’t 
realise that students are the most difficult group to restrain.  If one way fails, try 
another. How could those called students ever meet a ‘dead end’ in their 
struggle? … If that’s the case, why is there an attempt to sterilise students on the 
part of the authorities?  Can’t students’ role never be destroyed by anything?  
Isn’t students’ idealism not like a dry leaf easily blown by (the force of) the 
wind (Gelora Mahasiswa November 1976)?55
 
In a spoken interaction a question typically requires a listener to formulate and express 
an answer.  This process is one of the key means by which listeners and speakers 
collaborate in shaping a text.  In a written text, however, such immediate feedback is 
not possible.  The monologic nature of written texts means that it is the writer who ‘sets 
the agenda’, controlling which questions are asked and how they are answered.  Yet 
Pamusuk Eneste invites readers to engage in ‘dialogue’ with him by questioning them: 
‘Will such efforts to ‘sterilise’ students be successful’?  This question, like the others in 
the text, cues readers to respond mentally if not verbally.  At the same time, however, 
the way in which Eneste answers his own question and the way in which the questions 
themselves are worded, aims to guide readers in forming their answers.  So, when 
Eneste asks his readers the rhetorical question, ‘Can’t students’ role never be destroyed 
by anything?’, he ‘cues’ them by the use of the negative question tag bukankah to 
conclude, along with him, that it cannot.  These rhetorical questions cues readers to 
construct a mental picture of students, including the student readers to whom the 
questions are addressed, as possessing the qualities of ‘determination in the face of 
adversity’ and ‘uncompromising idealism’.56   
 
In addition to exploiting their rhetorical effect, students also use questions to challenge 
the regime and its practices, reflecting their role as ‘social control’ and as intellectuals 
whose nature is to continually question ‘truth’.  Salemba's editorial of 15 March 1977, 
                                                          
55 Apakah usaha ‘sterilisasi’ atau ‘pemandulan’ itu akan berhasil? Dan kalau sudah berhasil, lalu 
pemerintah mau apa? … Sepertinya pemerintah Muangthai tidak tahu, golongan mahasiswa itu paling 
susah dikekang.  Tak bisa dari satu jalan, ya cari jalan yang lain.  Masak yang namanya mahasiswa 
pernah menemui ‘jalan buntu’ dalam perjuangannya? … Kalau begitu, mengapa pula ada usaha 
‘sterilisasi’ dari pihak penguasa? Bukankah peranan mahasiswa tak pernah bisa dihancurkan oleh 
apapun? Bukankah idealisme mahasiswa tidak seperti daun kering yang bisa dengan gampang 
diterbangkan oleh (kekuatan) angin (Gelora Mahasiswa November 1976)?  
56 As noted in chapter one, however, there is always the possibility that readers will not draw the 
conclusions that the writer intends, instead formulating their own ‘resistant readings’ of the text. 
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 for example, presents a critical reflection on the expanding role of Kopkamtib since the 
Malari riots, from its original function as a force for external security to its recent 
involvement in matters of internal security, including those which are outside its 
jurisdiction.  The editorial concludes by asking: can the unlimited authority of this 
extra-constitutional body ‘guarantee the creation of the Pancasila democracy we desire’ 
(Salemba 15 March 1977, 4)?57  The concerns raised in the editorial and the criticisms it 
contains reflect students’ perceptions of their role as a force for kontrol sosial, whose 
aim is to bring ketidakwajaran (deviations), ketimpangan (imbalances) and 
kepincangan (defects) to the attention of the state in a critical but non-antagonistic way.  
By presenting its criticisms in the form of a question, rather than a statement, the 
editorial remains within the boundaries of students’ self-designated role as ‘corrector’ 
of such ‘deviations’ as the expanding jurisdiction of Kopkamtib.  At the same time, the 
editorial offers both its student and non-student readers the opportunity to consider the 
question of whether Kopkamtib’s unlimited authority is conducive to the creation of a 
true ‘Pancasila democracy’, represented as the desire of ‘all of us’ (kita).58   
 
Conclusion 
 
Despite the parameters set by the discourse of the state, students who wrote in the 
student newspapers of the mid to late 1970s were able to play a critical role for two 
main reasons.  Firstly, the status of students as part of the coalition that had helped to 
install the New Order, together with their important role in key moments in Indonesia’s 
nationalist history, gave them more freedom than other social groups to define their role 
in political terms.  More important than this, however, was students’ ability to define 
their role as critics of the regime, without presenting a fundamental challenge to the 
state.  Instead, students represented their role as a force for ‘social control’ and 
‘correction’ of the New Order state and its practices, as a moral rather than a purely 
political force, as leaders of the common people (rakyat) and as intellectuals in a way 
                                                          
57 …dengan tak terbatasnya wewenang sebuah lembaga yang ekstra-konstitusionil ini, apakah bisa 
menjamin terciptanya suasana alam Demokrasi Panca Sila yang kita cita-citakan (Salemba 15 March 
1977, 4)?   
58 Aspinall notes that in the discourse of student protest during 1973 and 1974 students had called for a 
reduction in ‘arbitrary state powers and the role of the military in government’.  By 1977-1978 this anti-
militarist sentiment was being expressed more strongly, with calls for the abolition of Kopkamtib (1993, 
5). The 1979 defence speeches provide a more developed critique of the role of the military in politics.  
Heri Akhmadi, for example, condemned Kopkamtib’s actions with regard to the press bannings as 
‘clearly unconstitutional’ and denounced the body as ‘the champion of the New Order Regime in 
confronting the people (jagonya Rejim Orde Bari dalam menghadapi rakyat) (Akhmadi 1979, 78 and 45).  
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 which was consistent with the New Order’s organicist values of harmony, consensus, 
order and stability.  Students’ ability to use the freedoms inherent in the process of 
government in a responsible way is a testament to the state’s success in effectively 
governing Indonesian students.  Yet the self-policing which students undertook is also 
an example of the considerable power they themselves were able to exercise.  It was this 
power which enabled students to continue to play the role of critics of the regime 
throughout the 1970s despite often harsh repression.
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 CHAPTER FIVE 
 
Depoliticisation and development: 
mahasiswa in the 1980s 
 
[T]he function of institutions of higher education … is to guide students to fulfil their 
mission as best as possible.  That is, [to develop their] strength of individual reasoning 
[and] their ability to think analytically … not their ability to agitate, ignite emotions 
and mobilise the masses. 
 
Press release issued by Minister of 
Education and Culture Daud Yusuf on 28 
November 1979.1
 
The previous chapter argued that despite the state’s attempts to redefine students’ role 
in politics in non-practical terms, students continued to represent their role as critical 
intellectuals who had a key role to play in ‘correcting’ the state.  This, together with the 
student demonstrations of 1977 and 1978, demonstrated to the state that mahasiswa 
identities, at least as they were understood in some student circles, remained too 
politicised for these students to fit neatly into the roles they were expected to play in the 
ideal New Order ‘organic state’.  The state’s short-term response to this was to freeze 
student council activities and close student newspapers, including Salemba and Gelora 
Mahasiswa.  In the longer term, however, the state, through the Department of 
Education and Culture, sought to effect a thoroughgoing ‘normalisation’ of students.  
The introduction of the NKK/BKK policies in 1978 and 1979, together with several 
other policies issued in the late 1970s and early 1980s,2 attempted to address this issue 
                                                          
1 [F]ungsi perguruan tinggi… menuntun mahasiswa menunaikan missinya sebaik-baiknya ialah kekuatan 
penalaran individuil, kemampuan berpikir analistis … dan bukanlah kemampuan beragitasi, membakar 
emosi dan mengerahkan massa (cited in Majalah Mahasiswa 3 (16) 1980, 131). 
2 See especially the Department of Education and Culture’s 1978 policy on the development of the young 
generation (Pola Dasar Pembinaan dan Pengembangan Generasi Muda) (Keputusan Menteri Pendidikan 
dan Kebudayan No 0323/V/1978, revised as Keputusan Menteri Negara Pemuda dan Olahraga No 
023/MENPORA/85) and the 1982 Presidential Instruction on Political Education for the Young 
Generation (Pendidikan Politik Generasi Muda) (Instruksi Presiden No. 12 Tahun 1982) (Kansil 1986).  
See also Direktorat Pembinaan Generasi Muda 1977; Gafur 1979; Departemen Pendidikan dan 
Kebudayaan 1979; Sekretariat Satuan Pengendali 1982; Pendidikan Politik 1982; Gafur 1982. 
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 by depoliticising mahasiswa identities and redefining their roles in social and political 
life in the framework of development (pembangunan). 
 
Majalah Mahasiswa (Student Magazine), published by the Department of Education 
and Culture and expressly aimed at students, was one vehicle through which these 
processes of depoliticisation and reorientation to development were carried out.  This 
chapter analyses the ways in which the state defined the roles and identities of 
mahasiswa through a detailed examination of editorials which appeared in this 
magazine between 1978 and 1986.  These editorials, which echo the various policies on 
youth and students issued in the late 1970s and early 1980s, represent the Department of 
Education and Culture’s official position on the roles and identities of students.  
Building on the conclusions drawn in chapter three, this chapter argues that the state’s 
definitions of students’ roles and identities - centred around the keywords pembangunan 
(development), pembinaan dan pengembangan (improvement and development), 
pengabdian (service), manusia penganalisa (people of analysis) and politik (politics)3 - 
were one of the key means by which it sought to shape the ways in which students were 
able to think and speak about their roles and identities.  In doing so, the state also 
sought to regulate students’ behaviour in ways which were consistent with the New 
Order’s emphasis on order, consensus and collective interests over individual interests 
and with its all-embracing program of development.   
 
At the same time, Majalah Mahasiswa editorials also aimed to socialise student readers 
into particular roles and identities by providing the conditions within which students 
could regulate their own behaviour in ways acceptable to the state.  As noted in chapter 
one, the effective governing of a population requires that they are allowed a certain 
degree of freedom in which to act, if only in ways deemed proper by the state.  Together 
with the arrest and trial of student activists involved in the demonstrations of 1977-
1978, and the persistent low-level repression and intimidation of students throughout 
the 1980s, this technique was aimed at ‘governing’ Indonesian students in order to make 
use of their skills and abilities for development.  This view reflects the New Order’s 
organicist ideas about the state as an integrated whole, in which each functional group 
had a role to play (see chapter one). 
                                                          
3 The keywords analysed in this chapter were chosen based on their importance in Majalah Mahasiswa’s 
constructions of the roles and identities of mahasiswa.  Some of the keywords, such as pembinaan and 
pengabdian, were the themes for one or more editions of the magazine.  Other keywords, such as 
pembangunan, were chosen because they were found in all sections of the magazine.   
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The period between 1974 and 1988 is regarded as the height of the New Order, when 
the introduction of a range of ideological indoctrination programs, and the almost 
unlimited powers of the regime’s repressive apparatus, meant that public dissent was 
largely contained.4  This period also saw the increasing concentration of power in the 
president (see chapter one).  This, together with the depoliticisation policies aimed at 
students, meant that between 1980 and 1987, university campuses remained relatively 
quiet, as students, banned from protesting, focussed on their studies and politically-
minded students sought other avenues to express their dissent (see Aspinall 1993; 
Aditjondro 1990; Budiman 1990; Denny 1989, 1990).  To some extent, then, the state’s 
aim of influencing students to regulate their own thinking and behaviour was 
successful.  As students’ contributions to Majalah Mahasiswa reveal, in writing about 
their roles and identities these students reproduced key aspects of the content and 
vocabulary of the state discourse of development.  Adopting the state discourse was a 
strategic response on the part of students who wrote for the magazine to the threat of 
state repression.   
 
Yet, as noted in chapter one, power is always exercised over ‘those who are in a 
position to choose’.  Because of this, the possibility of resistance is always present 
(Hindess 1996, 100; see also chapter one).  Students’ contributions to Majalah 
Mahasiswa thus reveal that despite their reproduction of the state discourse, they were 
not fully socialised into the roles and identities the state had constructed for them.  By 
representing students as playing more active roles and by incorporating keywords such 
as kontrol sosial, which were part of the ‘discourse of dissent’ of the student press 
during the 1970s, students who wrote in Majalah Mahasiswa challenged the state’s 
definitions of their roles as compliant subjects in development.  In doing so, however, 
the voices of those students were co-opted by the state discourse and the dissenting 
meanings of keywords like kontrol sosial were undermined.  This cooptation 
represented one of the ways in which the state mitigated the risks associated with 
allowing students the freedom to ‘make the right choices’.   
 
 
                                                          
4 See Bourchier and Hadiz 2003, 13-15 for a brief overview of the divisions within the elite during this 
period and the major areas of dissent.  See Aspinall 2000 for a more detailed account. 
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 Student magazine  
 
In September 1977 the Directorate for Student Affairs of the Directorate General of 
Higher Education launched a new publication, Majalah Mahasiswa (Student 
Magazine).  Majalah Mahasiswa’s mission statement, as set out on the front cover, was 
‘to increase the strength of individual reasoning and the spirit of patriotism for students 
as part of the youth of Indonesia in accordance with the demands of development’.  
Published bimonthly in January, March, May, July, September and November, the 
magazine was managed and edited by officials from the Department of Education and 
Culture.5  The magazine’s advisors and patrons - including the Minister of Education 
and Culture, the Junior Minister of Youth Affairs and the Director General of Higher 
Education - regularly contributed articles.  The magazine also included an editorial and 
articles dealing with the theme for that month’s issue.  The themed articles dealt with 
both abstract and practical issues relating to students and universities, from reflections 
on the role of students and universities in development to practical issues involved in 
the implementation of various policies.  In addition to the main articles, there were also 
a number of regular columns including a review of activities on campuses throughout 
the archipelago, a survey of the opinions of students, lecturers and university officials 
on various issues as well as study tips and readers’ letters. 
 
As an official publication of the Department of Education and Culture, Majalah 
Mahasiswa received institutional subscriptions from universities and colleges 
throughout the archipelago.  It also received individual subscriptions, and readers’ 
letters indicate that the magazine was read by students as well as university 
administrators and teaching staff.  In addition to articles contributed by Department of 
Education and Culture officials, the magazine also featured articles written by lecturers 
and others in the academic community as well as students.  The undergraduate and 
postgraduate students who contributed to Majalah Mahasiswa came from a variety of 
faculties.  Some of these contributors were involved in the student representative bodies 
and student senates set up under the auspices of the ‘campus coordination bodies’.  
Others were involved in the student presses of their home universities, either as editors 
or journalists.  Many also contributed to non-student newspapers and other publications.  
                                                          
5 Towards the end of its life the magazine was rather irregular: between 1988 and the final issue in 1992 
only nine issues appeared.  The magazine usually ran to between 90 and 100 pages although from July 
1985 onwards, it was reduced to between 40 and 50 pages.   
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 For students wishing to pursue a career in journalism or publishing, involvement in the 
student press was often the only way to gain practical experience.  After the closure of 
student newspapers and magazines in 1979 and 1980, many of the students who had 
been involved in these publications were left without an outlet for their writing.  In 
addition to provincial and national newspapers, Majalah Mahasiswa represented a 
means by which these students could gain journalistic and writing experience.  Indeed, 
many of the students who contributed to Majalah Mahasiswa later went on to have 
successful publishing and journalistic careers.6  
 
Pembangunan: framing students for development 
 
In Majalah Mahasiswa the keyword pembangunan (development) is the central 
reference point for the state’s definitions of students’ roles and identities.  Development 
was the theme for seven of the 35 issues of Majalah Mahasiswa examined in this study 
with key topics including the role of universities and students in development (4 (20) 
1980; 5 (30) 1982; 6 (34) 1983; (7) 37 1983) and the future of Indonesia’s development 
(5 (27) 1982; 8 (44) 1985; 9 (47) 1986).  Pembangunan also provided the overarching 
framework within which the other keywords of the state discourse on students’ roles 
and identities were defined (see below).  The emphasis on development in Majalah 
Mahasiswa is not surprising given that pembangunan was one of the most important 
keywords of the New Order (van Langenberg 1986; Heryanto 1995).  Michael van 
Langenberg argues that in New Order rhetoric the term pembangunan encompassed 
meanings of economic and material development and modernisation as well as national, 
social and individual development: 
  
Pembangunan is about re-construction and modernisation (modernisasi) and 
serves to emphasise the distinction between the new order (orba) and the 
preceding ‘old order’ (orde lama, orla) state system.  Pembangunan is also 
about social engineering, in which the instruments of state power for the 
realisation of order (ketertiban) and stability (stabilitas) are essential 
prerequisites.  It is social engineering in a totalitarian sense.  Economic 
development (pembangunan ekonomi) is emphatically associated with notions 
about ‘mental’, ‘moral’ and ‘spiritual’ development (pembangunan mental, 
moral, spirituil) (van Langenberg 1986, 19-20; see also van Langenberg 1990, 
124-5). 
                                                          
6 For example, Maksum (Airlangga, Universitas Airlangga), for example, went on to work for Jawa Pos 
and Muhammad Rusli Karim (Derap Mahasiswa, IKIP Yogyakarta) published and edited numerous 
books on Islam and New Order politics.   
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New Order officials represented pembangunan as a carefully-planned process, with 
clear aims and targets set out in the Five-Year Development Plans (Rencana 
Pembangunan Lima Tahun, Repelita).  Although the fundamental aims of development 
remained for the most part unchanged throughout the New Order, different themes, 
including democracy, national stability and national consensus, progress and the family 
spirit (kekeluargaan), were emphasised at different times (Matheson Hooker 1995, 277-
78).  Development was also represented as a process which was managed by the state 
and in which all Indonesians were to participate.  In official rhetoric, the role of wider 
society was to work together with the state to implement the state-devised development 
programs, often referred to as ‘successing development’ (mensukseskan pembangunan).   
 
The state’s policies on the young generation and students assigned these groups a key 
role in the development of the nation.   The 1978 Broad Outlines of State Policy (Garis 
Besar Haluan Negara, GBHN), for example, emphasised the central role of Indonesia’s 
pemuda and mahasiswa in providing the ‘skills, leadership, physical fitness, creativity, 
patriotism, and idealism and noble character’ necessary for development (Majelis 
Permusyawaratan Rakyat 1989, 485).  In editorials in Majalah Mahasiswa, however, 
the role of students in development tended to be subsumed as part of the role of 
universities.  Students’ role was not as individual mahasiswa, but rather as members of 
the university as an institution.  The representation of the university – not students – as 
the actor in development reflected the state’s concern to prevent students from playing 
an independent role in the nation.  At the same time, it also indicated the ways in which 
the state attempted to shape students’ roles and identities in order to make use of them 
for development.   
 
Two editions of Majalah Mahasiswa took the role of universities in development as a 
central theme (5 (30) 1982; 7 (37) 1983).  The editorials for these two editions, as well 
as those of several other editions, outlined specifically the role which Indonesian 
universities were expected to play in national development.  This role was defined in 
reference to the Trifold Mission of Institutions of Higher Education (Tridharma 
Perguruan Tinggi).7  Formulated in 1961 by former Minister of Higher Education and 
                                                          
7 The Sanskrit-derivation of the term tridharma was a common feature of the language of New Order 
politics (see Anderson 1990b; Errington 1986, 343-5). 
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 Science Tojib Hadiwijaja, the Tridharma Perguruan Tinggi characterised the university 
as having three key functions: education, research and service to society.  In Majalah 
Mahasiswa, each of these three functions was described in terms of its practical 
application for development.  Research, as a 1980 editorial explained, fulfilled the need 
for the development of scientific knowledge and new technologies which could be 
applied in a practical way to the economic and material development which 
pembangunan required.   Education supplied a core of trained specialists with an 
appropriate level of skills and education to staff the expanding bureaucracy and to 
implement development projects.  Finally, social service represented ‘the application of 
this knowledge for the interests of the nation’ (3 (16) 1980).  By applying the 
knowledge they develop, a 1982 editorial argued, universities are: 
 
aimed towards the interests and needs of our development, the development of 
the homeland, the Indonesian nation as a whole.  They are not merely ‘ivory 
towers’ … but rather they are pioneers and innovators (pembaharu) for the 
progress of society (5 (30) 1982).8
 
In defining the role of universities in development, the editorials drew on the New 
Order discourse of development, repeating key terms and phrases typical of this 
discourse. In her examination of former president Suharto’s Independence Day 
speeches, Matheson Hooker identifies a vocabulary and style that is typical of this form 
of New Order official rhetoric.  A central feature of presidential speeches, she argues, is 
the consistent use of the verbal suffix –kan in key verbs (Matheson Hooker 1995, 280).  
In standard Indonesian, one of the primary functions of –kan is to indicate that a subject 
is causing action to take place or is acting on the object in some way (Sneddon 1996, 
70-8).  This causative sense of the suffix –kan is evident in the key verbs that Matheson 
Hooker identifies: mewujudkan (to realise, to cause something to be realised), 
menegakkan (to uphold, to cause to be upheld), melaksanakan (to implement, to cause 
something to be implemented), and menumbuhkan (to grow or develop, to cause 
something to grow or develop).  The consistent use of this form in state discourse 
reflects the New Order’s concern with ‘acting on the world’, causing things to happen, 
and engineering change and development.  In this view, aspects of social, cultural, 
political and economic life are not left to chance or allowed to develop of their own 
                                                          
8 …perguruan tinggi diarahkan bagi kepentingan dan kebutuhan pembangunan kita, pembangunan tanah 
air, nasional Indonesia secara keseluruhan.  Ia tidak semata-mata ‘menara gading’ bagi masyarakatnya.  
Tetapi ia pelopor dan pembaharu bagi kemajuan masyarakat tersebut (5 (30) 1982). 
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 accord.  Rather, their development is directed towards a set of state-determined goals 
which are implemented in a staged and systematic manner.   
 
In the speeches that Matheson Hooker analyses, the objects of these causative verbs 
typically include key nouns such as pembangunan (development), kehidupan demokrasi 
(democratic life), stabilisasi politik (political stabilisation), masyarakat (society), 
kemajuan (progress) and kesejahteraan (prosperity) and the actor is generally 
understood to be the state or its institutions (Matheson Hooker 1995, 277 and 279-81).  
These nouns indicate that the New Order’s goals of progress, stability and the welfare 
and prosperity of wider society are both defined and (largely) brought about by the state 
itself.  However, official rhetoric also highlighted the role of wider society in 
development.  In the exhortative sections of the president’s public speeches the 
inclusive pronoun kita (we), representing the nation as a whole, often functions as the 
actor or subject (see Jackson 1999, 2000).  The stress on the role of ‘we the nation’ in 
development positions wider society alongside the state in terms of responsibility for 
development, reflecting the conflation of state and society in the New Order’s ideal of 
the organic state and the New Order’s emphasis on the participation of all citizens in the 
development effort. 
 
Editorials in Majalah Mahasiswa about the role of universities in development reveal 
similar patterns in the use of the verbal suffix –kan and the objects and actors associated 
with these verbs.  In editorials, one of the main actors in causative verbs is the 
university, expressed as perguruan tinggi (institutions of higher education), pendidikan 
tinggi (higher education) or universitas (universities).  The types of causative verbs and 
their objects are also similar to those identified by Matheson Hooker.  A 1980 editorial, 
for example, noted the increasingly important role of universities in ‘driving and 
creating a more prosperous social environment’ (mendorong dan menciptakan 
lingkungan masyarakatnya yang lebih sejahtera) (3 (17) 1980) and a 1982 editorial 
suggested that universities ‘could play an active role in advancing the Nation and State’ 
(dapat mengambil peranan aktif dalam memajukan Bangsa dan Negara) (5 (29) 1982, 
14).  Universities are also described as the ‘pioneers of development’ (pelopor 
pembangunan) (3 (16) 1980, 15).  In these editorials, the active role universities are 
represented as playing in development reflects the New Order’s emphasis on the 
centrality of the ‘modern’ values of rationality and scientific objectivity which are 
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 necessary for the modernisation and development of the nation.  This orientation is 
neatly captured in the explanation of the Tridharma Perguruan Tinggi provided above.  
 
In contrast to this, editorials in Majalah Mahasiswa rarely position mahasiswa as the 
actors or subjects in causative verbs.9  Instead, it is students’ activities which function as 
the actors.  In a 1981 editorial, for example, the concept of partisipasi (participation) 
functions as the impetus or stimulus (unsur pendorong) for progress: 
 
in the framework of today’s National Development, the active and creative 
participation of students through co-curricular activities is always expected to be 
able to provide an effective stimulus for the progress of their environment and 
society (4 (22) 1981).10
 
Ariel Heryanto has suggested that the New Order ‘practice of perceiving and 
confronting social reality in abstraction manifested by the nominalisation of verbs’ 
reflects ‘the abstract mode of social relations and mass production in modern industrial 
societies’ (Heryanto 1995, 15-16).  In this view, the emphasis in Majalah Mahasiswa’s 
editorial on the abstract concept of partisipasi as the stimulus for development reflects 
the New Order’s endeavour to create a modern, economically advanced and socially 
progressive society.11  Yet it is also a clear attempt to distance this development from 
the populace by ‘abstracting’ their role in it.  Thus, while New Order rhetoric stressed 
the need for the nation as a whole to rally behind development programs, in reality the 
participation of wider society in development was closely controlled by the state and 
there was very little room for individual initiative.  This strategy aimed to prevent 
individuals or groups from acting independently of the state or in ways which might be 
contrary to the state-defined national interest.  This was particularly important in 
relation to students, who had in the past seen their role as independent critics of the state 
and acted accordingly.  For this reason, Majalah Mahasiswa also stipulated the kind of 
                                                          
9 I found only one example of this: the editorial which appeared in edition 5 (27) 1982 of Majalah 
Mahasiswa stated that: Mahasiswa…dengan tekad serta cita-cita yang luhur di kemudian hari akan 
melanjutkan roda pembangunan yang telah berputar sejak Pelita I di tahun 1969. 
10 …dalam rangka Pembangunan Nasional dewasa ini, maka partisipasi aktif yang kreatif dari 
mahasiswa melalui kegiatan-kegiatan ko-kurikular senantiasa diharapkan akan dapat memberikan unsur 
pendorong yang efektif bagi kemajuan lingkungan dan masyarakatnya (4 (22) 1981).  Co-curricular 
activities referred to a variety of sporting, cultural and artistic programs which students could undertake 
on the campus.   
11 According to Heryanto, this process can be partly explained within the framework of the transitive and 
intransitive senses of development.  In its intransitive sense, development is seen as occurring of its own 
accord.  In its transitive sense, however, development occurs as a result of deliberate action, usually on 
the part of the government.  For Heryanto, this distinction helps explain the prevalence of the transitive 
independent noun pembangunan in the New Order (1995, 24-5). 
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 participation in development which was appropriate for students, limiting it to co-
curricular activities such as sporting and artistic activities, student regiments, the 
student press, agricultural extension programs and student management skills training 
(4 (22) 1981).  These activities were usually run on the campus and were monitored by 
university officials.  Thus, by representing universities, and not students, as the active 
participants in development, and by circumscribing the kind of participation in 
development in which students could engage, editorials in Majalah Mahasiswa shift the 
emphasis away from individual action to institutional action (see also chapter three).  
This reflected the state’s desire to make use of students’ skills and abilities in practical 
ways and at the same time ensure that their participation in national life was undertaken 
in a way which the state saw as appropriate.   
 
The organicist concept of the state as a family provided another means by which 
editorials in Majalah Mahasiswa attempted to limit students’ capacity to act outside the 
parameters of the university as an institution.  Minister of Education and Culture 
Nugroho Notosusanto’s Alma Mater Vision (Wawasan Alma Mater), introduced in 
1983, draws on this familial language in its representation of the university and of those 
within it.12  In this concept, outlined in several editorials in Majalah Mahasiswa, the 
university is depicted as ‘mother’, indicated through the use of the Latin term alma 
mater (bounteous mother), translated as ibu asuh, and campus life is described as ‘based 
on the family principle (kekeluargaan)’ (7 (37) 1983).  The university is also 
represented as a ‘unified whole’ (kesatuan yang bulat) and the members of the 
university ‘family’ - teachers, staff, students, and alumni – are represented as united 
(manunggal) with the university under the leadership of the rector, the head or bapak 
(father) of the university family.  The relationship between lecturers and students within 
this family, as described in a 1984 editorial, was both a partnership (kemitraan), and an 
older sibling-younger sibling relationship (kakak dan adik) (7 (39) 1984, 80).  Students 
                                                          
12 The Alma Mater Vision was formalised as Minister of Education and Culture Decision No 
0319/U/1983 in July 1983.  Nugroho Notosusanto held the position of Minister of Education and Culture 
from March 1983 until his death in June 1985.  Nugroho had a long association with Universitas 
Indonesia.  In 1963-64 he was Assistant Dean for Student Affairs in the Faculty of Arts and from 1964 to 
1967 he served as the Assistant Rector for Student Affairs.  In addition to his teaching at Universitas 
Indonesia, from 1964 Nugroho also taught at the National Defence Institute (Lemhannas) and the armed 
forces command school (Sesko ABRI). In 1968 he was approached to join the Armed Forces Military 
History Centre which he later headed.  In 1977, he received his doctorate in Indonesian history from 
Universitas Indonesia.  At the time of his appointment as Minister of Education and Culture, Nugroho 
was Rector of Universitas Indonesia (Apa dan siapa 1986, 602-3, McGregor 2002; see also Bourchier 
1996, 254-5).     
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 are also described as child-pupils (anak didik) whose care and educational development 
has been entrusted to lecturers.   
 
This representation of the university as a family, which clearly echoes the New Order’s 
ideology of the family state, has important implications for the ways in which students 
are able to think and speak about their roles and identities in the context of Majalah 
Mahasiswa as well as for the ways they are (potentially) able to act.  The application of 
the family principle to the university defines the roles and identities which individuals, 
including students, are to occupy and prescribes the proper relationships between 
members of the university family.  This view implies that students, as the anak 
(children) of the university family, are expected to be respectful and obedient to the 
rector as bapak (and to Suharto as the ‘ultimate’ bapak, the bapak of the nation).  As 
adik and anak didik to the teaching staff of the university, students are represented as 
the objects of the educational guidance and care of their dosen (lecturers), to whom they 
should show respect.  Moreover, the emphasis on ‘wholeness’ and ‘unity’ suggests that 
universities (like the nation) are characterised by harmony, order and consensus, 
implying that disunity or divisions do not exist and at the same time enabling the 
actions of those who cause disunity to be defined as contrary to the interests of all 
members of the family.   
 
Finally, in a practical sense, state control over students’ participation in national life 
was also achieved through the control the state exerted over the institution of the 
university itself.  In the New Order’s corporatist model, applied from the beginning of 
the 1970s, participation in public life was to be undertaken through the official organs 
of state-run ‘functional groups’ such as the farmers union (Himpunan Kerukunan Tani 
Indonesia, HKTI), the state labour union (Federasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia, FBSI), and 
the national youth organisation (Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia, KNPI) (see 
chapter two).  As the ‘corporatist organisation’ for mahasiswa, the university, like other 
functional groups, was under the effective control of the state, which through the 
Department of Education and Culture, had the authority to appoint (and dismiss) 
university rectors (Cummings, Malo and Sunarto 1997, 101-102).   
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 Self-censorship and dissent 
 
Majalah Mahasiswa’s representation of the role of the university in development 
provided the framework within which students’ roles in development were defined.  
The aim of this was to control the ways in which students could think and speak about 
their roles in national life and hence the ways in which they could act in their capacity 
as mahasiswa.  It was also designed to provide the conditions within which students 
could think about their roles and so modify their behaviour in ways which were 
consistent with the New Order’s emphasis on state-managed, top-down development.  
Students’ contributions to Majalah Mahasiswa indicate that while editorials did set 
parameters for the ways in which student contributors wrote about their roles and 
identities, they were also able to incorporate dissenting meanings into their articles, thus 
challenging the state’s positioning of them.    
 
In their contributions to Majalah Mahasiswa, students drew on the vocabulary and 
grammatical forms of the state discourse of development, representing the role of 
universities and students in development in terms of mensukseskan pembangunan 
(‘successing’ development), menyumbangkan (contributing) their efforts and ideas for 
development, and melaksanakan (implementing) development and noting the need for 
universities and students to berpartisipasi and ikut serta (participate) in development 
and described the process of development in terms of pertumbuhan (growth) and 
pengembangan (development), kemajuan (progress) and kesejahteraan (prosperity).  
Students also represented their own role in developmentalist terms.  In a 1978 article, 
for example, Muhammad Rusli Karim, then a final year student in the Faculty of Social 
Sciences at Yogyakarta Teachers College (IKIP Yogyakarta) and editor of its campus 
newspaper Derap Mahasiswa, argued that as part of the young generation, students 
were expected to play an active role in ‘giving substance (mengisi) to the ideals of the 
nation in development’ (2 (9-10) 1978, 25-6; see also below).  Students’ use of these 
terms, and the definition of their role in developmentalist terms, represents a significant 
contrast to the ways students who wrote in the student press of the mid to late 1970s 
represented their role, where they argued that their role was to critique the 
implementation of the state’s development policies (see chapter four).  The self-
censorship of the students who wrote for Majalah Mahasiswa thus required a significant 
shift, both in terms of vocabulary and in terms of the parameters within which they were 
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 able to write about their roles and identities.  In the post 1978 political climate, the fear 
of repression which the state engendered in students was thus successful in influencing 
the linguistic choices they made when they wrote about their roles and identities.13   
 
However, the reproduction of the terms of the state discourse was not necessarily an 
indication that students had been fully socialised into the roles and identities the state 
had constructed for them.  Even within the parameters which Majalah Mahasiswa’s 
editorials set, students incorporated dissenting meanings into the ways in which they 
wrote about their roles and identities.  Thus, while editorials positioned universities as 
the active participants in development, in student contributions mahasiswa were the key 
actors.  Ratna Juwita Thaib, a student at Medan Teachers College (IKIP Medan), for 
example, describes students as the ‘implementers of development’ (pelaksana dari 
pembangunan) and Djoko Walujo, a student in the Faculty of Social Sciences at 
Universitas Indonesia and a reporter for Salemba, argues that in the era of national 
development, students role is as ‘a force for national development’ (kekuatan 
pembangunan bangsa) in all fields (2 (9-10) 1978, 74; 2 (11) 1979, 48).   
 
Students also emphasised their role as agents of social control (kontrol sosial), even if 
this was represented in developmentalist terms.  Thus, while in Salemba and Gelora 
Mahasiswa students explicitly directed their criticisms as agents of social control at ‘the 
system’, ‘power’ or ‘the government’, for students writing in Majalah Mahasiswa, the 
aim of kontrol sosial was expressed more obliquely as ‘development’.  In the 1978 
article cited above, Ratna Juwita Thaib argues that the object of students’ criticisms as 
agents of social control is ‘the course of development’ (jalannya pembangunan) which 
involves ‘the input of ideas (input pemikiran) on the implementation of development’ (2 
(9-10) 1978, 74).  In a 1980 article Tonny Ardie, a frequent contributor to Salemba 
before its closure, argued that students’ role entailed correcting ‘deviations’ 
(penyimpangan) in order to realise prosperity (kesejahteraan umum) (18 (3) 1980, 72-
3).14   
 
The representation of students as active agents of development and the incorporation of 
the concept of kontrol sosial into students’ contributions to Majalah Mahasiswa 
challenged the state’s representations of students as compliant subjects prepared to 
                                                          
13 Majalah Mahasiswa’s editorial policy was also significant in this regard. 
14 This article had appeared in the 1 September 1977 edition of Salemba.  No revisions were made to the 
article that appeared in Majalah Mahasiswa. 
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 acquiesce and participate in the state’s development programs.  It indicated that despite 
their reproduction of the state’s discourse of development, students had not fully 
internalised the state’s definitions of their roles and identities.  Moreover, the fact that 
students were able to write in these terms indicates that even in the more closed political 
system of the late 1970s and 1980s they retained the ability to express dissent, albeit in 
subtle ways and provided they framed their dissent in terms which were acceptable to 
the regime.  This ability was partly the result of the state’s strategy of government in 
allowing students some measure of freedom. 
 
At the same time, however, students’ use of terms such as kontrol sosial in a magazine 
which was clearly a vehicle of the state enabled the state to coopt and so undermine its 
dissenting meanings.  The inside front cover of every edition of Majalah Mahasiswa 
stated that the magazine presented ‘the thinking as well as the concrete aspirations of 
students in supporting development’.  By soliciting contributions from students, 
Majalah Mahasiswa incorporated their discourse into the discourse of the state, 
integrating student voices with the voices of state officials.  In this way, students who 
wrote for Majalah Mahasisiwa were coopted into the very discourses that 
disempowered them.  In this process, the term kontrol sosial lost the sense of ‘open 
criticism of the government’ which it had in the student press of the mid to late 1970s 
and instead took on the meaning of ‘input in development’.  This cooptation of 
student’s voices in Majalah Mahasiswa represented one of the ways in which the state 
mitigated the risks associated with allowing students the freedom to ‘make the right 
choices’ which was an integral element of its strategy of government.  Ironically, it was 
partly as a result of the cooptation of the student discourse of dissent of the 1970s that 
students writing in the student press during the 1990s developed a new, alternative 
discourse with which to oppose the New Order (see chapter six).   
 
‘Developing’ students 
 
As noted above, the keyword pembangunan described the New Order’s top-down 
approach to political, social and economic life, incorporating meanings of economic and 
material development as well as national, social and individual development.  The 
keywords pembinaan (enhancement, improvement) and pengembangan (development) 
were variations on this theme.  However, while pembangunan primarily referred to 
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 material aspects of national life, pembinaan referred to the state’s approach to moulding 
Indonesians in order to make use of them for development.  In this sense, pembinaan 
was a product of the state’s exercise of disciplinary forms of power, that is, of forms of 
power which were designed to shape the citizenry, including students, in particular 
ways in order to utilise their skills and attributes in ways which were consistent with the 
state’s goals.   In Majalah Mahasiswa, the keywords pembinaan and pengembangan 
thus both articulate the state’s definition of its relationship to students and are integral to 
the state’s strategy of regulating students’ behaviour.   
 
Pembinaan was the main theme for the 1981 edition of Majalah Mahasiswa entitled 
‘Efforts in the Consolidation of Student Improvement’ (Usaha-usaha dalam 
Pemantapan Pembinaan Mahasiswa) (4 (23) 1981).  Editorials dealing with other topics 
were also framed in terms of pembinaan and pengembangan (see for example 3 (17) 
1980, 25; 4 (22) 1981).  The noun pembinaan is derived from the verb bina, meaning 
‘to build’ or ‘establish’ and ‘to better’ or ‘improve’.  As a noun, pembinaan 
incorporates meanings of ‘development’ and ‘improvement’ as well as ‘progress’ and 
‘renewal’.  During the 1950s, pembinaan was used alongside pembangunan to refer to 
the ‘development’ of the nation.15  During the New Order, however, pembinaan, like 
pembangunan, acquired a sense of top-down direction by the state (see above).  In 
Michael van Langenberg’s analysis of the keywords of the New Order state, the term 
pembinaan links ‘state power’ to ‘legitimacy’ and represents one of the keywords 
through which the exercise of state power is effected.  Pembinaan, he suggests:  
 
describes the role of the government in ‘guiding’ Indonesian society and the way 
in which this guidance is imposed on the populace in order to meet the needs of 
the state (van Langenberg 1986, 13).   
 
In policy documents and speeches the term pembinaan often appeared alongside the 
noun pengembangan (development).  Like pembinaan, pengembangan also encodes 
meanings of ‘development’, ‘improvement’ and ‘progress’.16
 
                                                          
15 See, for example, its use in the PSI literary journal Konfrontasi, which was published from 1954-1960 
and which included among its editors Sutan Takdir Alisjabana. 
16 The noun pengembangan is derived from the causative verb mengembangkan, meaning to ‘open up’ or 
‘unfurl’, ‘to make larger’ and ‘to advance’ or ‘improve’, giving it the grammatical sense of deliberate 
action (KBBI 2001, 538).   
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 The shaping of Indonesian citizens through processes such as pembinaan and 
pengembangan was integral to the disciplinary strategy of the New Order.  This strategy 
aimed to guide Indonesians to fulfil their state-defined role as the ‘human resources of 
development’.  Thus, the Pancasila education programs of the late 1970s and 1980s, 
including Pancasila Moral Education (Pendidikan Moral Pancasila, PMP), compulsory 
in schools from 1975, and the Pancasila education courses for civil servants (Pedoman 
Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila, P4) introduced in 1978, aimed to produce 
manusia Indonesia seutuhnya (whole Indonesians), people whose ideas and actions 
were guided by the state’s interpretation of the national ideology (Wandelt 1997, 317; 
Bourchier 1996, 244; Hooker 1996, 130-1).   
 
The productive aims of the New Order’s exercise of discipline over students and the 
young generation in general is clearly reflected in the wording of New Order policies on 
the young generation.  These policies articulate the state’s concern with shaping 
students and the young generation in order to enhance their capabilities as the ‘human 
resources’ (sumber insansi) of the future (see also Dipoyudo 1987).17  As the 1982 
policy on ‘Political Education for the Young Generation’ stated, the aim of education in 
Pancasila and other key national values was to create a young generation who will 
‘participate actively and creatively … in national development efforts’ (berpartisipasi 
secara aktif dan kreatif dalam … usaha pembangunan nasional) (cited in Kansil 1986, 
197). 
  
Yet the effective governing of a population also relies on the capacity of individuals to 
regulate their own behaviour.  In recognition of this, New Order policies emphasised 
that the young generation were responsible for ‘improving and developing’ themselves 
(membina diri dan mengembangkan diri) (cited in Kansil 1986, 98).  As the Department 
of Education and Culture’s 1978 policy on the development of the young generation 
stated, the aim of the improvement and development of the young generation was to 
provide them with the knowledge and skills that would enable them to develop 
‘themselves, their fellows and their environment’ on their own initiative (cited in Kansil 
1986, 137).18    
                                                          
17 Kirdi Dipoyudo worked for the Centre for Strategic and International Studies during the 1970s.  In 
1979 he published a book entitled Pancasila: Arti dan Pelaksanaannya [The Pancasila: Its Meaning and 
Implementation] (Majalah Mahasisiwa 4 (23) 1981, 102). 
18 …dalam rangka memberikan pengetahuan dan keterampilan sesuai dengan bakat, kecenderungan/ 
keinginan serta kemampuan sebagai bekal untuk selanjutnya atas prakasra sendiri menambah 
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In Majalah Mahasiswa, being manusia seutuhnya was represented in terms of striking a 
balance between mastery of knowledge and technology and being ‘people of culture and 
character’ (manusia yang berbudaya dan berwatak) (6 (35) 1983, 2).  A 1981 editorial, 
for example, argued that students ‘must be prepared (dipersiapkan) mentally and 
spiritually as well as physically and materially’ to face the challenges of the future (4 
(23) 1981, 2).  The task of preparing students for their role in development was in large 
part assigned to universities (see for example 3 (17) 1980; 5 (30) 1982; 6 (33) 1983; 7 
(39) 1984; 8 (45) 1986).19  This preparation involved developing (mengembangkan) 
students’ professional skills and knowledge (ketrampilan profesional) as well as their 
generic intellectual and reasoning abilities (kemampuan penalaran) (4 (22) 1981).  In 
addition to their specialist knowledge, students were also expected to develop good 
character (watak atau karakter yang baik) and a sense of social awareness and social 
responsibility (rasa sadar dan tanggung jawab sosial) (4 (23) 1981).  The development 
of these values in students, argued a 1983 editorial, would increase their enthusiasm for 
and desire to serve the interests of national development (semangat dan pengabdiannya 
bagi melanjutkan pembangunan nasional) (6 (35) 1983, 2; see also 4 (23) 1981).   
 
The position of students as the objects of efforts on the part of both the state and the 
university to ‘develop’ them is reflected in their role as the grammatical objects of 
pembinaan and pengembangan in editorials.  A 1981 editorial, for example, stated that 
in the process of developing and consolidating their reasoning abilities and character, 
students were ‘guided’ (dibimbing) towards maturity of thinking through various 
academic tasks and ‘trained’ (dilatih) to carry out activities which would develop in 
them responsible patterns of action (4 (22) 1981).  Editorials also represent students as 
participants in abstract processes of development, signified by the use of nominalised 
verbs such as pertumbuhan (cultivation), pengembangan (development) and 
pemantapan (consolidation), rather than as grammatical subjects.  The same 1981 
editorial stated that: ‘Students who are in the process of studying in institutions of 
                                                                                                                                                                          
meningkatkan dan mengembangkan dirinya, sesamanya maupun lingkungannya … (cited in Kansil 1986, 
137).   
19 According to a 1983 editorial, the most fundamental aspect of the university’s educative role lay in 
socialising (memberikan sosialisasi) students in scientific and personal values and educating them to 
become competent graduates in their field and committed ‘people of the Pancasila’ (manusia Pancasila) 
(6 (33) 1983).  The responsibility for this ‘noble task’ fell on the lecturers and staff of the university who, 
in the interests of creating a more prosperous society, were ‘called to (dituntut) produce graduates who 
have intellectual quality and are sensitive to the aspirations and needs of their environment’ (3 (17) 1980, 
25). 
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 higher education are in essence in the process of growing and developing their 
reasoning abilities and identity’ (Mahasiswa yang sedang dalam proses belajar di 
pendidikan tinggi pada hakekatnya sedang dalam proses pertumbuhan dan 
pengembangan penalaran dan kepribadiannya) (4 (22) 1981; see also 4 (23) 1981).  
Moreover, in active processes such as membina (improve), mengembangkan (develop), 
memantapkan (consolidate), membekali (to supply) and menumbuhkan (cultivate), 
abstract concepts function as the grammatical objects.  These abstract concepts include 
pengetahuan (knowledge), kemampuan (abilities), ketrampilan (skills), watak 
(character), kepribadian (identity), budaya (culture) and nilai (values).  While 
mahasiswa do occasionally function as post-modifying elements for these 
characteristics and qualities, their possession of them is often simply implied.  The 
subjects carrying out these active processes are also abstract nouns, including kegiatan 
(activities) and pendidikan (education).  The overall impression which editorials give is 
thus of a world largely devoid of human action and interaction.   
 
The focus on abstract concepts such as ‘knowledge’, ‘skills’ and ‘values’ as the objects 
of pembinaan shifts the emphasis away from mahasiswa as individuals and on to their 
characteristics and qualities.  In this view, it is not students themselves who are to be 
developed in ways which will be useful for development but rather their capabilities and 
attributes.  Unlike individuals, abstract qualities and characteristics are more easily 
shaped to fit the state’s purposes.  At the same time, the use of abstract nouns such as 
‘activities’ and ‘education’ as the grammatical subjects carrying out pembinaan shifts 
the emphasis away from the role of the state itself in these top-down processes of 
development.  This was in part a response to adverse reactions on the part of students to 
the concept of pembinaan.  Students writing in Salemba and Gelora Mahasiswa, for 
example, rejected the government’s enforcing of the pembinaan approach.  As an article 
in the November 1977 edition of Gelora Mahasiswa argued, the culture of ‘developing’ 
the young generation reflected the government’s naïve view of the young generation.  
The article also suggested that the concept of pembinaan was a political strategy.  
Citing the example of KNPI, the umbrella organisation for Indonesian youth which, the 
article agued, aimed to undermine the independence of existing organisations for youth, 
the article suggested that pembinaan was being used as ‘cover for other interests 
(selimut bagi kepentingan lain).  At the same time, the article also advocated the 
application of pembinaan to all areas of national life, suggesting that ‘everything must 
be improved, without exception’ (semuanya … harus dibina tanpa kecuali) including 
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 the government and the nation’s leaders.  The pembinaan of the state was part of 
students’ role in social control: the caption which appears below a photograph of a 
student addressing a crowd of fellow students reads: ‘Free speech: every so often 
‘improving’ the authorities’ (Mimbar bebas: sesekali ‘membina’ penguasa) (Gelora 
Mahasiswa November 1977, 3).  By backgrounding its own role in pembinaan through 
the use of abstract concepts then, the state, through the Department of Education and 
Culture, attempts to deflect students’ resentment towards the policy away from the state 
itself. 
 
The representation of students as objects of pembinaan reflects the state’s concern with 
regulating the ways in which they could think and speak about their identities and 
consequently the ways in which they could act.  In this view, the positioning of students 
as objects was integral to the state’s disciplinary strategy of shaping their identities as 
manusia seutuhnya whose thinking and behaviour was consistent with New Order 
values and aims and who could therefore usefully participate in the state’s all-
embracing program of development.  Yet despite the rhetoric that students should 
develop themselves and use their initiative in doing so, policy makers and the security 
apparatus in fact vigorously sought to prevent students from playing an active role or 
taking the initiative for action in anything other than in support of pembangunan.  For 
this reason, the activities permitted to students were those which were both sanctioned 
and controlled by the state, namely student regiments, agricultural extension activities 
and campus-based sporting and cultural activities (see above).  By representing students 
as objects rather than as active subjects, the state, through Majalah Mahasiswa, 
attempted to control their participation in public life in ways which the state had 
determined for them. 
 
Earlier it was suggested that the keyword pembinaan articulated the state’s definition of 
its relationship to students.  In editorials in Majalah Mahasiswa, the choices made from 
the system of modality establish the state (the editorial voice in Majalah Mahasiswa) in 
a position of authority and consequently students (the audience of the magazine) in the 
position of subjects of the state’s authority.  In the editorial which appeared in the 1981 
edition of Majalah Mahasiswa which took pembinaan as its key theme, categorical 
modality, expressed by the use of the simple present tense - [m]ahasiswa … pada 
hakekatnya sedang dalam proses (‘students … are in essence in the process of’) and 
tidak dapat disangkal lagi (‘it can no longer be denied’) - and the use of the modal 
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 auxiliary harus (must) (which appears twice more in the editorial) encode the writer’s 
authority with regard to the ‘truth’ of the assertions made in the editorial and his or her 
ability to make such assertions:   
 
As part of the young generation of the nation, students are in essence in the 
process of consolidating themselves to be responsive in facing the challenges of 
the future.  To meet the challenges of the future in all fields, which increasingly 
need to be handled, then it can no longer be denied that the young generation is 
called to be prepared (siap) to carry out this important task.  Of their own 
accord, then, they must also be prepared (dipersiapkan) both mentally and 
spiritually as well as physically and materially (4 (23) 1981).20
 
It is thus the state, through the editorial voice of Majalah Mahasiswa, which asserts the 
role of students (‘to be responsive in facing the challenges of the future’) and which 
determines that students should be developed ‘both mentally and spiritually as well as 
physically and materially’.   Students, on the other hand, are expected to participate 
willingly by being ‘prepared to carry out this important task’ and to ‘develop 
themselves’ in accordance with the state’s directives.  By positioning itself as the 
authority which determines students’ development, this editorial constructs the 
relationship between students and the state in a hierarchical and asymmetrical way.  
This hierarchical relationship reflects the state’s paternalistic approach to wider society.  
In the concept of the ‘state as family’, the bapak (father) as the head of the family 
exercises a paternal form of power, by positioning himself as the person in the best 
position to know the needs and interests of the family and to make sure these needs are 
met.  In Majalah Mahasiswa, the ‘benevolent paternalism’ which was the key 
characteristic of the state’s representation of its relationship to students, disguised the 
reality of repression and intimidation which students experienced at the hands of the 
security apparatus. 
 
Service to society  
 
In Salemba and Gelora Mahasiswa, one of the key elements of students’ role was the 
idea that they acted on behalf of the rakyat, as the spokespersons for their aspirations, as 
                                                          
20 Mahasiswa yang merupakan bagian generasi muda bangsa pada hakekatnya sedang dalam proses 
pemantapan diri untuk tanggap menghadapi tantangan masa depan.  Untuk menyongsong tantangan hari 
depan yang semakin memerlukan penanganan di segala bidang, maka tidak dapat disangkal lagi bahwa 
generasi muda dituntut untuk siap melaksanakan tugas berat ini.  Dengan sendirinya maka mereka harus 
dipersiapkan pula baik secara mental spiritual maupun fisik material (23 (4) 1981). 
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 their defenders, and as their guides and leaders.  This view of students’ relationship to 
the rakyat, it was suggested, reflected the state’s paternalistic approach to wider society 
and at the same time justified students’ role by implying that the national family was 
not functioning in an ideal way.  In editorials in Majalah Mahasiswa, however, 
students’ relationship to wider society was described not as being a channel for wider 
aspirations or as defenders of wider interests but in terms of pengabdian (service).  The 
redefinition of students’ role as one of ‘service’ was a dramatic shift from the leadership 
role which students who wrote for Salemba and Gelora Mahasiswa saw themselves as 
playing.  Now, rather than leaders of the rakyat and channels for their aspirations, 
students were to be followers and servants.  This shift undermined one of the more 
significant means by which students’ justified their role in social and political life.   
 
Students’ service role was the theme for two editions of Majalah Mahasiswa (8 (42) 
1985; 8 (43) 1985).  However, pengabdian also framed discussions of other topics, 
including students’ academic and ‘co-curricular’ achievements (4 (22) 1981) and their 
role in development (5 (27) 1982).  Editorials for these editions used a variety of terms 
to describe the concept of students’ ‘service’, including the Javanese-derived 
sumbangsih (contribution, assistance) and menyumbang (contribute), the Sanskrit bhakti 
(service), and Arabic pengabdian.  These terms incorporate meanings of obedience, 
loyalty, respect, submission and dedication.21  The primary object of students’ 
pengabdian, as defined in editorials, was masyarakat (society), although the nation 
(bangsa, ibu pertiwi), pembangunan (development) and lingkungan (environment) were 
also used.  Students’ service is thus represented as an expression of obedience, loyalty 
and devotion to the nation, to development and to wider society. 
 
The choice of masyarakat rather than rakyat as the primary object of students’ service 
reflects the New Order’s concern with shifting emphasis away from the rakyat as a 
political actor.  The term rakyat had long been linked to politics through its use in the 
pergerakan during the 1920s and 1930s, during the revolution and in Sukarno’s 
political rhetoric in the 1950s and 1960s.  In these contexts, the rakyat was a political 
object, whose interests could be spoken about, on whose behalf aspiring politicians and 
other political actors could act and who (at least in rhetoric) could be involved in 
                                                          
21 The base word of pengabdian, abdi, means ‘subordinate’, ‘servant’, ‘attendant’ or ‘slave’, the noun 
bhakti, refers to acts of loyalty, devotion or respect and sumbangsih refers to support or assistance given 
as a sign of love or devotion  (KBBI 2001, 2, 94 and 1101); Stevens and Schmidgall-Tellings 2004, 2, 81 
and 966).   
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 political struggle.  Rakyat also had class connotations: it referred to ‘the ordinary 
people’ and not the nation’s elite.  The term masyarakat, however, had the distinct 
advantage of being without these ‘undesirable’ political and class connotations.   
 
The choice of masyarakat over rakyat also reflects the New Order’s attempts to 
separate students from the rakyat.  This was a clear response to students’ definitions of 
their role as the defenders of the rakyat and the channels for their aspirations during the 
mid to late 1970s (see chapter four).  Masyarakat (society) is a more amorphous 
concept than rakyat: it refers not to a definable group of people (as rakyat does), but 
rather to the abstract concept of ‘society’, defined in broad and general terms.  The term 
masyarakat also encompasses both the elite as well as the ordinary people.  Moreover, 
since the New Order’s concept of the organic state obscured the divide between state 
and society, arguing that the institutions of the state were the embodiment of the 
people’s aspirations, in New Order rhetoric the concept of masyarakat also implied 
‘state’.  By representing the aims of students’ service as masyarakat (society) then, 
editorials in Majalah Mahasiswa redefine students’ role not as champions of the 
ordinary people, but as servants of the state and the nation as a whole, while at the same 
time appearing to acknowledge students’ long-established role in relation to the rakyat 
(see chapter three).  
 
Students’ active role in serving the nation and society is reflected in the grammatical 
roles mahasiswa play in editorials (and in the roles played by rakyat).  Significantly, 
social service is one of the few areas of meaning in which mahasiswa play the role of 
grammatical subjects.  An editorial in a 1985 edition of Majalah Mahasiswa for 
example, stated that ‘students can play a role in progressing still-undeveloped village 
communities (mahasiswa dapat mengambil peran untuk memajukan masyarakat desa 
yang masih terbelakang) (8 (43) 1985).  This active role was appropriate since social 
service, as it was defined in editorials, demonstrated students’ commitment and 
allegiance to the nation, to development and to wider society. 
 
Despite this, students were more often represented as grammatical objects.  A 1981 
editorial for example, asserted that ‘students are expected to be able to use their abilities 
and skills to serve the progress of society’ (Para mahasiswa diharapkan dapat 
membaktikan kemampuan dan keterampilannya bagi kemajuan masyarakat) (4 (22) 
1981, 106).  Similarly, a 1985 editorial argued that ‘as privileged and educated 
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 members of the young generation students are truly charged and expected to be called 
for all forms of social service (Sebagai generasi muda terpilih dan terpelajar 
mahasiswa sungguh-sungguh dituntut dan diharapkan terpanggil bagi segala jenis 
kegiatan bhakti sosial itu) (8 (43) 1985).  The representation of students’ as the objects 
of expectations suggests that the initiative for their social service does not originate with 
students’ themselves.  Rather, it is a response to the expectations of others; a duty or 
obligation imposed on them because of their status as educated individuals, a fact which 
clearly differentiates them from the uneducated masses.  The fact that the forms of 
social service advocated in editorials are concerned with development, indicates that it 
is the state which is the source of these ‘expectations’ and ‘calls’.  Yet editorials do not 
explicitly state this.  Instead, the focus is on the positive effects of students’ social 
service, that is, the progress of village communities.  Students are thus represented not 
as serving the state, but as serving ‘society’, something which students themselves had 
long seen as an integral part of their role.  In this way, the state attempted to utilise 
students’ skills and abilities for development while presenting the concept of social 
service in a more palatable way.22
 
Like Salemba and Gelora Mahasiswa, editorials in Majalah Mahasiswa emphasised the 
importance of students’ awareness of and sensitivity to the problems faced by wider 
society as the basis for their service.  Editorials reiterated the need for students to be 
peka (sensitive) and sadar (aware), to mengerti (understand) social issues and to be 
bertanggung jawab (responsible) for their society.  Students’ social service (bhakti 
sosial) was represented as upright (luhur) and noble (mulia) (see 8 (43) 1985).  These 
high-sounding terms, which are derived from Javanese and Sanskrit respectively, 
suggest that students’ social service took place in an idealised traditional, hierarchical 
society in which each member of the community had a designated place and in which 
values such as honour, self-sacrifice and righteousness were highly valued. 
 
A more contentious area of meaning (if not explicitly so), related to the aims of 
students’ role in relation to wider society.  For students writing in Salemba and Gelora 
Mahasiswa, in their role as the spokespersons and defenders of the rakyat students were 
to give a voice to the aspirations (aspirasi) and sentiments (perasaan, hati nurani) of 
                                                          
22 Social service was also represented as being useful for students.  As a 1985 editorial suggested, ‘In this 
process of service [to society] students are … also trained to be more beneficial, more useful for their 
environment …’ (Dalam proses pengabdian [kepada masyarakat] ini … mahasiswa juga dilatih untuk 
berbuat agar lebih bermanfaat, lebih berguna bagi lingkungannya…) (8 (42) 1985).   
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 the common people and to safeguard their rights.  In editorials in Majalah Mahasiswa, 
however, the aspirations of the rakyat are represented in less emotive terms, as ‘social 
problems’ (masalah sosial).  A 1982 editorial, for example, argued that students could 
‘contribute (memberikan sumbangsih) by striving to solve social problems’ (5 (27) 
1982).  These social problems, as they were defined in editorials, included practical 
issues related to development as well as the broader aim of social and cultural 
modernisation.  In this view, students’ role as educated members of society was not to 
identify issues which needed to be addressed, but merely to contribute to solving 
problems which the state had already identified.  Moreover, this contribution was 
undertaken through activities which the state deemed appropriate and which were 
managed on a national level through the universities and the Department of Education 
and Culture.  Thus, in keeping with the New Order’s benevolently paternalistic 
approach to society, it is the state which determines the interests and needs of wider 
society and which gives concrete expression to these needs in the form of the 
‘collectively-determined goal’ of development.   
 
The ideas which inform Majalah Mahasiswa’s representations of students’ relationship 
to wider society date to the height of the nationalist movement.  During the 1920s and 
1930s, nationalist rhetoric regarding the relationship between intellectuals and wider 
society took what Frederick has called a decidedly ‘rakyatist’ turn.  Frederick notes, for 
example, that during the 1920s and 1930s a number of nationalist organisations 
attempted to establish formal relationships with Surabaya’s urban communities 
(kampong) with the aim of ‘acquainting members with their plight’ and, later, of 
gaining their support for positions on the city council (Frederick 1989, 51-6) While the 
concern of the intellectuals associated with the nationalist movement was largely 
ideological, it also extended to practical assistance in the form of ‘aiding the 
unemployed, combating illiteracy, and encouraging thrift and cleanliness (ibid., 137).  
During the 1950s and 1960s, the Indonesian Communist Party advocated a program of 
turun ke bawah or ‘going down among the masses’ in which urban artists and activists 
were placed in rural areas.  The program was designed to provide artists and activists 
with an insight into the issues faced by rural communities and to serve as a two-way 
channel of communication between these communities and the party bureaucrats based 
in the capital (Shackford-Bradley 2000, 27).  And in the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
modernising students and intellectuals advocated students’ involvement in rural 
development projects as a means of benefiting the community and ‘transforming the 
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 political culture of the masses’ from a traditional to a ‘modern’ one (Liddle 1973, 188). 
In all of these programs, wider society were seen as ignorant and powerless and hence 
needing the assistance of more educated individuals: they were objects, rather than 
political actors in their own right.   
 
The persistence of this paternalistic view of the rakyat amongst the Indonesian elite is 
also apparent in the social service programs of the 1970s and 1980s.  One of the 
primary vehicles for students’ involvement in wider society was the study service 
scheme (Kuliah Kerja Nyata, KKN).23  Community service had been part of the 
university’s function since independence: during the 1950s, newly graduated teachers 
volunteered to spend a year providing their newly acquired skills in locations outside 
Java under the student mobilisation (Pengerahan Tenaga Mahasiswa, PTM) scheme 
(Hardjasoemantri 1982, 158-9; Apa dan siapa 1986, 279-80).  In 1967, however, the 
Basic Memorandum on the Development of Higher Education issued by former 
Director General of Higher Education Mashuri Saleh included a suggestion that 
community service become a formal part of all university degrees (Saleh 1968).  In 
1971, the new Director of Higher Education and the architect of the KKN program, 
Koesnadi Hardjasoemantri trialled the program at three universities: Universitas 
Andalas, Universitas Gadjah Mada and Universitas Hasanuddin (Hardjasoemantri 1982, 
chapter three).  In 1973, thirteen universities participated in the program and in 1974 the 
program gained official recognition in the Second Five-Year Development Plan (1974-
1979).  The major aims of the program were to link education to the needs of 
development, to stimulate social development, particularly in rural areas, and to give 
students practical experience of working for development.  In official formulations, the 
program was described as a means of ‘supplying large quantities of temporary extension 
manpower (sic) that can be deployed at the village level to supplement existing 
extension services’.  It also provided ‘greater opportunities for young Indonesians to 
participate directly in the development of their nation’ (ibid., 149 and 147-8).  Students 
usually spent between three and six months living and working in the village, often as 
part of an interdisciplinary team.  Depending on their discipline, students’ activities in 
the village ranged from implementing programs to improve agricultural practices, 
establishing cooperatives, introducing new teaching methods, building village roads and 
                                                          
23 Koesnadi Hardjasoemantri was the Director of Higher Education between 1969 and 1974 (Apa dan 
siapa 1986, 279-80).  The term ‘study service scheme’ is his translation of Kuliah Kerja Nyata (see 
Hardjasoemantri 1982).  
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 bridges and constructing water supplies, providing legal aid and establishing 
community health clinics.   
 
In editorials in Majalah Mahasiswa, the KKN program, as well as student work camps 
(kemah kerja mahasiswa, KKM), ABRI service and various other social and community 
service activities, were represented as the concrete means by which students could 
contribute to society (see for example 8 (42) 1985; see also 4 (22) 1981, 106).  This 
representation of students’ social service was consistent with the state’s paternalistic 
view of the masses, and with students’ own representations of their relationship to the 
rakyat (see chapter four).  In editorials in Majalah Mahasiswa, wider society is not 
represented as an actor in its own right, but rather the group on whose behalf the state 
(through students) works.   In a practical sense, the leadership role which students were 
expected to play in implementing development programs as part of the KKN program, 
did not aim to empower communities to develop themselves but rather to mobilise them 
behind programs which had been developed for them by students (and, ultimately, by 
the state).  Students were thus the vehicles for the state’s ideas of development and 
modernisation.  Moreover, while students’ role in the KKN program was ostensibly as 
leaders, their leadership was limited to practical development, that is, to programs 
which the state had deemed appropriate.   
 
People of analysis 
 
One of the key elements of Minister of Education and Culture Daud Yusuf’s 
normalisation policy was the effort to return students to what he defined as their 
essential identity as ‘people of analysis’ (‘manusia penganalisa’) (Majalah Mahasiswa 
3 (16) 1980, 128).  Unlike the term intelektual, the term manusia penganalisa had the 
distinct advantage of being without the connotations of social and political engagement 
which went alongside students’ representations of their role as intelektual and with the 
Western understanding of the role of the intellectual (see chapter four).  The term 
manusia penganalisa, as it was used in policy documents, speeches and in Majalah 
Mahasiswa, denoted those engaged in the intellectual exercise of ‘analysis’, who could 
think systematically and reach logical and reasoned conclusions.  In his explanation of 
the policy, Daud Yusuf drew a clear distinction between intelektual and manusia 
penganalisa:  
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The NKK policy is not intended to facilitate the campus in forming intellectuals.  
People can become intellectuals without undertaking higher education.  On the 
other hand, not all those who hold university degrees … can be considered 
intellectuals.  The NKK policy is intended to facilitation universities in forming 
the kind of people whose are no less important than intellectuals, that is, people 
of analysis  (cited in 3 (15) 1980, 9).24   
 
Such individuals had a key role to play in both the technical and practical aspects of 
development.  This redefinition of students’ role by the state was a response to students’ 
articulation of their role as politically engaged intelektual, outlined in their contributions 
to Salemba and Gelora Mahasiswa.  It had the clear purpose of reorienting students’ 
understandings of their roles and identities away from politics and towards the scientific 
activities which the state saw as appropriate for them.  
 
Students’ role as ‘people of analysis’ was the subject of a number of editions of 
Majalah Mahasiswa.  Two editions in 1980 focussed on students’ intellectual life and 
the creation of a ‘scientific community’ (masyarakat ilmiah) (3 (15) 1980; 3 (16) 1980).  
The latter was also the theme for a 1983 edition of the magazine (6 (33) 1983).  An 
editorial in a 1984 edition also discussed the status of the campus as a scientific 
community in the context of Nugroho Notosusanto’s Alma Mater Vision (7 (39) 1984; 
see above).  In the editorials for these editions, a broad range of terms were used to 
describe students’ identity as intellectuals.  In addition to manusia penganalisa, 
editorials also used terms such as manusia penalar (logical thinkers), insan 
cendekiawan muda (young intellectual beings), sarjana yang berkwalitas intelektual 
(graduates of intellectual quality), insan penalar (beings of reasoning), calon-calon 
sarjana dan intelektual (prospective graduates and intellectuals) and 
ilmuwan/profesional in statu-nascendi (nascent scientists/professionals) (3 (16) 1980; 3 
(17) 1980, 25; 3 (18), 22; 6 (35) 1983; 5 (30) 1982).25  Students were also described as 
bagian masyarakat akademis (part of the academic community) and bagian dari 
masyarakat ilmiah (part of the scientific community) (3 (17) 1980, 25; 3 (16) 1980) and 
                                                          
24 NKK tidak bermaksud memperlancar kampus membentuk intelektual.  Orang dapat menjadi intelektual 
tanpa melewati pendidikan tinggi.  Sebaliknya tidak setiap penyandang gelar pendidikan tinggi … dapat 
dianggap sebagai intelektual.  NKK bermaksud memperlancar perguruan tinggi membentuk sejenis 
manusia yang tidak kalah pentingnya dari intelektual, yaitu manusia penganalisa … (cited in 3 (15) 
1980, 9). 
25 See also the 1980 article in Salemba which drew a distinction between calon intelektual and the pekerja 
intelektual (intellectual workers) of the NKK policy (Salemba 20 March 1980, 4). 
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 in terms which indicated their place as educated members of society (bagian dari 
masyarakat yang terdidik and komponen bangsa terdidik) (5 (27) 1982; 5 (29) 1982).   
 
There are significant similarities between the way in which editorials in Majalah 
Mahasiswa represent the intellectual identity of students and the ways this identity was 
represented in Salemba and Gelora Mahasiswa.  Terms such as intelektual for example, 
are common to both state and student representations, as is the idea that students are 
prospective (calon) or young (muda) intellectuals.  Both also represent students as part 
of the academic community.  Yet the intellectual role envisaged for students in 
editorials in Majalah Mahasiswa was clearly different to that envisaged by students 
writing in Salemba and Gelora Mahasiswa.  The meanings given to the term manusia 
penganalisa in speeches and policy documents provide the framework within the state 
defined students’ role as intellectuals.   
 
In April 1978, Daud Yusuf presented his NKK policy to the working meeting of rectors 
of state universities.  In it he defined manusia penganalisa as future technocrats, 
specialists and bureaucrats who could ensure Indonesia’s development programs were 
carried out in an effective and efficient manner.  In chapter four it was noted that in the 
view of the secular modernising strategists of the early New Order, the role of 
intellectuals was to assist in policy-making and planning for development (see chapter 
four).  The minister’s argument that the success of Indonesia’s development efforts 
depended on the availability of a variety of specialists who could function as the 
‘operators of the machinery of development’ (penggerak mesin pembangunan) was 
consistent with this view.  According to the minister, the task of those specialists within 
the technostructure was to overcome problems and issues relating to their field of 
expertise (cited in Majalah Mahasiswa 3 (16) 1980, 5).  These pekerja otak (knowledge 
workers), as the minister referred to them, occupied a powerful role in society since the 
decisions they made in their capacity as technocrats had an important impact on society.  
Students’ mission (misi) as manusia penganalisa, the minister continued, was to 
strengthen their individual reasoning power (kekuatan penalaran individual) in order to 
fulfil their future role in the technostructure (Majalah Mahasiswa 3 (16) 1980, 10): 
 
 212
 From amongst students should be born, par excellence, individuals who have the 
strength of reasoning which is required to fill the technostructure in every field 
of social life (ibid., 7).26
 
Students’ role as manusia penganalisa was thus to provide the technical expertise 
required to solve the practical problems associated with development.  This role was to 
be carried out largely within the bureaucratic apparatus of the state.  It was also in effect 
a future role, to be undertaken once students had reached intellectual maturity and been 
equipped with the necessary skills. 
 
Speeches and policy documents continually reiterated the need for students to develop 
their reasoning abilities and their ability to think analytically (kemampuan berpikir 
analitis), for their thinking to be based on scientific principles (hakikat ilmu 
pengetahuan) and their ideas expressed in an ordered and systematic way (teratur dan 
sistematik) (see Majalah Mahasiswa 3 (16) 1980, 131; 3 (16) 1980, 6-7).  These policy 
documents and speeches emphasise the fact that students are still in the process of 
developing their intellectual abilities.  As Daud Yusuf expressed it, students were ‘not 
yet acknowledged to be mature in their knowledge (belum diakui matang di dalam 
keilmuan) (3 (15) 1980, 3).  Editorials in Majalah Mahasiswa reflect this emphasis, 
revealing the link between the keyword manusia penganalisa and the keyword 
pembinaan (see above).  As a 1981 editorial expressed it: 
 
Students who are in the process of studying in institutions of higher education 
are in essence in the process of growing and developing their reasoning abilities 
and identity so that they become firm.  In this process, students are guided 
towards maturity of thinking through various academic activities and scientific 
studies, activities for the development and full comprehension of scientific 
attitudes (4 (22) 1981).27
 
The agent responsible for developing students’ reasoning abilities was the university.  A 
1984 editorial described universities as ‘factories’ for producing thinkers (manusia 
pemikir), people who were able to think in a careful, logical and empirical manner 
(orang yang sanggup berpikir cermat, logis dan empiris) (7 (39) 1984, 3).  The 
                                                          
26 Dari kelompok mahasiswa seharusnya lahir, par excellence, individu yang mempunyai kekuatan 
penalaran yang diperlukan untuk mengisi teknostruktur di setiap bidang penghidupan masyarakat 
(Majalah Mahasiswa 3 (16) 1980, 7).   
27 Mahasiswa yang sedang dalam proses belajar di pendidikan tinggi pada hakekatnya sedang dalam 
proses pertumbuhan dan pengembangan penalaran dan kepribadiannya agar menjadi mantap.  Pada 
proses tersebut, mahasiswa dibimbing ke arah kedewasaan berpikir melalui berbagai kegiatan akademik 
dan pengkajian ilmu pengetahuan, kegiatan untuk mengembangan keterampilan dan penghayatan sikap 
ilmiah (4 (22) 1981). 
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 emphasis on the ‘production’ of manusia penganalisa revealed in the metaphor of the 
university as a factory reflects the state’s approach to wider society, including students.  
Underlying this metaphor is a perception of students as a (human) resource to be shaped 
in certain uniform ways according to the state’s specifications.  As a factory, the 
university is responsible for manufacturing ‘products’ which will be useful for 
development.  The representation of education as a process of producing standardised 
and model ‘thinkers’ undermines students’ agency, representing them as empty shells to 
be filled with knowledge and with the scientific values of the university.  Moreover, 
given students’ own emphasis in Salemba and Gelora Mahasiswa on the intellectual 
basis of their actions as a means of legitimising their active role in social and political 
life, Majalah Mahasiswa’s representation of students as not yet mature intellectually 
undermines one of the key sources of legitimacy for their actions.   
 
The emphasis on students as products of the university’s education processes is also 
reflected in the grammatical roles students play.  Throughout the editorials, students are 
represented as objects rather than as actors.  In the 1981 editorial cited above, for 
example, students are the objects of the university’s ‘guidance’ in the phrase mahasiswa 
dibimbing ke arah kedewasaan berpikir (students are guided towards maturity of 
thinking) (4 (22) 1981).  Moreover, while editorials often refer to students’ intellectual 
nature and characteristics, citing students’ ciri intelek (intellectual characteristics) and 
their nature as calon-calon sarjana dan intelektual (future graduates and intellectuals) 
(3 (16), 1980; 6 (35) 1983), there were no examples in the editorials studied in which 
students were represented as acting in their role as intellectuals.   Students’ role as 
manusia penganalisa is thus not to act or even to think or analyse (this they will do in 
their role as technocrats once they have achieved intellectual maturity) but to submit 
themselves to the university’s efforts to develop their thinking skills. 
 
The term manusia penganalisa also clearly entailed a non-political understanding of 
knowledge and the role of ‘knowledge workers’.  This was a significant contrast to the 
explicitly political understanding of the role of students as intelektual developed in 
Salemba and Gelora Mahasiswa (see chapter four).  An editorial in Majalah 
Mahasiswa, for example, defined knowledge (ilmu pengetahuan) as universal, public, 
and politically disinterested and as characterised by ‘positive scepticism’ (3 (16) 1980).  
In a 1980 interview with the news magazine Tempo, in which he defended the 
normalisation concept, Daud Yusuf explained these concepts.  Knowledge, he argued, is 
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 independent of skin colour, race, descent, or religious conviction.  It is also public, in 
the sense that it is for the benefit of the whole community.  Knowledge is disinterested 
in that it is not to be used for the purposes of propaganda and it is characterised by 
positive scepticism in the sense that it is based on logic and reasoning (cited in Majalah 
Mahasiswa 3 (15) 1980, 5).   This emphasis on knowledge as ‘disinterested’ and the 
need for students to be disinterested ‘thinkers’ reflected the state’s aim of depoliticising 
students’ understandings of their intellectual identities and roles.  Thus, while students 
who wrote in Salemba and Gelora Mahasiswa saw their role as politically-engaged 
intelektual as seeking truth by applying their analytical abilities, correcting the state 
when it deviated from what was true and just, and offering suggestions for improving 
society, the view of the state was that students were apolitical ‘scientists’ working for 
the interests of society. 
 
At the beginning of this section it was noted that among the range of terms used to 
describe students’ identity as manusia penganalisa in editorials was the term 
intelektual.  Yet as the preceding discussion has shown, when editorials use this term, it 
is not the socially engaged intelektual of Salemba and Gelora Mahasiswa to which they 
refer.  Rather, intelektual in this sense refers to the technocrats of the future.  By 
including terms like intelektual within the lexical set surrounding manusia penganalisa, 
Majalah Mahasiswa depoliticises the meaning of intelektual as it is defined in Salemba 
and Gelora Mahasiswa.  In doing so, Majalah Mahasiswa strips this term of the 
dissenting meanings given to it in the student press.   
 
Politik: concept, policy, arena 
 
Minister of Education and Culture Daud Yusuf’s campus normalisation policy deemed 
political activity to be ‘abnormal’ (tidak normal) for students.  In his justification for the 
introduction of the policy, the minister argued that the campuses and the student 
representative bodies had been misused (disalahgunakan) for political interests 
(kepentingan-kepentingan percaturan politik).  This, he argued, had caused a decay in 
the scientific norms on which the academic community should be based (3 (16) 1980, 
131; 3 (15) 1980, 3; see also chapter two).  The NKK policy aimed to return the 
campuses to their ‘proper’ state as apolitical scientific communities and students to their 
proper status as members of these scientific communities.  Yet the minister was 
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 concerned to point out that this did not mean students could not engage in politics.  
Instead, he drew a distinction between politics as a concept, politics as policy and 
politics as an arena (see also chapter four).  Politics as a concept, he argued in a 1978 
speech, is concerned with ideas about what is in the national and public interest, and 
with programs for action, desired goals and the means to achieve these goals.  Politics 
as policy is concerned with the actions individuals or groups take in solving the 
problems of a society or nation.  Finally, politics as an arena is concerned with how and 
where various concepts and policies meet and are contested.  Since students’ essential 
identity was as manusia penganalisa and not, as Yusuf noted, manusia rapat umum 
(people of public meetings, read: demonstrators), then the only legitimate sense in 
which students, in their identities as mahasiswa, could engage in politics was in the first 
sense, politics as a concept.  If students did wish to engage in political policy or in 
political action, he continued, as citizens of a democratic country they were permitted to 
do so, but only as ‘youth’ (pemuda) and only outside the campus (3 (16) 1980, 8-9; 3 
(15) 1980, 10).   
 
This separation of conceptual politics from practical politics reflected the state’s 
attempts to shape the ways in which students were able to think and speak about their 
roles and identities in politics.  The concept of ‘normalisation’ did not prohibit students 
from engaging in politics.  Rather, it attempted to define what was ‘normal’ and in 
doing so circumscribe the ways in which students could conceive of their role.  The 
concepts of ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ were particularly significant for the New Order.  
‘Normal’ was associated with conformity to the key values and ideologies of the New 
Order, and with order, stability and harmony, the essence of the ideal organic state.  
Abnormality, however, implied deviance, disorder, instability and discord, which 
threatened the integrity of the state and so jeopardised the common good.  In both state 
and student discourse, ‘deviations’ were represented as detrimental to the proper 
functioning of the state and the welfare of wider society and so requiring correction.  By 
characterising practical politics as abnormal for students, the state, through the Minister 
of Education and Culture, asserts its authority to define what is normal and hence in the 
interests of society and legitimises the attempts to correct or ‘normalise’ students’ 
political roles and identities.  At the same time, it also attempts to limit the roles which 
students can legitimately play in politics.       
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 The topic of politics was the theme for two editions of Majalah Mahasiswa.  A 1980 
edition of the magazine examined the topic of students and politics in the context of the 
minister’s separation of practical and conceptual politics (3 (18) 1980).  Edition number 
32 explored the issue of political education in the wake of Presidential Instruction No. 
12 on Political Education for the Young Generation (6 (32) 1982; see chapter two).   In 
these editorials, as in the campus normalisation policy, students’ role in politik was 
closely linked to their role as manusia penganalisa.   
 
In chapter three it was argued that the Sejarah Nasional Indonesia’s account of the key 
moments of history in which youth and students were involved attempted to reconcile 
the pioneering role of these youth with the depoliticised identities which the New Order 
saw as appropriate for contemporary youth.  It did so by transforming pemuda and 
mahasiswa into symbols and by backgrounding their active role in events.  The editorial 
of edition number 18 of Majalah Mahasiswa attempts to resolve this same tension by 
reinterpreting the role of youth and students in these key political events in terms of 
‘politics as a concept’.  The editorial emphasised the intellectual basis of students’ 
historical role in the political arena, which, it stated, was based on a broad and ‘forward-
thinking vision’ (wawasan yang jauh ke depan).  According to the editorial, the youth 
and students who were involved in organisations such as Budi Utomo, Perhimpunan 
Indonesia, and KAMI and in events such as the declaration of the Sumpah Pemuda and 
those leading up to the proclamation of independence, did not profess to act on behalf of 
their alma mater or campus as mahasiswa.  Rather, they acted independently as 
‘responsible individuals’ whose actions were based on a systematic analysis of the 
situation (pemikiran dan analisa situasi yang sistematis, cermat serta terarah) and who 
had recognised the signs of social instability.  This, notes the editorial, enabled the 
students of the past to produce effective aims for political struggle.28  These students’ 
ability to analyse the existing social and political situation, the editorial continued, was 
the key lesson to be drawn by contemporary students from their predecessor’s historical 
example.  This striking reinterpretation of history using the framework of ‘reasoning’ 
                                                          
28 Nugroho Notosusanto’s Alma Mater Vision was also based on a depoliticised view of the role of 
students in politics.  The Trikarya, which formed part of the Alma Mater concept, stated that as scientific 
communities, universities must be aimed at institutionalisation, professionalisation - a term used by Ali 
Moertopo in the context of his corporatist model of social and political organisation (see Bourchier 1996, 
202) - and transpoliticisation (transpolitisisasi).  The concept of transpoliticisation implied that students 
‘transcended’ or were above politics.  As a 1984 editorial expressed it, transpoliticisation encompassed 
raising the political awareness of students to enable them to ‘undertake scientific activities in order to 
implement the political decisions which have been made by the entire people through the MPR’.  If 
students wanted to engage in ‘politicking’ (in English), this was to be undertaken outside the campus and 
must not be carried out in the name of the university (7 (39) 1984, 3). 
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 and ‘analysis’ represents students’ historical role in politics not as a practical one, but as 
a conceptual one and hence one which is consistent with the ‘normal’ mode of politics 
for students.  Moreover, in those key moments when students do play a more ‘practical’ 
role, such as in the 1966 student demonstrations, they are represented as doing so as 
responsible pemuda, not as mahasiswa. 
 
Like the minister, Majalah Mahasiswa was also concerned to point out that ‘politics as 
a concept’ did not reduce the opportunities for students to engage in politics.  As the 
editorial in edition number 18 argued, in the era of development, students could still 
undertake political activities and participate in politics insofar as these activities were 
relevant to and in accordance with students’ level of thinking (tahap pemikiran) and 
were within the scope of their role as ‘people of reasoning’ (insan penalar).  Thus in the 
editorial students were the subjects of a variety of active processes.  Students were to 
‘continue to observe the course of history’ (terus menerus ikut mengamati jalannya 
sejarah) as had previous generations of students.  They were also to ‘realise’ 
(merealisasikan) their duties of service to society.  Their participation in activities based 
on ‘politics as a concept’ were ‘still able to be undertaken’ (masih tetap dapat 
dilakukan) and they were legitimately able to engage in politics (berpolitik), provided it 
was ‘politics as a concept’.  Yet as these examples make clear, while students’ role in 
conceptual politics was an active one, it was limited to the ‘conceptual’ politics which 
the state saw as appropriate for students, that is, to analysing social and political 
conditions and making recommendations for policy based on the results of this analysis 
(see 6 (32) 1982).  The editorial gave no examples of the concrete means by which 
students could participate in politics as a concept, although the minister suggested that 
student discussion groups, provided the discussion was based on analytical principles, 
were an appropriate means by which they could express their political ideas (3 (15) 
1980, 10).  The redefinition of students’ role in politics as a conceptual one was a clear 
response to students’ conceptions of their political role in Salemba and Gelora 
Mahasiswa.  Yet it was also a response to the practical manifestations of this role, that 
is, to protests and demonstrations in which students were engaged in 1977 and 1978 and 
at earlier points in the New Order.  By redefining politics, and students’ role in it, the 
state hoped to prevent them from engaging in the kind of practical politics which 
undermined the claim that only the New Order’ could provide the stability, order and 
harmony that Indonesia required. 
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 In the above discussion of students as ‘people of analysis’ it was suggested that the 
designation of students as not yet mature intellectually undermined a key source of 
legitimacy for their actions.  This was also the case with regard to their role in politics.  
The editorial in edition number 32 of Majalah Mahasiswa noted that students were still 
in the process of consolidating their values and their identities. Moreover, although 
students were very enthusiastic about politics, their ideas about it were often vague and 
their thinking was not yet firmly planted in the state ideology.  Given this intellectual 
and political immaturity, students’ political education and their role in politics, the 
editorial argued, should only encompass theoretical politics (politik teoretis), that is, the 
evaluation of political policy and the making of policy recommendations.  Practical 
politics (politik praktis), which encompassed policy making and its execution, was not 
part of students’ role (6 (32) 1982).  This definition of students as ‘immature’ in terms 
of their thinking and in their understanding of political issues enables students’ 
criticisms to be dismissed as the opinions of idealists who don’t yet fully understand 
practical considerations.  At the same time, however, in providing a political role for 
students, albeit a ‘conceptual’ one, the state creates a set of conditions which enable 
them to regulate their political behaviour in appropriate ways.  The redefinition of 
students’ political role as concerned with ‘politics as a concept’ provided a framework 
which enabled students to continue to define their role in political terms but do so in a 
way which was conducive to the state’s disciplinary aims.  Moreover, since students 
represented their role in politics as both a constitutional right and a practical 
manifestation of their role as agents of social control, by allowing students to play a role 
in politics, the state also appears to be respecting the democratic and constitutional 
rights of its citizens and to be responsive to criticisms from society.  
 
Intellectuals and politics: the student view 
 
In the discussion of students’ self-censorship and dissent above, it was suggested that 
the representations of students’ roles and identities in Majalah Mahasiswa’s editorials 
established a set of parameters within which students could think and speak about their 
roles.   In doing so, these editorials aimed to provide the conditions under which 
students could modify their own behaviour in ways consistent with the New Order’s 
disciplinary aims.  Students’ contributions on the topic of their identity as intellectuals 
and their role in politics indicate that they also engaged in self-censorship with regard to 
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 their intellectual identity and political roles.  However, just as students were able to 
incorporate dissenting meanings into the way they wrote about their role in 
development, so they were also to some extent able to challenge the state’s positioning 
of them as manusia penganalisa and represent their role in ‘politics as a concept’ as an 
active one.    
 
In some student contributions, the minister’s characterisation of students as future 
technocrats who would use their knowledge and skills to serve the nation in a technical 
and practical capacity provided the framework for their roles as intellectuals.  For 
example, Djoko Walujo, a frequent contributor to Majalah Mahasiswa and a student in 
the Faculty of Social Sciences at Universitas Indonesia, observed that universities were 
expected ‘to create people with the quality of broad knowledge, who have the skills and 
character to fill the technostructure’ (melahirkan orang-orang yang berbobot 
pengetahuan yang luas, mempunyai keterampilan dan berwatak buat mengisi 
teknostruktur) (2 (11) 1979, 48).29  Similarly, fourth year teacher’s college 
undergraduate student Hari Karyono argued that universities were expected to produce 
people who can ‘contribute their efforts and ideas for the developing nation’ 
(menyumbangkan tenaga dan pikirannya bagi negara yang sedang membangun) (7 (37) 
1983, 15).  Other students framed their role as intellectuals in developmentalist terms 
but also drew on the political conceptions of the role of intellectuals developed in 
Salemba and Gelora Mahasiswa, using it to justify their function as agents of ‘social 
control’.  For example, in a 1978 article, Medan Teacher’s College student Ratna Juwita 
Thaib argued that students’ role as objective critics and as a force for social control of 
the implementation of development was ‘progressive’ (progresif) and consistent with 
the nature of intellectuals (2 (9-10) 1978, 75).   
 
In chapter four it was suggested that students who wrote in Salemba and Gelora 
Mahasiswa stressed that while their role in politics was an active one, it was not that of 
a political party but rather was connected to their role as agents of social control.  
Students also emphasised their sense of social responsibility as the motivation for their 
role in politics and defined politics itself in terms which were consistent with the New 
Order’s organicist values.  This representation of students’ role in politics, it was 
suggested, was a response to the very real threat of repression which students faced and 
                                                          
29 Djoko Walujo had been a reporter for Salemba.  He later became a reporter for Majalah Mahasiswa 
before serving on its editorial staff.   
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 a strategy which they hoped would enable them to avoid state repression and so allow 
them to continue their role as ‘loyal’ critics of the regime.   
 
The depoliticisation policies of the late 1970s meant that for students who wrote in 
Majalah Mahasiswa the parameters within which they were able to write about their 
political roles and identities were significantly narrower.  Students responded to this by 
defining their role in politics within the framework of ‘politics as a concept’ that 
Minister of Education and Culture Daud Yusuf had deemed appropriate for students.  
However, unlike editorials in Majalah Mahasiswa, these students were more specific 
about the practical ways in which they could be involved in ‘politics as a concept’.  For 
example, Alo Liliwery, a Universitas Nusa Cendana student and managing editor of that 
university’s monthly magazine Arena, defined politics as ‘the participation of every 
citizen in contributing their ideas’ (keikutsertaan setiap warga bangsa dalam 
menyumbangkan pemikirannya) for the development of their nation.  The most 
fundamental task of ‘politics’, he argued, was thus solving the nation’s problems.  
Students’ role in this process was as ‘conceptors’ (konseptor) whose task was to analyse 
these problems (6 (32) 1982, 20-21).  As members of the scientific community the 
correct way for students to express their opinions about these issues was not to protest 
and form ‘street parliaments’ (parlemen jalanan).  This, he argued, was ‘tragic’ and 
‘irrational’ behaviour.  Rather, it was to bring them to the attention of the authorities 
using legislative channels, that is, by taking their ideas to members of parliament (3 (16) 
1980, 29-31).  Similarly, in an article on the political role of students in development, 
Universitas Gajah Mada student Muhammad Firdauz AP, a regular contributor to mass 
media and campus publications, suggested that one of the ways in which students could 
‘participate politically in development’ (berpartisipasi secara politik dalam 
pembangunan) and contribute their ideas to the nation was to involve them in decision-
making and policy formulation, for example, by having student delegates in the 
parliament.  He also pointed out that contemporary students exercise their political 
rights by acting as a means of social control, by forming delegations to their 
representatives and putting forward demands.  This, he argued, was ‘more positive than 
having to hold demonstrations’ (3 (18) 1980, 46-8). 
 
As these contributions indicate, the notion of students’ role as agents of social control 
remained a consistent feature of their own conceptions of their role, at least for those 
students who wrote for Majalah Mahasiswa.  This concept allowed students to 
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 challenge the state’s positioning of them as simply the technocrats of the future and to 
represent their role in ‘politics as a concept’ as encompassing actions such as sending 
delegations to members of parliament, a strategy which had been used by students 
during the 1970s (see chapter four).  At the same time, students’ role as intellectuals and 
their role in politics was constrained by the limits of ‘politics as a concept’.  Moreover, 
as noted above, students’ use of terms such as kontrol sosial in their contributions to 
Majalah Mahasiswa, undermined the dissenting meanings of this term and so 
incorporated students’ voices in the state’s ‘voice of authority’. 
 
Voices of authority 
 
In chapter one it was suggested that the choices speakers and writers make from the 
system of interpersonal meaning have important implications for how power 
relationships are expressed in texts.  In particular, modality choices establish certain 
subject positions for speakers or writers as well as for their audiences.  These subject 
positions play a significant role in speakers’ and writers’ attempts to socialise their 
readers into a particular version of social reality and their position in it.  In editorials in 
Majalah Mahasiswa, the modalities which were used establish the voice of the state as 
an authoritative one and position students as objects.  
 
The editorial in the 1982 edition which dealt with the topic of students’ political 
education, for example, uses categorical modality to position the state (the editorial 
voice of Majalah Mahasiswa) as the source of ‘facts’.   
 
There are two aspects to practical politics, that is, the technical/strategic aspect 
in the context of policy making, and the technical/tactical aspect in the scope of 
policy executing.  And the role of students in the field of politics only covers 
policy evaluation and policy recommendation.  Political education for students 
on the campus is theoretical politics, which covers the stages of policy 
evaluation and policy recommendation.  It is these two aspects which are in 
accordance with the NKK policy which states [that] students engagement in 
politics needs to be seen as conceptual (6 (32) 1982).30
 
                                                          
30 Dalam politik praktis ada dua aspek yang mengikutinya, yakni aspek teknik/strategi dalam rangka 
policy making, dan aspek teknis/taktis dalam lingkup policy executing.  Dan peran mahasiswa di bidang 
politik hanya meliputi policy evaluation dan policy recommendation saja.  Pendidikan politik bagi 
mahasiswa di kampus adalah politik teoretis yang meliputi tahap policy evaluation dan policy 
recommendation.  Dua aspek ini yang sesuai dengan kebijaksanaan NKK yang menggariskan mahasiswa 
berpolitik perlu ditanggapi sebagai konsep (6 (32) 1982).  
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 The use of the verb ada (there are) here presents the state’s definition of practical 
politics as indisputable ‘truth’.  The verb (meliputi) and the reiteration of ‘only’ in 
hanya and saja represents the state’s view of the role of students in politics as only 
covering ‘policy evaluation and policy recommendation’ in categorical terms while 
adalah (is) encodes a definitive statement about political education for students.  The 
final sentence provides an authoritative assertion about the kind of politics which is 
appropriate for students according to the NKK policy, namely conceptual politics.   
 
These categorical modalities establish the authority of Majalah Mahasiswa’s editorial 
voice to represent what is said as ‘truth’ and the state’s view of students’ role in politics 
as ‘fact’.  This authority reflects the hierarchical relationship between the state as bapak 
and students as anak and distances students from the voice of authority.  Yet the bapak-
anak relationship is a benevolent one, in which the bapak’s interest is the welfare of 
those for whom he is responsible.  By representing the state’s view of students role in 
politics as ‘in the best interests of students themselves and the nation as a whole, 
Majalah Mahasiswa attempts to socialise student readers into their ‘appropriate’ role in 
‘politics as a concept’. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The keywords which frame editorials in Majalah Mahasiswa define students’ roles and 
identities in ways which reflect the New Order’s policy of depoliticisation and its focus 
on development (pembangunan).  Through these keywords, the state sought to shape the 
ways in which students were able to think and speak about their roles and identities, 
including their role in development, their identity as manusia penganalisa, their role in 
relation to wider society, and importantly, their role in ‘politics as a concept’.  These 
representations of students’ roles and identities reflected the state’s aim of ‘governing’ 
students, that is, with regulating students’ behaviour in ways which were consistent with 
the organic values of the New Order state.  It also reflected the state’s concern with 
utilising students’ skills and capabilities for its all-encompassing program of 
development. 
 
Yet student contributions to Majalah Mahasiswa reveal that the power relationship 
between students and the state was by no means a relationship of dominance and 
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 subordination.  While students reproduced key aspects of the content and vocabulary of 
the state discourse of development in order to avoid state censorship and repression, 
student contributors were also able to incorporate into Majalah Mahasiswa some 
aspects of the dissenting meanings which had been present in Salemba and Gelora 
Mahasiswa during the mid to late 1970s.  Thus, while ‘politics as a concept’ meant that 
students had to represent their role in politics in conceptual terms, they were also able to 
represent actions such as sending delegations to members of parliament as a legitimate 
way of expressing their ideas about politics.  Students’ contributions thus reveal that 
despite their reproduction of the state discourse, those who wrote for Majalah 
Mahasiswa were not fully socialised into the roles and identities the state had 
constructed for them.   
 
However, students’ incorporation of terms such as kontrol sosial into their contributions 
to Majalah Mahasiswa enabled the state to undermine the dissenting meanings which 
this term had in Salemba and Gelora Mahasiswa during the mid to late 1970s. By 
coopting student discourse, the state attempted to mitigate the risks associated with 
allowing students the necessary freedom to ‘make choices’ about how they represented 
their roles and identities and how they acted in their capacity as students.  This 
cooptation, together with the cultivation of alternative avenues of student dissent during 
the 1980s, produced a new language of student dissent, which drew on concepts such as 
opposition and which represented the relationship between students and wider society in 
new ways.  It is to this new language that the next chapter turns.  
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 CHAPTER SIX 
 
Resist = lawan: the student media of the 
1990s 
 
Now is the time for us to be ‘democratic’ in our thinking … [I]t is also our right to 
determine our identity as students.1
 
Universitas Gadjah Mada student 
 
The previous chapter argued that the redefinition of students’ roles and identities 
undertaken in editorials in Majalah Mahasiswa during the late 1970s and 1980s 
represented a disciplinary strategy on the part of the New Order state.  This strategy 
aimed to shape the ways in which students were able to think and speak about their 
roles and identities and so regulate students’ behaviour in ways which were consistent 
with the New Order’s organicist values.  As a result of this strategy, the voices of 
students who wrote for this magazine were in part coopted by the state discourse, and 
the dissenting meaning of terms such as kontrol sosial, which students employed in 
their writings, were largely undermined.   
 
This chapter examines the ways in which students who wrote in the student press of the 
1990s redefined their roles and identities in the context of the period of limited political 
liberalisation or ‘openness’ (keterbukaan) between 1988 and 1994 and the subsequent 
retraction of political liberties after 1994.  It also covers the period between late 1997 
and 1998 during which Indonesia experienced rapid economic and political change as a 
result of the Asian economic crisis.  The widespread social unrest and political divisions 
this caused eventually led to the resignation of President Suharto on 21 May 1998. 
 
The chapter focuses on five student publications published between 1990 and 1998 and 
which were based on state and private universities in four urban centres: Balairung 
                                                          
1 Sudah saatnya kita ‘berdemokrasi’ dalam berpikir… hak kita pulalah untuk menentukan identitas kita 
sebagai mahasiswa (Balairung 4 (12) 1990: 18-19). 
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 (Universitas Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta), Himmah (Universitas Islam Indonesia, 
Yogyakarta), Politika (Universitas Nasional, Jakarta), Ganesha (Institut Teknologi 
Bandung) and Hayamwuruk (Universitas Diponegoro, Semarang).  It also examines 
Universitas Indonesia’s ‘action media’ (media aksi) bergerak!, which was published 
during the height of the 1998 demonstrations.  While these publications represent a 
fraction of the number of student newspapers, magazines and bulletins published in the 
early to mid 1990s, they were among the most widely circulated and influential of the 
period.2
 
The chapter traces the shifts in the ways students who wrote in the student press of the 
1990s represented their roles and identities through an examination of six keywords: 
perubahan (change), reformasi (reform), rakyat (the people), gerakan (movement), 
perlawanan (resistance) and demokrasi (democracy).  The chapter argues that these 
shifts were a consequence of the changes in state-society relations brought about by 
keterbukaan, and by the additional scope for ‘responsible’ freedom of political 
expression which this period allowed.  They were also a consequence of the 
depoliticisation policies pursued by the state during the 1980s, under which students, 
among other groups, were politically marginalised.  This marginalisation severed in a 
decisive way the relationship of ‘critical collaboration’ which had existed between 
students and the state in the 1970s.  It was also a significant factor in the revival of 
radical populist discourses, which provided students with an alternative framework with 
which to analyse social and political life and their own role in it.  These factors enabled 
the student press of the 1990s to develop a genuinely oppositional discourse in which 
their roles, and their relationship to the state, were defined in terms of conflict, struggle 
and resistance.   
 
From a theoretical standpoint, this resistance was possible precisely because, in 
Foucault’s view, effective government requires that individuals be provided with the 
freedom to ‘make the right choices’.  Yet this freedom always involves the possibility 
that the ‘wrong’ choices will be made.  Students’ choice to represent their role in 
oppositional terms in many ways threatened the status quo.  When students’ criticisms 
breached the limits set by the state, the state responded with repressive measures.  Over 
                                                          
2 Student dissent during the 1990s was far more geographically diverse than in previous decades, 
spreading beyond the main urban centres of Java to cities such as Ujung Pandang and Medan.  For 
reasons of space, however, it has not been possible to include publications from outside Java in the 
analysis.   
 226
 the course of the 1990s a number of critical student newspapers were banned.  Student 
activists were also periodically arrested by the security apparatus, and a not 
insignificant number disappeared.  Yet this repression was not unlimited: students 
retained a significant amount of freedom for political expression.  This was not because 
of a reduced capacity to repress dissidents on the part of the state.  Rather, as this 
chapter suggests, it was in part because the students of the 1990s, like those of the 
1970s, used their political freedom ‘responsibly’, by representing their roles and 
identities in ways which did not directly threaten the underlying values and ideologies 
of the regime.  As David Ingram argues in his discussion of Foucault’s view of the 
nature of power in modern societies: ‘the exercise of civil and political liberties only 
serves to mask the deeper discipline required of citizens inhabiting modern states’ 
(1994, 220).  However, it was also a product of the state’s confidence in its ability to 
effectively repress dissent when it was necessary to do so and the relatively weak nature 
of organised civil society opposition. 
 
The chapter begins with a brief survey of the student press during the 1990s.  It then 
examines in detail the keywords which students writing in the student press during the 
1990s employed in defining their roles and identities.  As the chapter shows, the 
meanings students gave to these keywords reoriented their roles and identities away 
from notions of control and correction towards the concept of thoroughgoing change.  
Students also framed their roles in society and their relationship to the state in terms of 
struggle and resistance and represented the rakyat (the people) as an integral part of the 
broad movement for change.  Despite this, paternalistic conceptions of students’ 
leadership role in society persisted throughout the 1990s.  Unlike the 1970s, students’ 
justification for their function in social and political life relied less on the concept of 
their role as a moral force and disinterested intellectuals as on the legitimacy of 
opposition in a demokrasi (democracy).  The final part of the chapter examines the 
ways in which the student press used humour and satire as well as other linguistic 
techniques to attempt to socialise their readers into the identities constructed for them 
through the keywords.   
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 The student press in the late 1980s and 1990s  
 
After the closure of the student newspapers in 1979 and 1980, the student press 
experienced a period of relative inactivity.  From the mid 1980s, however, student 
publications began to re-emerge.  The student presses on most campuses were managed 
under the auspices of the student activity units, which were part of the campus 
coordination (BKK) policy.  However, on some of the smaller private universities, 
where implementation of the NKK/BKK policy had not been as consistent, the student 
press was able to operate with a greater degree of independence, albeit remaining under 
the patronage of the rector (see Supriyanto 1998, 95-7). 
 
While the student publications of the 1970s were mostly tabloids published on a 
fortnightly or monthly basis, those of the late 1980s and 1990s took various forms 
including magazines, tabloids, newspapers and bulletins, usually published on a 
monthly basis (Supriyanto 1998, 99).    Most of these publications had relatively small 
circulations compared to those of the mid to late 1970s, with between 1000 and 5000 
copies (Direktori pers n.d.).  In addition, while the most active student presses of the 
1970s were based on the campuses of large state universities, the student press of the 
1990s reflected the increasing importance of private and smaller state universities as 
well as the broader geographical spread of student activism (see chapter two).3  As a 
result, by the late 1990s there were over 400 publications published at university 
campuses throughout the archipelago (Direktori pers n.d.).   
 
In Yogyakarta, the first edition of Balairung, Universitas Gadjah Mada’s student 
magazine, was published on 8 January 1986 with an initial print run of 5000 copies.  It 
was 54 pages long and featured a variety of articles on the topic of industrialisation in 
Indonesia (Balairung 6 (34) 2001, 182).  The magazine was published quarterly from 
the end of 1988 and its circulation was relatively small, at between 3500 and 5000 
copies (Balairung 13 (27) 1998, 74).  From 1990 onwards, the magazine usually ran to 
about 120 pages.  It included a wide variety of articles and opinion pieces dealing with 
themes such as the political role of the middle class, New Order political detainees, the 
                                                          
3 Private universities had not been subject to the same level of scrutiny when it came to applying the 
NKK/BKK policy and so had somewhat more freedom than larger state campuses which had been at the 
centre of the protests of the 1970s and so key targets for ‘normalisation’ (Aspinall 2000, 165-6; Denny 
1989, 75). 
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 1997 elections, former Minister of Research and Technology B. J. Habibie’s policy on 
technology as well as the state of student representative bodies and the student 
movement (Balairung 9 (21) 1995; 9 (22) 1995; 10 (23) 1996; 10 (24) 1996; 6 (15) 
1992; 4 (12 ) 1990; 12 (25) 1997).  In addition, the magazine regularly included profiles 
of key public figures, sections on health, culture, the environment, technology and 
student issues as well as book reviews, a photographic essay, readers’ letters and 
cartoons. 
 
Himmah was published at one of Indonesia’s oldest Islamic universities, Universitas 
Islam Indonesia in Yogyakarta.  The magazine was established in March 1967 with the 
title Muhibbah.  Muhibbah was banned by the New Order twice during its lifetime, in 
the lead up to the 1978 and 1982 General Sessions of the MPR (Direktori pers n.d.).  In 
the early 1980s, the magazine changed its name to Himmah.  The new magazine was 
published four times a year and by the late 1990s had a circulation of 5000-7000 copies.  
It usually ran to between 70 and 80 pages and included feature articles on topics such as 
development and democratisation of the economy, the presidential succession, 
opposition parties and the elections (Himmah 28 (2) October 1995; 28 (1) June 1995; 30 
(2) October 1997; 24 (1) February-March 1993; 30 (1) April 1997).  Like Balairung, 
Himmah also included regular features such as essays and opinion pieces, book reviews, 
interviews and profiles of public figures, and sections on culture, the economy, law, 
religion, education, science and technology and student issues as well as readers’ letters, 
cartoons and a pojok. 
 
In Bandung, students associated with Ganesha, the student bulletin of Institut Teknologi 
Bandung had been important in the re-emergence of protest in the late 1980s.  This was 
reflected in the critical stance which the publication took (Aspinall 2000, 163).  
Ganesha was first published in 1988.  It appeared 4 times a year, although it was rather 
irregular, and usually ran to around 20 pages.  Its motto was ‘upholding students’ 
sovereignty’ (menegakkan kedaulatan mahasiswa) and the front cover described it as a 
forum for the ‘aspirations of the campus community in the context of developing a 
critical and responsible attitude to make student life more dynamic’.  To this end, it 
included feature articles on topics such as the political parties, ITB Rector Wiranto 
Arismunandar’s repressive policies, the elections, the student movement, the 
parliament, monetary policy and higher education policy (Ganesha 6 (11) February 
1994; 8 (22) 1997; 8 (23) 1997).  It also included essays and opinion pieces, book 
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 reviews, a section on campus issues, profiles of public figures, and a regular poetry 
section. 
 
In Semarang Hayamwuruk, published by the Faculty of Arts student senate at 
Universitas Diponegoro, was a measure of the increasing importance of many of the 
smaller state universities in the development of a critical student press during the 1990s 
(Aspinall 2000, 172).  The magazine was established in 1985 and at the end of the 
1990s had a relatively small circulation of 1500 copies.  It was published twice a year 
and usually ran to about 70-80 pages (Direktori pers n.d.).  It contained a variety of 
articles dealing with economic, political and cultural themes such as the pro-democracy 
movement, literature and politics, and the SMPT policy.  It also included regular 
features such as book reviews, essays and opinion pieces, sections on culture and the 
arts, the environment and student issues and interviews with prominent public figures as 
well as short stories and poems. 
 
In Jakarta, Universitas Indonesia’s student press, like many others, had languished after 
the banning of Salemba in 1980.  Even though a campus-level publication had been 
published since the mid 1980s, the placement of this publication under the patronage of 
the rector meant that it was unable to develop the same critical quality as its 
predecessor.4  The student press at Universitas Nasional, however, contributed to filling 
this gap.  Universitas Nasional was one of Jakarta’s most prestigious private 
universities.  Politika, published by the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences Student 
Study and Communication Forum (Forum Kajian dan Komunikasi Mahasiswa Ilmu 
Sosial dan Ilmu Politik), was from the outset one of the most critical publications of the 
period.  The magazine appeared four times a year and usually ran to around 30-40 
pages.  It was banned several times during its lifetime: at the end of 1993 and again two 
years later at the end of 1995 (Supriyanto 1998, 94).  The topics it covered included 
political prisoners, the electoral system, development, the restrictions on political rights, 
the presidential succession and the political role of the middle classes and the 1992 
elections (Politika June-July 1995; April 1995; September 1993; February 1993; 
November 1992; May 1992).  It also featured essays, interviews and profiles of public 
                                                          
4 Warta UI was published from the mid-1980s (see Supriyanto 1998, 91and 242, fn 53) until 1992 when it 
was replaced by Suara Mahasiswa UI, published by the student senate (senat mahasiswa).   
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 figures, sections on culture and on campus issues, book reviews as well as readers’ 
letters and an occasional poem.5  
 
With the NKK/BKK policy still in force until 1990, and the regime’s continuing 
repressive attitude towards critical voices, the student press of the mid to late 1980s 
remained relatively cautious.  After 1990 however, some student publications became 
increasingly outspoken.  David Hill has suggested that the campus publications of the 
1990s ‘tend[ed] to be tame organs for university public relations rather than an 
expression of student discontent’ (Hill 1995, 116-7; see also 114-8).  While this was 
true of some campus publications, the publications examined in this chapter were 
integral to the development of a critical student press.  The critical stance of these and 
other publications led to periodic repression.  In addition to Politika, Arena, the student 
magazine of Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic Institute (IAIN Sunan Kalijaga) in 
Yogyakarta, which was well-known for its critical reporting of political issues, was 
banned after it published an investigative report into Suharto’s wealth in 1993 (see 
Sushandoyo, Pamungkas and Mulyana 1998, 32).   
 
The student press of the 1990s was more ‘intellectual’ in orientation than its 
predecessors, publishing well-researched reports which drew on the writings of both 
Indonesian and non-Indonesian academics.  This was in part a response to the repressive 
steps taken by the regime during the 1980s, the legacies of which lasted into the 1990s.  
It was also a product of the backgrounds of those who ran the publications, many of 
whom had been involved in the study groups of the 1980s and remained active in the 
discussion groups associated with many student publications in the 1990s (Supriyanto 
1998, 92 and 121; see also below).  Many publications also endeavoured to present a 
more professional face, with glossy covers and sophisticated layout.  As in the 1970s, 
many of the students associated with the student press went on to work for provincial 
and national newspapers and magazines.  
 
During the 1998 demonstrations, student presses on campuses throughout the 
archipelago responded to the need for readily available information which would help to 
                                                          
5 After Politika was banned, students associated with the magazine formed a study grouped called the 
Centre for the Study of Politics and the Defense of Society) (Pusat Pengkajian Politik dan Advokasi 
Masyarakat, Puspipam) in December 1994.  The centre published a 20-page magazine entitled Opini 
which dealt with themes of politics and human rights and which was circulated among the Universitas 
Nasional campus community (Direktori pers n.d.). 
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 facilitate the coordination of protests by publishing daily or weekly ‘wall newspapers’ 
(koran dinding) and newsletters known as ‘action media’ (media aksi).  These media 
aksi played an important role in disseminating information to students and provided a 
link between the student activists behind the protests and the large numbers of students 
participating in them (Mahendra 1999, 92).6  At Universitas Gadjah Mada, students 
published a ‘wall newspaper’ edition of Balairung to provide information about the 
student protests.  This was later replaced by a 4-page newsletter entitled Gugat, which 
was published twice a week (Balairung 13 (28) 1998, 3; Gugat 25 April 1998).  A 
number of other campuses, including Universitas Airlangga in Surabaya, and Institut 
Teknologi Bandung, published similar media in the months leading to the fall of 
Suharto.7  Universitas Indonesia’s action media bergerak! (move!) was among the most 
consistent of these action media.  It was published daily without interruption from 
March to June 1998.  It appeared as a simple 4–page bulletin, and had a circulation of 
500 to 1000 copies.  During the student occupation of the parliament building, however, 
10 000 copies were printed and distributed to students (Mahendra 1999, 91).  
 
Power and the politics of student identity  
 
Indonesia’s brief period of political liberalisation at the beginning of the 1990s was the 
consequence of two principal factors.  The first was structural change in Indonesian 
society.  The second was intra-regime conflict.  The strong economic growth of the 
1970s and 1980s had created both a new middle class and a large urban working class.  
By the end of the 1980s, social pressures for reform from within civil society had begun 
to mount.  The new middle class was increasingly seeking greater political participation 
and democratisation of Indonesia’s social, political and economic life.  At the same 
time, the urban working class, which had been marginalised both politically and 
economically by the growth of the previous decade, also began to mobilise.  Pressures 
from within the New Order political elite were also growing.  The tension between the 
president and certain sections of the military, centred around the powerful armed forces 
commander General L. B. (Benny) Moerdani was particularly important in this regard.  
After the very public conflict over Suharto’s choice of vice-presidential candidate, 
                                                          
6 The internet was also an important source of information during this period (see Winters 2002). 
7 Resist = lawan was published by the Student Publications Association (Lembaga Penerbitan 
Mahasiswa) at Universitas Airlangga in Surabaya from May 1998.   
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 Suharto’s support within the military was seriously compromised.  Figures within the 
military began to call for the reform of Indonesia’s political system.8   
 
Suharto’s response to this was to declare his support for greater openness (keterbukaan) 
(see Aspinall 2000, 64-80; Budiman 1992; Bertrand 1996; Lane 1991).  Bertrand (1996) 
suggests that while the military’s aim in proposing reform was to pressure Suharto, the 
president would not have declared his support for openness had it not served his own 
interests.  He suggests that the initiation of openness enabled Suharto to re-establish his 
control over the military and at the same time consolidate his own power in a post-
Suharto government.  The president, he maintains, ‘clearly did not see liberalisation as a 
means to disperse power nor to change the political system (1996, 335).’  Nonetheless, 
openness did provide an opportunity for more open discussion of previously taboo 
political issues.  In addition to the succession issue and the political role of ABRI, 
government policies and the nature and role of institutions of state were also debated 
(Bertrand 1996, 338).  This debate did not only take place at the level of elite politics.  
Between 1988 and 1994, there was increasingly bold opposition to the Suharto regime 
as NGOs, groups of dissident intellectuals such as Forum Demokrasi (Democracy 
Forum), the press, labour organisations and, eventually, the Indonesian Democracy 
Party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, PDI), took advantage of the new political mood (see 
Aspinall 2000; Lane 1991).   
 
Yet the limited political liberalisation initiated under openness was also a means by 
which the regime attempted to contain dissent.  By allowing greater freedom of 
expression, the regime appeared to be responsive to societal demands for change.  At 
the same time, it was also able to limit the parameters within which public debate could 
take place.9  Despite this, periodic repression continued to occur and the state responded 
harshly to organised labour.  In addition to repression, the state also employed 
ideological strategies.  Bourchier argues that the revival of organicist or integralist 
ideology from the mid 1980s was an attempt by the regime to consolidate its hold on 
power in the face of increasing pressures from civil society (Bourchier 1997, 159; 
                                                          
8 For good accounts of these developments see Aspinall 2000, 44-8, 51-61; Bourchier and Hadiz 2003, 
16-18. 
9 Discussing Foucault’s ideas on liberalism, Hindess cites Adam Smith’s observation that high levels of 
police regulation of a population tend to be associated with higher crime rates.  Smith concludes from this 
that it is a lack of freedom on the part of individuals (and their consequent dependence on others to 
regulate their behaviour) that causes crime.  Minimising crime is thus best achieved by promoting 
individual freedom and responsibility (Hindess 1996, 126-7).   
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 Bourchier 1996, chapter 9).  This involved a reassertion of that claim that 
individualistic, Western models of social organisation were not appropriate for 
Indonesia.  Instead, Indonesia was an organic or integralist state, modelled on values 
such as consensus and order and in which there was no separation between the state and 
society (Bourchier 1997, 165).  During keterbukaan, integralist ideology set the 
parameters within which debate about democracy, the political system, the role of the 
military, the relationship between the state and wider society, and human rights could 
take place (Bourchier 1997, 174). 
 
For students, keterbukaan saw a relaxation of some of the restrictions which had been in 
place throughout the 1980s.  During the 1980s, student voices, especially on the 
campuses, had remained relatively muted.  In addition to the closure or cooptation of 
the student press, the independence of the student representative organisations had been 
effectively undermined by the BKK policy, which controlled student activities and 
intervened in the appointment of student representatives.  Minister of Education and 
Culture Fuad Hassan, appointed in 1985, took a more moderate approach to student 
political activity than his predecessors Daud Yusuf and Nugroho Notosusanto.  In July 
1990, the minister responded to student protest by revoking the NKK/BKK policy.  In 
its place he introduced the university student senate (Senat Mahasiswa Perguruan 
Tinggi, SMPT) policy, which allowed students to elect their own representatives at the 
school and faculty levels.10  These and other measures opened up new opportunities for 
students to test the limits of tolerated opposition.  In the late 1980s, student protest 
began to re-emerge on university campuses.  Initially, these protests dealt with campus 
issues, including protests against the NKK/BKK policy.   Gradually, however, issues of 
social justice, including land disputes such as the Kedung Ombo dam project, as well as 
human rights and other national concerns became more prominent (Aspinall 1993; 
Denny 1989, 77; Harahap 1993, 96-102; Harahap and Basril 1999, 269-74).  In 1991 
and 1993, for example, students protested against the state lottery and in 1994 they took 
to the streets in protest against the closure of Tempo, Editor and Detik (Harahap and 
Basril 1999, 278-80; Aspinall 2000, 172).  The elections of 1992 and 1997 were also 
                                                          
10 The policy was outlined in Ministerial Decision No. 0457/U/1990.  Membership of the university 
student senate (Senat Mahasiswa Perguruan Tinggi) comprised the chairpersons of the departmental and 
faculty student representative bodies, namely the Faculty Student Representative Body (Badan 
Perwakilan Mahasiswa Fakultas), the Faculty Student Senates (Senat Mahasiswa Fakultas) and the 
School Student Associations (Himpunan Mahasiswa Jurusan).   The leadership of the SMPT was 
approved by the university authorities to whom it was responsible in undertaking its activities (Hassan 
1998, 133-35).  For this reason many students viewed the policy with scepticism. 
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 accompanied by vociferous student protests demanding democratisation 
(demokratisasi).   
 
One of the distinguishing features of the student protest of the 1980s and 1990s was the 
revival of a strongly populist radicalism (Aspinall 1993; see also Bourchier and Hadiz 
2003; 17-18). This new radicalism tapped into the radical nationalism of the late 
colonial period and to the leftist and socialist traditions of the 1950s and 1960s.  
However, it was also influenced by the more recent ideologies of the environmental and 
feminist movement as well as by Islamic revivalism.  Students were particularly 
significant in the revival of radicalism. The tight controls placed on student dissent 
during the 1980s led students to seek other means of continuing their active social and 
political role, primarily through the burgeoning NGO movement as well as through the 
study groups which emerged both on and off campuses from the early 1980s.  Students’ 
involvement in NGOs equipped them with a new awareness of social injustice.  Within 
the student study groups which emerged during the 1980s, radical political theories and 
leftist literature were popular.   
 
Aspinall (1993) suggests that the attraction to radical ideas amongst students was the 
result of a combination of factors.  Firstly, unlike their predecessors in the 1970s, the 
students of the late 1980s and 1990s had little sense of connection with or commitment 
to the ideals of the New Order.  The mythologisation of the 1966 generation and its 
partnership with the military had largely been debunked by the 1980s.  At the same 
time, the young generation of the late 1980s and 1990s did not have the same fear of the 
left that earlier generations of students had since they had no personal experience of the 
political dominance of the PKI during the 1950s and 1960s or of the traumatic events of 
1965-66.  Secondly, the depoliticisation policy of the 1980s also had a significant effect 
on the revival of radicalism.  This policy excluded students from the political process 
and coopted many of them into the regime’s ideology.  This led students to look to 
NGOs and study groups for alternative forums for dissent and alternative discourses 
with which to challenge the regime.  Thirdly, as noted above, through these avenues 
students became aware of the marginalising effects of the New Order’s economic 
growth and development on rural communities and urban workers.  Radical and 
populist ideas provided students with a new framework within which to understand 
Indonesian society and to define their own roles and identities in it. 
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 As a strategy of ‘government’, keterbukaan depended on the ability of Indonesian 
citizens, including students, to use their new-found political liberties to make choices 
which would not threaten the status quo.  In 1994, however, it became clear to elements 
within the state that this freedom was not being used ‘responsibly’.  As a result, in June 
1994 the Minister of Information banned three news publications – Tempo, Editor and 
Detik – which were deemed to have violated the parameters of a ‘free and responsible’ 
press (bebas dan bertanggungjawab).  From this time, the state gradually wound back 
keterbukaan and returned to the tried and tested methods of coercion.  This strategy 
might have been successful in containing dissent had it not been for the Asian economic 
crisis, which undermined the Suharto regime’s ability to guarantee continued economic 
growth and stability. 
 
Change: contesting the New Order 
 
The need for a fundamental restructuring of Indonesia’s social, political and economic 
order provided the overarching framework within which students who wrote in the 
student press of the 1990s conceived of their roles and identities.  This concern was a 
clear reflection of the re-emergence of the radical tradition amongst students, which 
advocated a thoroughgoing transformation of Indonesian politics and society.  It was 
also clearly counter to the regime’s public pronouncements on the need for change and 
the extent of change which was required.  Students’ views on change, and the meanings 
they gave to the keyword perubahan, thus positioned them in a clearly oppositional 
relationship to the state.  It also reoriented their roles and identities away from the state 
and towards the broader pro-democracy movement.   
 
For the New Order, change was ‘a path to be proceeded upon only as required and with 
great caution’ (Elson 2001, 161).  The importance of stabilitas (stability) and ketertiban 
(order) in the New Order state meant that change needed to be carefully planned and 
implemented in a gradual and cautious manner.  Change that originated from outside the 
state, or that occurred of its own accord, was potentially destabilising and even harmful 
to the collective interests of the nation.  The New Order’s model of change aimed to 
avoid the potentially destabilising effects of change by redefining it as a process to be 
engineered and managed by the state, as set out in the Broad Outlines of State Policy 
(GBHN) and in numerous other official documents.  The goal of the state-determined 
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 processes of change, which included modernisasi (modernisation), kemajuan (progress) 
and pembangunan (development), was the achievement of the collective interests of the 
nation, expressed in key phrases such as masyarakat adil dan makmur (a just and 
prosperous society), masyarakat berkembang (a developed society) and masyarakat 
bangsa yang dicita-citakan (an ideal national community) (Matheson Hooker 1995, 
276-81).   
 
With the beginning of keterbukaan, the regime allowed more open public debate about 
change.  Yet there were clear limits to the scope of this debate: while the government 
was prepared to countenance discussion of the issues such as the succession and the 
future role of the military within politics, criticism of the political system and of its 
underlying values and ideologies, including the Pancasila, was not tolerated.  Thus, 
while politics was to be more ‘open’ and ‘democratic’, it was also to be ‘responsible’.  
As President Suharto noted in his 1992 Independence Day address, the nation must 
‘consolidate political culture, political traditions and political behaviour which are 
increasingly democratic, increasingly open and increasingly responsible’ (Suharto 1992, 
9; see also Suharto 1994, 12).11  The limits the regime placed on the scope of discussion 
permitted under keterbukaan stemmed from its underlying motivations for promoting 
liberalisation.  As Bertrand argues, the aim of keterbukaan was not to bring about real 
change, but rather to ‘test the viability’ of the existing system for a post-Suharto 
Indonesia (1996, 320).  Despite this, during the final years of keterbukaan and beyond, 
students continued to press outside these limits in their own discussions of change. 
 
The view of change promoted in the student press of the 1990s presents a stark contrast 
to the conception of change as ‘correction’ advocated in the student press of the 1970s.  
As noted in chapter four, while students who wrote in Salemba and Gelora Mahasiswa 
discussed the issue of change, and referred to their own role as agents of change, they 
were not concerned with bringing about a fundamental transformation of the economic, 
social and political order.  Instead, students emphasised that their aim was to correct the 
deviations and defects in the current system by engaging in social control.  This view of 
change as ‘improvement’ (perbaikan) in part reflected students’ belief in the principles 
(if not the practice) of the New Order.  However, it also reflected their desire to avoid 
presenting a fundamental challenge to the regime.   
                                                          
11 … memantapkan budaya politik, tradisi-tradisi politik dan tingkah laku politik yang makin demokratis, 
makin terbuka dan makin bertanggung jawab (Suharto 1992, 9). 
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For the students who wrote in the student press of the 1990s, however, correction and 
control of the state-managed process of change and development were no longer 
enough: what was needed was a fundamental restructuring of society, polity and 
economy.  Accordingly, articles and editorials in the student press linked perubahan to 
issues such as the overall strategy for democratisation and to the presidential 
succession.  An important element of students’ definitions of perubahan was the notion 
of ‘structural change’.  An article in the September 1993 edition of Politika, for 
example, argued that students’ actions must be aimed at addressing both the structural 
and the cultural inequalities in society.  Without such actions, the article stated, students 
could not carry out ‘real and meaningful change’ (perubahan nyata yang berarti) 
(Politika September 1993, 20).  This issue remained an important one in the student 
press throughout the 1990s.  A 1997 edition of Balairung argued that any agenda for 
resistance to the New Order power structures and for greater democratisation must 
incorporate both structural and cultural resistance to the regime (Balairung 12 (25) 
1997, 33-36).   
 
The goal of this process of change was generally defined in broad terms as the ‘status 
quo’.  For students, this term referred to the nature and practices of the existing regime 
(rezim, penguasa) which needed to be deposed in order for real change to occur.  An 
article in the September 1993 edition of Politika written by M. Arief Hakim, the former 
assistant general manager of IAIN Sunan Kalijaga’s recently banned student magazine 
Arena, asserted that one of the aims of the movement was ‘to topple the conservative 
and oppressive forces of the status quo’ (menumbangkan kekuatan status quo yang 
konservatif dan menindas).  A 1995 article in Hayamwuruk was more explicit about 
those aspects of the Indonesian political system which needed to change, identifying 
issues such as the floating mass policy, state-directed development and weak 
institutions of state (Hayamwuruk 10 (1) 1995, 73).  The 1996 special edition of 
Balairung wrote of the need to ‘form a stronger opposition alliance to tear down the 
status quo’ (membentuk aliansi oposisi yang lebih kuat untuk mendobrak status quo).   
 
Students also identified suksesi (succession) as a key element in effecting real social 
and political change.  The issue of suksesi had been clearly placed on the political 
agenda since at least the beginning of keterbukaan (Aspinall 2000, 56-8; Bertrand 1996, 
329).  Succession was one issue which both the military and the president were 
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 prepared to allow: the military because they hoped to use it to pressure Suharto and 
Suharto because it allowed him to gauge the level of elite support for a successor, in 
whose appointment he wished to play an active role (Bertrand 1996, 328-9).  Students 
responded to this by openly discussing the issue of succession, even after keterbukaan 
had been wound back.  The December 1990 edition of Politika, for example, published 
a special report on the succession issue (‘Suksesi 1993: Perubahan atau status quo’) in 
which presidential succession was identified as a precondition for real change.  Yet 
students also expressed the view that change must go further than succession.  A 1995 
article in Hayamwuruk, for example featured a photograph of Suharto addressing senior 
cabinet ministers.  The caption below the picture read: ‘Not only succession, but change 
to the system’ (Hayamwuruk 10 (1) 1995, 73).  The caption expressed clearly students’ 
view that presidential succession was necessary for systemic change to occur.   
 
In chapter four it was suggested that the use of rhetorical questions in the student press 
of the 1970s reflected students’ perceptions of their role as critical intellectuals whose 
task was to question ‘truth’, and as a force for social control of the state and its 
practices.  In this view, students were to bring deviations to the attention of the state in a 
critical but non-antagonistic way.  As a result, students often presented their criticisms 
in the form of questions, rather than statements.  In the student press of the 1990s, 
students’ calls for a fundamental transformation of the political structures of the New 
Order are reflected in the use of categorical statements, as in the above article from 
Hayamwuruk.  The short caption which appears beneath the title of the article orients 
readers to the position being developed in the article:  
 
The freedom of the people of Indonesia will be bound if the authorities always 
force their will on them.  Oppression will also occur.  And Indonesia’s history 
will be increasingly filled with the suffering of the people.12   
 
The article then begins:  
 
Up till now we have been spellbound by the words unity and oneness, openness, 
social solidarity, democracy and social justice.  But, without our being aware of 
it, hidden behind those sweet words was mass deception, structural deception, 
and pretence … This ‘unhealthy situation’ arose because society was made into 
an apolitical floating mass.  As a result, society’s initiative has been blunted, 
                                                          
12 Kemerdekaan rakyat Indonesia akan terpasung jika penguasa selalu memaksakan kehendaknya kepada 
mereka.  Penindasan pun akan terjadi.  Dan sejarah Indonesia akan semakin dipenuhi oleh penderitaan 
rakyat (Hayamwuruk 10 (1) 1995, 73). 
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 apathy has become a common phenomenon, and development has become the 
property of the government alone.  In addition, few state institutions are bold 
enough to control the authorities.  It is conditions such as this which have 
become characteristic of the Indonesian ‘political system’ (Hayamwuruk 10 (1) 
1995, 73).13
 
This series of statements position the writer as an authoritative provider of the ‘truth’ 
about the Indonesian political system.  This truth is expressed in a categorical way 
through a succession of straightforward assertions: kemerdekaan rakyat Indonesia akan 
terpasung (the freedom of the people of Indonesia will be bound), penindasan pun akan 
terjadi (oppression will also occur), inisiatif masyarakat tumpul (society’s initiative has 
been blunted) and apatisme menjadi gejala umum (apathy has become a common 
phenomenon).  These are summed up in the emphatic statement (Kondisi seperti itulah 
…).  These categorical statements about political and social conditions within the nation 
indicate that students in the 1990s no longer saw their role as being to question ‘truth’ 
and to draw the state’s attention to deviations in the system as a means of ‘correcting’ it.  
Rather, their role was as advocates of a fundamental restructuring of the system and as 
an authoritative source of information regarding those aspects of the system which 
required transformation.  Despite this, the student press of the 1990s was for the most 
part not concerned with articulating a detailed program for change.  While this no doubt 
reflects students’ fear of state coercion, it is also perhaps a product of students’ 
perceptions about the nature of their role.  While the terms kontrol sosial and koreksi 
had largely disappeared from the student press in the 1990s (see below), students 
continued to see their role as being to bring the attention of others to the need for 
change rather than take steps to undertake such change themselves.    
 
Students’ use of ideas of structural change, suksesi and demokratisasi located them 
clearly within a broadly defined sphere of opposition to the Suharto regime and its 
practices.  Notions of structural change were by no means new to groups critical of the 
state in Indonesia.  Aspinall notes that the emphasis on the need for structural change 
reflected a broader populist trend and a concern with ‘structural analysis’ in critical 
intellectual circles beginning in the late 1970s (2000, 146-7).  Theories of political 
                                                          
13 Selama ini kita selalu terpukau oleh kata persatuan dan kesatuan, keterbukaan, solidaritas sosial, 
demokrasi dan keadilan sosial, Tetapi, tanpa disadari, dibalik kata-kata manis itu terselubung 
pembodohan massa, pembodohan struktural, dan kepura-puraan …  Keadaan yang ‘kurang sehat’ itu 
muncul karena masyarakat dijadikan massa mengambang yang apolitis.  Sehingga inisiatif masyarakat 
tumpul, apatisme menjadi gejala umum, dan aktivitas pembangunan hanya menjadi milik pemerintah.  
Selain itu, lembaga negara pun belum banyak yang berani mengontrol penguasa.  Kondisi seperti itulah 
yang menjadi ciri ‘sistem politik’ Indonesia (Hayamwuruk 10 (1) 1995, 73). 
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 change, including those of the Frankfurt School, dependency theory and liberation 
theology, as well as the broader issue of democratisation, had also developed a 
following in student and critical intellectual circles during the 1980s.  During 
keterbukaan, it became possible to speak more openly about these issues as reformist 
elements within the armed forces and the civilian elite debated the forms of political 
change Indonesia required (Aspinall 2000, 71; Schwarz 1999, 292-303).  While the 
views expressed in the student press of the 1990s reflected the more radical end of the 
demokratisasi spectrum, they nevertheless tapped into broader discourses of change and 
democratisation which were becoming legitimate topics of public debate in Indonesian 
dissident circles in the 1990s.  Students’ discussion of change in terms of demokratisasi 
and suksesi thus enabled them to access a broader discourse of opposition evident in 
Indonesian public life throughout the period of keterbukaan and beyond.  These 
discursive links established the discourse of the student press within the wider 
framework of ‘opposition’ to the New Order state. 
 
Reformasi 
 
From the beginning of 1998, perubahan was overshadowed on the streets and in the 
pages of students’ action media (media aksi) by the term reformasi, usually translated as 
‘reform’.  The term reformasi appears to have gained currency in the Indonesian 
vocabulary from around the 1970s when it was used in the context of the Islamic reform 
movement.14  During the 1980s reformasi came to be applied to reform in increasingly 
wider areas of social, political and economic life.  By the mid 1990s, the terms 
reformasi and pembaharuan (renewal or reform) were being used by a broad spectrum 
of political actors advocating varying degrees of change to the existing political system.  
It was these ‘dissident’ credentials which enabled the term reformasi to become the 
keyword of the 1998 demonstrations.  Moreover, as Sekiguchi suggests, the term 
reformasi was an effective slogan precisely because it promoted the reform or 
improvement of the existing system, something which some economists and members 
of the political elite had been advocating since the beginning of the economic crisis 
(2000, 35).  As a result, reformasi did not alienate those reformist members of the 
military and civilian elite whose support was so crucial to the achievement of the 
movement’s aims.   
                                                          
14 See for example the 1976 volume by Taufik Abdullah entitled Aspek reformasi Islam di Indonesia: 
pengantar diskusi published by Lembaga Ekonomi dan Kemasyarakatan Nasional in Jakarta.  
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Yet reformasi was by no means an uncontested concept in 1998, nor were its meanings 
clearly delineated and unchanging.  Before 1998 reformasi, like perubahan, was 
represented in the student press as entailing thoroughgoing change.  An article in the 
October 1994 edition of Ganesha, for example, featured an interview with former 1978 
student activist and Indonesian Legal Aid Institute (Lembaga Bantuan Hukum, LBH) 
leader Hendardi in which reformasi politik (political reform) was defined as: 
 
forming an opposition, pushing for constitutional reform, returning the military 
to the barracks … separating the judiciary from the executive, eliminating the 
monopoly of [the corporatist labour, farmers and youth organisations] SPSI, 
HKTI and KNPI, removing the rectorate from the iron fist, supporting the 
freedom of the press from censorship, [and] supporting the independence of 
businesspeople from corruption.  In essence … opening opportunities for the 
freedom of the rakyat (Ganesha 6 (15): 17).15  
 
In 1998 however, these more radical conceptions of reformasi were forced to compete 
with a wide spectrum of views about what the process of reformasi should encompass 
(see Young 1999, 73-77).  In the student press, reformasi was conceived as reformasi 
total, a process of change encompassing reform of all areas of national life which was to 
be undertaken in a ‘peaceful’ way (reformasi damai).  This was contrasted to the 
reformasi setengah hati (half-hearted reformasi) of many in the Suharto regime.   
 
Universitas Indonesia’s newsletter bergerak! represented the more moderate end of the 
activist spectrum.  Unlike Hendardi’s view of reformasi, students who wrote in 
bergerak! in the early months of 1998 emphasised that reformasi was not aimed at a 
total overthrow of the existing system.  An editorial in the 17 March 1998 edition of 
bergerak!, for example, differentiated between reformasi and the more radical and 
confrontational term revolusi:16  
 
                                                          
15 See also the article ‘Reformasi untuk senyuman di akhir tahta’ (Himmah 30 (2) October 1997: 30-33) 
which defined reformasi in terms of change to the political system, including succession. 
16 McGregor notes that from the early years of the New Order, there was a ‘gradual shift away from 
revolutionary rhetoric’ in state discourse and that ‘the term revolusi was increasingly avoided’.  Instead, 
terms such as perjuangan kemerdekaan (independence struggle) or perang kemerdekaan (independence 
war) were used to describe the events of 1945-49 (McGregor 2002, 253; 245; Cribb 1992, 405).  See 
Heryanto (1995, 17) for a discussion of the term revolusi in the Old Order. 
 242
 We don’t want to carry out revolution … What we are struggling for is refomasi: 
a process of change aiming towards what we hope will be a better direction 
(bergerak! 6, 17 March 1998).17   
 
This more moderate conception of reformasi enabled action media such as bergerak!, 
and the students whose views it represented, to establish crucial links between the 
student movement and reformist elements both within and outside the regime.  These 
links were possible because of the ‘common language’ these groups shared.  The 
rejection of revolusi, for example, established shared ground between students and 
opposition figures such as Amien Rais.  At the same time, the rejection of more wide-
ranging reform can also be seen as an effect of the parameters of reformasi established 
by more conservative elements within the regime.  The military, for example, proposed 
a narrow view of political change, arguing against revolutionary reform on the grounds 
that it may ‘change the political structures and the order of the nation which is focussed 
on pembangunan’ (cited in Sekiguchi 2000, 38).  Students’ more moderate calls for 
change must thus also be seen in the context of a desire to avoid provoking a repressive 
response from the military.   
 
Despite this, students’ perception of reformasi as a ‘revolutionary moment’ was 
suggested in many of the slogans and appellations which appeared in the action media 
of 1998 and the exhortatory style in which editorials were written.  Recalling the 
revolutionary slogan merdeka atau mati (freedom or death), for example, a key rallying 
cry and common feature of the media aksi of early 1998 was the phrase reformasi 
sampai mati (reformasi till death) (see for example the editorials in bergerak! 5, 16 
March 1998 and 4, 13 March 1998).  Student activists who lost their lives in the course 
of the struggle, such as the four students killed outside Trisakti University on 12 May 
1998, were honoured as pahlawan reformasi.18  Reformasi was also described as a long 
journey, full of challenges and hence one which required the unity and semangat (spirit) 
of both students and the rakyat in order to achieve its aims.  It was also described as a 
struggle (perjuangan) which required sacrifice (pengorbanan) (see for example 
bergerak! 3, 12 March 1998; bergerak! 10, 23 March 1998).  As the editorial in the 3 
April edition of bergerak! stated, every individual involved in the struggle for reformasi 
                                                          
17 Kita tidak hendak mengadakan revolusi ...  Yang sedang kita perjuangkan sekarang adalah reformasi. 
Suatu proses perubahan menuju arah yang kita harapkan lebih baik (bergerak! 6, 17 March 1998).   
18 See also the obituary in the 16 March 1998 edition of bergerak! in which a student killed in a car 
accident after returning home from a day spent working at an Universitas Indonesia sponsored food 
distribution program is described as a pahlawan reformasi.  Aspinall notes that the national media also 
represented the students killed at Trisakti in this way (2000, 308, fn 162). 
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 ‘must be prepared to sacrifice everything: time, worldly possessions, tears and even 
blood and soul’ (bergerak! 19, 3 April 1998).19   
 
Students also clearly saw their role in reformasi as an active one.  Editions of bergerak! 
in the months leading to the resignation of Suharto reveal mahasiswa to be the actors in 
a wide range of active processes including ‘demanding change’ (menuntut perubahan), 
‘demanding total reformasi’ (menuntut reformasi (secara) total), ‘strongly condemning 
the work of the DPR’ (mengecam keras kerja DPR), ‘warning the president and vice-
president’ (memperingatkan presiden dan wakil presiden), and ‘pressing for the 
formation of a clean, honest and moral cabinet’ (mendesak pembentukan cabinet yang 
bersih, jujur dan bermoral) (bergerak! 4, 13 March 1998).  These actions were an 
integral part of the process of ‘struggling for the interests of the mother who gave them 
birth: the rakyat’ (memperjuangkan kepentingan ibu kandungnya: rakyat) (bergerak! 7, 
18 March 1998).  In addition to students’ role in the processes of ‘demanding’, 
‘condemning’ and ‘warning’ students also stressed their involvement in concrete actions 
in support of the rakyat.  This was a key source of their credibility.  In response to 
criticisms that the attitude of Universitas Indonesia students was ‘No Action Talk Only’ 
(NATO), an article in bergerak! of 16 March argued that: 
 
Apart from continually carrying out criticism and correction of the manner in 
which the regime undertakes [the process of] government through 
demonstrations, UI has also carried out concrete actions which directly impact 
the lowest level of the rakyat (bergerak! 16 March 1998).20
 
Students’ structuring of the meanings of reformasi in the student press during the first 
few months of 1998 brought them into direct discursive (and often physical) 
confrontation with elements of the state and the state apparatus.  At the same time, it 
also linked the student movement with the broader movement for political change, both 
within and outside the political elite.  It was precisely because students were able to 
share elements of their structuring of the meanings of reformasi with others in this 
movement, including, crucially, those within the military and civilian elite, that the 
                                                          
19 Laiknya sebuah perjuangan, setiap individu yang terlibat aktif di dalamnya harus siap mengorbankan 
segalanya.  Waktu, harta, air mata bahkan darah dan nyawa (bergerak! 19, 3 April 1998).   After 1998, 
the term revolusi appeared in a number of student publications in articles reflecting on the events of 1998.  
A key theme of these articles was the questioning of whether a revolusi had indeed occurred and whether 
revolusi was even a desirable method of change (see for example Himmah 32 (2) (June) 1999: 13; 14-17; 
Ganesha 10 (24) 1999: 12-13; see also Ganesha 7 (17) September 1995: 10-11). 
20 Selain terus-menerus mengadakan kritik dan koreksi terhadap cara rezim menyelenggarakan 
pemerintahan melalui demonstrasi, UI pun melakukan tindakan kongkret yang langsung menyentuh 
lapisan rakyat terbawah (bergerak! 16 March 1998). 
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 reformasi movement was able to achieve one of its most significant aims: the 
resignation of Suharto.   
 
Students and the rakyat  
 
In the student press of the 1990s, the meanings given to the keyword rakyat articulate 
the shift in students’ definitions of their relationship to wider society from the 1970s 
and reflect the significant changes in the ways they interpreted Indonesian society and 
their own place in it.  These changes were the result of the increasing influence of 
radical populist theories of society and of social and political change on the student 
movement.  Yet ideas about students’ leadership role in relation to the rakyat also 
persisted.  In the action media of 1998, the idea that students were the spokespersons for 
the rakyat’s aspirations was a key source of legitimacy for their actions in the reformasi 
movement. 
 
In the 1970s one of the key justifications for students’ role in social and political life 
was the conviction that they acted on behalf of the rakyat and that they had a 
responsibility to educate and lead them in matters of politics.  This role was justified 
through the meanings given to the concept of the rakyat in the student press.  Thus, it 
was because the rakyat was ‘disempowered’, with ‘low levels of education’ and a ‘lack 
of awareness’ that students’ intervention on their behalf was necessary.  This 
paternalistic view shared much in common with the New Order’s own approach to 
society, captured in the idea of the ‘family state’, in which the interests of the rakyat 
were represented by the appointed ‘delegates’ of regional and functional groups.  
Society itself was transformed into a depoliticised ‘floating mass’ and the masses were 
urged to focus their energies on development rather than politics.  Students’ role in the 
family-state was to ‘serve’ society through state-directed programs such as the study 
service scheme (KKN).   
 
There were some continuities between the student press of the 1990s and that of the 
1970s, particularly in regard to students’ perceptions of their role as leaders of the 
rakyat.  An article in the September 1993 edition of Politika, for example, argued that 
because students were aware that struggle should involve many elements of society, it 
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 was they who must become the movement’s pioneers (pelopor) (Politika September 
1993, 21).21   
 
[We] recognise that it is not possible for us to rely on the forces of students only.  
As a result, we must try to initiate the unification of the various critical elements 
in society so that they amass and become a real political and economic force.  
And together, we will be able to uphold the values of democracy.  It is this 
which constitutes the strategic role of students, that is, to emerge as pioneers and 
initiators who become mediators between those who usually raise grassroots and 
vertical issues, those who use NGO channels, those who use educational media, 
and anyone who is considered to have a commitment to democracy and is able 
to contribute to the struggle (Politika September 1993, 21).22
 
Students’ key role in this process is reflected in their designation as grammatical actors 
in processes such as ‘initiate’ (mempelopori) and ‘uphold’ (menegakkan).  Yet the 
student press of the 1990s also challenged this view of students’ relationship to them by 
defining the rakyat as key agents of change and as a potentially powerful element in a 
broad pro-democratic force.   
 
In the student newspapers of the 1970s, the role of ‘agent of change’ was attributed to 
students (see chapter four).  By the beginning of the 1990s, however, students who 
wrote in the student press had recognised that they could not carry out their role as 
agents of change alone but must seek wider support for their actions.  The question of 
an appropriate ally was thus a key one in the student press throughout the 1990s.23  In 
1966, the military had proven an effective partner in students’ efforts to bring down 
Sukarno and the Communist Party.  By the 1990s, however, the idea of a partnership 
with the military had long been anathema to the student movement.  As a result, the ally 
most often invoked in the student press of the 1990s was the rakyat.  As in the 1970s, in 
the student press of the 1990s, the term rakyat was used to refer to those elements of 
                                                          
21 Kita, mahasiswa yang menyadari bahwa perjuangan mesti melibatkan banyak elemen masyarakat, 
karenanya kita yang harus jadi pelopor (Politika September 1993, 21). 
22 Dengan menyadari bahwa kita tak mungkin hanya berpegang pada kekuatan mahasiswa saja, maka 
kita harus mencoba mempelopori penyatuan berbagai elemen kritis dalam masyarakat agar terakumulasi 
dan menjadi kekuatan politik dan ekonomi yang nyata.  Agar memungkinkan kita bersama-sama 
menegakkan nilai-nilai kerakyatan.  Di sinilah sebetulnya peran strategis mahasiswa, yaitu tampil 
sebagai pelopor dan inisiator yang menjadi perantara bagi mereka yang biasa mengangkat isyu-isyu 
grassroot, isyu-isyu vertikal, yang menggunakan saluran LSM, yang menggunakan media pendidikan, 
dan siapa saja yang dianggap memiliki komitmen kerakyatan serta mampu untuk memberikan 
sumbangan bagi perjuangan (Politika September 1993, 21). 
23 See for example the 1992 opinion piece entitled ‘Students and social change’ in Balairung in which 
Universitas Gadjah Mada philosophy student Edy Haryadi argues that the question of whether students 
wanted elite level change or structural change would have implications for students’ choice of ally, that 
is, whether they chose to ally themselves with the elite or with farmers and workers (6 (16) 1992, 6).  
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 Indonesian society who were marginalised and disempowered.  However, there were 
also attempts, absent in the student press of the 1970s, to differentiate among a number 
of broad groups within the rakyat.  These included petani (farmers), buruh (workers), 
pedagang kecil (small traders) and kaum miskin kota (the urban poor) (see Ganesha 8 
(22) 1997, 4; Balairung 12 (25) 1997, 19).  More general terms, including para kaum 
tertindas (the oppressed) and kaum proletariat (the proletariat) were also used 
(Ganesha 8 (22) 1997, 4; Balairung 12 (25) 1997, 12; see also McRae 2001, 36).   
 
Students who wrote in the student newspapers of the 1970s drew a sharp distinction 
between the uneducated and politically naïve masses and themselves, as the educated 
elite of Indonesian society.  This distinction, it was argued, was both a reflection of 
students’ paternalistic understanding of their relationship to the common people and a 
response to the parameters which the threat of state repression set for the ways in which 
students were able to represent their roles and identities.  In the 1990s, students’ 
relationship with the rakyat was described in terms of kerja sama (cooperation) and 
bersatu (uniting).  In a 1994 article in Balairung, for example, recently released student 
activist Bonar Tigor Naipospos argued that:  
 
one of the characteristics of today’s student protest movement is the importance 
of direct collaboration with the rakyat both in rural and urban areas.  Today’s 
students cannot (only) speak on behalf of the rakyat, while those they defend are 
not involved.  That is what differentiates [today’s student movement] from the 
student movement of the past, which tended to be elitist (Balairung 8 (20) 1994: 
35).24   
 
Similarly, a 1997 article in Ganesha argued that students should no longer see 
themselves as the exclusive agents of change.  Rather, they should position themselves 
as part of a collaborative movement (gerak bersama) with the rakyat since it was the 
rakyat who had the most right to determine change.25  The article criticised the idea of 
students as agents of change and a moral force as merely ‘jargon’.  Some sections of the 
student press of the 1990s also emphasised the similarities between students and the 
rakyat.  A 1993 article in Politika, for example, argued that students ‘were an 
                                                          
24 [S]alah satu karakteristik gerakan protes mahasiswa saat ini adalah pentingnya kerja sama dengan 
rakyat secara langsung baik di pedesaan maupun di perkotaan.  Mahasiswa sekarang tidak bisa (hanya) 
membela rakyat ke atas, sementara rakyat sendiri yang sedang dibelanya tidak diikutsertakan.  Itulah 
yang membedakan dengan gerakan mahasiswa sebelumnya yang cenderung elitis (Balairung 8 (20) 
1994, 35).   
25 Mahasiswa bukan lagi agent of change yang eksklusif tapi merupakan bagian dari sebuah gerak 
bersama.  Idealisme gerakan 90-an ini adalah berjuang bersama rakyat, karena sesungguhnya rakyatlah 
yang paling berhak menjadi penentu perubahan (Ganesha 8 (22) 1997, 12).   
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 inseparable part of all elements of society’ (adalah bagian tak terpisahkan dari seluruh 
elemen masyarakat) and were ‘no different from the common people’ (tidak berbeda 
dengan masyarakat biasa).  This was because both students and the rakyat were subject 
to state repression and both were in effect ‘workers’ for state-driven development 
(Politika September 1993, 21).  A 1997 article in Ganesha made a similar statement, 
asserting that there were similarities between the interests of the rakyat and those of 
students, such as the fact that both groups faced obstacles in freedom of organisation 
(terdapat irisan-irisan antara kepentingan rakyat dan kepentingan mahasiswa).  The 
same article also suggested that students were in fact part of the rakyat (bagian dari 
rakyat) (Ganesha 8 (22) 1997, 12).  These representations of the relationship between 
students and the rakyat reflected a rejection of the elitism of past generations of students 
and the influence of theories of political change and democratisation which emphasised 
the role of the middle and lower classes in bringing about change. 
 
Yet despite these assertions, the rakyat were rarely assigned the role of grammatical 
agents in student publications.  Instead, they were represented as modifying elements 
within prepositional phrases, as in for example, berkoalisi dengan kekuatan rakyat 
(form a coalition with the forces of the rakyat) (Himmah 30 (1) April 1997, 65) and 
‘[b]ersatu dengan kekuatan rakyat (unite with the forces of the rakyat) (Balairung 12 
(25) 1997, 17-21) or as elements within lengthy noun phrases such as [t]erintegrasinya 
gerakan mahasiswa dan gerakan-gerakan kelompok masyarakat dalam kerangka 
kepentingan yang sama (the integration of the student movement with like-minded 
social movements).  The rakyat were also represented as objects of students’ actions.  
An article in the 1997 edition of Balairung, for example, wrote of the need for students 
to ‘develop people’s organisations and social organisations’ to carry out control of the 
arbitrary acts of the authorities (mahasiswa harus masuk membangun organisasi-
organisasi rakyat serta organisasi sosial untuk mengadakan kontrol bagi kesewenang-
wenangan penguasa) (Balairung 12 (25) 1997: 17-21).  These examples reveal that in 
many senses students continued to see their role in terms of guidance of the rakyat.  In 
particular, students saw their function as being to channel the political potential of the 
rakyat into a broad movement for change.  Collaboration between students and the 
rakyat was thus initiated by students, and not by the rakyat.  Moreover, while this 
movement for change was intended to benefit the rakyat, it was not conceived by them 
but by students.   
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 The contradictions between students’ calls for collaboration with marginalised elements 
in Indonesian society and the persistence of paternalistic ideas about the necessity of 
students’ leadership of the rakyat is apparent in an article which appeared in the 
September 1993 edition of Politika.  The article, entitled ‘Buy me a new shirt, just like 
in Mode magazine’ [Beliin baju baru, kaya’ di majalah Mode], consists of an imaginary 
monologue in which the wife of a bus driver’s assistant (kenek Metro) tries to persuade 
her husband not to strike against rising petrol prices.  The article, which is written 
entirely in the variety of colloquial Indonesian spoken in Jakarta, is both a criticism of 
the political apathy of many urban working class Indonesians and of the elitism and 
hypocrisy of many students.  The woman begins by arguing that the everyday needs of 
the family are more important than politics: 
 
What’s politics?  What’s the state?  What do you want to think about all that 
stuff for?  Just getting some cash is hard enough.  You’ll never figure it out 
anyway.  Hey …, think you’re a king do you, think you’re the president, think 
you’re a politician.  Get rid of the rats in the roof first, and make sure Gimin’s 
got food on the table, after that you can talk about anything you like, it’s up to 
you (Politika September 1993).26
 
Demonstrating or going on strike will only make their life more difficult: ‘don’t go 
getting chased by the cops again, like last time’, she pleads (jangan sampe diuber-uber 
pelisi lagi, kaya’ dulu).  Besides, she argues, matters of politics are not for the ‘little 
people’ (wong cilik) (‘What would we know?’) but for the ‘big shots’ (orang gedean).  
Yet she is also a contradiction in terms: after pleading with her husband to ‘think of 
their next meal’, she reminds him of his promise to buy her a new shirt ‘just like the one 
in this picture’ (she opens the paper her take-away fried tofu is wrapped in to reveal a 
page ripped from a fashion magazine).   
 
One of the aims of students’ intervention in campaigns for the land rights of rural 
communities and the struggles of urban workers was to educate these groups about their 
rights so that they could articulate their interests for themselves.  This view was also 
evident in calls such as those made in the edition of Balairung cited above for students 
to develop people’s organisations.  In Politika the urban rakyat, expressed through the 
voice of the woman, is represented as lacking political awareness.  The woman’s 
                                                          
26 Apa itu politik?  Apa itu negara?  Kok, mau-maunya sih mikirin yang begituan.  Nyari duit aja susah.  
Nebak buntut ndak jebol-jebol.  Eh …, udah sok taju, sok jadi peresiden, sok jadi politikus.  Urusin dulu 
tikus-tikus di loteng, urusin dulu makannya si Gimin, habis itu mau ngomongin apa aja juga, terserah 
situlah (Politika September 1993).   
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 perception that politics is a matter for the politicians and ‘big shots’ and not the ‘little 
people’ thus provides a justification for students’ role in educating the rakyat about 
their political rights.  Yet the article also highlights the extent to which the urban poor 
are disempowered by their poverty.  It is because of the daily difficulties the poor face 
that students’ efforts to raise their political awareness, and their campaigns to secure the 
rights of the poor, are necessary. 
 
However, the article is also critical of the elitist attitude which many students were 
perceived to hold towards the rakyat.  In the course of her monologue, the woman 
relates a recent incident in which a student refuses to pay the full fare for his bus trip, 
offering the bus driver’s assistant 100 rupiah.  The assistant refuses to accept this, and 
asks the student to ‘be reasonable’ (kire-kire dong): the petrol price has risen so the fare 
has gone up.  The student replies angrily: 
 
You’re the one who should be reasonable.  Yesterday I was demonstrating at the 
parliament, defending your rights, so that the petrol price didn’t go up. Look, my 
photo’s in the paper.  Now you’re trying to screw me over, not even giving me a 
free ride.  Typical, you people are so stupid, you don’t appreciate anything.  
Give me some credit for my struggle (Politika September 1993).27
 
The incident, told from the woman’s perspective, illustrates the hypocrisy of the 
student’s actions: yesterday he defended the rights of the ‘little people’ but the 
following day he refuses to do what will help those same people in a practical way, that 
is, pay the right fare.   
 
This criticism of students’ elitist views of the rakyat reflects the revival of the radical 
populist tradition in Indonesian politics during the late 1980s and 1990s.  In this 
tradition, the rakyat were seen as the very essence of Indonesia and as objects of 
admiration and devotion.  Discussing the ‘rakyatism’ of the radical nationalist 
organisations of the 1930s, for example, Frederick notes that a key element of the 
rhetoric of these organisations was respect for and identification with the aspirations 
and needs of the rakyat (1989, 55; see also McVey 1967, 138-40).  Sukarno’s 
veneration of Indonesia’s rural masses, the kaum marhaen, during the 1950s reflected a 
similar populist identification with the rakyat.   The re-emergence of this populism in 
                                                          
27 Elo yang kire-kire.  Kemaren gua baru demonstrasi di DPR, bela-belain elo punya nasib, supaya 
bensin kagak naek, liat tuh foto gua di koran.  Eh sekarang lo malah malakin gue, bukannya bolehin gue 
naek gratis.  Dasar rakyat bego, nggak tau diuntung.  Hargain perjuangan gua dong (Politika September 
1993). 
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 the 1990s, reflected in students’ assertions that they were bagian dari rakyat (part of the 
rakyat) and their calls for students to forge a new, more egalitarian political relationship 
with the rakyat by collaborating in a pro-democratic force, was clearly a product of 
students’ political marginalisation through the NKK/BKK policies.  It was this 
marginalisation which enabled students to recognise the similarities between their own 
and the rakyat’s political marginalisation at the hands of the state and which highlighted 
the necessity of finding alternative discourses with which the challenge the regime.  
 
Yet if in the mid 1990s there had been a move away from the notion that students were 
spokespersons for the rakyat, in action media such as bergerak!, this represented one of 
the key sources of legitimacy for students’ actions in support of reformasi.  Editorials in 
bergerak! stressed that students’ actions were ‘a sign of their concern for the rakyat’ 
(tanda kepedulian dengan rakyat) (bergerak! 4, 13 March 1998) and were aimed at ‘the 
improvement of the fate of the people and the condition of the nation’ (perbaikan nasib 
rakyat dan kondisi negara) (bergerak! 11, 24 March 1998).  Students also represented 
themselves as the channels for the rakyat’s aspirations: one editorial appropriated 
Sukarno’s famous epithet, describing student protesters as the ‘extension of the people’s 
tongue’ (penyambung lidah rakyat) (bergerak! 35, 30 April 1998).  Editorials in 
bergerak! also described students as educators of the rakyat.  An editorial in the 1 May 
edition, for example, noted that students should be thankful for their education and 
express this ‘by providing education and awareness to the rakyat’ (dengan memberikan 
pendidikan dan penyadaran kepada rakyat) (bergerak! 36, 1 May 1998).  Yet students 
also framed their relationship to the rakyat in terms of collaboration.  Editorials in 
bergerak! emphasised collaboration between students and the rakyat, citing ‘the need 
for students, together with the rakyat, to rise up to struggle for a better situation’ 
(perlunya mahasiswa bersama rakyat bangkit memperjuangkan keadaan yang lebih 
baik (11, 24 March 1998).  At the same time, the rakyat themselves were 
depersonalised.  An editorial in the 4 May edition of bergerak!, for example, purported 
to speak on behalf of all Indonesians when it wrote that ‘the people of Indonesia are 
tired of being continually deceived by the authorities’ (rakyat Indonesia sudah begitu 
bosan dibodohi dan dibodohi terus oleh penguasa).  The rakyat’s own voice was also 
conflated with that of students, with bergerak! claiming that ‘the voice of students is the 
voice of the rakyat’ (suara mahasiswa adalah suara rakyat) (bergerak! 37, 4 May 
1998).   
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 As in the 1970s, students’ representations of their role as channels for the rakyat’s 
aspirations provided a powerful justification for their role in the reformasi movement.  
By claiming to speak on behalf of a broad social grouping, students gave their own 
demands for change additional authority.  Such a significant source of legitimacy was of 
particular importance at such a crucial time as 1998 when the credibility of students’ 
actions calling for reformasi and the resignation of Suharto was so essential to the 
success of the movement.  At the same time, students’ claims that their voice was ‘the 
voice of the people’ implicitly challenged the regime’s assertion that it ruled on the 
basis of the support of the whole nation.  It also undermined the view that under the 
current regime the rakyat and the state constituted an integrated whole, united within a 
‘family’.  Yet while students do not challenge the idea of the state as a family guided by 
a benevolent father-figure, they do contest Suharto’s continuing occupation of this 
position. 
 
A movement for political change 
 
Students’ attempts to redefine their relationship to the rakyat in terms of cooperation 
and collaboration in a broad pro-democratic force structured their role in new ways and 
produced an alternative framework for defining mahasiswa.  This framework was built 
around the notion that the students of the 1990s acted not only in their role as students 
but also as part of a broader movement of opposition to the New Order state.  In the 
student press, this role was articulated through the keyword gerakan (movement).  The 
meanings students gave to this keyword characterised students’ role as a movement for 
political change and democratisation and defined their relationship to the state in a 
framework of struggle and resistance.   
 
In the student newspapers of the 1970s, students defined their role in politics as one of 
the practical manifestations of their role as agents of social control and a product of 
their sense of social responsibility.  As a result, the term gerakan most often appeared in 
references to gerakan kontrol sosial (movement of social control), gerakan petisi 
(petition movement) and gerakan mahasiswa anti-NKK (anti-NKK student movement).  
This representation of students’ role in politics was a response to the very real threat of 
repression which they faced and a means by which they sought to continue their role as 
disinterested and ‘moral’ critics of the regime.  In the 1990s, however, the association 
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 of the term gerakan with kontrol sosial and petisi was largely replaced by a new set of 
meanings which were consistent with the shift in students’ definitions of their role and 
identity from a force for social control to a movement for political change.  As a result 
of this shift, terms such as gerakan politik (political movement), gerakan perubah 
politik (movement for political change), gerakan perubahan (movement for change) 
and gerakan demokratisasi (democratisation movement) were almost synonymous with 
the student movement (see for example Balairung 4 (12) 1990, 12, 14; Balairung 12 
(25) 1997, 10, 11, 33, 34, 38).  Students also defined their role as a gerakan menentang 
(movement of resistance) and a gerakan protes (protest movement) (Balairung 4 (12) 
1990, 39; Balairung 8 (20) 8 1994, 35).   
 
Consistent with this shift was the increasing concern from the mid 1990s with strategies 
and methods of resistance, indicated by the use of terms such as posisi tawar 
(bargaining position), strategi perlawanan (strategy for resistance), isu-isu strategis 
(strategic issues), partner strategis (strategic partners), perhitungan taktis (tactical 
calculations), agenda perjuangan (agenda for struggle) and agenda perlawanan (agenda 
for resistance), and discussion of the need to create and take advantage of opportunities 
(menciptakan peluang, memanfaatkan peluang) (see for example the lead articles in 
Balairung 12 (25) 1997; see also Politika September 1993, 20).  The images of conflict, 
struggle and resistance evoked by students’ discussion of ‘strategies’ and ‘tactics’ 
suggest that the notion of resistance was built into the very framework within which 
students conceived of their roles.  These images also suggest that they saw their 
relationship to the state in terms of conflict and contestation.  Yet as Suharto noted in 
his 1993 Independence Day address: 
 
We realise that in our increasingly dynamic society there will be friction, 
conflict or even disputes.  This cannot be avoided, because it is natural.  We 
need not inhibit such friction, disputes or conflict.  What we must do is 
formulate procedures and protocol for [their] resolution in a peaceful, ethical, 
just, mature and civilised way (Suharto 1993, 9).28
 
Suharto’s acknowledgement that conflict was an inevitable and natural part of a 
dynamic society such as Indonesia’s reflected the shift in the public discourse of the 
                                                          
28 Kita menyadari bahwa dalam masyarakat kita yang akan bertambah dinamis nanti akan ada 
persentuhan, konflik ataupun pertentangan.  Hal itu tidak dapat dihindari, karena alamiah.  Yang perlu 
kita lakukan bukanlah meredam persentuhan, pertentangan atau konflik.  Yang harus kita lakukan adalah 
menyusun tatacara dan tatakrama bagi penyelesaian persentuhan, konflik atau pertentangan itu secara 
damai, etis, adil, dewasa dan berkeadaban (Suharto 1993, 9).   
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 state which occurred during the period of keterbukaan.  This new emphasis was a 
response to earlier criticisms of the state’s organicist ideology (revived under the new 
name of ‘integralism’ in the mid-1980s) which, it was claimed, presented an unrealistic 
view of social life as harmonious and free of conflict (Bourchier 1996, 274).  Yet while 
Suharto emphasised that it was natural for conflict to occur, he also stressed that it was 
not appropriate for conflict to continue.  Instead, disagreements must be resolved and 
the nation returned to its proper state of harmony, consensus and unity.  In this context, 
students’ representation of their relationship to the state in terms of conflict, struggle 
and resistance represents a significant challenge to the state precisely because it 
contradicts the claim that the New Order is able to guarantee harmony, order and 
consensus within the family-state.  It does not, however, challenge the idea that 
Indonesia should constitute a harmonious and ordered whole nor the values of harmony, 
unity and consensus.  Rather, it challenges the regime’s ability to secure this harmony. 
 
From social control to resistance  
 
Linked to students’ role as part of a political movement which aimed at change was the 
idea that they were a force for resistance against the state and its practices.  In the 
student press of the 1990s, this area of meaning was articulated through the keyword 
perlawanan (resistance).  The addition of this keyword to the student press reflected a 
significant shift in students’ representations of their relationship to the state from the 
social control and correction of the 1970s.  Yet in some sections of the student press, 
and in the action media of 1998, the notion that students also played a role in 
controlling the state persisted.   
 
As noted above, the concept of opposition was contrary to the New Order’s vision of 
the state as an integrated and harmonious whole which was at the core of the notion of 
the integralist state.  Indeed, as noted in chapter two, Suharto claimed that Indonesia did 
not ‘recognise’ (mengenal) Western-style opposition, which he defined as ‘opposition 
for the sake of opposing, for the sake of being different’.  This was because in 
Indonesia’s Pancasila democracy, the appropriate and authentically ‘Indonesian’ mode 
of political decision-making was ‘deliberation and consensus’ and not the adversarial 
political style of many Western democracies (Suharto 1989, 346; see also Hooker 1996, 
128-31).  In contrast, as noted in chapter three, ‘differences of opinion’ were 
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 appropriate.  During the keterbukaan period, the regime expressed a more tolerant 
toward such differences.  In his 1990 Independence Day address, for example, the 
president acknowledged that the nature of social and political life at the beginning of the 
1990s had changed.  Since Indonesian society was now united by its commitment to the 
Pancasila, he asserted, there was no need to fear the kind of ideological divisions that 
had characterised Indonesian politics in the 1950s and 1960s.  Instead, the diversity of 
opinions within the nation needed to be ‘harnessed’ in order to contribute to the nation’s 
progress: 
 
Democracy indeed requires a lot of consultation, discussion, exchanges of views 
and dialogue, both between the government and the society and between various 
groups in society.  We should see differences of opinion as the very source of 
life’s dynamism (Suharto 1990, 16).29
 
The New Order’s attempts to delegitimise oposisi focused on defining it as a ‘foreign’ 
concept and therefore as inappropriate for Indonesia.  During the period of keterbukaan, 
this understanding of oposisi was challenged, as key public figures called for the revival 
of parliamentary opposition parties to act as a control on government, a move which the 
president strongly opposed (see for example Media Indonesia 8 September 1995 
‘President tolak gagasan partai oposisi’ [President rejects the idea of opposition 
parties]).  In restructuring the meaning of oposisi, the student press intersected with 
these broader discourses of dissent, emphasising the essential role of opposition in 
demokrasi, even a Pancasila democracy.  An article in the February-March 1993 edition 
of Himmah, for example, described oposisi as an ‘appropriate’ (wajar) and ‘natural’ 
(alami) element of democracy (Himmah February-March 1993: 34).   
 
The concept of opposition also informed students’ conceptions of their own role in 
social and political life in the keterbukaan period.  This new role was articulated 
through the keyword perlawanan (resistance) and the lexical sets into which it entered.  
The term perlawanan was by no means new to the Indonesian political vocabulary.  Its 
use in the context of modern Indonesian history dates at least to the nationalist 
movement of the 1920s and 1930s, when resistance to the Dutch became an essential 
part of the struggle for independence.  The revolutionary connotations of perlawanan 
and in particular, its ability to recall the part students played in resistance against the 
Dutch during the revolution, perhaps explains its attraction as a keyword in the student 
                                                          
29 This translation is from Bourchier and Hadiz 2003, 195. 
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 press of the 1990s.  The choice of perlawanan was also a function of the revival of the 
radicalist tradition which emerged in the study groups of the 1980s.  Students associated 
with these study groups were attracted to leftist political writings and to the 
revolutionary style which had characterised the nationalist and communist rhetoric of 
the past.  During the 1990s, this radicalist discourse, including many of the terms 
associated with it, began to permeate student publications.  By the mid 1990s, the term 
perlawanan was being used in the student press in relation to the contemporary 
situation and students’ role in it.  In June 1995, for example, Himmah published a 
special report on student activism (Mereka gelisah, mereka melawan) which framed 
student activism in terms of perlawanan, citing the final line of Wiji Thukul’s well-
known poem ‘Warning’ (‘There is only one word: resist.’) as the inspiration for student 
demonstrators (Himmah 28 (1) 1995, 51 ff).30  Similarly, a 1997 article in Ganesha 
described students’ actions as part of a collective movement of perlawanan based on 
the common interest of students and the rakyat for political change and democratisation 
(Ganesha 8 (22), 3-4).   
 
Perlawanan was also a key element in the action media of 1998.  An article in the 13 
March 1998 edition of bergerak!, for example, echoed the slogan ‘Resist to the death!’ 
(Lawan sampai mati!) used by student demonstrators: ‘UI students will resist to the 
death’ (Mahasiswa UI mau lawan sampai mati) (bergerak! 4, 13 March 1998).  Another 
edition wrote that a recent event staged on the UI campus had taken place in ‘an 
atmosphere of resistance to the absolutism of power’ (atmosfir perlawanan terhadap 
absolutisme kekuasaan) (bergerak! 10, 23 March 1998). 
 
In the student press, the term perlawanan was part of a broad lexical set concerned with 
opposition and resistance which included terms such as oposisi (opposition), oposan 
(opponent), counter (in English), and resistensi (resistance).  A 1994 article in 
Balairung, for example, argued that in their recent protests students had taken an 
oppositional political stance (sikap politik oposisi) against the authorities, as indicated 
by the increasing tendency for students to oppose or condemn (menggugat) the political 
system (Balairung 8 (20) 1994: 34).31  And an article in the February-March 1993 
edition of Himmah included the terms kelompok penekan (pressure group), menentang 
                                                          
30 See Bourchier and Hadiz (2003, 179) for an English translation of this poem. 
31 Dalam aksi-aksi protes mahasiswa tersebut mereka dengan tegas mengambil sikap politik oposisi 
terhadap penguasa dan kebijaksanaan Orde Baru, sikap oposisi mereka mulai terlihat pergeseran kearah 
menggugat sistem politik walaupun belum secara substansial (Balairung 8 (20) 1994: 34).   
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 and melawan (oppose, resist), membongkar kemapanan (tear down the establishment), 
and kelompok tandingan (counter group) (Himmah February-March 1993: 34-38).  
These terms point to an understanding of oposisi both antithetical to that of the state and 
broader than simply the installation of a parliamentary opposition system.  Their use 
also clearly frames students’ roles and identities in a relationship of opposition and 
resistance to the state.  Like the emphasis on students’ role as part of a political 
movement, students’ framing of their roles in terms of perlawanan constitutes a 
significant challenge to the state’s claims that Indonesia under the New Order is an 
integralist state, in which the rakyat and the state are a cohesive family.   
 
In their discussions of perlawanan, students explicitly identified the regime and its 
practices as the object of resistance through the use of phrases such as ‘the repressive 
political practices of the authorities’ (praktik politik represif penguasa), ‘the political 
regimentation of the New Order’ (regimentasi politik Orde Baru), ‘the repressive 
regime’ (rezim yang represif), ‘oppression’ (penindasan), ‘injustice’ (tindak 
ketidakadilan), and the ‘status quo’ (Balairung 10 (23) 1996, 26-30; Balairung 12 (25) 
1997, 10; 33-36; Ganesha 10 (24) 1999, 6-8; Himmah 29 (1) 1996, 61).  This 
representation of the state as a repressive and totalitarian regime provides evidence of 
students’ rejection of the position of the critically collaborative role they had played in 
the 1970s and of the clear rupture in the relationship between students and the state in 
the 1990s.  Yet while these terms reflect the strongly critical stance which students took 
towards the regime, they do not indicate a wholesale rejection of the ideological basis of 
the state, enshrined in the five principles of the Pancasila.  Indeed, the student 
publications almost invariably avoid critical discussion of the Pancasila itself, instead 
focussing on the state’s implementation of Pancasila democracy (see below).  Thus, as 
these terms indicate, the student press of the 1990s, like that of the 1970s, was primarily 
concerned with criticising the practices of the New Order regime.   
 
Adding to this impression is the persistence of notions of ‘control’ and ‘correction’.  A 
1992 article in Politika, for example, described intellectuals and students as a group 
with great strength ‘to correct the path of the process of democratisation in this country 
(untuk mengoreksi jalan proses demokratisasi di negeri ini) (Politika 8 (1) January 
1992, 16).  An article in the September 1993 edition of the same publication also 
echoed the discourse of control, suggesting that students should play a role in resolving 
all kinds of irregularities (ikut menyelesaikan segala macam ketidakberesan) both 
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 cultural and structural (Politika September 1993, 20).  And a 1997 article in Balairung 
argued that students needed to build social organisations which could ‘continue to carry 
out control of the arbitrary acts of the authorities (terus mengadakan kontrol bagi 
kesewenang-wenangan penguasa) (Balairung 12 (25) 25 1997, 17-18).  Ideas of control 
and correction were also apparent in the action media of 1998.  An editorial in the 12 
March 1998 edition of bergerak!, for example, argued that: 
 
We [at bergerak!] feel that students must be a control for the government.  
Because if the government does wrong and it is not corrected then its actions can 
be magically transformed into agreed truth … As a result, students must always 
put pressure on the government (bergerak! 3, 12 March 1998).32   
 
Similarly, the editorial in the 16 March edition argued that since ‘the order which we 
[students] helped to establish was in fact going in the wrong direction’ (orde yang telah 
turut kita bangun itu ternyata salah arah), it was students’ responsibility to ‘straighten 
it out’ (meluruskannya kembali) (bergerak! 5, 16 March 1998).  The same edition 
described the demonstrations by UI students as a form of ‘criticism and correction of 
the manner in which the regime undertakes [the process of] government’ (kritik dan 
koreksi terhadap cara rezim menyelenggarakan pemerintahan).  The editorial in the 3 
April edition similarly described student activists as ‘carrying out correction of the 
authorities’ (melakukan koreksi terhadap penguasa) (bergerak! 5, 16 March 1998; 
bergerak! 19, 3 April 1998). 
 
The persistence of notions of control and correction in the student press of the 1990s 
and in the action media of 1998 reflects students’ ability to work within the broadly 
defined parameters of the New Order state, even as they defined their own roles in 
clearly oppositional ways.  Rather than focussing their criticism on the core values and 
ideologies of the regime, students instead defined their roles and identities in terms of 
resistance to the practices of the state.  In doing so, students demonstrated their ability 
to use their political freedom ‘responsibly’.  This, together with the organisational 
weaknesses of the student movement, enabled them to avoid a repeat of the crackdowns 
of 1977-1978.  When students did suffer repression, it was because they breached the 
                                                          
32 Kami merasa bahwa memang mahasiswa harus jadi kontrol pemerintah.  Karena bila pemerintah 
berbuat salah dan tidak dikoreksi maka perbuatannya dapat tersulap dan berubah menjadi kebenaran 
yang disepakati …  Oleh karena itu mahasiswa memang harus senantiasa memberikan pemerintah 
tekanan (bergerak! 3, 12 March 1998).   
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 limits set by the state for dissent by, for example, criticising the authority of the 
president.   
 
Democracy and dissent  
 
In the 1970s, students who wrote in Salemba and Gelora Mahasiswa justified their role 
as a force for social control and correction by arguing that their actions were moral and 
based on their status as independent intellectuals.  Consistent with the new emphasis on 
democratisation, people power and resistance to the status quo, in the student press of 
the 1990s there was a shift away from morality and intellectuality.  Instead, students 
increasingly looked to the values of democracy to justify their actions.  These changes 
were a reaction against the emphasis in the state discourse of the 1980s on students as 
‘people of analysis’ whose role was only in politics as a concept.  It also reflected the 
revival of radicalism in the late 1980s and 1990s and the emergence of issues such as 
democracy into the public arena.  These two processes underlined students’ search for 
new types of authority with which to frame their opposition and resistance to the state.  
 
In chapter four it was argued that in the student press of the 1970s students emphasised 
that their role as a force for social control and correction of the state and their role in 
practical politics was based on their identity as a moral, idealistic and politically 
disinterested group committed to truth and justice.  This enabled them to avoid 
presenting an overt threat to the state and at the same to frame their criticisms in terms 
which the New Order itself acknowledged as legitimate.  In the early 1990s, students 
who wrote in the student press continued to cite morality and conscience as an 
underlying motivation for their actions.  An article in the July-August 1990 edition of 
Himmah, for example, likened students’ support of communities whose land was 
affected by large development projects to the actions of resi, arguing that the arbitrary 
and unjust behaviour of the state apparatus had ‘called students to action’ (membuat 
mahasiswa terpanggil) (Himmah 21 (3) July-August 1990, 31).  Similarly, a 1990 
special report in Balairung suggested that because students acted from their conscience 
(hati nurani), their movement was pure (murni) (Balairung 4 (12) 1990, 39).   
 
After the mid 1990s, however, the terms in which students discussed the issue of 
morality changed.  Discussing the debate between those who argued that the student 
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 movement should only be concerned with moral issues and those who argued that it 
should engage in political issues, a 1993 article in Politika asserted that this dichotomy 
was evidence of ‘the success of the regime in dividing students’ forces’ (memecah 
belah kekuatan mahasiswa).  Instead, the article equated moral and populist issues 
(persoalan-persoalan moral/kerakyatan) and argued that students should be a political 
movement with morals (gerakan politik yang bermoral) which put its moral and 
political commitment into practice by, for example, ‘raising grassroots and vertical 
issues’ (mengaktualisasikan komitemen moral maupun politisnya … misalnya … 
mengangkat isyu grassroot dan isyu vertical) (Politika September 1993, 21).  Similarly, 
a 1997 article in Ganesha rejected the designation of students as a politically 
disinterested elite, arguing that it was time to tear down ‘students’ position as ‘resi’, the 
‘stage’ mentality, and the localisation of the student movement’ (Ganesha 8 (22), 4).33    
 
The rejection of student elitism was also evident in the shift away from the emphasis on 
students’ intellectual credentials as the basis for their political role.  In the student 
newspapers of the 1970s students cited their privileged education, and the superior 
reasoning abilities and scientific objectivity with which this education provided them, as 
a key reason for their role as critics of the state.  Since rationality and objectivity had 
been central to the way the state defined students’ roles from the beginning of the 
1970s, students’ emphasis on these characteristics framed their role in terms which the 
state acknowledged as legitimate.  During the 1980s, however, the state defined 
students’ role as only to be engaged in thinking and analysis, and not to engage in 
practical politics.   
 
The study groups of the 1980s were in part a product of the state’s definition of students 
as ‘thinkers’.  However, they also tapped into a critical intellectual tradition in 
Indonesia which dated from the 1930s.  The study group tradition of the 1980s had a 
significant impact on the development of the student press in the 1990s.  In some cases, 
former study group activists became involved in the establishment of student presses 
and throughout the 1990s publications such as Balairung continued to host regular 
discussions on topics of political or social import which formed the basis for feature 
articles in the magazine.  Yet while there was less overt discussion of students’ 
intellectual credentials as the basis for their role in the student press of the 1990s than 
                                                          
33 The article suggested that the student movement had become a stage on which students made 
themselves the actors while the rest of society became the ‘audience’ for the drama played out by 
students, implying that many students continued to have an elitist attitude towards wider society. 
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 there had been in publications such as Salemba and Gelora Mahasiswa, students’ 
intellectual approach remained an important feature of many of the publications 
themselves.  This was reflected in the mottoes of magazines such as Balairung, which 
described itself as the ‘Breath of students’ intellectuality’ (nafas intelektualitas 
mahasiswa), Hayamwuruk, the motto of which was ‘The reflection of students’ culture 
and intellectuality’ (Refleksi budaya dan intelektualitas mahasiswa) and Himmah, 
which styled itself as ‘the Forum for faith, knowledge, [and] deeds (Forum man, Ilmu, 
Amal).  It was also reflected in the topics with which the student publications dealt as 
well as the style in which the articles were written.  Himmah, for example, featured 
discussions of key issues of the keterbukaan period such as democracy and the 
economy (28 (2) October 1995), succession (28 (1) June 1995; 30 (2) October 1997), 
opposition parties (24 (1) February - March 1993) and the elections (30 (1) April 1997).  
The articles were well-researched and included references to academic work by both 
Indonesian and non-Indonesian scholars as well as interviews with key public figures.  
Himmah’s October 1997 edition on succession, for example, featured interviews with 
former PDI parliamentarian Sabam Sirait, Universitas Indonesia constitutional law 
expert Harun Al-Rasyid and National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM) 
member Asmara Nababan.  It also cited literature on democratisation by Samuel 
Huntington and Guillermo O’Donnell, Herbert Feith’s The decline of constitutional 
democracy (1962), and Ulf Sundhaussen’s work on Indonesian military politics 
(Himmah 30 (2) October 1997, 17 and 20-24).   
 
This intellectual orientation in the student press enabled it to present itself to the regime 
in a less threatening way.  Thus, while students who wrote in the student press of the 
1990s only rarely discussed their role in overtly intellectual terms, they continued to 
present their criticisms of the state from the position of educated, politically aware 
individuals.  In this context, the intertextual references to academic literature provides 
students’ criticisms with credibility and at the same time enables them to express these 
criticisms in a more indirect way, by representing them as originating from a source 
other than students.  The publication of lengthy interviews with key public figures, 
many of whom had a reformist outlook, achieved a similar aim.  Discussing the 
demonstrations led by mainstream journalists after the banning of Tempo, Editor and 
De Tik in 1994, Ariel Heryanto observes that such demonstrations were highly unusual 
for New Order journalists who usually ‘express their grievances by proxy’, by 
publishing interviews with significant public figures (Heryanto 1996, 251).   
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From the mid 1990s, students also began to legitimise their role in social and political 
life in reference to demokrasi.  In the discussion of oposisi above it was suggested that 
students during the 1990s restructured the meaning of oposisi, emphasising it as an 
appropriate and natural part of demokrasi.  These ideas intersected with broader 
discourses about demokratisasi current during the period of keterbukaan.  In the 
discourse of the student press, this new discourse of demokratisasi and, in particular, 
students’ own version of it, provided them with a new source of authority for their 
opposition to the state.  In this view, students and other groups could oppose 
(menentang), resist (melawan) and condemn (menggugat) the regime and its practices 
because such actions were appropriate for a demokrasi, as defined by students.  
Students’ morality thus became secondary to their democratic right to express 
dissenting views as a justification for their role in social and political life.  Furthermore, 
according to the students’ version of demokrasi, all sectors of society, and in particular 
the most disempowered groups, had the right to oppose. 
 
The shift away from morality and overt expressions of intellectuality as the basis of 
students’ actions in the student press reflected the broader changes taking place in 
Indonesian society and politics during the 1990s.  Students’ rejection of the elitism 
associated with their superior intellectual abilities, for example, was a product of the 
revival of populism during the 1980s and an associated identification with the rakyat.  It 
was also a response to the state’s emphasis during the 1980s on students’ role in 
thinking and analysis rather than politics, which made a focus on their characteristics as 
politically disinterested intellectuals somewhat unattractive for the students of the 
1990s, particularly those who defined students’ role in overtly oppositional ways.  At 
the same time, the shift away from morality as a basis for students’ actions reflected 
their new role as a movement for political change.   While during the 1970s the term 
moral had been used alongside terms such as idealisme to refer to students’ ethics and 
integrity, by the 1990s, the term was often perceived to mean that students were only 
concerned with moral issues and not political issues (McRae 2000, 34-5).  Insofar as 
this excluded political issues such as democratisation, succession, dwifungsi and human 
rights, then students who wrote in the student publications of the 1990s rejected it. 
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 Producing students  
 
Chapter four suggested that the variety of language used in some sections of the student 
newspapers, together with the use of rhetorical questions, represented techniques by 
which the students who wrote in the student newspapers of the 1970s attempted to 
socialise their readers into their identities as students.  In the student newspapers of the 
1990s a similar pattern of language use is evident. 
 
Some sections of the student publications of the 1990s, for example, addressed their 
readers in the language which these readers used.  Editorials in Politika, for example, 
often used non-standard spelling, indicating the non-standard pronunciation which was 
characteristic of the colloquial variety of Indonesian used in Jakarta, especially by 
young people (for example, rame for ramai, busy) as well as non-standard verb endings 
such as -in (pikirin for pikirkan, think) and vocabulary (bilang, say; keren, cool) and 
particles common to spoken language such as kok and deh.  Readers were also 
addressed using the inclusive personal pronoun kita (with kami for the voice of the 
publication) or as anda (with a small ‘a’ instead of the capital letter used in standard 
Indonesian), indicating students’ rejection of the distance of the New Order’s version of 
standard Indonesian. This intimate, conversational style is also evident in Ganesha and 
Hayamwuruk .34
 
An example of Politika’s style is the editorial which appeared in the April 1995 edition, 
which reflected on elections under the New Order: 
 
Those who always win of course want to prove that ‘I’m gonna win again, how 
‘bout you?’ and there is no fear whatsoever of being the loser.  But those who 
usually lose can only say ‘for the sake of democracy, we will take part, whatever 
the result.’  A deep resignation in the face of a victory determined well in 
advance.  And those who are merely the supporters can say ‘ah, they won 
again!’ (Politika April 1995, 10).35
 
                                                          
34 See Kenalkan: Sherlock Holmes! (Ganesha 8 (22) 1997, 9) and Pidato (Hayamwuruk 10 (1) 1995, 18). 
35 Untuk yang selalu menang, tentunya ingin membuktikan bahwa ‘gue pasti menang lagi, elo gimana?’ 
dan tidak ada ketakutan sedikitpun untuk menjadi the loser. Tapi yang biasa kalah, paling hanya bisa 
mengatakan, ‘demi demokratisasi, kami akan ikut.  Apapun hasilnya.’  Suatu kepasrahan yang mendalam 
melihat kenyataan kemenangan jauh di tangan.  Dan untuk yang sekedar sebagai penggembira bisa 
bilang, ‘ah, paling itu lagi yang menang!’  
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 The simple language used in the editorial makes it accessible and the use of the 
colloquial language used in Jakarta (the pronouns used in gue (I) and elo (you)) serves 
to demystify the election process, namely the political engineering which ensures that 
Golkar always wins elections with a significant majority.  The editorial’s use of this 
style thus enables student readers to identify with the criticisms being made and so 
creates the conditions by which students can come to see themselves as critics of the 
regime.   
 
Another technique which the student newspapers of the 1970s used to attempt to 
‘socialise’ their student readers into the identities constructed for them in the student 
press was rhetorical questions.  In the student discourse of the 1990s, rhetorical 
questions also form part of the construction of readers.  An article in the 18 March 
edition of bergerak!, for example, positioned students as martyrs of reformasi.  The 
caption for an article entitled ‘Students boldly take to the streets’, claimed:   
 
Students in Solo and Jakarta try to take to the streets.  The security apparatus 
blocks [them], clashes are unavoidable.  A sign that students are ready to die for 
reformasi? (bergerak! 7, 18 March 1998).36
 
The fact that students are attempting to take their movement to the streets, bergerak! 
implies, is a sign that they are ready to die for reformasi.  Taking to the streets will 
necessarily bring students into physical conflict with the security apparatus.  The 
readers of bergerak! are cued to respond in a particular way to the question asked at the 
beginning of the article.  As they read on, they will interpret what they read as evidence 
to support the foregone conclusion that students who take to the streets are ‘true’ heroes 
of reformasi.  bergerak! thus constructs an identity for students as heroes and martyrs of 
a struggle on a revolutionary scale, with the implication that students should be ready to 
die for the cause of reformasi. 
 
Cartoons and politics 
 
In chapter four it was argued that the shared knowledge created between the cartoonist 
or satirist and the reader had important implications for the socialisation of readers into 
their identities as students.  It was also suggested that the interpretive work which 
                                                          
36 Mahasiswa di Solo dan Jakarta berusaha turun ke jalan.  Aparat menghadang, bentrokan pun tak 
terhindarkan.  Pertanda mahasiswa siap mati untuk reformasi? (bergerak! 7 18 March 1998). 
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 readers must do in order to make sense of a cartoon or pojok was one of the key ways in 
which collective identities were constructed and reaffirmed.  While the forms and 
themes of the student cartoons of the 1990s differed in many respects to those of the 
1970s, their aim remained the same: to socialise readers into their identities as actors in 
a broad pro-democratic force for resistance against the state and its practices. 
 
Chapter four suggested that the student cartoons of the 1970s depicted students as 
carrying out their role in social control by, for example, bringing petitions to parliament.  
They were also shown expressing their criticisms of the state despite the restrictions and 
intimidation to which they were subject (see Figure 4.4).  In the student cartoons of the 
1990s, where students were the subject of cartoons, they were usually depicted as 
demonstrating.  In a 1994 cartoon which appeared in Balairung, for example, a group of 
students is shown holding a protest march (Figure 6.1) (Balairung 8 (Edisi Khusus) 
1994, 128).   
 
Figure 6.1 Cartoon: This is a demo! 
 
The cartoon parodies the fact that demonstrations have become a ‘hobby’ for many 
students.  For these students, the demands are not as important as the fact that they are 
demonstrating.  This interpretation is supported by the anecdote appearing above the 
cartoon which describes student demonstrations as the new ‘tourist attraction’ (atraksi 
wisata).  The depiction of students as demonstrators reflects the role constructed for 
them throughout the student press as actors in a gerakan politik (political movement) 
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 and a gerakan protes (protest movement) (see above).  The visual images in the cartoon 
provide a means by which readers can identify themselves as ‘protesters’ and so attempt 
to lead readers to see themselves in these terms.  Yet the cartoon also cues students to 
see themselves as different from the student depicted in the cartoon.  It does so by 
creating a shared joke with readers: unlike the students depicted in the cartoon, who join 
in demonstrations without an awareness of or concern for the underlying issues, when 
‘we’ demonstrate, ‘we’ do so with a full understanding of ‘our’ demands. 
 
Consistent with the shift in the way the rakyat was depicted in the student press of the 
1990s, student cartoons from this period depict members of the rakyat as taking part in 
protests and demanding their rights.  In a cartoon which appeared in the February 1993 
edition of Politika, for example, the rakyat, represented by a factory worker, a farmer 
and a Javanese villager, are shown holding a banner demanding social justice (keadilan 
sosial) and equality (pemerataan) (Figure 6.2).   
 
Figure 6.2 Cartoon: The rakyat demands justice and equality 
 
The fact that they appear alongside a group of students bearing a banner with the words 
‘We need democracy’ reflects the calls in the student press for students to collaborate 
with the rakyat in bringing about change and democratisation.  The cartoon also neatly 
captures the tension between the demands for social justice, political rights and 
democracy and the New Order’s technocratic model of development.  In the view of the 
New Order, represented by the figure at the front of the cartoon, on whose head appears 
the words: ‘Politics, No; Development, Yes’ (Politik, No; Pembangunan, Yes), politics 
is incompatible with the stability required for economic growth and development. 
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 Yet the student cartoons of the 1990s also represent the rakyat as oppressed and without 
a voice.  A 1997 cartoon in Balairung, for example, depicts Indonesia’s urban workers 
(buruh) as weighed down by state corporatism, the repression of the security apparatus 
and the depoliticisation and stagnation of labour organisations (Figure 6.3) (Balairung 
12 (26) 1997, 11).   
 
Figure 6.3  Cartoon: The acrobatic display of Indonesia’s workers 
 
To this burden is added the Draft Law on Manpower (Rancangan Undang Undang 
Ketenagakerjaan, RUUK) which, it was claimed, legalised practices which 
disadvantaged workers (Ford 2003, 79).  As in the images of the rakyat in the student 
cartoons of the 1970s, in this cartoon the rakyat are represented as being ‘crushed’ by 
the state’s industrial relations policy, represented by the boulder on the worker’s 
shoulders and the oversized boot.  The worker’s right to protest is also represented as 
severely constrained: while he holds a protest placard, his movements are restricted by a 
large ball and chain and his voice silenced by the adhesive tape covering his mouth.   
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 A 1995 cartoon in Balairung employed similar imagery (Figure 6.4).  The cartoon 
shows a military boot with sharp teeth, representing the New Order military 
dictatorship, biting into a rubber thong, representing the rakyat.  The cartoon parodies 
the slogan of Indonesia’s fiftieth year of independence, ’50 golden years’ (50 tahun 
emas), changing it to ’50 years of fear’ (50 tahun cemas), suggesting that Indonesia’s 
rakyat suffered state intimidation and tyranny under both the Sukarno and Suharto 
regimes (Balairung 9 (21) 1995, 86).37  These images of the rakyat in student cartoons 
reflect students’ depictions of Indonesia’s urban and rural masses as oppressed and 
exploited.  In doing so, they reinforce the idea, advocated in some sections of the 
student press, that it was students’ task to mobilise the rakyat to defend their rights and 
resist the state and its practices.38  
 
Figure 6.4 Cartoon: 50 years of fear 
 
In addition to these representations of students and the rakyat, the images and themes of 
the student cartoons suggest that a key element in students’ role as a political movement 
of resistance is to criticise the state and the political system.  While the student 
newspapers of the 1970s also dealt with these themes, in the 1990s there was more open 
criticism of topics previously deemed taboo.  This reflected the more open climate of 
public debate during the period of keterbukaan.  However, it also reflected the shift in 
students’ role from a force for ‘correction’ and control to one of opposition and 
resistance.   
 
                                                          
37 Politika’s September 1995 edition contained a similar play on this slogan on page 14. 
38 See also the cartoon in Ganesha which shows a tap from which the water is siphoned off before it can 
reach the outstretched hand of the rakyat (Ganesha 6 (11) February 1994). 
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 One significant theme in student cartoons in the 1990s was the state’s restriction of 
freedom of expression.  As in the student cartoons of the 1970s, one of the most 
common images used to represent this theme was that of a human figure whose mouth 
has been sealed shut by adhesive tape or a padlock, as in for example the cartoon on 
workers’ cited above.  Another cartoon, which appeared in the February 1993 edition of 
Politika, highlighted the disparity between the state’s public pronouncements on 
differences of opinion and the necessity for ‘correction’ of the state’s development 
policy and the reality faced by those who wished to express such differences of opinion 
(Politika February 1993, 5) (Figure 6.5).   
 
Figure 6.5 Cartoon: ‘Of course you can criticise…as long as it’s appropriate and 
polite’ 
 
In the student newspapers of the 1970s, students used pojok or ‘corner columns’ to 
satirise the state.  In the student publications analysed in this chapter, the pojok genre 
had been largely replaced by other forms of satire.  The September 1993 edition of 
Politika, for example, used the genre of an employment advertisement to satirise the 
state of Indonesia’s political parties:  
 
Wanted (immediately!): An alternative party to be located in a country which 
requires pure/non-engineered democracy. 
 
Criteria: 
1. not coopted by any political elite. 
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 2. possess a populist/non-sectarian vision. 
3. possess a mass base/not just claim to 
4. have the will to change an ailing political system. 
 
Contact immediately: places where those who think critically and idealistically 
gather (Politika September 1993, 40).39
 
Another form of satire in the student press of the 1990s was the use of anecdotes 
(anekdot). In Balairung, these appeared on the back page, often together with a cartoon.  
The anecdotes covered a variety of themes, including the state of Indonesia’s 
democracy, presidential succession, the restriction of freedoms under the New Order, 
the corruption of politicians, the business interests of Suharto’s children, Indonesia’s 
foreign debt and state corporatism.  A 1994 edition of Balairung, for example, 
contained an anecdote about Indonesia’s ‘Pancasila democracy’. 
 
In a seminar on democracy, where the majority of the participants were very 
optimistic and fully supported the democratisation process in Indonesia, one 
presenter suddenly offered an opinion, ‘I believe, that in Indonesia there is no 
democracy.’  Of course the other participants were bowled over, but he quickly 
added, ‘What we have is Pancasila democracy.’ (Balairung 8 (Edisi Khusus) 
1994, 128).40
 
Such cynicism about the status of Indonesia’s Pancasila democracy as true democracy 
was a dominant theme in student cartoons and other forms of irony and satire.  In 
cartoons, democracy-related themes included the exclusion of the rakyat from 
participating in democracy, the ‘death’ of democracy, the dominance of the state ‘party’ 
Golkar in the elections, nepotism within the parliament, the culture of ‘the four D’s’ 
(D4) (datang, duduk, diam, duit; arrive, sit, be quiet, get paid) amongst parliamentarians 
and the crushing of legitimate forms of democratic opposition by the state (see Politika 
November 1992, 3 and 24; Politika February 1993, 38; Balairung 10 (23) 1996, 9; 
Politika 8 (1) 1992, 10; Politika May 1992, 15; Balairung 10 (24) 1996, 98; Ganesha 6 
                                                          
39 Dicari (segera!): partai alternatif untuk ditempatkan di sebuah negara yang butuh demokrasi 
murni/non-rekayasa.   
Syarat-syarat:  
1. tidak terkooptasi oleh elit politik manapun. 
2. memiliki visi kerakyatan/tidak sektarian.  
3. memiliki massa/bukan klaim. 
4. memiliki semangat untuk mengubah system politik yang ‘sakit’.  
Hubungi segera: tempat-tempat berkumpulnya masyarakat yang berpikiran kritis dan idealis (Politika 
September 1993, 40).   
40 Dalam sebuah seminar tentang demokrasi, dimana sebagian besar pestera sangat optimis dan 
menyokong penuh proses demokratisasi di Indonesia seorang pemrasaran tiba-tiba melontarkan 
pendapat, ‘Kalau saya percaya, bahwa di Indonesia ini tidak ada demokrasi.’  Tentu saja para pestera 
jadi terhenyak, namun buru-buru ditambahkannya, ‘Yang ada adalah demokrasi Pancasila.’ (Balairung 
8 (Edisi Khusus) 1994, 128). 
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 (15) October 1994, 15).  Anecdotes in Balairung dealt with issues such as 
parliamentarians who refused to relinquish their seats in parliament, Indonesia’s ailing 
democracy and the engineering of elections (Balairung 9 (22) 1995, 78; Balairung 10 
(23) 1996, 82).  A ‘community service announcement’ (iklan layanan masyarakat) 
published in Politika in the lead up to the 1993 Special Session of the MPR expressed 
students’ views more unequivocally.  The full page advertisement stated: Democracy, 
Yes! Sole presidential candidate, No! (Demokrasi, Yes! Calon presiden tunggal, No!) 
(Politika February 1993). 
 
Conclusion 
 
Students’ use of the keywords perubahan (change), reformasi (reform), gerakan 
(movement), perlawanan (resistance) and demokrasi (democracy) defined their roles in 
ways which clearly positioned them in a relationship of opposition to the state and as a 
force for resistance against the regime and its practices.  At the same time, the meanings 
students gave to these keywords indicated that they were able to use the new political 
freedoms granted them during the period of keterbukaan and after in a ‘responsible’ 
manner.  As a result, students did not attack the ideological basis of the regime, 
avoiding critical discussion of Pancasila.  Nor did they challenge certain key aspects of 
Indonesia’s integralist ideology, instead focusing on the regime’s implementation of 
these values.  This self-policing is a testament to the ‘deeper discipline’ which the 
students who wrote in the student press of the 1990s possessed.  Yet as Ingram argues: 
  
With the advent of a highly differentiated and fragmented society, the pretence 
of unitary will evaporates … And so the harmony requisite for the functioning 
of the system must rely on a different kind of power (1994, 220).   
 
The power of the New Order state thus lay in its capacity to oblige its citizens to use 
their freedom responsibly and to continue to ‘govern’ (in Foucault’s sense of the word) 
the populace even in the face of dissent.  This capacity was in part a function of the 
regime’s continuing capacity to utilise its extensive security apparatus against dissenters 
and of the organisational weaknesses of opposition.  Fundamentally, however, it was a 
demonstration of the New Order’s success in providing the conditions within which 
Indonesian citizens could police themselves.  It was this capacity which enabled the 
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 New Order state to ensure the harmony, stability and order essential for the effective 
functioning of its system of rule, at least until the Asian economic crisis of 1997-1998.
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 CONCLUSION 
 
This study set out to explain the apparent contradiction between the New Order state’s 
celebration of the role of Indonesian youth and students and the repression, intimidation 
and physical violence to which they were often subject.  It also sought to explore the 
reasons behind the upsurge in student activism at various periods during the New Order.  
The study approached these questions from the perspective of student identity, 
examining the particular ways in which the state and students themselves constructed 
their roles and identities during the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s and the impact of these 
roles and identities on students’ political behaviour. 
 
Foucault’s concept of ‘government’ provided the overarching framework for the study.  
In Foucault’s conception, government represents a specific form of power, in which 
those in authority employ a variety of techniques and strategies in order to modify the 
behaviour of those they govern.  As this study shows, the New Order state aimed to 
regulate students’ behaviour by attempting to control the terms in which they were able 
to think and speak about their roles and identities.  Chapter three suggested that the role 
that Indonesian youth and students had played in several key moments in the nation’s 
history was of particular concern to New Order historians.  The New Order’s official 
account of these moments, outlined in its national history, the Sejarah Nasional 
Indonesia, provided a number of key lessons for the contemporary young generation.  
These lessons were designed to construct a vision of heroic and patriotic youth 
struggling to achieve independence and give substance to Indonesian nationhood.  They 
were also designed to socialise students into key organicist values of harmony, 
consensus, self-sacrifice and the placing of collective interests above the interests of 
narrow regional, religious or political groupings.  Chapter five analysed the ways in 
which a magazine published by the Department of Education and Culture and aimed at 
university communities throughout the archipelago constructed a depoliticised and 
development-oriented identity for the university students of the late 1970s and 1980s.  
This identity deemed students to be servants of the nation, future technocrats and actors 
in ‘conceptual politics’ rather than practical politics. 
 
As chapter one suggested, the most effective form of government entails providing the 
conditions within which the governed are able to regulate their own behaviour.  This 
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 necessitates allowing subjects the freedom to ‘make the right choices’.  Yet this 
freedom also allows for the possibility of resistance since free individuals will not 
always make choices that are consistent with the interests and aims of those in 
authority.  This resistance may range from private acts of non-conformity to public 
opposition to the authorities.  Throughout the New Order, Indonesian university 
students engaged in various forms of resistance to the state.  Of these, this study was 
concerned with students’ resistance to the state’s attempts to define their roles and 
identities.  Yet these roles and identities were also profoundly shaped by the state.  As 
this study argued, it was students’ ability to negotiate the complexities of their 
relationship with the state, and to work largely within the parameters defined by the 
state discourse, that enabled them to continue to play a role in social and political life.  
 
The discussion of student resistance focussed on a number of student newspapers from 
the period 1976-1980 and 1990-1998.  As chapter four showed, students who wrote in 
the student newspapers of the 1970s promoted their role as a force for ‘social control’ 
and ‘correction’ of the New Order state and its practices, as a moral rather than a purely 
political force, as leaders of the common people (rakyat) and as intellectuals.  Yet they 
did so without presenting a fundamental challenge to the state or its discourse.  This 
strategy was a response to the very real threat of repression that students faced as the 
state tightened its grip on political life over the course of the 1970s.  And while it 
entailed concessions to the state discourse on the part of students, it also enabled them 
to continue to play the role of government critic, at least in the short term.  Chapter six 
traced the shifts in students’ representations of their roles and identities during the 
1990s.  It suggested that during this period students defined their roles in ways which 
positioned them in a relationship of opposition and resistance to the state and its 
practices and as part of a broad political movement advocating structural change and 
democratisation.  Students’ strategic allies in this movement were the rakyat, with 
whom they closely identified.  At the same time, students also saw the rakyat as in need 
of their guidance.  Yet while there were significant shifts in students’ perceptions of 
their role as fundamentally concerned with social control and their relationship with the 
state as one of ‘critical collaboration’, the students of the 1990s also shared with their 
predecessors in the 1970s an ability to criticise the state from within the parameters the 
state had defined for dissent.  By not challenging the Pancasila nor contesting key 
aspects of Indonesia’s integralist ideology, students engaged in a process of self-
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 policing.  This process was a testament to the regime’s ability to effectively ‘govern’ 
Indonesian students. 
 
As this study has shown, the politics of identity of Indonesia’s students was 
characterised by significant conflict.  This conflict was manifested in the competing 
meanings given to particular keywords and areas of meaning.  The meaning of the term 
politik, for example, and students’ role in it, was a significant area of contestation 
between students and the state.  In the student press of the 1970s, students associated 
politik with the efforts to correct and improve the social, political and economic system 
and defined it in a practical sense.  In the state discourse of the late 1970s and 1980s, 
however, politik was divided into conceptual and practical forms and was linked to the 
keyword pembangunan.  This new conception of politik provided a means by which the 
state could redefine students’ roles as political ‘thinkers’ and prohibit practical forms of 
politik to them.  Students’ relationship to wider society was also a site of contestation.  
Thus, while in the student press of the 1970s, students defined their role as leaders of 
the rakyat, in the state discourse of the late 1970s and 1980s, students’ role was 
redefined in terms of service to society and the nation.  Students in the 1990s responded 
to this by defining their relationship to the rakyat in terms of collaboration.  It was this 
conflict between students and the state over the meaning of these keywords which led to 
the production of new ways of thinking and speaking about the roles and identities of 
students during the course of the New Order.  As Rouse notes, conflict is ‘the locus for 
the continuing development and reorganisation of knowledge’ (1994, 110).  
 
This study has thus drawn attention to the complexities of the power relationships 
which existed between students and the state during the New Order period.  It has done 
so by exploring the micro-level aspects of state’s exercise of power in language and of 
students’ resistance to this power.  As the study has shown, the state’s exercise of power 
was not merely concerned with domination but with a dynamic and productive form of 
power which incorporates individuals in order to fulfil its needs and interests.   It has 
also shown that while students’ resistance to the state was undertaken from a position of 
relative freedom, this freedom was also to some extent constrained by the limits set by 
the state.  Yet this did not mean that students occupied a wholly powerless position.  
Indeed, students were only able to resist the state and its practices because they did so 
from within the parameters the state had defined for dissent.  Students’ resistance also 
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 compelled the state to respond and to adjust its discourse in an attempt to incorporate 
dissent into the state.  
 
In practical terms, students’ perceptions of their roles and identities had an important 
impact on their behaviour.  In the 1970s, for example, it was because students saw their 
role as agents of social control and correction of the state and its practices that they took 
to the streets in 1977 and 1978, criticising foreign investment, unregulated state power 
and the state’s development strategy and calling for the abolition of Kopkamtib and, 
eventually, for the withdrawal of Suharto as a presidential candidate.  During the 1980s, 
the redefinition of students’ role as apolitical servants of the state, coupled with the 
introduction of the NKK/BKK policies, militated against further student activism.  In 
the 1990s, students’ perceptions of their role as champions of the rakyat led them to 
take part in campaigns in support of the rural and urban poor.  In 1997-1998, students 
role in the reformasi actions were consistent with their role as part of a broad-based 
social movement for political change and democratisation.  
 
These insights into the complexities of the relations of power between students and the 
state have a number of implications for understanding the broader dynamics of power in 
New Order Indonesia.   In particular, they suggest that the New Order state’s apparent 
dominance over civil society, at least during the height of the New Order, can be 
understood as a product of its capacity to create the conditions under which Indonesian 
citizens were able to police themselves.  As Hindess argues: 
 
…what makes it possible for the free inhabitants of contemporary Western 
societies to be governed by the state via mechanisms that appear to rest on their 
consent is the fact that the vast majority of those inhabitants have already been 
trained in the dispositions and values of responsible autonomy (1996, 131). 
 
Rather than limiting these observations to Western societies, I suggest that they also 
apply in New Order Indonesia.  There, citizens were schooled in responsible social and 
political behaviour through the regime’s vast apparatus of ideological indoctrination.  
This, together with the state’s substantial capacity to marginalise and repress those who 
expressed dissent, enabled to New Order regime to effectively govern Indonesian 
citizens.   
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 In this context, what scope existed for other social groups to contest the New Order’s 
attempts to constrain their political behaviour by limiting the ways in which they were 
able to think and speak about their roles and identities?  In the first place, it must be 
remembered that not all social groups shared students’ status as among the most highly 
educated members of society.  This status meant that students’ criticisms were more 
highly valued than those of other groups.  An additional factor was the strong tradition 
of student activism, including students’ role in helping to establish the New Order by 
means of a ‘partnership’ with the military.  Yet while other groups lacked these 
characteristics, they retained the capacity for resistance that Foucault’s concept of 
power allows.  Non-government organisations, for example, employed similar strategies 
of working from within the limits set by the state in attempting to effect social and 
political change (see Eldridge 1990, 1995; Aspinall 2000).  This strategy enabled them 
to play an increasingly important role in social and political life and contributed 
significantly to the emergence of civil society opposition in the 1990s.  Organised 
labour was less successful: the New Order’s fear of the threat posed by lower class mass 
movements meant that labour organisations were a key focus of state repression. 
 
As noted in chapter one, an important element of this thesis involved testing the 
effectiveness of the critical discourse analysis method for understanding discourse and 
power in Indonesia.   Bearing in mind the limitation that critical discourse analysis can 
only provide an insight into the ways texts are produce and not the multiple ways in 
which they may be interpreted by readers and listeners, this study has shown that the 
analytical tools of critical discourse analysis offer a means of exploring micro-level 
aspects of the exercise of power.  Such an exploration adds depth to existing studies of 
political opposition and resistance in Indonesia and to analyses of Indonesian student 
activism.  It also builds on the findings of a number of studies of the language of the 
New Order state, including van Langenberg (1986), Saryono and Syaukat (1993), 
Matheson Hooker (1995), Heryanto (1995) and Eriyanto (2000), and further develops 
important aspects of link between language and power in Berman (1998, 1999) and 
Langston (2001).   
 
This study has also provided a practical case-study of the application of the critical 
discourse analysis method to the analysis of opposition and resistance in language, 
something which has been somewhat neglected in existing critical discourse analyses.  
From a theoretical perspective, the application of Foucault’s concept of power, and in 
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 particular his analysis of the techniques of government, enables many of the 
complexities inherent in the exercise of power and in its resistance to be explored.  In 
particular, unlike the Weberian theories of power and Marxist conceptions of ideology 
usually employed in critical discourse analysis, Foucault’s view of power as a dynamic 
relationship between free individuals, allows the analysis of power relations to progress 
beyond the dichotomous categories of dominance and subordination. 
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